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This thesis argues that states have cosmopolitan obligations of a moral-legal character. These 
obligations are articulated as “cosmopolitan law”, which is a Kantian term referring to the moral-
legal norms that regulate the relation between states and foreigners. The main example of 
cosmopolitan law today is found in the right to asylum. In the first part, I argue that the 
globalized circumstances actualize the need for an extension of this law and therefore I consider 
some of the main contributors to the extension of cosmopolitan law, namely Immanuel Kant, 
Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib. I also situate this Kantian account in the immigration debate 
and conclude that I prefer Benhabib’s position compared to other positions in the current 
discussion.  
In the second part, I take some distance from Benhabib’s reading of Arendt and seek to explore 
an alternative reading informed by a Husserlian phenomenological perspective. I tend to agree 
with a more radical reading of Arendt, which seeks to balance the institutionalist and 
performative aspects of her thinking. My reading is grounded in a systematic conceptual analysis 
of Arendt’s more theoretical perspectives that are found in The Human Condition, in central 
chapters of The Origins, and in some of her essays.  
My main point is to show how central the significance of the co-presence of others is to her 
thinking. Through a phenomenological reading, the richest experiential mode of this co-presence 
– as “fully human” – is taken to be the basic experience that motivates Arendt’s typology of 
modes of activities and her normative ranking of principles of action. Further, informed by 
Alfred Schutz’s conceptual framework of social relations, I discuss in more detail what this 
experience of the “fully human” could entail. I argue that this mode of experience has normative 
implications both on the face-to-face level of interaction, and on the level of indirect interaction 
among strangers.  
The main implication of this reading is that Arendt’s contribution should not be understood – as 
Benhabib seems to suggest – only as an extension of the content of cosmopolitan law within the 
Kantian framework. Decisively, Arendt’s thinking should be considered as a reconceptualization 
of the guiding principles of political thought and a new concept of human dignity. I argue that 
this reconceptualization allows for an extension of cosmopolitan law more adequately adapted to 
the circumstances of our times than the Kantian framework.  
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Introduction – “the frailty of human affairs” 
What obligations does a state have toward foreigners? There are at least two decisive aspects of 
this question that needs to be answered. First of all: What is the scope of justice that states are 
obliged to fulfill toward individuals? Is it responsible only for its own citizens, or does the state 
have some obligations toward non-citizens as well? Does it make a difference whether these non-
citizens are within the state territory or not? Unless we hold the scope of justice to be strictly 
bounded to the citizens of a state, we would also have to give an answer to a second aspect: What 
is the character of the state’s obligations toward foreigners? Mainly, even if we accept the premise 
of universal moral equality, we still need to distinguish merely humanitarian or Samaritan 
obligations from obligations that ought to be legally binding and that correspond to individual 
rights of foreigners.  
In this dissertation I will argue in favor of an extension of cosmopolitan law according to the 
current circumstances of globalization. By cosmopolitan law I mean the kind of obligations a 
state have toward foreigners and the corresponding rights a foreigner can claim from alien states. 
I consider some of the main contributors to the extension of cosmopolitan law, namely 
Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib. I tend to agree with a radical reading of 
Arendt, which seeks to balance the institutionalist and performative aspects of her thinking. The 
main implication of this reading is that Arendt’s contribution should not be understood only as 
an extension of the content of cosmopolitan law within the Kantian framework. Decisively, 
Arendt’s thinking should be considered as a reconceptualization of the guiding principles of 
political thought motivated by the new and globalized circumstances. I argue that this 
reconceptualization allows for an extension of cosmopolitan law more adequately adapted to the 
circumstances of our times than the Kantian framework.  
Although the argument of this dissertation is based on a reconceptualization of the basic 
principles of justice, the basic categories of Kant’s notion of public right remains applicable and 
guiding. According to these categories cosmopolitan law takes on a specific meaning. States have 
moral-legal obligations toward foreigners according to cosmopolitan law, which – similarly to 
domestic law and “interstatal” law1 – regulate a certain domain of external interactions. The 
extent of these obligations might vary according to the given historical circumstances. Especially 
it might vary according to the degree to which the actions of states, citizens and foreigners affect 
each other.  
                                                 
1 I generally use «interstatal» to define the category of public right which compliments domestic and cosmopolitan 
law. (see chapter 2) I use “international”, similar to the common use of the term, when referring to the legislation 
and institutions which may implement the moral-legal norms. Like the national level of institution, the international 
may implement norm on any level of public right, including domestic, interstatal and cosmopolitan.  
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An indication of the favoring circumstances for the actuality of the question of the scope of 
justice is found in the increasing relevance of the statist-cosmopolitan axis in the political 
landscape, compared to the traditional left-right axis. The level of globalization we experience 
today, with its economic interdependence and porous borders seems to call for an extension of 
cosmopolitan justice. This view is however contested. An example of these ongoing negotiations 
is linked to the only conventionally recognized cosmopolitan law in the current international law, 
namely the right to asylum. Although it is plausible to say that this right (and its corresponding 
state obligation) still has wide public support, it is also challenged by those who, for various 
reasons, redeem it outdated in the current circumstances. I think there is a core of truth in this 
diagnosis in the sense that the right to asylum is primarily intended for the exceptional cases of 
individual refugees, such as political dissidents. Hence, I agree with the challenge in the qualified 
sense that the right to asylum only covers a narrow aspect of the content of cosmopolitan law 
that the current circumstances seems to demand. 
In the following I will not only defend the right to asylum, but also argue that the circumstances 
call for an extension rather than a full abandonment of cosmopolitan law. I will pursue to justify 
the claim of an extended cosmopolitan law along two main lines. First of all, I will consider 
specifically the kind of obligations that a state has toward foreign immigrants and argue, with 
Seyla Benhabib, that a state today has obligations toward residential non-citizens that go beyond 
fulfilling the right to asylum. These obligations should however be moderated by the concern for 
democratic self-determination of a state. In general, I label the moral-legal norms regulating these 
obligations toward foreigners, entering or residing on the territory of a state, under the heading: 
the cosmopolitan law of admission. Second, I will also consider the kind of obligations that a state has 
regarding the protection of an emerging global civil society. These obligations correspond to the 
foreigner’s right to establish communicative relations and participate in democratic processes of 
decision-making in cases that affect them. This second kind of obligations and rights belong to 
the cosmopolitan law of deliberation, and do not to the same degree rely on the territorial proximity or 
positive legal status of the foreigner. In brief I argue that the second line of cosmopolitan law is 
necessary in order to adequately address systemic issues of the first line.  
I will begin my discussion by clarifying the specific character of cosmopolitan law and distinguish 
it from state-centric positions within the tradition of political philosophy of justice. In my initial 
defense of cosmopolitan law I will argue mainly within the scope of issues regarding immigration 
and foreign residents related to the law of admission. Having established my support for 
Benhabib’s proposal to extend this law by adding a foreigner’s right to political membership, I 
will however issue critical concerns internal to the project of cosmopolitan law. This critique is 
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concerned both with the issues of admission and with the issues of deliberation. Considering 
admission, Benhabib’s proposal can be viewed as an extension of the rights to “second 
admission” (i.e. to acquire membership). This might solve some of the problems associated with 
irregular territorial residents, but it does not seem fit to solve the systemic problems of admission 
policies, such as those associated with long term encampment and the problem of relocating 
refugees. As a systemic problem, the admission policies are viewed from the perspective of the 
international society and how well-intended policies of each polity might generate excluding 
consequences as a whole. A central example is long-term encampment, which involves 
unacceptable suffering inflicted by exclusion of people from political life.  
Considering the cosmopolitan law of deliberation, Benhabib’s proposal might improve the 
internal political process of some strong democracies, but it does not adequately address the 
increased need for institutionalized protection of the emerging global civil society. I argue that 
this protection can be given principled reason that concords with the regulative idea of humanity 
as a global collective. Further I argue that the protection of global civil society has an 
instrumental value in the sense that it facilitates deliberations among citizens and non-citizens 
which may improve the actual content given to cosmopolitan law. In the case of the problem of 
long-term encampment, and the exclusionary mechanisms it presents, the cosmopolitan law of 
deliberation both articulate the implied moral-legal norms that are violated and suggests a 
framework of political problem solving that does not imply turning foreigners into citizens. 
To accommodate these critical concerns, I suggest an alternative reading of “the right to have 
rights” that emphasizes the implications of Hannah Arendt’s relational revision of the principle 
of justice. According to a phenomenologically informed reading, Arendt’s basic concern for 
plurality takes conceptual distance from Kant’s principle grounding in the autonomous will of the 
individual. In short, the intersubjectivity of politics cannot be reduced to scaffolding for the 
development of individual autonomy and public reason. Accordingly, just institutions should be 
grounded in moral-legal norms that answer to the human condition of plurality, which is given 
shape in the public space of human affairs. Since these human affairs are fragile, just institutions 
should protect them against the arbitrary rule of physical force or economic incentives, and give 
endurance to this public space through the rule of law. In my view, this need for protection 
includes both spaces with domestic and cosmopolitan character. The cosmopolitan public spaces 
should be protected by a cosmopolitan law of deliberation. 
Theoretically the discussion of the political character of the global civil society is related to the 
question of how we appear as human. I explicate Arendt’s answer to this question by arguing that 
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this human mode of appearance is not only related to a communicative practice, but also to a 
certain mentality of action. Conceptually, I take the implications to be that “the right to have 
rights” does not belong to the conventional category of human rights, which include at least one 
cosmopolitan right of foreigners (i.e. the right to asylum). It is rather an articulation of a political 
principle of meaningfulness, which is a principle of action answering to the condition of plurality. 
This principle is given an insufficient and partly misleading articulation within the dominating 
individualistic discourse of “right”. It is not simply an inherent individual right (an acquisition 
right), nor is it simply a communitarian or group right (such as a right to a national public). It is a 
general right to political integrity, articulated to protect the basic political activities of human 
agency – action and speech. This general human right can be given specified expressions in the 
content of domestic, interstatal or cosmopolitan law. This dissertation will restrict the discussion 
mainly to the adequate content of cosmopolitan law.  
In practical terms I take my main contribution to be the articulation of the need for a 
cosmopolitan law of deliberation. This general law of deliberation articulates state obligations 
regarding the protection of the political participation of foreigners. This is especially relevant to 
the issuing of immigration laws and policies, because foreigners are in these cases subjected to the 
law of the state. First of all, the law of deliberation adequately reflects the basic cosmopolitan 
intention of preserving the political integrity and humanity of foreigners. On this ground it 
objects to an understanding of “the right to have rights” as merely an individual right to 
admission, because this interpretation neglects the scope of the relevance of this “right” for 
public right in general. In terms of cosmopolitan law, more specifically, it neglects the regulation 
of non-resident or extra-territorial foreigners’ right to political participation. Second, this law is 
compatible with a foreigner’s right to establish communication and participate in the 
deliberations of civil society, especially when affected by the binding decisions in question. This 
participation finds, to a degree, some protection within the law of admission. Yet, a conception 
of cosmopolitan obligations restricted to admission tends to conceive the moral obligations to 
foreigners as non-political (and merely moral) in character. For instance, it seems to devalue the 
relevance of perspectives of foreigners, beyond their generalized interests as human beings. 
Finally, even if this law of deliberation is not feasibly implemented on the international level, it 
could still articulate a strong moral-legal obligation of single states. Assuming that strong 
democracies benefit epistemologically from the perspectives of foreigners, this could strengthen 
the deliberations in the decision-making processes, and more suggestively and speculatively 
indeed, a procedural right of foreigners to participate in the aggregation of binding political 
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decision-making could give representatives of less democratic states valuable experiences in 
deliberative democratic practices.  
… 
A central premise of this thesis is a normative cosmopolitan assumption which Arendt shares 
with Kant: In order for a state to be legitimate under the globalized circumstances we find 
ourselves in today, it cannot rest on the protection of the individual rights and interests of its 
citizens alone. It must also fulfill its cosmopolitan responsibility for foreigners. In other words, 
for a state to be legitimate it must not only comply with a liberal-democratic standard of domestic 
legality and democratic participation, it must also comply with a complementing cosmopolitan 
standard. In the cosmopolitan tradition after Kant, this responsibility has been mainly associated 
with migration and the kind of interactions with foreigners it implies. In the liberal reading of 
Kant, the central cosmopolitan principle is the individual freedom of movement, which tends to 
be defended by arguing for the individual interest of this freedom. But, we might also read the 
Kantian cosmopolitan law with an emphasis on the regulative political idea this freedom, in my 
opinion, is mainly sought to comply with, namely: the emergence of a cosmopolitan society.  
Since our categories of political relations are so tightly connected to the state-system, we are 
easily led to assume that a cosmopolitan society entails a global state. I don’t think this is a very 
accurate reading of Kant’s position, but more importantly I don’t think it helps us much in our 
current situation. What I propose instead is that we – inspired by Arendt – reconfigure our 
conceptual understanding of the political, such that the primary purpose of the sovereign liberal 
state is not the protection of individual rights, but the protection of the public space in which 
such rights may be actualized. We may still appreciate the discourse of individual rights as a 
useful rhetorical device, but the main value of the state and its institutions would be its protection 
of public space, appreciated as the condition of human agency.  
The main benefit of this conceptual shift is that it makes clearer that the state has an obligation to 
protect public spaces of different characters and this entails different kinds of state obligations 
and individual rights in order to be adequate. There are of course many ways to define various 
public spaces, but – following the Kantian triad of public right – we might at least distinguish 
between domestic, inter-state and cosmopolitan publics. In the current state-centric order, there 
is a striking asymmetry in the international law regarding the obligations of a state. Whereas 
international law imposes a wide range of regulations on domestic and interstatal interactions, 
there are but a few conventions issuing cosmopolitan law. This thesis is the product of a concern 
to explicate and suggest remedies to a poorly protected cosmopolitan public space.    
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The revised conception of the principle of justice detaches the notion of “the political” from the 
conventional, state-centric use. We might say that the conventional use of “political activities” 
has a primarily descriptive reference to the kind of activity related to the institutions and 
procedures that lead to collective binding decisions within a modern state. There are also 
positions that will hold that these political activities imply inherent norms, such as a division 
between citizens and enemies, or at least a democratic closure necessitated by the principle of 
public autonomy. Arendt’s alternative notion of political activities refers to the specific status of 
actions and mentalities that manifest and are guided by principles, which in its turn answer self-
reflexively to the conditions of human agency. By introducing such a notion of “the political”, 
the descriptive reference is detached from the decision-making of a state and potentially relocated 
to any communicative relations performed in a political mode, including deliberations over 
instrumental and constitutive issues. Law is in this sense not only the product of politics, but 
primarily the necessary protection of political life and its framework. To retain the pre-
institutional character of public space I will emphasize the secular idea of society as associations 
that are able to emerge spontaneously and independently of such institutional protection. I refer 
to this alternative notion of the political, which is detached from the state system, as “proto-
political”.  
The aim of this thesis is to develop an answer to how states can form responsible immigration 
policies by including the perspectives of affected foreigners in the decision-making process. An 
important part of this answer relates to a change of mentality when it comes to our collective 
self-understanding as a democratic people. Hence, this is primarily a conceptual argument, with 
the practical implementation of reconfigured political principles as its guiding star. From the ideas 
of the two thinkers – Kant and Arendt – I will draw two main implications. First, I argue that if 
we recognize cosmopolitan law as a moral-legal domain, even if only a provisional and non-
sanctioned one, we should also consider the possibilities of democratizing the legislation and 
decision-making within this field. By appealing to a basic democratic ideal of including all 
affected parties, I suggest we consider it a cosmopolitan right of the foreigner to influence 
legislation and policies that affect them.  
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The outline of the thesis  
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part addresses the specific scope and character of 
cosmopolitan law and discusses the question of its adequate content in terms of the actual 
historical circumstances within the immigration debate. The second part challenges this narrow 
scope of cosmopolitan law within the Kantian tradition and seeks to widen its conception via an 
alternative reading of Arendt. This interpretation contests the institutionalist reading of Arendt’s 
“right to have rights” and suggests that this right must be interpreted in the context of Arendt’s 
rethinking of the conceptual framework of justice in the face of the new circumstances.  
Part 1 Cosmopolitan law – the character and adequate content of immigration law 
In chapter 1 I will structure the public debate on immigration according to a division between 
cosmopolitan and statist positions. Inspired by Christoph Menke’s commenting on the German 
debate2, I’ve organized the positions according to a shared conceptual framework of “the 
individual” and “the state”.3 These positions are considered ideal typical poles on a continuum 
where various actual positions will tend to take more moderate positions where one of the two 
concerns is emphasized and the burden of proof distributed accordingly to the opposite side.  
On the one side, the cosmopolitan positions tend to emphasize the moral obligations the state 
have to every human individual. The scope of these obligations goes beyond the obligations of 
each state toward their own citizens. Cosmopolitan positions tend to view borders as morally 
arbitrary in light of the premise of universal moral equality. These positions tend to appeal to the 
discourse of “human rights”, such as the right to asylum.  
Since the appeal to such state obligations trumps consequential concerns of the hosting 
countries, they are sometimes referred to as an “ethics of conscience” [Gesinnungsethik; 
sinnelagsetikk]4, which in Max Weber’s conception is opposed to the more “realistic” or 
“responsible” political balancing of interests [Verantwortungsethik; konsekvensetikk] within a state.5 A 
moderate cosmopolitan position would therefore implement certain restrictions on the scope of 
obligations, such as for instance a concern for the public order of the hosting state.  
On the other side we have the statist positions. These tend to emphasize the concern for 
sustainable policies of immigration, where the Samaritan duty of assistance is balanced with the 
                                                 
2 Menke, Christoph. 2016. "Philosophiekolumne - Zurück Zu Hannah Arendt - Die Flüchtlinge Und Die Krise Der 
Menschenrechte." Merkur-Deutsche Zeitschrift Fur Europaisches Denken 70, no. 806 (Jul): 49-58. 
3 A simple illustration: the two perspectives see the same structure from different angles, analogue to the way “6” 
and “9” are arguably equally true reports on the same sign, depending on the perspective.  
4 This refers to the typically ascribed positions in the German and Norwegian debate.   
5 Max Weber: Politik als Beruf, in: Gesammelte Politische Schriften, hrsg. von J. Winckelmann, 5. Auflage Mohr 
Siebeck, Tübingen 1988 [1926], 551-552 
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costs of hosting presumably traumatized, low-skilled and culturally distanced individuals. An 
extreme statist position would imply a double standard between the domestic rule of law and 
relations to foreigners, which are considered as a lawless state of nature. 
To specify conceptually the moral-legal domain that is relevant for the debate on immigration, I 
will in chapter 2 draw on Kant’s notion of “cosmopolitan law” which articulates the specific 
obligations states have toward foreigners. As a formal legal domain, cosmopolitan law is 
distinguished from domestic and interstatal law. Kant’s notion offers us a way to localize 
cosmopolitan problems, such as the issue of immigration, more precisely within the conventional 
framework of possible relations between individuals and states. This is basically a formal 
conceptual clarification, which allows us to think of cosmopolitan norms as distinct from other 
universal moral-legal norms. It also designates a moral-legal domain where foreigners – or non-
citizens – are per definition considered subjects of law. 
Further, within the Kantian framework I discuss the requirements of the adequate content of 
cosmopolitan law. I argue that this content cannot be determined by general principles (such as 
freedom and justice) alone, but that an adequate content must also answer to the given 
circumstances and the regulative idea of a global civil society. In the end of chapter 2 I suggest 
two possible readings of the law of hospitality that follows the general lines defined by the law of 
admission and the law of deliberations.   
In chapter 3 I consider three levels of state-centrism which stands in conceptual conflict to the 
notion of cosmopolitan law. In contrast to the statist positions, state-centric positions do not 
necessarily oppose the cosmopolitan position in the question of the scope of state obligations. But 
a state-centric view will take distance from a cosmopolitan position on the question of the 
character of cosmopolitan obligations. On the question of character it operates with a distinction 
between moral cosmopolitan matters and domestic or interstatal political matters according to 
the institutional framework of modern state boundaries. In contrast, the cosmopolitan position 
on the question of character holds moral-legal norms to be valid, at least as an unwritten code, on 
the cosmopolitan level as well. 
The first level of state-centrism is the methodological. I will present John Rawls’ conception of 
justice as the central example of this level. The second level concerns the social imaginary of 
modern society. This level will be discussed in the light of Charles Taylor’s analysis and with a 
special emphasis on the secular imaginary of civil society. The third level of state-centrism refers 
to the way this position is given expression in democracy theory and the deliberative turn. On 
this level there is a noticeable change in the way foreigners are viewed as relevant subjects of 
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opinion- and will-formation. As Seyla Benhabib points out, the views on democratic participation 
are changing in a globalized situation where cross-border migration is an integral part of everyday 
life. For instance, some countries experiment by giving non-citizen residents a right to vote in 
local (sub-national) elections, and by giving expats (citizens living abroad) representation via 
parliamentary seats.  
The main challenge of state-centrism is that it tends to marginalize the political significance of 
cosmopolitan issues. To defend the relevance of cosmopolitan law against this state-centric 
marginalization, I will in chapter 4 argue that the circumstances of our current global situation 
implies political commitments to the cosmopolitan law. This is especially urgent in the field of 
immigration, where the dominating state-centric approach tends to deal poorly with the actual 
problems of exclusion. The most severe problems are related to systemic issues of long-term 
encampment. These are systemic consequences of the state-centric understanding, where states 
limit their institutional responsibility for foreigners (if they recognize it at all) to those that reside 
on or are about to enter its territory. There is currently no international coordinated effort to 
resettle the displaced and homeless on a scale adequate to the demand. Unlike statist policies that 
contest the moral status of foreigners, and are willing to violate the premise of moral equality, the 
systemic outcome of state-centrism is compatible with acknowledging cosmopolitan obligations 
in terms of voluntary aid beyond the narrow law of admission (i.e. the right to asylum).  
To get a clearer view on what is at stake, I will go back to Kant’s argument on cosmopolitan law 
and elaborate on the question of what it is that the legal domain is meant to protect. Kant’s 
answer reveals him as a thinker of the Enlightenment: the cosmopolitan law is to protect the 
emergence of a global civil society of commerce and communication. By exchanging goods and 
ideas we will understand each other better, and will be less likely to make legislations or policies 
that lead to military conflict. Within the framework of basic human dignity, the regulative idea of 
a global civil society must be given an adequate institutional specification and content of law 
according to circumstances. Kant’s understanding of the circumstances at his time suggests a 
clear relevance of cosmopolitan law, but is only provided with a quite narrow scope of adequate 
content.  
The need for a more encompassing protection of the global civil society becomes evident, I 
argue, in light of the experiences that Arendt witnessed in the midst of the 20th century. The 
extensive use of internment camps, concentration camps and later extermination camps, made it 
clear to Arendt that even the basic condition of human agency cannot be taken for granted in a 
world that had become “One”; a completely organized international order. For the excluded, the 
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economically superfluous and politically denationalized there was nowhere else to go. Their 
utterly reliance on the celebrated “human rights” proved of little more value than the rights of a 
species to basic needs of shelter and food. By turning encampment into an institutional response 
to the superfluous, the excluded where left in an uncanny state of the “living dead”. In this 
context “the right to have rights” can be read as a way to give expression to the condition of 
human agency as something more than being treated well according to certain category of animal 
rights.   
If we look at Arendt’s formulation of “the right to have rights” as a contribution to the context 
of the debate on immigration and just membership, it seems perfectly reasonable to assume that 
what Arendt is promoting, is a cosmopolitan right to state citizenship. In chapter 5 I will 
demonstrate how Benhabib, by interpreting Arendt in this manner, is able to balance between the 
“closed” and “open” standard positions in the theoretical debate on immigration. According to 
this reading, Arendt’s contribution is situated within the conventional framework as an extension 
of cosmopolitan law. It adds to Kant’s right to visit, the right to become a permanent guest with 
– eventually – full citizenship. Hence, it suggests a revision of the cosmopolitan law of admission 
in a way that more adequately answers to the circumstances that Arendt depicted and that still is 
actual.  
Part 2 Rethinking human dignity – A phenomenologically informed revision of the right 
to have rights 
Although I am sympathetic to Benhabib’s position and support her argument against state-
centrism, it is questionable to what degree her argument is able to escape the state-centric 
premises. Sarah Parekh makes this clear in her general critique of how the discussion on 
membership distribution takes on the character of an “ethics of admission”. Benhabib’s solution 
neglects, like the standard positions, the systemic issues of migration that have a transnational 
and systemic character – such as long-term encampment. 
In chapter 6 I offer a “proto-political reading” of Arendt that emphasizes her philosophical 
argument of the performative and informal character of the public. This alternative reading seeks 
a greater consistency between the conceptual ambition in Arendt’s early critique of human rights 
and her later formulation of the human condition of plurality. If the “new law on earth” is read in 
the light of the political principle it seeks to address, namely the principle of meaningfulness, the 
right to have rights can be interpreted as the articulation of a basic human right to the political 
activities of action and speech. In other words it expresses a rethinking of the Kantian principle 
of justice that seems to be overlooked in the conventionalist reading of Arendt.  
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Further, I argue that the critique of Arendt, mainly represented by Benhabib and Rancière, can be 
answered by this proto-political reading. The critique of Arendt can be summarized in two main 
points: First, Arendt seems to rely on Aristotle’s anthropology of the political and speaking 
animal. Without clarifying the philosophical step to its normative political relevance, Arendt’s 
conception is left with problematic and hidden normative presumptions. Second, Arendt 
provides a political solution to the historical problems she faced, but without providing it with a 
philosophical grounding.      
In chapter 7 I defend Arendt’s proto-political position by arguing that the anthropological 
premise of her conception should be understood as a non-foundational grounding in a 
comparative analysis of the human condition. Arendt is inspiring because she thinks politics 
within history, and not from a given set of ideas.6 She provides us with no system or doctrine, but 
rather emphasizes the practical aspect of thought as wisdom or judgement guided by principles; 
the adequate, thoughtful grasp of human co-existence that pure logic, ideology and knowledge 
alone cannot guarantee. This is reflected in her critique of philosophical solipsism in Heidegger, 
and in the instrumental notion of politics initiated by Hobbes, based on an ambition to unify the 
free will of the individual with the sovereignty of the state. 
Guided by the Greek concept of “praxis”, Arendt develops an original notion of political 
activities that relies on public appearance among equals and a notion of political public space that 
cannot be reduced to its institutional organization. Further, by distinguishing three kinds of 
human activities according to their relative reliance on and constitutive role for the togetherness 
of public space, Arendt identifies certain stable human conditions which correspond to certain 
principles of action; comfort, usefulness, and meaningfulness. I argue that it is a mistake to 
identify Arendt’s reference to “praxis” directly with her conceptual ambition. Rather, she finds in 
this old concept inspiration to rearticulate a new political mentality. Mentalities are generally 
guided by principles of action and are internally ranked by Arendt relative to their capacity to 
form norms, regulative ideas and institutions that answer to the condition of human agency. In 
this manner, Arendt never intended in my view to restore a topical, face-to-face model of politics 
from the city state, but sought to reform the modern conception of politics by grounding its 
guiding principle of action in a manner that does not undermine or neglect the very condition of 
action. Arendt identifies this in the principle of meaningfulness, the principle of principled action, 
which corresponds to the highly artificial human condition of plurality. 
                                                 
6 On the impossibility of finding an Archimedean point, see Disch, Lisa Jane. 1994. Hannah Arendt and the Limits of 
Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.. 
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To flesh out the implications of this principle for a mentality of action, I consider in chapter 8 
Arendt’s notion of plurality in comparison with Alfred Schutz’s analysis of social space and the 
double character of personal experience. I argue that there is a conceptual distinction between the 
kind of equality (i.e. reciprocity) that makes us able to understand each other and the kind of 
equality (i.e. principled) that makes us appear as human. The former relies on types derived from 
experience or reducible to imaginable examples. The latter cannot be determined in the same 
manner. It relies on temporal manifestations that must be reenacted and rethought under the 
guidance of principles.  
Further, I distinguish between the metatopical manifestations of plurality of contemporaries in 
our imaginary and the ideal objective manifestation of plurality of collectives. If these levels are 
isolated analytically we might consider how the principle of meaningfulness can be given 
responsible expression in the way we imagine our contemporaries, even in the form of quite 
empty and anonymous types, and in the way we think of collectives in terms of regulative ideals. 
These are clearly political issues that should be addressed. In the context of a global civil society 
these levels – the imagined society and the collective – specify aspects of a mentality of actions 
that can formulate an adequate content of cosmopolitan law.  
In chapter 9 I discuss the implications of the proto-political reading of Arendt in greater detail. 
First I reconsider the relation between the pre-institutional and the institutional public space in 
relation to the reception of Arendt within the deliberative turn in democracy theory. Second I 
consider certain practical implications of the mentality of action for the cosmopolitan law of 
deliberation beyond Arendt’s own thinking.  
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Part 1 Cosmopolitan law – the character and adequate content of 
immigration law 
In 2015 “we” – as Norwegians and as Europeans – experienced a high increase of refugees that 
entered the Schengen territory. The experience has been referred to as the “refugee crisis”. 
Curiously, it is ambiguous exactly for whom it is a crisis, or what kind of crisis we understand this 
to be. At first, we might say, the numbers of refugees told a story of millions of personal crises, 
of people losing their community, their homes and were forced to go searching for new ones. 
Some of the pictures that reach the global public solicited a boundless moral response to the 
inhumane suffering and treatment of people that had already lost almost everything. Other 
pictures portrayed refugees as normal adult migrants, usually male, with a smartphone and 
apparently with enough resources to pay smugglers to get across the borders. These second kind 
of pictures resonated with the second reaction, the crisis was rhetorically turned into “our” crisis, 
as the crisis of the hosts of some of these refugees that succeeded to enter Schengen territory. 
The spontaneously solicited moral response was halted by questions like: How can we afford to 
host masses of refugees? What will be the cultural and economic consequences of keeping our 
borders open?   
In the public debate these reactions where mirrored by opposing positions. On one side, people 
argued in favor of our moral obligation to help individuals in need, based on the idea of human 
rights. Some politicians even had the courage to lead the welcome. “Wir schaffen das!” On the 
other side, people promoted a concern for the state obligations to promote the interests of those 
already within the territory. The debate reflects in my mind a crisis on a deeper level, understood 
as a critical event, where the normative foundation of the state, as our political community, is 
negotiated and where two clear alternatives seem to stand out. In this sense the presence of the 
refugees provoked a crisis in the political self-understanding of “us” as a democratic people and 
as a European community. From an optimistic perspective this was an occasion for questioning our 
moral responsibility as a political community and to bring the deliberations on this issue into full public. 
It raised constitutive questions on the border-line between moral and political issues: Do we not 
have a cosmopolitan responsibility toward people in need of a place to stay? To what extent are 
we justified to let national and regional (EU) interests go first?  
From a pessimistic perspective the critical event might as well have turned out to be an occasion 
to sharpen the opposing views even more, and polarizing the debate to a point where the search 
for a common ground seems futile. In part 1 I will shed light on this debate by considering the 
perspectives of thinkers that have dealt with relevant cosmopolitan experiences in the past. 
Primarily I will draw on the ideas of two central cosmopolitan thinkers: Immanuel Kant and 
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Hannah Arendt. Kant argued, in the wake of the early experiences of imperialism, for the need to 
recognize “cosmopolitan law” as a distinct legal domain, which should regulate the interaction 
between states and foreigners according to rational principles. By “foreigner” I simply mean the 
relative status of a non-citizen to any given state, such as a “hosting state”. Kant’s contribution 
has the advantage of providing conceptual clarity to a field of moral and legal obligations which is 
usually obscured by the vague and complex notion of “human rights”. Still, Kant clearly operates 
within the conceptual bounds of modern political philosophy where “rights” (corresponding to 
perfect moral-legal duties) are understood as legitimizing moral claims of moral agents, i.e. either 
states or individuals. In light of this distinct use of cosmopolitan law I see the potential to 
moderate the tension between the actual opposing views. There is for instance a grain of 
justification in the current “nativist backlash” as a reaction against the unconstrained and overly 
optimistic liberal cosmopolitanism of the early 90’s. It did not distinguish clearly enough between 
the problems solved by universal citizen rights and problems solved by cosmopolitan rights.   
It should be made clear from the beginning that by committing to a Kantian notion of 
cosmopolitan law, I take distance from the idea of universal human rights by default as 
cosmopolitan norms. I think it is instructive to distinguish norms held to be universal, including 
both liberal citizen rights and rights of foreigners, and norms held to be cosmopolitan, which refer 
to rights of foreigners exclusively. This distinction comes with some overlap in relation to the 
conventional use of “human rights”, since this expression also refers to the articulation of both 
citizen and cosmopolitan right in positive international law. There is also a grey area of domestic 
rights associated with territorial residents without formal status as citizens. As residents they 
might still have some status as domestic members with limited rights to education, health 
services, etc.  
The Kantian notion of cosmopolitan law also comes with the implication that it presumes 
boundaries within the global political order. A borderless global state would simply leave the 
rights of foreigners (and the very content of cosmopolitan law) redundant, unless we prepare 
conceptually for extra-terrestrial encounters or the interplanetary relation with the human settlers 
of Mars. Hence, the notion of cosmopolitan law that I promote is only compatible with some 
sort of global federation of states. Within this framework, the notion of “foreigner” is not 
conceived as derogatory and must not be confused with notions such as “stateless” or 
“strangers”. The “stateless” might simply refer to individuals that are deprived of citizenship. As 
such these individuals are subject to institutional exclusion and are vulnerable to further 
violations of their political integrity and humanity. In some contexts it also might refer to certain 
an activist term, appealed to as a representation of resident non-citizens with clean sheets (and no 
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papers). Like newborns they are “bare”, with no loyalty or papers related to other states, and thus 
they are pure and easily assimilated. The “stranger” seems to refer to the contrary, to someone 
with strong, but abnormal or outlandish affiliations. This might also be applied as a 
representational strategy, by playing with the distancing and alienating effect of the exotic or 
impartial.   
Arendt, who considered herself a “German Jewess”, had escaped the horror of the Nazi-regime 
as a refugee. Her life experience exemplifies a more fundamental confrontation with the premises 
of the current debate. In Arendt’s attempt to find meaning in the historical events she 
experienced, she developed a conception of political activities that could articulate the great risk 
inherent to the international order and the grave violations of human dignity associated with the 
totalitarian regimes. The famous and paradoxical formulation of a new political law, “the right to 
have rights”, reflects Arendt’s response to these circumstances. The violations are articulated as 
the unpreceded deprivation of the human condition of plurality, taken for granted in our 
appreciation of individual human rights: to have ordinary rights depend on the possibility of 
human agency. Exactly what this human agency entails in Arendt’s thinking will be discussed in 
the next part (part 2). The relevant point for the argument in part 1 is that Arendt describes new 
global circumstances that call for the renewal of cosmopolitan law. In part 1, I will pursue this 
concern for the changing circumstances mainly by considering the adequacy of extending the 
cosmopolitan law of admission. In part 2, I will consider Arendt’s response in greater detail and 
suggest arguments for a democratization of the determination of this content. The protection of 
this democratic process could find its expression in the form of moral-legal norms of the 
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Chapter 1: The public debate on immigration. Statist and cosmopolitan 
positions   
In general we might say that migration as a phenomenon tends to provoke two kinds of debates, 
which are both associated with the political and moral negotiations on the self-understanding of 
modern state communities. In other words, “migration”, i.e. simply people moving, tends to 
spark debates from the perspective of the hosting states on “immigration”, which more specifically 
refers to people on the move entering a foreign state territory.7 The first kind of debates respond 
directly to the consequences of immigration. Given that immigrants as a group are highly 
diversified, there is a broad set of issues related to this debate that span from the consequences of 
free work migration to the urgent needs of displaced people to relocate. In sum we might classify 
these issues as practical problems answering the question: How do we best fulfill our obligations as a 
state community in cases of immigration? The second kind of debates are associated with immigration 
on the level of intellectual provocation. The unease of dealing with immigration as a political and 
moral issue reflects a conceptual and principle vagueness that puts us in moral-intellectual 
embarrassment. Hence, immigration can also be said to motivate a theoretical problem: What are 
our obligations toward foreign immigrants?  
In the currently ongoing public debate on immigration we find at least two main positions on 
how to solve the practical question of immigration. The disagreement between these two 
positions does however also reflect a tension between competing principled commitments 
associated with the modern state. This tension relates to a theoretical problem concerned with 
the scope and character of the obligations of a state toward foreign immigrants:  
On the one side there is the position of moral cosmopolitanism, which is defined by the universal 
moral concern for the well-being and dignity of every human individual. It is usually a position 
based on a moral individualism that follows the principle of the moral equality of every 
individual. In the debate on immigration it is typically articulated as a concern for human rights 
and especially for the right to asylum. This position is cosmopolitan in character, but is 
disclaimed by its opponents as an “ethics of conscience” [sinnelagsetikk], implying that it is not a 
public concern or that it is not likely to become one.  
                                                 
7 The Wikipedia definition reflects the common use of the term quite well: “Immigration is the international 
movement of people into a destination country of which they are not natives or where they do not possess 
citizenship in order to settle or reside there, especially as permanent residents or naturalized citizens, or to take-up 
employment as a migrant worker or temporarily as a foreign worker.” Usually, in a political context, we speak of 
“migration” not simply as movement of individuals, but as movement across political borders on long-term basis, 
excluding short-term trips for business, study or tourism. Jordan, Bill, and Franck Du ̈vell. 2003. Migration : The 
Boundaries of Equality and Justice, Themes for the 21st Century. Cambridge, UK Malden, MA: Polity Press ; Distributed 
in the USA by Blackwell Publishers. It should also be noted that “immigration” (associated with the right to enter a 
political territory) is legally distinguished from “emigration” (associated with the right to leave a political territory).  
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On the other side there is the position of normative statism, which is defined by limiting the state 
obligations to its citizens or territorial boundaries. The concern for the legitimacy of the state is 
primarily grounded in its obligations to protect the interests of its citizens. These obligations may 
take on a legal character in terms duties of the state to protect citizen and their rights. But they 
may also take on a more strictly political character by representing the democratic will of a 
sovereign people. In the face of immigration, these statist concerns are typically expressed in 
terms of the sustainability of the economic and social conditions of the hosting state. The typical 
arguments will take the form of a domestic cost and benefits-analysis of immigration, for instance 
comparing the cost of high rates of individuals given asylum with the benefits of spending the 
same money elsewhere. This position is statist in character and is associated with a 
consequentialist style of reasoning. Opponents will typically raise concerns for the cynical 
“realist” conception of state obligations toward foreigners.    
These positions are ideal-typical descriptions and do not pretend to point out the view point of 
any real proponent. Fortunately, most participants in the public debate are moderate and 
reasonable in the sense that they recognize both these concerns as important. Nonetheless, the 
emphasis on either concern seems to go beyond a mere preference of competing normative 
intuitions. As indicated above they also represent distinct styles of reasoning, which reflects a 
disagreement on the scope of the obligations. The cosmopolitan proponents tend to appeal to a 
right-discourse, which rests on an idea of the inherent dignity of every individual. I will use the 
legal example of asylum right to illustrate this style of political thought in the debate on 
immigration. Their statist opponents tend to appeal to a calculating cost-benefit-reasoning, which 
serves the purpose of defining the most profitable or at least most sustainable options for a polity 
(such as a modern state) understood as a common wealth. To exemplify this style of thought I 
will present a case where the Norwegian Supreme Court considers the main type of arguments 
for legal residency on humanitarian grounds. The obligation corresponding to the right to asylum 
has the character of a specified or “perfect” duty, whereas the humanitarian claim corresponds to 
a conditional or “imperfect” duty.  
Even though the dominating competing positions tend to be moderate, there is in any case a 
polarizing tendency in the current debate – varying of course according to the national context – 
which to some degree makes it plausible to speak of the ideal-typical positions as lining out two 
distinct and competing political projects for the state. We might speak of this as a public 
disagreement in the negotiations on the collective self-understanding of the modern state 
community with implications for the direction to take the ongoing institutional reforms. Should 
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we go in the cosmopolitan direction of opening up or in the statist direction of closing the 
borders?  
In the following I will elaborate further on these standard positions in the debate on immigration. 
I will discuss some of the theoretical ideas behind these positions and consider their main 
strengths and weaknesses. At the end of the chapter I will also point out that these positions are 
binary in the sense that they both rely on a conceptual framework of “individual” and “state” as 
the relevant entities of the social ontology. Taken as a conceptual whole neither the individual 
nor the state can serve as an absolute ground without relying on uncanny abstractions. Provided 
that I support neither extreme position as practically or theoretically liable, I end by asking for a 
way out of this dilemma: How can we find a middle ground that includes both concerns?  
1.1 Cosmopolitan positions 
Cosmopolitan positions tend to take the human species as a whole as the relevant category for 
the moral community. On this account, state borders are in principle morally arbitrary, but might 
– at least by the moderate positions – serve an instrumental purpose insofar as the state-
apparatus promotes cosmopolitan norms and values.  
If we divide normative positions according to three main levels – individual, group, global – we 
see a clear difference between the statist and cosmopolitan positions. In contrast to the statist 
emphasis on a particular type of group (usually the nation or “bounded society”), cosmopolitans 
emphasize the global level, undifferentiated by membership of states. Some do this by envisaging 
a global state, and we might call these legal or political cosmopolitan positions.8 But, not all 
cosmopolitan conceptions envisage such a global state as an aiming point. In fact, the traditional 
and common cosmopolitan denominator is the conception of each individual as primarily a 
“citizen of the world”. This corresponds to the meaning of the Greek root of the word in 
kosmopolitês. Hence, the global is mediated through the status of each individual, regardless of 
their political affiliations. In other words, while the normative level is global, cosmopolitanism 
finds its expression in a conceptual individualism. Historically, this cosmopolitan individualism 
has found its ground in some conceptions of human nature (universal; natural law) in contrast 
and opposition to human conventions (particular community). So, in general we could say that 
cosmopolitan positions are global and usually universal in character, grounded in the assumed 
moral relevance of the similarity of human individuals.  
                                                 
8 After Thomas Pogge: Legal cosmopolitanism is committed “to a concrete legal political ideal of a global order 
under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a universal republic.” (p. 
49, in Pogge, Thomas W. 1992. "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty." Ethics; an international journal of social, political and 
legal philosophy 103, no. 1: 48-75. 
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In the following I will consider mainly the moral cosmopolitanism, since this is the most relevant 
in the context of the immigration debate. Rather than emphasizing the institutional and legal 
structure of being a “citizen of the world”, moral cosmopolitanism refers to a certain attitude or 
form of life that puts an emphasis, we might say on being a citizen of the world,9 rather than of a 
specific state. The most common form of moral cosmopolitanism today is associated with the 
idea of moral human rights as a moral standard of principles that exists independently of any 
specific legal system and that lends its legitimacy to the modern state in so far as it fulfills this 
standard.  
To the extent that cosmopolitan moral claims, such as rights, are seen as unconditional, their 
proponents have been criticized for being moralistic, lofty and idealistic. It is useful therefore to 
distinguish this position from the conception of a humanitarian duty to assist foreigners in need. 
The latter, also known as a Samaritan duty, is clearly conditional in character and more “realistic” 
in the sense that it balances different political concerns. In brief, the duty to assist would not be 
allowed to compromise the interests of the helper. To the extent that the right of asylum, or 
similar rights of foreigners, do not have a corresponding duty to a specified party, the moral 
cosmopolitanism (the opponents argue) mistake a private duty of conscience for a public duty. 
Hence, it is accused of being a moralist ethics of conscience. The moral cosmopolitans would 
obviously object, for instance by arguing that there are or should be assigned institutions to bear 
the obligations corresponding to cosmopolitan rights. 
1.1.1 Moral cosmopolitanism 
In the famous scenario of the drowning child, Singer vividly depicts our experienced urge to help 
people in our physical proximity.10 Further, Singer’s dismissal of physical proximity as a morally 
relevant criterion for being responsible, articulate the basic premise of a moral cosmopolitanism: 
all human beings are of equal moral worth, no matter where they happen to be on the globe (or 
beyond). In its unqualified form we might call it a strong moral cosmopolitanism. Singer 
represents a utilitarian version. We also find similar conceptions of moral cosmopolitanism in 
Kantian11 and virtue ethics12.  
                                                 
9 Martha Nussbaum, for instance, denies special moral obligations to people that we share culture or descent. In this 
sense cosmopolitanism entails a moral attitude of not placing partial concerns ahead of those of others/strangers. 
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. 2006. Frontiers of Justice : Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Belknap Press : Harvard University Press.  
10 See for instance Singer, Peter. 1997. "The Drowning Child and the Expanding Circle." New internationalist, no. 289 
(April 01): 28. 
11
 See O'Neill, Onora. 2016. Justice across Boundaries : Whose Obligations?: Cambridge University Press. 
12 Nussbaum 2006 
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Strong cosmopolitanism is criticized from several positions. The most common, which both 
moderate cosmopolitans and statists share, is a levelling-down argument against a radical 
egalitarian world-wide redistribution.13 It is utopian in the bad sense of the word, because it does 
not seem to allow for cultural and individual distinctness or the corresponding psychological 
incentives for making an effort (or literary: for making a difference). Similarly, a contractual 
critique would emphasize the benefits of the kind of implicit agreement that keeps fellow-citizens 
together. A strong moral cosmopolitanism seems to undermine the moral value of such 
agreements, or the implicit bonds of trust and promise on the political level. Why such a contract 
would not be possible to reproduce on a global level is less clear, but such a globally constituted 
state certainly introduces its own problems. Kant has famously pointed out the undesirable risk 
of such a state in terms of division of power: A global state “may lead to the most fearful 
despotism”.14  
In the Kantian tradition of moral cosmopolitanism we find a moderated position, which 
recognizes the contractual notion of special commitment to fellow-citizens, in the sense that it is 
required by democratic states.15 So, the usual tendency seems to be something like the following: 
A strong moral cosmopolitanism stand in stark contrast to the conventional political community 
(that is defended by moderate statists), while a moderated version seems to stand in a 
complementary – sometimes foundational, other times co-original – relation to the political 
obligations. As I will discuss further in chapter 2, the Kantian approach will solve this relations 
conceptually (or “metaphysically”) by clarifying the formal relation between different domains of 
moral duty, all complying with the human dignity of each person.  
In the utilitarian tradition, the strong moral cosmopolitanism is usually moderated by including 
knowledge of the negative consequences of a “flat” or non-discriminating treatment of everyone. 
There is a range of biological and evolutionary psychological arguments that aim to counter the 
utopian cosmopolitanism with facts about how human social nature and moral psychological 
dispositions will affect such policies. For instance, it seems plausible to say that we have certain 
deep-seated intuitions that make us treat our closest family without necessarily being able to give 
a rational argument as to why. The question “Why do you help your own children?” is either 
pragmatically absurd, or it is contextually detached (such as the “selfish gene”-explanation) from 
my conscious deliberations. In the context of evolutionary theory the question of child care 
makes perfect sense and the answer would be according to the evolutionary logic of kinship 
                                                 
13 Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2006. Cosmopolitanism : Ethics in a World of Strangers. London: Allen Lane. 
14 See p. 90 in Kant, Immanuel, and Hans Reiss. 1991. Political Writings. 2. enlarged ed., Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
15 O’Neill describes it as a “semi-cosmopolitanism”. (O’Neill 2016) 
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altruism. To the same effect regarding egalitarianism, it seems morally contra-intuitive, even 
unnatural, to require that we treat our closest family in the same mode – with the same effort and 
passion – as everyone else.16  
Most cosmopolitan positions will account for these possibly absurd and contra-intuitive 
consequences by building moderations of psychological realism into their own position. Singer 
acknowledges the utility of attending to family relations17, and also – perhaps more problematic – 
to allow dumb-founded or triggered xenophobia to define the pace of immigration.18 We might 
call these kinds of moderations anti-utopian moderations of moral cosmopolitanism. These 
moderations acknowledges that the way we treat “our own” is not completely morally arbitrary. 
The utopians conceive such partial norms (of family or nation) as fully malleable and have at least 
since Plato, suggested ways to abandon this natural moral bias on an institutional level. The 
conservatives conceive the nature of these partial norms as unavoidable, and argue instead for 
accommodation of the norm on an institutional level according to an impartial norm of a 
secondary order. The formula is thus:  
Given that we have naturally the first order partial norm P, we should agree on the second 
order impartial norm P2.  
In the case of kinship altruism this implies that the natural care for one’s own is institutionally 
legitimated by a general consensus on the value of the family as “the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society”.19  
Regarding the national level as a possible institutional accommodation of ingroup-partiality, the 
utopian-liberal seems to disregard this aspect as well, conceiving no peculiar reason why the 
institutional reform cannot expand the circle beyond the national borders. Singer seems to 
support an anti-utopian moderation of this in a recent online commentary: “Such [open border-
policies] arguments ignore our species’ lamentable xenophobic tendencies, evidenced all too clearly by the 
surge in popularity of far-right extremist political parties in Europe.”20 As I will discuss in more 
detail in chapter 5, I support the anti-utopian moderation of the cosmopolitan liberalism, but I 
                                                 
16 The cosmopolitan egalitarian ideal has traditionally found expression in two, equally inadequate, imperatives: The 
stoic ideal implies that we should treat our closest like everyone else, whereas the Christian ideal implies that we 
should treat everyone else like our closest.  
17 Singer, Peter. 1981. The Expanding Circle : Ethics and Sociobiology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
18 ---. "Escaping the Refugee Crisis". Accessed 15.05.2017. https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/escaping-europe-refugee-crisis-by-peter-singer-2015-09?barrier=accessreg.  
19 §23 in UN. "The Un Covenant on Civil and Political Rights". Accessed 16.05.2017. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx. 
20 Singer 2015 
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also raise some concerns regarding the tolerance for the political influence of “xenophobic 
tendencies” indicated in the quote from Singer.  
When it comes to the issue of immigration, I find the deontological approach more adequate 
than the utilitarian approach, for the following reason: To the extent that immigration provokes a 
question of obligations of a state toward foreign immigrants, it actualizes a constitutive question 
of what kind of world – both domestically and interstatal – we want to live in.21 By default the 
utilitarian gives only one unconditional answer to this question: We are obliged to promote the 
happiest (or otherwise preferable) world. In comparison, the deontological approach allows us to 
articulate the rational legal and moral obligations that structure this world in a way that is less 
contingent on the shifting empirical knowledge of the complex social and interactive 
environment. 
To give an example, the utilitarian approach will have no principle objection to the strong 
cosmopolitan claim on freedom of movement. It may argue in favor of such a freedom, provided 
that for instance the redistributive effect of such an open border-policy will comply with the 
basic utilitarian obligation and provide the best means compared to alternative measures.22 This 
utilitarian support for the freedom of movement could however easily be dismantled, provided 
that other empirical knowledge suggests that free mobility has less redistributive effect than 
expected or has other unintended negative effects. Do we want a world where the obligations of 
states are so easily shifting to the current consensus of social scientists?  
As I will present in more detail in the following chapter, Kant provides an anti-utopian 
moderation of the strong cosmopolitan position that is more robust on these terms. The point is 
not to deny the value of social science in the implementation of immigration policies, but to 
articulate certain principled boundaries that ensure predictability in highly complex social 
systems. In the light of the current debate this is perhaps one of the reasons moderate 
cosmopolitans tend to appeal to a (deontological) discourse of rights, such as the right to asylum, 
whereas moderate statists tend to appeal to a Samaritan (utilitarian) discourse, such as residency 
on humanitarian grounds. Accordingly, as I discuss in section 1.3, the disagreement between 
                                                 
21 I do not have a decided theoretical preference on the deontological and utilitarian approaches in general. They are 
pragmatically speaking best suited for different task. It is also questionable to what extent they actually come up with 
different results, or if they are rather not procedures to sort out arguments and rationalize an already desired 
conclusion. In the discussion on immigration I find the deontological approach suitable because the issue of 
immigration, as I address it, is basically a formal and conceptual matters related to the theoretical problem. Empirical 
knowledge of consequences of different kinds of policies will of course be extremely valuable in the further 
deliberations on the practical problem.   
22 For argument in this direction, see Wilcox, Shelley. 2009. "The Open Borders Debate on Immigration." Philosophy 
Compass 4, no. 5: 813-821. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00230.x. 
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these moderate positions is not so much on the issue of the scope of the obligations, as it is on 
the character of these obligations. 
1.1.2 The extreme side of cosmopolitanism 
A noticeable tendency in the statist positions in the debates on immigration is a certain discursive 
reduction of the representation of the foreigner from a full human agent to a more generic 
strategic agent or passive subject of charity or violence. To the extent that this discourse has 
gained political power, this discursive distancing is also reflected in the strategic antagonism that 
at least to some degree defines the field of immigration policies. Some state measures to exclude 
or keep out undesirable foreigners are quite physical, such as fences and walls; others are less 
material, such as visa-bans and bilateral agreements on border regulation.  
In positive legal terms this reflects a quite narrow scope of moral-legal obligations in international 
law, and those that exist are hardly sanctioned when states transgress the legal limits they define. 
To trust each state to fulfill its obligations by themselves has proven a futile endeavor. For 
instance, the international law is explicit on the right to asylum, but the general willingness to take 
one’s share of a common responsibility is low and the international community stands with few 
options on how to sanction this strategic “free-riding”. Feasible measures to solve this impasse is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but the theoretical concern of my discussions are motivated by a 
question on how we might raise the general global level of trust, or willingness to be vulnerable, 
in the encounter with foreigners. And then especially in the cases where the practical responses 
of states (or the lack thereof) to foreigners in a desperate situation – deprived of a home and with 
nowhere to go – causes even more harm.  
What I’ve called in somewhat dismissive terms “extreme” cosmopolitan positions, tend to solve 
this problem of systemic failure conceptually by simply moving one concern from the equation. 
The economic cosmopolitanism solves the problem by simply minimizing the significance of the 
sovereign state in favor of an unregulated, cosmopolitan civil society. The utopian political 
cosmopolitanism solves it by moving the state level to the higher, global level, aligning the 
institutional level with the cosmopolitan level of civil society. I hold neither to be particularly 
attractive positions.  
1.1.2.1 Economic cosmopolitanism – free market capitalism 
If we start with the kind of cosmopolitanism most strongly associated with a minimal state, we 
find an economic cosmopolitanism that promotes a single global market. It conceives favorably 
of open borders for goods and people (labor power) and the down-scaling of (presumably too 
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expensive) welfare states. It is quite clearly highly influential in the development of international 
trade (Washington-consensus) and has been promoted by prominent economists such as 
Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. 
From the Marxist tradition this free market cosmopolitanism has been criticized for advocating 
an unregulated market that leads to high inequality and a problematic wealth concentration.23 
This “global neighborhood”-model has also been criticized for its views on immigration,  one of 
the earliest criticisms was Henry Sidgwick’s utilitarian argument for regulation of borders; 
Sidgwick argued that open border policies would threaten to diminish the social cohesion of a 
state society. Today, the antagonistic market of international corporations is met with increasing 
suspicion, especially when it comes to issues such as the environment and democratic control. 
Taking these concerns into account, the emergence of a global market can also be seen as an 
important step in the development of an emerging cosmopolitan civil society. As I discuss in 
chapter 4, commercial relations are an important part of how Kant envisioned the emergence of 
peaceful interactions across borders.   
1.1.2.2 Political cosmopolitanism 
Formally, a global state would have the attractive effect of eradicating the problem of 
immigration, since immigration implies an inter-state system. In a global state all migration would 
in effect be internal.24 However, as mentioned above, the main argument against a political 
cosmopolitan aspiration for a global political state is the inherent danger of despotic reign, 
unchecked by any comparable power.  
Because of this inherent danger ( as well as its implausible utopian nature), most political 
cosmopolitans would hold a more moderate view that either aspire to some weaker federation 
among states or some vertically dispersed sovereignty model. The difference between these two 
positions is manifested in the debate between Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics. Because a weak 
federation would be, strictly speaking, international and not global, it is compatible with Rawls 
liberal-statist conception of justice. His cosmopolitan critics, such as Thomas Pogge and Charles 
Beitz, would be more skeptical to the idea of the state as an indispensable instrument in the 
pursuit of justice. Pogge’s critique would for instance question if the state interests could be 
promoted without imposing expenses and harm on individual world-citizens. In some issues of 
                                                 
23 Piketty, Thomas, and Arthur Goldhammer. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge Massachusetts: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
24 In terms of “migration” as mere movement this is of course the case today as well, in the sense that the migration 
within federal/imperial regions like China, Schengen, Brazil, US, is much higher in numbers than the trans-regional 
migration across political borders. 
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globalization, and we might include migration, the states are clearly not the adequate level of 
administration to address the issue and its systemic implications. In these matters the states 
should disperse some of their autonomy to another, regional or global, level.  
Whereas Rawls tends to emphasize the domestic and interstatal levels of Kant’s notion of public 
right, his cosmopolitan critics emphasizes (contrary to Rawls) Kant’s notion of cosmopolitan law. 
This law does not regulate the relation between states, but it regulates the commercial and 
communicative relations between state and individual foreigners (see also chapter 2). It presents a 
moderate version of the “extreme” political cosmopolitanism, which we find traces of already 
today. In the “soft law”-model of international order, cosmopolitan law is to some degree 
implemented in the international criminal court, which seeks to protect individuals and groups 
against “crimes against humanity”, such as genocide, regardless of which territorial sphere of 
sovereignty they happen to reside in. This model allows for some degree of legitimate 
interference in the sovereign sphere of domestic rule of positive law. These cases seem to be the 
only field – so far – where there is an actual international willingness to forcefully deprive an alien 
state of its sovereignty on the grounds of a shared moral standard as expressed in international 
law.   
An interesting and less institutionally explored option, in addition to cosmopolitan legality, is the 
implementation of procedures of democratic legitimacy in the regulation of cosmopolitan 
interaction. This option reflects a concern for the democratic character of dispersing of power to 
regional and global levels.  I take this issue of democratic deficit to be highly relevant in the case 
of immigration laws. I understand this deficit to be relevant in at least two distinct but 
interconnected ways:  
First of all: formally speaking, immigration laws are one of the few domains of legislation on the 
state level that directly affects and specifically address foreigners as its legal subjects.25 In other 
words, immigration laws are laws issued on, according to Kantian cosmopolitanism, a distinct 
legal domain of cosmopolitan law. As such, these laws are formally in conflict with the statist 
notion of democratic legitimacy as limited to the decision-making process among citizens. This is 
a concern for the democratic legitimacy of the cosmopolitan law of admission.  
Second, immigration laws regulate an emerging field of a global civil society, as the first step to a 
moral-legal civil condition on the cosmopolitan level. If we consider the cosmopolitan law of 
                                                 
25 The Norwegian law is explicitly called “the law of foreigners” [Utledningsloven].  
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admission26 beyond its minimal content (such as the right to asylum), then we can understand it 
to also protect the conditions of this emerging civil society. Primarily it has the self-referential 
function of articulating certain obligations and rights to protect the further deliberations on the 
content of cosmopolitan law. The content of a law of admission beyond asylum protects 
communication across state boundaries, and might also ensure the possibility of “voting with 
one’s feet” as a grass-root means of sanction against states. Regarding this latter aspect, we might 
speak of immigration in terms that overlap with the cosmopolitan law of deliberation. I will 
develop these ideas further in chapter 2.  
1.2 Statist positions 
A statist position can be described as a variant of ethical or moral particularism. Statists tend to 
regard the political community of the state as having particular moral significance, which implies 
that our central moral obligations are restricted to those who share membership in the same 
political community, i.e. in the same state or nation. A common case of such statism is found in 
the almost taken-for-granted assumption that questions of justice are limited to the state. As a 
consequence, the state is seen as having few, if any, obligations to human beings living outside 
the community.  
The conception of the state might vary; from the classical liberal “Night watchman”-state, via a 
wide range of welfare state models, to the more authoritarian models of fascism, socialism, 
theocracy, etc. There are nonetheless some quite commonly held features as well. The political 
community is distinguished from other associations or groups in several ways. Like membership 
in the family one is born into, membership in the state is not a voluntary association and the 
members are subjected to a set of common rules. In its modern form, the state is, however, also 
distinct from family-groups in a number of ways: The state is a legally defined term. In principle, 
the state rules as sovereign over a territory and a people (inhabitants, citizens, members). It is the 
only organization that has the legal decision-making competence of giving laws to a defined 
territory. It is also the only organization that can legitimately claim monopoly of violence and 
hence use extensive sanctioning force. As a constituted legal community, the modern state of 
mass societies is usually also closely associated with extensive and impersonal bureaucratic 
systems, which regulates and (ideally) protects civil society; the economy, the sovereign people 
and the public sphere.  
                                                 
26 I consider the “law of admission” and the “laws of deliberation” subcategories of the formal cosmopolitan law, 
that have a semi-formal status in the sense that they primarily gives conceptually guided designation to certain fields 
of issues or concerns related to the relation between states and foreigners. 
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The statist positions on immigration tend to vary with the corresponding conception of the state. 
Those holding a conception of a minimum state – such as the libertarians – tend to reduce the 
question of immigration to a non-political question of trespassing upon private property.27 The 
external borders are primarily seen as marking the limit of a distinct realm of legitimate and state-
protected property rights. Those favoring a conception of a more extensive state, such as that of 
a welfare state, tend to be more concerned with immigration on a political level. This is because 
the welfare state is based on a bureaucratic system of redistribution that relies on reciprocity 
between duties and rights of its citizens. Border regulation, both external and internal, becomes 
an important mean of securing social integrity and trust. A restricted pace of migration is 
intended to ensure a certain homogeneity of worldviews and values. The welfare state also 
depends on the ability to sanction the potential free-riders or “fortune-hunters”, which threaten 
to exploit the generosity of the system. Within a moderate statist position, communitarians tend 
to emphasize the importance of social cohesion, and liberal-egalitarian statists the institutional 
reciprocity as reasons for border-control.  
Among moderate statists we also find recognition for the idea that state legitimacy rests on 
international standards such as “universal human rights” in the sense that each state is obliged to 
secure the enjoyment of these rights among its citizens (and even for residential members in a 
wider sense). The difference between a moderate statist position and a moderate cosmopolitan 
one could then in practice be small. It relies basically on a theoretical disagreement on the 
primary emphasis of the question of the scope of justice. The burden of proof on easing or 
strengthening the border control is distributed accordingly. As I will discuss in the next section, 
this difference also tends to be reflected in a different view of the character of obligations beyond 
state borders.28  
                                                 
27 For a more extensive discussion on the libertarian view on immigration, see Carens’ account in section 5.3. 
28 A “liberal” statism might seem like a contradiction in terms, but there seems to have been at least an historical 
development from a liberalism which understood «the rights of Man» as citizen rights, to an international consensus 
where human rights are held to be cosmopolitan. In the early liberal international order, every liberal state was 
expected to treat their own citizens with dignity according to universal standards of rights. After the World Wars 
there seems to have been a change toward an understanding of rights as not only universal citizen rights, but actual 
“human” rights. (See for instance: Pogge 1992, p. 49)  
After the World Wars and the UN declaration of Human Rights, many welfare-states practiced a cosmopolitan 
reading of these rights as an extended right of the visitors. Foreigners on the territory had access to health care, 
education and most civil and political rights (except vote). Today the internal performance of borders is more 
nuanced and discriminating.  The general tendency seems to be a formalization of qualifications of services, 
especially regarding positive rights that give access to welfare services, in order to discriminate more selectively 
between desired migrant workers and undesired irregular migrants. This quote from a call for papers to the Nordic 
Migration Research (NMR) conference, in Oslo August 11-12 2016, illustrates the point (might replace with ref. to 
research on welfare-provisions): 
“State borders can no longer, if they ever could, be studied only as the geographical demarcation line of a 
specific territory. Moving toward an understanding of borders as situational and performed, state borders can occur 
everywhere, including at healthcare clinics, at working-places, and in people’s homes. This decentralized and 
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1.2.1 The extreme side of statism  
In the current polarized public discussion on immigration, one side of the discourse represents a 
reactionary “nativist backlash” to the current globalizing trend of more open borders. Donald 
Trump’s slogan “America first” exemplifies this anti-globalist movement, which reminds us of a 
specific tradition of interpreting the sovereign people as identical to the nation. Historically, the 
nation-state offered a believable response to the disintegrating effects of industrialization. It 
efficiently replaced the absolutist territorial states, the city-states and the empires as the most 
attractive model of political formation. 
To some degree, the statist discourse of what is often termed ‘the populist right’ is (at least in 
Norway) following the moderate line of the conventional view of the welfare state. Part of this 
discourse even seems to express a certain nostalgia for the period after the Second World War, 
where the welfare state was combined with exceptionally low levels of economic inequality. In 
this period the myth of national homogeneity discretely provided loyalty on the part of the 
citizens to a liberal constitutional state. In a globalized situation, this loyalty is easily dispelled as 
socio-economic security no longer sustains the multi-cultural revisions of the old nationalist 
imaginary.29  
The more extreme and worrisome aspects of this populist statist discourse are associated with a 
certain imaginary of a nationalist world order, where each nation is represented by its own state. 
The idea of a “right to national self-determination” and the myth of the nation have proven to be 
very powerful instruments both in the imperial and the totalitarian regimes in recent European 
history. The nationalism of late 19th and early 20th centuries solved growing domestic class 
conflicts by creating loyalty to the expansionist politics of the elites (first in the form of colonies 
and later in the form of continental Lebensraum).30  
Hannah Arendt’s provoking reflections on the historical catastrophe of nationalism draws out the 
darkest potential in the statist position. In chapter 9 “The Decline of the Nation-State and the 
End of the Rights of Man” of Origins of Totalitarianism (1968), Arendt depicts how the members of 
the “League of Nations” struggled with the question of minorities and people of different 
                                                                                                                                                        
dematerialized approach to borders has implications for how we understand and examine migration control. 
Migration control here implies a different sense of materiality, management and agency than control over physical 
border barriers, and there are different ways of understanding control: as coercive or as disciplinary, as practiced by 
state actors, but also by non-state actors.” 
 
29 This is probably one of the reasons why the “rust-belt” started to move right: the white worker rejected becoming 
yet another marginalized party of identity politics.  
30 Although the claim to national self-determination also has positive connotations to it in the post-colonial context, 
it seems reasonable to question to what degree this call to sovereignty on the grounds of nationality has served the 
general public and reformed the system of exploitation implemented in the former colonies.  
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
37 
 
nationalities. It was the first international attempt to regulate the issue of national strangers 
(minorities) and foreigners. Notice in the following passage how prevalent the idea of national 
self-determination was in the negotiations on immigrants and minorities in the League of 
Nations:  
The interpretative speeches on the League treaties by statesmen of countries without 
minority obligations31 spoke an even plainer language: they took it for granted that the law 
of a country could not be responsible for persons insisting on a different nationality. They 
thereby admitted – and were quickly given the opportunity to prove it practically with the 
rise of stateless people – that the transformation of the state from an instrument of the law into an 
instrument of the nation had been completed; the nation had conquered the state, national 
interest had priority over the law long before Hitler pronounced “right is what is good for 
the German people.”32  
The point is not to draw an immediate line between demagogic oligarchs and Holocaust, but to 
keep in mind the danger of taking the state to be an instrument for “the people”. It easily leads to 
the assumption that in order to have one’s own human rights fully realized, each nation/people 
would need its own state. Perhaps needless to say, this step was – from a cosmopolitan 
standpoint – a disastrous strategy for dealing with the migration crisis of the mid-war period. A 
moderate nationalism has to face this danger and find ways to redefine the social imaginaries of 
patriotism in a way that is compatible with a pluralist civil society. We find examples of this in the 
attempts to formulate “civic religions” and “constitutional patriotism”.    
1.3 The right to asylum and residency on humanitarian ground – moderate statist 
and cosmopolitan positions 
So far I’ve mainly discussed the statist and cosmopolitan positions with regard to the question of 
the scope of justice. I’ve also claimed that the most dominant positions in the public debates tend 
to take a moderate stand between two extreme (idealized) positions.33 Both moderate positions 
acknowledge some state obligations to foreign immigrants, and in this section I will discuss the 
character of these obligations.  I’ve also suggested above that there is a tendency in moderate 
cosmopolitan positions to emphasize the obligations of a deontological character, whereas the 
statist positions emphasize obligations that are based on consequentialist concerns. In the 
                                                 
31 In a footnote Arendt is referring quite curiously to a representative from Brazil, the “rainbow nation”. 
32 P. 275, my emphasis, in Arendt, Hannah. 1968. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York,: Harcourt. First published 
1951. From now on: (Arendt 1968). In the text: Origins. 
Absurdly, this expression is a reversal or appropriation of an expression given to the world conspiracy of 
the Jews in the Russian forgery “the Protocols of Sion.”  
33 This claim will of course rely on empirical conditions that might vary from state to state, or between different 
locations within the public sphere. My assumption is probably colored by my experience with the Norwegian public, 
which tends to be quite moderate. Other publics, like the American one, seem to be more polarized.  
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following I will exemplify these tendencies by considering how representatives of each position 
find its expression in the Norwegian immigration law.   
1.3.1 The legal distinction between asylum and residency on humanitarian grounds  
If you arrive in Norway as an immigrant without a visa, your only possibility for attaining legal 
residency would be to apply for asylum to the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 
(Utledningsdirektoratet, UDI). Given that Norway has ratified the “UN convention relating to the 
status of refugees” 34, any foreigner on the border or within the territory has a right to do so. In 
other words, the Norwegian state recognizes its international (and moral) obligation in these 
cases. The only condition is that the asylum seekers haven’t already applied in another Schengen 
state. Asylum (from Greek asylon) means a haven or safe and free place. In practice, it means for 
the immigrant the legal right to residency, social service and work permit, and the right to acquire 
travel documents. To get there, the directorate must approve the foreigner’s status as a 
“real”/conventional refugee.  
If you are denied an asylum after § 28 in the Norwegian foreigner law by UDI, you may still 
attain residency on subsidiary or humanitarian grounds after § 38 (you cannot apply directly 
according to § 38).  
1.3.2 The right to asylum (§28) 
So far I’ve treated the moral cosmopolitan position in theoretical terms. The right to asylum is a 
practical case where cosmopolitan law (in Kantian terms) is quite broadly recognized both in legal 
terms and in popular opinion. In general, we could say that the right to asylum corresponds to a 
clear obligation of the state toward foreign immigrants. It gives the government and migration 
officers clear instructions, and provides the foreigners with an unconditional right to apply for 
asylum. That is, it is unconditional in the sense that the need for protection shall not be weighed 
against any other concerns, such as migration control, national economy, etc. Ideally speaking, it 
is an inalienable individual right of the foreigner, no matter the consequences for the common 
wealth. 
Still, statist-minded governments will be able to use the space within the legal framework to limit 
its obligations. To the extent that the government wants to regulate or manage the scope of its 
                                                 
34
 The “Geneva convention” of 1951 is considered the “lex specialis” on refugee law. It defines a refugee as a person 
who: “[…] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it.” (UN. "The Un Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees". Accessed 16.05.2017. 
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html.) 
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obligation to asylum seekers, it has to work around the right to asylum by external measures. The 
most commonly applied measure is to exploit the territorial condition, that one may only apply 
for asylum if at or within the borders of the state. One might do so by “non-arrival” measures 
such as physical obstacles (fences/walls) or legal regulations (such as EU’s agreement with 
Turkey).  
Another way to regulate the state’s obligation to provide asylum, would be through re-defining 
the amount of refugees. The concept of a refugee is defined in the Norwegian foreign law § 28 
The first part, “a)”, refers to the “UN convention relating to the status of refugees” which 
emphasizes the “well-founded fear of being persecuted”. Since 2010 a more controversial second 
part of the paragraph has been added to align the Norwegian law with the precedence of the 
European Court of Human Rights.35 It states that the definition of refugees also includes those in 
risk of death penalty or inhumane treatment when deported, regardless of the reasons given in a). 
The widening of the definition also corresponds better to the way “refugee” is commonly used, 
which includes refugees of war (and not just persecution).  
This extension was added by a previous, cosmopolitan-minded government. As a consequence, 
the numbers of persons receiving residency on humanitarian grounds dropped in 2010.36 This 
was an intended consequence of the widened definition of “refugees”, because the sitting 
government at the time sought to strengthen the legal status of those granted permanent 
residency. The residency provided on humanitarian ground implies weaker privileges compared 
to asylum. Hence, the regulation of the amount of refugees is directly linked to the character of 
the obligations the state has toward foreign immigrants.  
The current, statist-minded government (sitting from 2013 to 2017) has suggested removing this 
last part in order to get the law back in line with the definitions used by our neighboring 
countries. Although the European Court of Human Rights already has a liberal precedence, § 28 
b) implies that Norway currently has the widest legal definition of refugees in Europe.37  
The argument for restricting the definition of refugee appealed to the consequences of operating 
with a comparatively wider definition than our neighboring countries: Under the “refugees crisis” 
of 2015 this subtle difference was considered to have great strategic significance in terms of 
immigration control. The sitting government met the crisis in 2015 with a set of proposed 
changes that among other things proposed to revise the change in §28 and go back to a more 
                                                 
35 See also: 2010. Asylum and the European Convention of Human Rights, by Mole, Nuala and Meredith, Cathrine  
36 UDI. "Hvem Fikk Beskyttelse?". Accessed 16.05.2017. https://www.udi.no/en/statistics-and-analysis/annual-
reports/annual-reports-from-previous-years/tall-og-fakta-2014/hvem-fikk-beskyttelse/. 
37 See p. 275ff, in Øyen, Øyvind. 2013. Lærebok I Utledningsrett: Universitetsforlaget. 
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extensive use of subsidiary grounds.38 There might be several reasons for this proposal. The 
proposal argues for the privileged status of “refugees” and explicitly raises concerns about the 
incentives (i.e. the “pull factor”) this might give migrants for choosing Norway as their 
destination. The report explaining the proposal states that this must have been an unintended 
consequence of widening the definition.39 Besides being an explicit attempt to regulate the pace 
of immigration, this proposal also exemplifies a clear preference of the statist position to 
formulate obligations in humanitarian terms rather than in terms of legal commitments.  
Without accepting the empirical assumptions supporting the assumed “pull factor” that this 
revision sought to reduce, this proposal also reflects how systemic perspectives take on an 
antagonistic attitude toward foreigners who are portrayed as strategic agents that will react as 
rational and well-informed agents to the symbolic legal measures of the government of the 
hosting countries. Contrary to the cosmopolitan spirit of the right to asylum, this strategic 
approach to foreigners both affirms and enforces the idea of cross-border movement as situated 
in an interactive environment where subjects might seek to be subsumed to the category of 
refugees for strategic purposes. The widening of the definition of refugees is not conceived here 
as an appropriate alignment with our principles – according to a moral cosmopolitan position, 
but it is rather seen as a sign of weakness that make the state stand out as a preferable “prey” 
among potential hosting countries.  
1.3.3 Residency on humanitarian grounds (§ 38) 
If we compare the right to asylum with the grant of residence on humanitarian grounds, the 
room for political discretion in the latter case is far wider. The required balancing of humanitarian 
concern with the interest of state sovereignty is here made explicit. On the one hand, there is 
given specific weight in the law to concerns regarding children, health conditions, return 
conditions and cases of human trafficking On the other hand, these concerns must be balanced 
against the possible number of similar applicants, the societal consequences, and the concern for 
immigration control and foreigner’s respect for Norwegian law in general. While most statist 
positions will recognize the international and moral obligations mentioned, these obligations take 
on a Samaritan character of charity where the amount of aid given is seen in proportion to the 
capacity of the provider.  
                                                 
38 beredskapsdepartementet, Justis- og. "Høringsnotat - Endringer I Utlendingslovgivningen (Innstramminger Ii)". 
Accessed 16.05.2017. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing--endringer-i-utlendingslovgivningen-
innstramninger-ii/id2469054/. 
39 Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet 2015, p. 45 
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The textbook example40 is as follows: one could easily make the case that foreigners living in 
extreme poverty, and without education and work, would benefit from being granted permanent 
residency in an affluent welfare state. Nonetheless, concerns for immigration control would 
clearly deny this as a sufficient reason for residency on the ground that this could lead to 
innumerous other cases with an equally valid claim to be admitted.41 It would basically create a 
precedence that would “leave the door open” and undermine the welfare state.  
1.3.4 The statist arguments recognized by the Norwegian Supreme Court  
A discussion in the Norwegian Supreme Court on the issue of residency on humanitarian 
grounds is interesting here because it in many ways illustrates the statist perspective on 
immigration. The particular case concerns humanitarian grounds associated with the best interest 
of children. First of all, the court establishes the general point that it is important to maintain 
political control on the pace of migration in order to keep it on a sustainable level. In addition, 
the court acknowledges that the state has commitments to protect foreigners according to 
international law. In the case of children, this includes the UN Convention of children’s rights, 
and more specifically the article on the best interest of the child.  
In addition to the obvious interest of any child to material wealth (and the Norwegian state’s 
capacity to provide welfare outcompetes most states in this regard), the court also accounts for 
“the distinct value of growing up in a place where the roots, networks and belonging are 
strong”.42 In the cases of children, this attachment is considered to shift from their parents and 
gradually toward the society of residence as the child attends daycare and school. This has 
decisive implications in cases of deportation, since it will define whether it is in the children’s best 
interest simply to be with their parents, or whether it is also in their interest to remain in a 
neighborhood and society where they have strong attachments of their own.  
Further, the court presents four arguments, where at least two of them are balanced against the 
child’s best interest:  
1) The “innocence”-argument: the child should not be held responsible for the actions of its 
parents.43 (also known as the Jeffersonian proviso) 
2) The “systemic consequence”-argument: the child’s best interest cannot be seen in 
isolation from other, similar cases. A liberal practice that might benefit one child, might 
lead other parents to use their children as means to an end.44 
                                                 
40 Øyen 2013 
41 Ibid., p. 316  
42 There’s a distinct sense of personal identity in value of attachment that stands in a curious tension to the notion of 
citizenry. In Norwegian: «Det er også tydelige verdier knyttet til å vokse opp et sted hvor røttene, nettverkene og 
tilhørigheten er sterk.», § 111 in (Høyesterett), Norwegian Supreeme Court. 2012. Rt-2012-1985. 
43 § 113, Rt-2012-1985, this concern is dismissed by the first-voting judge as irrelevant in these particular cases (133) 
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3) The “developmental aid”-argument: From the perspective of immigration control the 
pace of immigration cannot be significantly increased and still be sustainable. The main 
humanitarian instrument of the Norwegian government is developmental aid.45 
4) The “humanitarian exception”-condition: “If a granted application will not give a 
potentially significant increase in the influx [tilstrømning] or imply consequences for other 
cases to come, there might be occasion to give a higher rate of grants than in cases where 
the immigration control concerns are more pertinent.” 46  
In general, we see how the right of the child corresponds to obligations which are quite different 
from the duty corresponding to the right to asylum. The right of the child is not unconditional, 
but highly contingent on the humanitarian rationale and the specific circumstances of the case. 
Most clearly, this is articulated in the argument of the “humanitarian exception”, where the right 
is contingently relying on the uniqueness of the case. The less precedence a case is conceived to 
create, the easier it will be to give weight to individual concerns.47 It is also noticeable how all 
these arguments maintain a highly distancing discourse about the foreigner, either as a strategic 
agent or as a subject of charity.   
1.4 A shared conceptual framework – concluding remark 
In this chapter I’ve laid out, in quite schematic lines, the two main positions regarding the 
question of the scope of obligations a state has toward foreign immigrants. I’ve emphasized the 
soundness of moderate positions on each side and pointed out that one may discuss meaningfully 
the character of the cosmopolitan obligations in question from either position. One might say 
that the moderate positions allow for justified exceptions in either direction. For the statist there 
are justified cosmopolitan exceptions to the state interest, and likewise there are justified statist 
exceptions to the interest of the foreigner. 
I’ve also briefly discussed how immigration can provoke issues of justice that seem unusual to a 
statist tradition of political philosophy, which habitually assume the scope of justice to be 
confined within its territorial borders. As a minimum, immigration reveals that borders are 
institutions which create their own problems of justice: “Boundaries of whatever sort are not 
unquestionable presuppositions of thinking about justice, but institutions whose structure raises 
questions of justice.”48 The issues related specifically to immigration can be labeled “issues of 
                                                                                                                                                        
44
 § 114, Rt-2012-1985, see also § 120, this argument is related to a systemic logic: the respect for the law; avoiding 
incentives to non-cooperation, avoiding signals that create pull-factors (ultimately based on the assumptions of the 
psychology of the ideal-typical migrant). 
45 § 116, Rt-2012-1985 
46 § 117, Rt-2012-1985 
47
 § 129, Rt-2012-1985: non-cooperation might be overlooked in “concrete cases where special concerns are 
decisive.”    
48 O’Neill 2016, p. 100 
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admission”, and in the next chapter I will address the segment of cosmopolitan law that seeks to 
regulate these issues. I’ve also indicated that I find it plausible to argue that immigration, in a 
broader thematic scale, also provokes a concern for cosmopolitan law as the protection of an 
emerging and ideally democratically deliberating global civil society.  
As a final remark, I also find it worth pointing out that although each of the two main positions 
tends to give incommensurable answers to the scope of justice, they also tend to share a common 
conceptual framework. If we consider the two extreme positions it is easier to identify the main 
concepts that guide the moderate positions as well. Characteristic of the extreme cosmopolitan 
perspectives is that it holds the scope of justice to be global. The character of the obligations in 
question are however usually grounded in some conception of individual rights, which in some 
cases even leaves the conventional state structure redundant. For instance, in the UN declaration 
and conventions on human rights, one gets the sense that world-citizenship might be something 
that each of us have, independently of our membership or relation to any group or state. From a 
diametrically opposite position, the extreme statist perspective finds its point of departure in the 
state (or some group it naturally represents, such as the nation, the people or the common 
wealth) to the point where the distinctiveness of each individual implodes. 
The moderate positions on either side try to mediate between these two perspectives, admitting 
that the concept of the individual and the concept of the state should not be considered 
completely separate from each other. From these moderate positions it is easier to realize that the 
ideas of inherent dignity and inalienable rights are individualist abstractions from a relational 
structure relying on a corresponding responsible party, such as the state. We might say that what 
characterizes the moderate positions is their ability to recognize this relational structure and the 
value of the opposing perspective. The two extreme positions also share, as I said above, a 
certain similarity. To give a simple comparison, just as a number might be “6” or “9” depending 
on one’s perspective, the two extreme positions are referring to the same relation with a 
symmetrically opposed prioritizing of either the individual or the state. Hence, moderation would 
here imply the capacity to admit that both sides possess part of the truth. They even tend to share 
the conceptual framework. In so far as they do, the cosmopolitan and statist positions are parts 
of a conceptually predictable dialectical disagreement that both confirm what we with Menke 
could call the same “situational ontology”.49  
Given that both ‘individual’ and ‘state’ are to be considered dependent parts of a conceptual 
whole (an ontology), they should be acknowledged as relationally dependent on the other 
                                                 
49 Menke 2016 
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concept. To reduce either concept to a “natural kind” has an abstractive function, similar to the 
uncanny effects of imagining a living body without consciousness (a zombie) or a consciousness 
without a body (a ghost).  
To avoid either of the extreme positions, and to counter the polarizing effect of the debate on 
immigration, we might reasonably search for a middle ground. There are different strategies for 
doing so and the moderate positions tend to raise reasonable concerns and perspectives on either 
side. In the following chapters I will follow the liberal and discourse-ethical individualist 
approach of Benhabib quite far along the way. In part 2, I will however break with Benhabib’s 
argument to explore a reading of Hannah Arendt that might provide us with a “situational” 
ontology that more adequately fits the issues of cosmopolitan law.  
To put it very simple, this reading aims to introduce a third level, that of public space, to split 
open the conceptual dyad of the individual and the state. Unlike Rawls “peoples” this space does 
not depend on the state and does not follow the state as a conceptual shadow. Nor does it simply 
promote the allocation of cosmopolitan obligations to civil society, as both O’Neill and Benhabib 
seem to suggest. The ambition is to explicate that state obligations are not primarily grounded in 
individual rights, but in the protection of the conditions that make human life possible in terms 
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Chapter 2: Cosmopolitan law – cosmopolitan law of admission and political 
deliberation 
[It] is imposed by men upon themselves, in that their inclinations make it impossible for them to exist side 
by side for long in a state of wild freedom. But once enclosed within the precinct like that of civil union, the 
same inclinations have the most beneficial effect. In the same way, trees in a forest, by seeking to deprive 
each other of air and sunlight, compel each other to find these by upward growth, so that they grow 
beautiful and straight – whereas those which put out branches at will, in freedom and in isolation from 
others, grow stunted, bent and twisted.  
- Kant, Idea of Universal History  
In analogy to the constructive antagonism of trees forced to live side by side, Kant appreciates 
the antagonism of a free market and a free public debate within the framework of a “civil union”. 
Could we not assume that globalization would deem a similar union on the cosmopolitan level 
necessary for the beneficial effect of our conflicting inclinations? 
The notion of cosmopolitan law50 is already briefly mentioned as the formal category of law 
regulating the interaction between states and foreigners. In this chapter I will follow Kant’s 
conceptual argument in order to specify the character and content of this formal category as a 
way to clarify the cosmopolitan obligations of the state and the corresponding cosmopolitan 
rights of the foreigner. I will begin by situating the cosmopolitan law in Kant’s conceptual 
framework of moral principles and norms. The main ambition is to clarify a distinction between 
three domains of moral-legal norms (or “right”/law): the domestic, the interstatal and the 
cosmopolitan. Further, it is important to distinguish these moral-legal domains from their 
positive institutional implementation on the state and international level. In general, these three 
domains are regulated by formal principles of justice which can be given institutionalized 
expression in various ways. By implication, “international law” designates a set of positive laws 
grounded in conventional agreements on all three moral-legal domains.  
Second, I will continue by discussing the character of the content of cosmopolitan law as 
consisting of either ethical-humanitarian or moral-legal duties. This discussion is important 
because it clarifies the character of the obligations a state might have toward foreigners. I also 
want to stress the inadequacy of a distinction between merely “moral” obligations and legal 
                                                 
50 I use “cosmopolitan law” instead of the ordinary English translation of “Recht” to “right”. There are two reasons 
for this. The first is merely pragmatic: I want to be able to distinguish between a legal domain of law and the 
individual rights that are related to this domain. The distinction between citizen rights and cosmopolitan rights are 
crucial here. Second, I think “law” reflects better than “right” the original use of Kant’s German “Recht” (or Latin 
“ius”) as referring to a moral-legal domain. The risk here is the somewhat misleading connotation to merely positive 
law, given that cosmopolitan law (formally speaking) is distinct from international law. Its content can still be part of 
the positive “international law”, if by “international law” we mean international agreements on content that might 
include all three formal domains.   
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obligations as it tends to confuse the discussion of the adequate content of cosmopolitan law 
with the discussion of the actual content of international law.  
As a third point, I will discuss cosmopolitan law in light of its constitutive idea of a global civil 
society and bring forth readings of Kant by Jeremy Waldron and Onara O’Neill that emphasize 
the provisional and compromising character of cosmopolitan law. The adequate content of 
cosmopolitan law is not, according to these readings, found by deducing it from, or grounding it 
on, some shared or metaphysical premises. Rather, the adequacy of the content relies on a 
rational and publically communicable response to changing circumstances. Given the significance 
of public reason for the articulation of the adequate content of law, the global civil society takes 
on a central role in Kant’s cosmopolitan conception. 
In light of these considerations I will end this chapter by discussing two different interpretations 
of Kant’s universal law of hospitality. I will discuss to what degree it can be considered to 
articulate the moral-legal duties of the state, and to what degree it adequately answers to the 
circumstances of our times, and finally I will argue that the law of hospitality articulates elements 
of cosmopolitan law concerning both admission and deliberation. 
2.1 A conceptual clarification of cosmopolitan law 
Kant’s account is quite straightforward in the sense that it relies on the premise that law might 
regulate actions between moral agents. The possible kinds of moral agents are confined to the 
situational ontology described in the last chapter: individuals and states. Given that some 
individuals51 are citizens of a state and some are not, we get a set of three possible kinds of legal 
relations. (See figure 1). 
Figure 1: Kant’s threefold categorization of legal domains.  
Relying on this formal distinction of domains within the dominating situational ontology, 
“cosmopolitan rights” are not synonymous with “human rights”. As figure 1 indicates, “human 
rights” is rather an umbrella term which encompasses both citizen rights and cosmopolitan rights.  
                                                 
51 We might also consider corporations and civil organizations individuals in this regard.  
52 OP = original position, which refers to Rawls procedural adaptation of the Kantian framework. See chapter 3 and 
5 for more detailed accounts.  
Moral-legal domains Interactive relation OP52 Ex.  
Domestic law State – citizen  “citizen” Citizen rights 
Interstatal law State – state “people” Rules of war 
Cosmopolitan law State – foreigner  “world citizen” Right to asylum 
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It is also worth noticing that Kant’s conceptual framework does not determine the specific 
content of cosmopolitan law. Today we could for instance easily think of economic and 
environmental reasons to develop cosmopolitan law to include redistribution and carbon 
emission. I’ve chosen to narrow my concern here to the issue of immigration. This is partly due 
to practical reasons concerning the thematic scope of this thesis, but it is also because of  the 
peculiar character of immigration as a topic of cosmopolitan law. First of all, it concerns the kind 
of content of cosmopolitan law which has been historically recognized, such as the right to 
asylum. Second, it differs from economic and environmental concerns in the sense that 
immigration is indisputably a case of cosmopolitan law. Unlike cases where our economic actions 
or the use of fossil fuels might affect others in complex and indirect ways, there seems to be less 
need to consider whether or not the actions of a state (or its citizens) affect foreigners in cases of 
border-crossing and residency on state territory. As a third point, there is also a close connection 
between the law of hospitality, which Kant promotes as the only content of cosmopolitan law, 
and the regulative idea of a global civil society. I will discuss this last point in more detail at the 
end of this chapter.  
2.1.1 On the three domains of the “public right”  
As shown in the table above, cosmopolitan law is part of a triad in the Kantian framework. These 
three moral-legal domains are to be complementary elements of a civil condition of “public 
right”. Hence, cosmopolitan norms are not understood conceptually as more fundamental than 
other moral-legal norms. Cosmopolitan law consists of universal norms, but so does domestic 
law and interstatal law. In order to clarify the distinct character of cosmopolitan obligations of 
the state, we might take a closer look at each domain.  
First of all, we have the interaction between the citizens and the state. The state is, according to 
Kant, the shape all the individuals in the same civil condition take in relation to themselves as 
individual members. As an inherited union, it is called a nation, and as a union of interest it is 
called a commonwealth. This kind of domestic interaction is regulated by domestic law or the right of 
the state (including the right to sanction transgressions of the law).  
Like other liberal Enlightenment thinkers, it was important for Kant to distinguish between 
public and private law (mainly the right to private property and to initiate voluntary private 
contracts) because it differentiated the state from civil society (especially the economy). When the 
state makes use of positive law as a means of organizing and implementing its power (through 
public law), it also commits itself to the recognition of subjective rights and its bearer: the citizen 
as a legal person. In this sense domestic law protects the freedom of the extra-political, civil 
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society in a negative form: “[…] within an order of modern law that is set free from immediate 
moral expectations (though only in certain respects), the citizens are permitted to do anything 
that is not prohibited.”53  
Second, we have interactions among sovereign states.54 These interactions are regulated by 
“interstatal law”55, which seeks to  avoid the arbitrary rule of the mighty associated with a political 
realist position. The main threat here is military aggression from foreign states, and Kant argues 
that neighboring states have an obligation – more or less analogous to individual agents in the 
social contract – to enter into a civil condition to avoid confrontations. In its minimal form, the 
civil condition between states is not much more than a non-attack alliance, but the content might 
be broadened. Today, the system of international law contains a quite extensive set of interstatal 
laws, which includes rules of trade, rules of war and numerous other agreements.  
Third, and clearly distinguished from both domestic and interstatal interactions, there is the 
cosmopolitan law.56 This last domain is seen by Kant as complementary to the two other domains in 
order to have a stable global civil condition. As I read it, the cosmopolitan right has two main 
implications: First, it rejects the statist idea of the sovereign state that has no obligations to 
foreigners and that unavoidably acts on self-interest. Second, it is incompatible with the idea of a 
global state, because this would dissolve all interstatal and cosmopolitan relations and make the 
triad of moral-legal domains implode. Hence, the institutionalization of this law seems to require 
as a minimum the balancing between these two unacceptable extremes. 
By specifying cosmopolitan law as duties of states toward foreigners, it also has implications that 
differ from other common uses of “cosmopolitan”. First, cosmopolitan law does not simply refer 
to universal moral norms or claims that can be made by any human being, as for instance 
“human rights”, as the ground for more specific rights as  citizens. Cosmopolitan law does not 
serve as a normative ground for domestic law, they complement each other. Second, 
cosmopolitan law is not compatible with a global state of world-citizens. It requires some people 
to remain foreigners. Hence, cosmopolitan law is not the constitution of a global state order. It 
                                                 
53 P. 109, in Habermas, Jürgen. 2001. The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory. 3. print. ed., Studies in 
Contemporary German Social Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. See T.H. Marshall for influential essay on 
“Citizenship and Social Class” (1950) for account on the historical development of the content of domestic rights 
since Kant went from “civil”, and later “political” to “social” rights.  
54 Notice that Kant recognizes states as moral agents, with rights and duties.  
55 Kant uses “the right of nations” (ius gentium; law of peoples). I use «interstatal» to distinguish it from the more 
ambiguous notion of “nation” and “international law” in our current use of the terms. A state might host a number 
of nations, and as such be an inter-national or multi-national polity. “International law” refers usually to the positive 
legal framework, and is not necessarily identical in content to the moral-legal domain of interstatal law.  
56 At some point Kant refers to “the right of a state of nations”, which I find confusing unless we hold that all three 
moral-legal domains define elements of this law of a “league” or loose federation of nations (i.e. states).  
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does, however, express moral-legal duties and rights that are rational and that should be 
implemented on some level to ensure the adequate protection of a global civil condition.  
2.1.2 Cosmopolitan law as moral-legal laws and positive law  
To clarify the relation between moral-legal cosmopolitan law and positive international law even 
further, it should be made clear that the distinction is not merely between the notion of what 
international law ought to be and what it actually is in legal and institutional terms. There is also a 
conceptual distinction of levels, where cosmopolitan law, as a part of public right, defines a 
category of laws that might be implemented on two different levels: On one level as a formal 
class of law, on the other level as an institution of justice:  
For Kant a just world is one in which principles of justice that could be principles for all 
are realistically institutionalized. He argues that realistic institutions of justice will include 
not only states – and therefore boundaries – but further structures that secure 
international justice and cosmopolitan right, including a league of states.57   
Like the entire set of public rights, cosmopolitan law answers to universal principles of justice. 
The realistic institutionalization of these principles can be implemented both on the level of state 
and international institutions of justice. Kant defines cosmopolitan law to denote an area or 
department of juridical concern, similar to “interstatal law”58, and  with a decisive distinction in 
mind to international law: Whereas international law (usually) refers to actual agreements among 
states on how to regulate a global order of states (for Kant this was ideally a federation or 
“league” of states), cosmopolitan law is meant to articulate conceptually a specific kind of 
obligations that states should recognize – both individually and as part of a federation. These 
obligations might be actualized as positive laws on both the state level (as immigration laws) and 
the international level (as human rights or refugee conventions).  Hence, cosmopolitan and 
interstatal law refer to formal classes of law (or public right), and international law refers to an 
institution of justice.  
To give an example: if we compare cosmopolitan law to the current “soft law” regime of Human 
Rights, we could say that only a few articles of the Universal Declaration of human rights (1948) 
and the succeeding UN conventions (1966) are, strictly speaking, implementations of 
cosmopolitan law. Most of them articulate traditional liberal and welfare rights of citizens. In 
other words, it articulates well-established contents of domestic law as laws “for all”. That is, 
these domestic rights are held as rights that each human being should be entitled to. They are, 
                                                 
57 O’Neill 2016, p. 116 
58 Kant use «international law» where I use «interstatal». O’Neill, in my reading, is referring to “international justice” 
as “interstatal law”. My use of “international law” is designated to the way it is most often referred to these days as 
the positive law based on multilateral agreements among states.  
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strictly speaking, international agreements on citizen rights as a universal, softly binding standard 
of international law. The responsible agents to fulfill these rights are the states, and the UN 
human rights regime relies on the state level to implement these principles.  
Hence, cosmopolitan law is not only different in the normative modality of what international 
law ought to be or is, but also in its possible content. Actually, the only clearly identifiable 
cosmopolitan right in the declaration of 1948 is article 14:  
“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from [mainly 
political] persecution.”  
This is the only exception that to some degree compensates for the lack of a cosmopolitan right 
to immigrate that would correspond meaningfully with the citizen right to emigrate (Article 13). 
According to the declaration, only persecuted individuals have a cosmopolitan freedom of 
movement. In any case, it should be quite clear that the content of human rights in international 
law is not identical in content to cosmopolitan rights.  
Some claim that there has been a cosmopolitan shift after the Second World War in the public 
understanding of the state’s obligations toward foreigners according to the idea of human rights. 
This is partly true in the sense that many states would interpret their obligations to extend to “all 
human beings” currently residing on its territory. It is in this sense cosmopolitan in spirit. This is 
however not a conceptual transposition of human rights from domestic law to cosmopolitan law 
(including cosmopolitan rights), but rather an extended implementation of domestic right due to 
a wider notion of legal subjects; which is widened from citizens only to include territorial 
members (its “guests”) as well.  
It should also be noticed that the UN human rights regime is vague on the question of how 
strongly states are legally obliged to give foreign residents something approximating citizen rights. 
There are ongoing negotiations on which categories of rights (civil, political and social) that 
correspond meaningfully to an extended obligation of the state to foreign residents. Generally, 
liberal civil rights are more easily accepted than obligations to provide political, social, economic 
and cultural goods and services.59 Some of this vagueness is dealt with by bilateral or regional 
agreements among states, which implies that the vagueness is especially problematic for those 
people who find themselves outside the grid of concrete international agreements, such as the 
stateless, the irregular immigrants and the non-deportable.  
                                                 
59 See for instance report from “Menneskerettighetsutvalget”: «Rapport til Stortingets presidentskap fra 
Menneskerettighetsutvalget om menneskerettigheter i Grunnloven» (Dokument 16 (2011–2012)) 
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Given the unclear normative and weak institutional status of human rights on the international 
level, I find it necessary to stress that cosmopolitan law is not deprived of its conceptual status as 
“moral-legal” simply because it is not written in conventions or realistically institutionalized. 
Cosmopolitan law might still articulate an adequate answer to the constitutive question of how 
the world ought to be, even if an answer to the instrumental question of feasibility seems 
pragmatically distant.  
2.2 The character of cosmopolitan obligations – ethical and legal duties   
Within a Kantian framework it seems quite obvious that a state has cosmopolitan obligations of 
some sort. The character of these obligations is however contested. In this part I want to clarify 
the status of ethical and legal norms within the Kantian framework in order to explicate what is at 
stake in this discussion. According to the distinction made above between moral-legal norms and 
positive law, I also want to stress that the distinction between moral and legal cosmopolitanism 
bears little relevance in this discussion (unless  we take “moral norms” as referring to a general 
category of norms that include duties that ought not to be sanctioned by positive law).60  
If we look at Thomas Pogge’s well-known definition of moral and legal cosmopolitanism, it 
makes little sense to locate cosmopolitan law in either of these categories: 
Legal cosmopolitanism is committed to a concrete political idea of global order under 
which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a 
universal republic. Moral cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in certain moral 
relations to one another: we are required to respect one another’s status as ultimate units 
of moral concern – a requirement that imposes limits upon our conduct and, in particular, 
upon our efforts to construct institutional schemes.61   
As already established, cosmopolitan law is not compatible with a global state, even if its citizens 
are fortunate enough to sustain it in the form of a republic. With this moderation in mind we 
might still insist on the legal character of cosmopolitan law and label it as a quasi-legal or semi-
cosmopolitan account. This is, however, problematic on Pogge’s terms, since his definition puts 
legal cosmopolitanism very close to the institutionalization of cosmopolitan law. Legal rights 
“depends on the legislative, judicial, and executive bodies that maintain and interprets the laws in 
question.”62 
                                                 
60 There are for instance certain moral duties in the Kantian framework which are harder to categorize in this manner 
as moral-legal norms, such as honesty, which are necessary conditions for a civil society, but hardly possible to 
sanction.   
61 Pogge 1992, p. 49 
62 Ibid. 
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Another strategy, which is found in Seyla Benhabib’s reading of Kant, is to understand 
cosmopolitan law as a hybrid of legal and moral norms. For Benhabib, cosmopolitan law 
“occupies that space between human rights and civil rights, between the right of humanity in our 
person and the rights that accrue to us insofar as we are members of specific republics.”63 Given 
that cosmopolitan law is conceptually complimentary with civil rights (as part of domestic law), I 
find this “space between” rather puzzling. But it might make sense in terms of the strength of the 
obligations in question in the sense that a broad institutionalization of cosmopolitan law seems 
unrealistic at the moment.  
Benhabib seems to argue that the “space between” of cosmopolitan law is distinct from the 
ethical duties of moral cosmopolitanism which go beyond the call of moral-legal duty. For 
instance, in our “effort to construct institutional schemes” on a state level we might take 
concerns to assist non-citizens in humanitarian or Samaritan ways. Cosmopolitan law, according 
to Benhabib, seems, on the contrary, to express a “certain sort” of moral-legal claim: “The right 
of hospitality entails a moral claim with potential legal consequences in that the obligation of the 
receiving states to grant temporary residency to foreigners is anchored in a republican 
cosmopolitan order.”64 In other words, it has a hybrid status of: “quasi-legal binding obligations 
through voluntary commitments”.65 
Benhabib draws in this way a ladder from weaker moral obligations, via quasi-legal obligations 
(which are still voluntary) to strong legal obligations that are reciprocal and sanctioned. If we 
consider this ladder in relation to the distinction between cosmopolitan law and positive law, it 
seems reasonable to say that within the current weak sanctioning regime of human rights, any 
state obligation is “voluntary”. In the following I want to make clear that this sense of 
voluntariness is different from ethical duties due to its commitment to a global civil condition. To 
clarify this distinction, we need to locate Kant’s threefold distinction of public right – domestic, 
interstatal and cosmopolitan law – within a larger set of systematic distinctions. 
Primarily, legal norms are part of the subject of “metaphysics”, which in Kant’s terminology is 
restricted to a question of form or law (noumena) as conceptually distinguished from experienced 
content (phenomena). Distinct from natural laws (of the natural sciences), the metaphysics of morals is 
concerned with the laws of humans as free or autonomous (self-lawgiving) beings. All laws have, 
                                                 
63 Benhabib 2004, p. 27 
64 Ibid., p. 29 
65 Ibid., p. 29 
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according to Kant, an empirical (or synthetic) aspect as well, but metaphysical analysis brackets 
this content and considers only the purely formal, a priori aspects.66  
In distinction from natural laws, both ethical and moral-legal norms are moral laws. All laws 
within this category of moral laws must comply with the general formal criteria of universality. 
Furthermore, moral norms are divided into two main formal categories: On the one hand we 
have duties of rights which regulate external acts. These include domestic (ordinary laws, 
constitutional law), interstatal and cosmopolitan law. On the other hand, we have duties of virtue 
(or ethical duties), which concerns the internal determination and incentive of one’s will. These 
two spheres, the legal and ethical, are equiprimordial or co-original as they emerge from the same 
binary distinction: external actions and internal motive.   
For Kant, the main difference between legal and ethical norms is that legal norms are conceived 
as the expression of public reason,67 whereas ethical norms are conceived as the law of our own 
will (a private maxim). The content of the norm might be the same, but the formal classification 
significantly changes the way we conceive the specific character of the action that the norm is 
intended to regulate. From a legal perspective, Kant argues, we expect from ourselves and others 
that our actions comply with the general law. To follow the law is seen as a perfect duty. From an 
ethical perspective we may in addition also judge how our own specific actions are motivated and 
how well or honestly they are performed. To follow moral maxims is seen as an imperfect duty.  
Kant’s emphasis on the legal as restricted to external acts, i.e. to observable behavior, has the 
conceptual advantage of articulating a clear boundary for the appropriate realm of sanctioned 
moral-legal norms. Duties of virtue address the ability to set ends, understood as internal acts of the 
mind which cannot be directly subjected or subsumed to prescriptions of external actions.68 Since 
this end-setting capacity cannot be regulated by law, any legitimate legislation should respect the 
negative freedom of conscience on the reasoning that it is futile to legally control the internal will.  
                                                 
66 I understand this to be a procedural concern. Kant does not present a substantial metaphysics, but relies primarily 
on a conceptual analysis guided by certain indeterminable principles. Some of the distinctions Kant makes still have 
problematic ontological implications, but I think his conceptual analysis can be appreciated as a procedural 
suspension of the concrete content of the norms in order to simplify the analysis of their form.  
67 This has connotations to Rousseau’s general will (the will of all; the will in general), but as we will see in 2.3.2, 
Kant’s notion of public reasons in quite open.  
68 P. 6:239-240, in Kant, Immanuel, and Mary J. Gregor. 1996 [1797]. The Metaphysics of Morals (in "Practical 
Philosophy"), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Originally published 1797. Hereafter “MM”.  
In other words: in Kant we find a Cartesian dualism at work in the definition between the legal (bodily 
behavior) and the moral (acts of the mind). 
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This might be a convenient distinction for practical reasons within the liberal project, but it 
presumes a problematic theoretical divide between pure behavior and the “supersensible” will.69 
As a concern for the freedom of thought and conscience, it seems reasonable. But intuitively, it 
also seems unreasonable to say that we should not distinguish legally between intended and 
unintended actions. If we look at more contemporary accounts of interaction, we find a wide 
ranging critique of the behaviorist account of human interaction.70 Every action is mediated and 
interpreted with some intention (or will) inherent to it. In the end this theoretical problem 
provides a leading clue for the questioning of the situational ontology (see chapter 6 ff.).  
2.2.1 The grounding principles of cosmopolitan law 
Even if it is reasonable to question the ontological distinction between the external action and the 
internal motive that grounds Kant’s operative distinction between ethical and legal norms, we 
might accept that there is a distinction in principle between duties that ought to be enforced by 
law and those that ought to be considered voluntary obligations. Since the content of moral-legal 
norms cannot be deduced from general moral principles, the manifestations or concrete 
articulation of the obligations might vary according to the context.  
In any case, all concrete ethical and moral-legal norms must be considered as coherent with the 
principle of humanity, which includes the ideas of “innate” freedom and equality of the 
individual, and finds its clearest expression in the “right to humanity”:  
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can 
coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only 
original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity. 71  
In addition to this general requirement of moral norms, moral-legal norms must comply with the 
principle of justice. In line with a liberal ideal, these norms are restricted in the negative sense that 
they prohibit the kind of interaction among individuals that inhibit the autonomy of one or more 
of the parts. This is formulated as the formal criterion of moral-legal norms, also called the 
“universal principle of rights”:  
                                                 
69 Associated with thinking, or the mind as ‘the organ of the supersensible’. Its objects: metaphysics, “the true world” 
(as against the apparent) or even God. Positivism = the death of the supersensible. For discussion on this, see p. 421 
in Arendt, Hannah. 1971. "Thinking and Moral Considerations - Lecture." Social Research 38, no. 3: 417-446. <Go to 
ISI>://WOS:A1971Y182700001.  
The “supersensible” is associated with the opposite of the extended and phenomenal: According to the 
Cartesian division of the extended and the rational, the body and mind, or in Kant’s words: phenomena and 
noumena.  
70 For Norwegian critique of positivism, see Skjervheim, Hans. 1976. Deltakar Og Tilskodar Og Andre Essays, Idé Og 
Tanke 31/32. Oslo: Tanum-Norli. For social anthropological account, see Geertz, Clifford. 1993. The Interpretation of 
Cultures : Selected Essays. London: Fontana Press. For recent phenomenological account, see for instance: Overgaard, 
Søren. 2007. Wittgenstein and Other Minds : Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl, 
Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy. New York: Routledge. 
71 MM, p. 6:237  
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Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal 
law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law. 72  
Since legal norms (the duty of right) regulate external actions by the use of force, they do not rely on 
the good will of its citizens. They are robust enough to hold, even in a “society of devils” or a 
society of “social morons” (i.e. ambitious and selfish homo economicus).73 On this ground Kant 
articulates the distinction between the three moral-legal domains of public right (a legal category 
distinguished from private right).  
2.2.2 Cosmopolitan law distinguished from philanthropy  
What seems clear in Kant’s account, is that the cosmopolitan law cannot be reduced to a matter 
of the ethical private conscience (or “philanthropy” as he calls it) of each individual world-citizen. 
As stated above, the ethical subcategory of moral norms consists of norms that regulate internal 
acts of the will. Ethical norms are related to the idea of “the good” (i.e. the realization of the ends 
of oneself and others), and are meant to regulate the positive and voluntary motives for action. 
They involve duties toward oneself and others according to the mutual recognition of each other 
as free and equal human beings. Following the general distinction between what is right and what 
is good, ethical norms are articulated as positive formulation of ends (of the good) distinguished 
from the articulation of the “right” in the negative formulation of freedom. The ethical principle 
recognizes that: “a human being is an end for himself as well as for others.”74  
Even if ethical duties should not be enforced, their weaker character of obligation is not meant as 
a moral excuse for being a “law-abiding devil”. The point is rather that the wide duty, i.e. the duty 
to go beyond the narrow duty of legal prohibitions, involves a freedom of choice. You stand free 
to limit the scope of your obligations from “the love of one’s neighbor in general” to “the love of 
one’s parents”, but it does not necessarily make you more virtuous:  
The wider the duty […] the more imperfect is a man’s obligation to action; as he, 
nevertheless, brings closer to narrow duty the maxim of complying with wide duty, so 
much the more perfect is his virtuous action.75  
In this sense, moral cosmopolitanism, understood as the individual responsibility for everyone 
else, is the widest obligation possible and hence the most imperfect duty thinkable. We should of 
course think of every human being as an end in him- or herself, but we are not legally obliged to 
                                                 
72 MM, p. 6:230-231  
73 Sen, Amartya. 1977. "Rational Fools - Critique of Behavioral Foundations of Economic-Theory." Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 6, no. 4: 317-344. <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1977DX39800002. 
74 MM, p. 6:395 
75 MM, p. 6: 390 
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do so beyond the perfect duty of the negative maxims of co-existence. Cosmopolitan law has a 
quite different character than this widest duty. 
In practice this philanthropic duty is usually interpreted according to the principle of mutual aid, 
for instance as a Samaritan duty. We have – both as individuals and as political communities – an 
ethical, imperfect duty to provide aid to some people, but we cannot possibly help everyone. 
Imperfect duties allow exceptional assistance to some (similar to residency on humanitarian 
grounds). It also allows for some discretion on how to fulfill them. 
An example of how the distinction between ethical and moral-legal norms might change 
according to context is related to the distinction between the right and the good outlined by 
Kant. The current political negotiations between the political left and right can be understood as 
a negotiation on the character of the obligations associated with “social and economic rights”. 
The political right might agree that we have some ethical-humanitarian obligations as a political 
community to provide goods and services, whereas the political left will typically argue that there 
is a false distinction between the material and civil conditions for the freedom of choice. A 
decisive issue in this regard is for instance whether social and economic rights should be included 
as constitutional rights, or rather should be confined to less protected political agreements.   
Without taking position in these political negotiations (or struggles), I take the decisive issue to be 
the regulative idea of an inclusive civil society that is protected against the rule of force (including 
economic force) and defined by mutual trust. Given this regulative idea, we might question if the 
distinctions between the internal and external; the good and the right will always give us the best 
guidance. In situations of strong economic interdependency it does for instance seem wrong to 
claim that grave economic inequality will not affect the mutual trust of society. In any case, in my 
mind, there is a distinction in principle between those obligations that should be rendered 
voluntary ethical commitments and those that should be considered legally binding in order to 
secure the necessary protection of the (possibility of) a civil condition.   
The extreme case of a state of war exemplifies this distinction: Under such conditions one can 
hardly speak of any norms as “legally binding” in the sense of being enforceable by rule of law. 
However, the practice of “total war” is from a Kantian perspective still unjust, and not merely 
unethical, because even the voluntary commitment to the public right (in this case of interstatal 
law) should be concerned with the regulative idea of a possible civil society (as a condition of 
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perpetual peace): “No state at war with another shall allow itself such acts of hostility as would 
have to make mutual trust impossible during a future peace […].”76  
In the Kantian framework, cosmopolitan law seems to be associated with a similar idea of being 
legally binding and still only (due to the circumstances) a voluntary commitment to public right. 
The attention given, by Kant, to the fragile conditions for a society, such as trust, might seem 
naïve and superfluous in times of war and unrest. And, similarly, the idea of hospitality might 
seem equally naïve in times of mass migration, but – given that the regulative idea of civil society 
is not confined to the statist idea of domestic justice – we have to consider cosmopolitan 
obligations as necessary for the protection of a global civil society. The adequate content of 
cosmopolitan law should be articulated accordingly.  
2.3 The provisional and compromising character of cosmopolitan law 
As we move from a pure conceptual analysis of cosmopolitan law, to the question of its content, 
we simultaneously need to consider how concrete cosmopolitan laws respond to actual 
circumstances, which also implies that we need to articulate a regulative idea of public right that is 
more specific than merely “a just civil condition”. The notion of a federation of states is the 
typical Kantian answer on the level beyond the domestic. In the following, I will emphasize the 
global civil society, which is what this federation is arguably intended to protect.  
First I will present Waldron’s argument for a provisional understanding of the content of 
cosmopolitan law, according to the historical changes of circumstance. Waldron argues that since 
a diversity of conceptions of justice is Kant’s starting point of public right the concretization of 
cosmopolitan law requires a universalist political attitude which is incompatible with 
communitarian or identity-political positions.77 
Second I will consider O’Neill’s critique of a statist conception of public reason. She argues that 
since the institutionalization of the state always takes on a character of compromise with given 
circumstances, the institutional arrangements might become outdated due to circumstantial 
changes. For instance, the globalization of the last decades seems to challenge the idea of a 
reasonable scope of the public. O’Neill emphasizes Kant’s understanding of the global scope of 
the public as a promising point of departure.   
                                                 
76 P., 8:346, in Kant, Immanuel, and Mary J. Gregor. 1996 [1797]. The Metaphysics of Morals (in "Practical Philosophy"), 
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
, ---. 1996 [1795]. Toward Perpetual Peace (in "Practical Philosophy"), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel 
Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. PP hereafter.  
77   Waldron, Jeremy. 2000. "What Is Cosmopolitan?" Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 2: 17. 
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2.3.1 The provisional character of cosmopolitan law 
According to the general idea that the rule of law of a civil condition is preferable to the rule of 
force, we have, according to Kant, a moral duty to leave the state of nature. This duty complies 
with the rather empty principle of justice and cannot be deduced a priori as an absolute moral 
norm. Rather, as Waldron notes, the content of this duty – according to public right – can only 
be adequately concretized in response to the circumstances. Depending on how strongly we 
affect each other, this duty should take on a correspondingly extensive content.  
Today we have grown accustomed to the expectation of the rule of law within the domestic 
sphere. Similarly, the dominant view on international affairs involves the expectancy of certain 
standards beyond the state of nature or the “realist” conception of states as merely self-
interested. Presuming that the domestic and interstatal content of public right responds to the 
degree we affect each other, or perhaps rather the degree we have affected each other so far. The 
current rate of globalization seems to suggest an extension, in my view, not only of its content 
but of the category of emphasis. This can be further specified in terms of cosmopolitan law, 
according to Waldron:  
Cosmopolitan [law], for Kant, is the department of jurisprudence concerned with people 
and peoples’ sharing the world with others, given the circumstance that this sharing is 
more or less inevitable, and likely to go drastically wrong, if not governed by juridical 
principles.78  
What does this moral-legal obligation entail? In general, this is a hypothetical requirement, 
according to Kant:  
Public right is […] a system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings,  or 
for a multitude of peoples, which because they affect one another, need a rightful condition 
under a will uniting them, a constitution, so that they may enjoy what is laid down as 
right.79  
In other words, if a multitude of human beings affect one another, they need a rightful condition. 
And, as globalization takes on its strength, the duty to step into a civil condition seems to imply 
an increased content of cosmopolitan law. In a footnote to section II in PP, with reference to the 
triad of a rightful constitution, Kant qualifies the cosmopolitan right in the following manner: 
“the right of citizens of the world, insofar as individuals and states, standing in the relation of 
                                                 
78 Waldron 2000, p. 230 
79 MM, p. 6:311, my emphasis 
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externally affecting one another, are to be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind (ius 
cosmopoliticum).”80  
As Waldron indicated in the quote above, the kind of situation which solicits this need for a 
rightful condition depends on empirical circumstances where we affect one another in a shared 
world. Said otherwise, we have an obligation to seek a civil condition when the circumstances 
require it, i.e. when we happen to ‘affect one another’ or happen to live ‘unavoidably side by side’. 
In the case of cosmopolitan law this implies the requirement of a rightful condition beyond state 
borders, in so far as the people on the surface of the globe affect each other.   
According to Kant, the globalized circumstances at his time already met the requirements for the 
need of a cosmopolitan law81:   
Since the (narrower and wider) community of the nations of the earth has now gone so 
far that a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all, the idea of a 
cosmopolitan right is no fantastic and exaggerated way of representing right; it is, instead, 
a supplement to the unwritten code of the right of a state and the right of nations necessary for the sake 
of any public right of human beings and so for perpetual peace; only under this condition can we 
flatter ourselves that we are constantly approaching perpetual peace.82  
The cosmopolitan law is “unwritten” and in this sense voluntary, but it nevertheless defines 
moral-legal norms that supplement the domestic83 and interstatal84  law. Kant’s project must not 
be confused with the project of “natural law” which seeks to ground citizen rights in a universal 
and pre-institutional source. Cosmopolitan law is perhaps pre-institutional in the sense that it can 
exist as an unwritten rational code, but this moral-legal obligation does not however dictate its 
specific content. The specification of its content is best understood, according to Waldron, as a 
political concern:  
Cosmopolitan [law] – one’s willingness to do what is required by the general principle of 
sharing this limited world with others – is rightly regarded by Kant as not just one ethical 
idea among others. […] It imposes a certain juridically-based discipline in politics, a 
discipline rooted in our diversity, our potential disagreements, and our need nevertheless 
for law.85  
As Waldron notices, Kant’s starting-point for formulating public right is not the idea of self-
interest (as in Hobbes) or a shared conception of justice (as in Rawls and Walzer), but the 
competing “banners of justice and right” which are held “independently of the opinion of 
                                                 
80 PP, p. 8:349, my emphasis 
81 I’ll go more into the details of these circumstances in chapter 4. 
82 PP, p. 8:360, my emphasis 
83 “the right of a state” 
84 “the right of nations” 
85 Waldron 2000, p. 242 
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others”.86 Because no party in a cosmopolitan discipline of politics can take for granted that their 
conception of justice is the most rational one, this has great implications for the kind of attitude 
that cosmopolitans are required to take. According to this implication, Waldron argues that a 
naively held belief in the universal validity of one’s parochial conception of justice is actually more 
cosmopolitan than the communitarian or reflexive identity-political stance, which defends “our 
way” independently of any ambitions to universalize their conception.  
In the domain of cosmopolitan law, it seems plausible to claim, as Waldron does, that our current 
circumstances call for an even stronger consolidation of the public right. If this is the case, it 
presents us with the following practical challenge:  
[In summary,] we share the earth with those who may have ways of doing things that are 
different from our own, perhaps ways of doing things that we can barely understand, and 
who may make demands on us, for cooperation or forbearance, that are quite different 
from the demands with which we are prepared to comply.87  
For “us” as affected parties, in lack of mutual understanding and agreement, provisional 
regulations seems to be needed in order to live peacefully side by side. This is to some degree, of 
course, already ensured by the implementation of domestic and interstatal law. There is however 
an additional need for law to ensure peace in circumstances where foreigners affect each other. 
As a first step, the provisional regulations of a cosmopolitan law, this will enable us (as a second 
step) to provide a further and adequate content to a shared cosmopolitan law. In the next section 
I will consider Kant’s law of hospitality as a candidate for such a provisional content of 
cosmopolitan law.  
2.3.2 Compromises of public reason 
In light of Waldron’s concern for the proper cosmopolitan attitude, we might consider how 
sensitive the conditions (of the provisional negotiations on the content of cosmopolitan law) are 
to our implicit limitation of the notion of “public” (such as to the “people”). This concern is 
explicated in O’Neill’s critique of Rawls’ notion of public reason. While she recognizes that Rawls 
is a pluralist, (and in this sense differs from a communitarian position) and that Rawls does not 
accept political arguments based on community or tradition, O’Neill still suggests that Rawls’ 
understanding of public reason seems to be grounded in some heteronomous source of a more 
institutional character, which remains an implicit premise in Rawls account of domestic justice. 
With reference to Political Liberalism, O’Neill defines Rawls’ notion of public reason as follows: 
                                                 
86 MM, §44 
87 Waldron 2000, p. 238 
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Public reason, as Rawls construes it, is ‘citizens’ reasoning in the public forum about 
constitutional and ‘basic questions of justice’. Evidently this conception of public reason 
as reciprocity between fellow-citizens presupposes the constitutive institutions that define 
not just citizenship but more specifically fellow-citizenship: the bounded society and the 
constitutional basis of citizenship (including liberal rights and democracy in just societies, 
on Rawls’ account).88  
O’Neill critically questions the extent to which the “bounded society” is detached from the state. 
Are not the boundaries, presupposed by this society, in fact state boundaries?89  
Almost as a consequential error of this state-bound assumption of the character of the public, 
Rawls assumes that “peoples” partakes in the reasoning in public on the international level.90 
Here as well O’Neill is skeptical as to what extent Rawls is able to successfully detach the 
“people” from the state. O’Neill readily accepts that Rawls is correct in distancing himself from 
the realist conception of the state, but she contests the notion that the state is irredeemably 
structured as a self-interested agent. According to O’Neill, Rawls argument relies on the weak, if 
not false, assumption that states cannot be agents of justice. 
Although Rawls considers his position Kantian, O’Neill points out a core difference between 
Kant’s and Rawls’ understanding of public reason, with clear implications for their notions of 
justice across borders. Arguing against Rawls’ critique of Kant’s metaphysical presuppositions, 
O’Neill gives the following reading of Kant’s anti-metaphysical position91:     
 The central thought of Kant’s account of public reason is simply that the standards of 
reason cannot be derivative. Any acceptance of other, ‘external’ authorities of whatever 
sort as sources of reason must fail. […] A would-be reasoner who leans on some socially 
or civilly constituted power and authority that lacks reasoned vindication fails to reason.92  
O’Neill points out that although Rawls’ position is not communitarian; his notion of “public 
reason” bears heteronomous characteristics. Since Rawls notion “presupposes the authority of 
civilly and socially constituted roles, institutions and practices”93, Rawls seems to understand 
“public” the way Kant understands “private” (i.e. as institutionally dependent reasoning). In 
contrast, Kant has a global or borderless understanding of the public as the ‘world of readers’. 
                                                 
88 O’Neill 2016, p. 104 
89 Ibid.  
90 Obviously, and as I’ll come back to in chapter 3 and 5, Rawls’ “people” was never intended as a realistic 
sociological concept, but rather as an analogue to the individuals of a bounded society as they were “prior to justice” 
in the hypothetical situation of the original position. Compared to Kant, this seems to put Rawls’ “people” and the 
agreement between them in a somewhat unclear position between interstatal law and international positive law. 
91 I take “metaphysical” here to refer to substantial assumptions, beyond the formal conceptual analysis (or perhaps 
necessarily intertwined with this). For O’Neill, the decisive point is the question of derivability from principles, which 
are in her reading essentially indeterminable.   
92 O’Neill 2016, p. 108 
93 Ibid., p. 109 
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In addition to pointing out the ideal of autonomy from political authority in Kant’s notion of 
public reason, O’Neill emphasizes the basic intersubjective character of autonomy in her reading 
of Kant. There is a minimal criterion of rationality in Kant’s conception, she argues, which is that 
it should be communicable or possible for other to follow. Hence, to be free, in the sense of 
being able to reason by oneself (i.e. to be autonomous), is not the same as being alone: “how 
much and how correctly would we think if we did not think as it were in community with others 
to whom we communicate our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us!”94 
The central significance given to intersubjectivity by O’Neill in her account of Kant’s notion of 
autonomy is remarkable. Usually it is deemphasized in favor of his more formal, solipsistic 
accounts. Similar to the original position of Rawls, the general idea is that the primary step would 
be the rational individual making up its own mind, and only then it would make it public. The 
significance given to communication for autonomous thinking reveals a false dichotomy between 
the natural state of isolated individuals and the civil condition of bounded societies.  According 
to O’Neill this has clear implications for the way we understand the basic requirement of justice; 
i.e. to leave the state of nature. As she makes clear, Kant rejected a Hobbesian view that any state 
is unconditionally preferable to a state of nature.95 Rather: “On Kant’s view, state power is not an 
intrinsic requirement of justice, but a compromise that we have to accept under actual 
conditions.”96  
As a compromise, any realization of justice on the domestic or international level must be 
considered an approximation of the ideal civil condition. In regard to changing circumstances this 
approximation must be adjusted in public to allow for the best possible compromise. O’Neill 
concludes that Kant’s conception, as it is not grounded in the state structure, is in this sense both 
more realistic and more open to continuous improvements than Rawls’ account.   
2.4 The cosmopolitan law of hospitality 
To clarify the status of cosmopolitan law we may use the law of hospitality as an example. 
Compared to the two other aspects of the triad of ‘public right’ – domestic law and interstatal law 
– Kant devoted only a few brief remarks to cosmopolitan law [Weltbürgerrecht].97 In Toward 
Perpetual Peace it is articulated in this manner:  
                                                 
94 Quoted from Kant’s “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”, p. 8:144, in O’Neill 2016, p. 111. 
95 Notice that Kant’s requirement is not democratic in our terms, but requires a condition of equality of status for all 
citizens under law. Hierarchical societies like feudalism undermine this condition.  
96 O’Neill 2016, p. 115   
97 Kant’s treatments of cosmopolitan law are found, to my knowledge, only in two places. In both places it is treated 
very shortly, as a supplement to the other concerns of a civil constitution. The first place is found as the third 
definitive article of the conditions for perpetual peace in Toward Perpetual Peace (1795). The second place is §62 in 
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“Cosmopolitan [law] shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.”98  
In my following discussion of this law of hospitality, I will discuss the character of the obligations 
that this law articulates and consider if it presents us with an adequate content of a cosmopolitan 
law of admission. Further, I will consider some elements of this law of hospitality that, in my 
opinion, can be read as provisional aspects of a cosmopolitan law of deliberation, provided that 
Kant seems to have given the global public a quite central role in the public reasoning on issues 
of justice.  
2.4.1 The right to visit - hospitality as a cosmopolitan law of admission  
The law of hospitality specifies both duties and rights of the hosting and visiting parties. The 
most common reading of this law tends to emphasize the parts that revolve around the question 
of the cosmopolitan rights of the foreign immigrant. Naturally, these rights are concerned with 
the right to enter the territory of an alien state for short-term visits (first admission) and the right 
to remain on the territory with some kind of membership status (second admission).  
For instance, Seyla Benhabib reads the law of hospitality is this manner, i.e. as a cosmopolitan law 
of admission. She stresses the distinction Kant makes between being a guest (second admission) 
and being a visitor (first admission). 99 Quite explicitly, according to Kant, the law of hospitality 
concerns the right to visit [besuchrecht], not the right to be a guest [gastrecht].100 This distinction is 
related to the character of the obligations corresponding to these rights. Kant recognizes the right 
to visit as part of cosmopolitan law, since it implies a perfect, negative duty of the hosting 
country not to send someone to their “destruction”. The right to be a guest is given less 
protection as it is considered by Kant to correspond merely to an imperfect, positive duty 
                                                                                                                                                        
“The doctrine of right” [Rechtlehre] (1797), the first part of The Metaphysics of Morals, which situates the cosmopolitan 
right as the third part of the public right, the part of the external law (contrary to the moral law of conscience). Kant 
also mentions the notion of a “cosmopolitan system of general political security” in the essay “Idea of a Universal 
History”. 
98 PP, p. 8:357, my insertion (replaced “right”) 
99 Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. The Rights of Others : Aliens, Residents, and Citizens, The Seeley Lectures. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
100 One is easily confused with the different uses of terms here. Kant distinguishes the right to visit (besuchsrecht) from 
the rights of a guest, or to reside (gastrecht). Benhabib uses correspondingly “the temporary right to sojourn” 
(besuchsrecht) and “the right to be a permanent visitor” (gastrecht). (See Derrida, Jacques. 2002. On Cosmopolitanism and 
Forgiveness. Reprinted. ed., Thinking in Action. London: Routledge.) Derrida distinguishes the two as an internal 
tension to the right of hospitality, on the one side unconditional and on the other side conditional. When Benhabib 
uses the “right to hospitality” she seems to refer to both simultaneously, and as her general approach to immigration 
indicates, the Derridian aporeic premise of ‘closure as the very possibility of openness’ seems to be central to her 
understanding of the problem. See for instance “The paradox of democratic legitimacy” (Benhabib 2004, p. 43. ff). 
When Garrett Brown uses the term “laws of hospitality” he also includes six further specifications.  
I tend to read ‘the right to visit’ as the cosmopolitan right (unconditional claim), while ‘the right to be a 
guest’ is a qualified moral-philanthropic right of mutual aid. 
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conditioned by the will of the hosting state. Hence, the right to be a guest is not properly 
speaking a “right” in moral-legal terms of public right.  
To be a “guest” equals here the “right” or contractual private privileges to a long-term or 
permanent residency. To be a proper guest requires the good-will of the host to agree to a 
contract with the temporary visitor in order for him/her to become a part of the national 
household or (eventually) a permanent member. The reason for this weaker obligation toward 
foreign guests seems to be that their stay affects the hosting state not only as a civil union, but 
also and perhaps primarily as a community of interest (a common wealth) and as one of 
inheritance (a nation). As a guest, the foreigner is treated as a member of the “household” (or 
welfare state), and may presumably affect the welfare of the inhabitants. Potentially, as mentioned 
in the discussion on residency on humanitarian grounds, it could be a self-undermining decision 
to allow too many to enter and settle.  
According to this distinction between the perfect duty of the state toward the visitor and the 
imperfect duty toward the guest, I suggest a minimal reading of the law of hospitality that is 
restricted to the right of “a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he arrived on the 
land of another”101. Considered as a law of admission, the law of hospitality is limited to a 
negative duty not to inflict harm on others in accordance with the principle of justice. As long as 
foreigners approach us in a peaceful manner, they should be met likewise. Not to be treated with 
hostility does not exclude the possibility of being turned away by immigration officers, but only if 
it does not lead to the “destruction” [Untergang] of the foreigner. This formulation is usually 
interpreted according to the principle of non-refoulement, which implies that the state 
sovereignty of immigration control is restricted when the mere rejection or deportation of a 
foreigner to their country of origin (including transit states) is likely to put them at risk of losing 
their life or their basic freedoms. That is, to expose them to the risk of inhumane treatment like 
political persecution and torture This right might be summarized as an unconditional right not to 
be harmed when entering or residing on foreign territory, including harmful deportation and 
refoulement. The corresponding duty does not imply a duty to open the borders, but it is similar 
to the basic requirement of the asylum system we have today. In the next section I will consider a 
wider reading of this law of hospitality concerned with the communicative aspect of public 
reason and the right of a foreigner “to present oneself for society”102. I suggest we call this 
second aspect of cosmopolitan law the law of deliberation. 
                                                 
101 PP, p. 8: 357-8 
102 Ibid., p. 8:359 
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In general, this minimal reading seems to go quite well with Benhabib’s reading of the ‘law of 
hospitality’ as Kant’s specification of the cosmopolitan law of admission. There seems however 
to be a disagreement about the character of the duty involved. I hold it to be moral-legal and 
perfect in character, whereas Benhabib states that “The universal right to hospitality which is due 
to every human person imposes upon us an imperfect moral duty to help and offer shelter to 
those whose life, limb, and well-being are endangered. This duty is “imperfect” – i.e. conditional 
– in that it can permit exceptions, and can be overridden by legitimate grounds of self-
preservation.”103 On the one hand, it seems Benhabib considers the right to visit to imply more 
than the corresponding unconditional (i.e. perfect) duty associated with non-refoulement. If so, it 
is a matter of disagreement on content. On the other hand, and in addition to the first possible 
disagreement, what Benhabib implies with the use of “conditional” seems to be something to the 
effect of assigning this duty an ethical-humanitarian character, rather than a moral-legal one. 
Every moral-legal norm does not have to be “perfect” in the sense of an absolute rule, but they 
cannot (according to Kant’s framework) be conditional in the sense that it relies on the goodwill 
of the agents involved. The motive of self-preservation seems to me to be a limit-case of “good 
will” or virtue, depending on how wide “the self” is considered.  
Either way, if we consider the provisional character of the law of hospitality as an adequate 
compromise with the actual circumstances of his time, we would expect the content of Kant’s 
law to be outdated by the current circumstances. As O’Neill states: “Many of Kant’s specific 
institutional suggestions are inadequate to the twenty-first century: in particular we can no longer 
imagine that rights to hospitality deal adequately with justice to those who are beyond the 
boundaries of their own states.”104  
Whereas O’Neill seems to aim beyond the law of admission all together, Benhabib seeks to revise 
it. She criticizes Kant on a similar account for not including a right to permanent residency, i.e. a 
guest right. She even identifies what appears to be a basic conflict in Kant’s own conception: 
The right to seek human association, or in the literal translation of the German, “to offer 
oneself to civil association [Gesellschaft] with others,” and to seek “approach” – Zugang – 
rather than entry – Eingang – is for Kant a fundamental human right. This is to be 
distinguished from the res nullius thesis105; in fact, the right to seek human association is at 
the core of what it means to be a Weltbürger [a cosmopolitan; a world citizen].106   
                                                 
103 Benhabib 2004, p. 36 
104 O’Neill 2016, p. 117 
105 Regards Kant’s critique of Locke and relates to the notion of the common possession of the surface of the earth. 
I’m uncertain as to what is the scope of this restriction, but I would at least agree to it when it comes to settling on 
and appropriating foreign land (i.e. to be a guest).  
106 Benhabib 2004, p. 38 
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Benhabib nonetheless acknowledges that the soundness of the appeal to this distinction between 
visiting rights and guest rights depends on the context.107 When the hosting party is a powerful 
and affluent state, this weakening of one’s obligations might seem like a cynical excuse for a lack 
of commitment to fellow world-citizens. Especially if the individuals in question are stateless and 
have nowhere else to go, no association to return to or no free spot to establish a new, it seems 
difficult to legitimize the rejections of someone seeking “civil association”. But the picture is 
different when the relation of forces is reversed. Weak and poor states (even nations without 
much state structure) could certainly be in need of such a privilege to deny second admissions as 
a protection against the rule of force of international corporations and foreign settlers.  
To understand the arguments for not admitting “guest rights” as a moral-legal norm, it is 
important to understand the historical context Kant was writing in. His main concern was not a 
“stream of poor migrants” to the industrialized (and soon to be automatized) global north. 
Kant’s main concern was the impact of western settlements and commercial endeavors (which 
later led to the full blown imperialism in the 19th century) in the newly “discovered” land 
elsewhere. Kant describes his concern this way in Toward Perpetual Peace:  
If one compares [the cosmopolitan condition] with the inhospitable behavior of civilized, 
especially commercial, states in our part of the world, the injustice they show in visiting 
foreign lands and peoples (which with them is tantamount to conquering them) goes to 
horrifying lengths.108  
He continues by referring to the cases of American slave trade (“negro countries,”109 “spice 
Islands”) and the colonization of India (“Hindustan”). The problems involved in settling 
elsewhere seem to have motivated Kant to make a clear distinction between “the right to visit all 
regions of the earth” and “the right to make a settlement on the land of another nation.” The 
latter right requires, according to Kant, a specific contract. The “good intentions” of forced 
christening (salvation), expelling of the corrupted to Australia (New Holland) and exploitation of 
a lack of juridical competence on the part of Native Americans (civilization), did not justify these 
means in Kant’s view.  
Although the world is more or less decolonized today, Kant’s argument can still be considered 
relevant: For instance, the attempt to institute a lawful condition by means of violence has 
repeatedly proved disastrous in the last decades (for instance in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya). More 
prominent still, international corporations have strong economic incentive power to motivate 
                                                 
107 Benhabib 2004 
108 PP, p. 8:358, my insertion 
109 This term was used as in derogatory manner by the abolitionist movement against slavery.  
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states to lower wages, environmental standards and standards of working conditions in order to 
compete in the global investment market.  
If we recognize Kant’s ambition as the establishment of a reciprocal relation, with protection 
against exploitation going both ways, the conditioned right to be a guest is primarily understood 
as an unconditioned right of sovereignty of the hosting state, and the corresponding perfect duty 
of the visiting side not to harm the host. These aspects considered, there is still good reasons to 
agree with Benhabib that the cosmopolitan law of admission should be extended to something 
similar to the right to be a guest, or more precisely as a right to be a member. (See chapter 5) 
2.4.2 The right to present oneself - hospitality as a cosmopolitan law of deliberation 
Waldron’s and O’Neill’s readings of Kant are interesting because they suggest an original 
specification of cosmopolitan law; one that emphasizes the communicative aspects as well as the 
agents of civil society. This reading conceives the liberal argument for freedom of movement, or 
the general discussion of a cosmopolitan law of admission, as a provisional regulation as a mean  
to actualize and protect cross-border communication according to the regulative  idea of the 
emergence of a global civil society. In sum, rather than promoting the rights to visit and to move 
freely, based  on the needs and life opportunities of the individual,110 Kant’s argument ultimately 
rests on the regulative idea of a lawful condition on the cosmopolitan level; i.e. a cosmopolitan 
condition. 
The articulation of the law of hospitality as the right “to present oneself for society” indicates a 
broader orientation of cosmopolitan law beyond the “no harm”-principle. ‘To present oneself’ 
alludes more directly to the cosmopolitan spirit that promotes free communication across 
physical and formal borders. Whereas the sailing ship and the camel (the ship of the desert) 
contribute to overcoming physical barriers, the right to present oneself (as a visitor) facilitates not 
only a safe arrival, but a successful one. This aspect of the right to visit would correspond more 
closely to the kind of freedom of movement that we see within academia, than to the kind we see 
within regional agreements like the EU.  
To understand why the law of hospitality has a provisional function in this context, Garrett 
Brown’s argument is helpful. Brown argues that the main purpose of Kant’s law of hospitality is 
not to set the final content of cosmopolitan law. It is rather, in line with Waldron’s perspective, a 
provisional law to establish the “conditions of hospitality”. These conditions are defined by 
                                                 
110 For argument against this position, see Carens (this thesis: 5.3 Radicalizing Rawls: the “Open Border” 
cosmopolitan response) and Oberman, Kieran. 2016. "Immigration as a Human Right." In Migration in Political Theory 
: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, edited by Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi, 32-57: Oxford University Press. 
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Brown as “the ethical conditions to establish a sense of mutual consistency between visitor and 
visited.”111 This is important, because it secures a relation (ideally) free from domination, which is 
meant “to allow for the possibility of a future deliberation about cosmopolitan justice to take 
place.”112 As such, the conditions of hospitality secure the conditions for deliberation. In other 
words, it articulates the basic, provisional conditions for an emerging cosmopolitan legal order.  
In “What is Enlightenment?” Kant associates these conditions of hospitality with the “freedom 
to make public use of one’s reason”.113 According to Brown, the use of public reason is a 
necessity “that allows for humanity to rightfully associate, trade, communicate and exchange 
experiments in living without conflict.”114 The quoted passage summarizes quite clearly the 
instrumental value of being able to visit peacefully. Its function is not primarily to allow people to 
escape one’s own country, to travel or to realize one’s life-plan, but to establish peaceful relations 
with other societies and bring us all as a global community closer together. The law of hospitality 
thus protects the possibility of communication, i.e. the process of building and maintaining 
relations. In this sense the law of hospitality is not just an adequate compromise with the current 
status quo, but the moral-legal norms it entails are also formulated with the intent to change the 
future circumstances in a direction which is more favorable for an extension of the content of 
cosmopolitan law. In this sense, the law of hospitality is not only the basic content of the law of 
admission, but also the basic content of the law of deliberation. 
The law of hospitality can be seen as providing a balanced relation between foreigners and states, 
in contrast to imperialism, which manifested the globalized rule of force. In addition to serve as a 
normative contrast to a proper civil condition, the global consequences of imperialism 
strengthened the circumstantial need for cosmopolitan law. It actualized the relevance of a shared 
world in the weak sense that Kant refers to when he describes how troubles and violence 
experienced by settlements in foreign territories, are located “in one place on our globe [but are] 
to be felt all over it”.115 With this circumstantial understanding in mind, Brown emphasizes the 
future situation as decisive:  
This ‘conditioned’ limitation on hospitality by Kant was not an effort to promote a 
xenophobic nationalism, but was an attempt to limit imperial colonialism abroad. Thus, 
Kant’s distinction between gastrecht and besuchsrecht could be read as a necessary 
                                                 
111 P. 314, in Brown, Garrett. 2010. "The Laws of Hospitality, Asylum Seekers and Cosmopolitan Right." European 
Journal of Political Theory 9, no. 3: 308-327. 
112 Ibid., p. 316, my emphasis 
113 P. 55, in Kant, Immanuel, and Hans Reiss. 1991. Political Writings. 2. enlarged ed., Cambridge Texts in the History 
of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
114 Brown 2010, p. 321 
115 MM, 6:353 
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precondition for a more mutually consistent and universal application of cosmopolitan 
norms. This mutually consistent application of cosmopolitan right is a necessary 
condition for future justice, in that justice and the corresponding condition of public right 
are ‘the sum of conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice 
of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom.’ 116 
It is on this note that Brown develops a reading of Kant where “[…] the laws of hospitality could 
be seen as being specifically designed to act as a minimal foundation from which future 
discussions about cosmopolitan justice might take place between a plurality of world voices in an 
increasingly globalized world.”117 The law of hospitality is from this perspective understood as a 
cosmopolitan law that protects cosmopolitan interactions in its very initial stages: “This [law], 
since it has to do with the possible union of all nations with a view to certain universal laws for 
their possible commerce, can be called cosmopolitan [law].”118  
Seen in this light, the right to visit is quite different from the current right to asylum. In addition 
to the negative duty of non-refoulement, it would imply the legal passage of asylum seekers “to 
present themselves” by applying for asylum. It would also allow economic migrants and 
intellectuals from all over to go where they want. Given that they have the resources to sustain 
themselves. Hence, it is a considerably wider notion of the right to first admission. It allows any 
individual to move freely between countries on a short term basis119, but without the guarantee of 
acquiring rights of second admission (i.e. long-term residency or membership rights). If we 
consider it as a moral-legal right it is indeed a radical proposal, consistent with a liberal 
cosmopolitan position on freedom of movement, but far from the actual practice of the 
international community of states.   
It should also be noted that “possible commerce” refers to a wider notion of communication 
than the current use of “commerce” would indicate. Specifications of the cosmopolitan law of 
hospitality like ‘the right to present oneself for society’ or ‘the right to approach others with a 
view to engage in commerce’ are also intended to include deliberations of public reason on a 
global level and hence serve to protect the basic conditions of establishing a possible 
cosmopolitan legal order as a common framework.  
When we consider the law of hospitality as a cosmopolitan law of deliberation, the main issue is 
concerned with the scope of the content. The question of a narrow or wide interpretation of the 
right to visit is relevant in this regard because a wider interpretation provides the basic and 
provisional content for the law of hospitality as a cosmopolitan law of deliberation, and not just 
of admission. The question of the character of the obligation implied takes on a secondary 
                                                 
116 Brown 2010, p. 314, Brown quotes from MM, 6:230 
117 Ibid., p. 310  
118 MM, 6:352 
119 A global “allemannsrett”.  
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significance. Given that the content of cosmopolitan law is moral-legal norms, any philanthropic 
or ethical-Samaritan elements in the content suggested would merely indicate a categorical 
mistake.  
What is at stake in a wider interpretation of the right to visit is the reflexivity implied in the 
openness of the content of cosmopolitan law: The content is reflexive in the sense that it is not 
only concerned with the dignity of each human individual, but also with the social conditions that 
sustain the deliberations which may improve the adequacy of the content of the law. The 
deliberations which specify this content are important because it is futile to trust any one of us to 
determine the content of the law in isolation. This content cannot be determined by deduction 
from the principles of human dignity that should guide our public reason. We have to come to a 
compromise together and in terms that we can share. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I’ve provided an answer to the question of the state’s obligations toward foreign 
immigrants within the Kantian conceptual framework. Within this framework, the scope of 
justice is defined by the triad of public right. It implies that a cosmopolitan scope of obligations 
(of states toward foreigners, and individuals toward alien states) is seen as necessary in 
circumstances where foreigners affect each other to a certain degree. In conceptual terms this 
demand is distinct from the kind of obligations we associate with ethical-humanitarian duties. It 
is also important to note that any specification of this content is a compromise with outer 
circumstances. Such compromises are somewhat detached from positive law. The content of 
cosmopolitan law will never articulate perfect justice and are always open to further 
improvements and adjustments according to shifting circumstances. In light of these insights I 
have suggested two ways to read Kant’s own specification of the cosmopolitan law (i.e. the right 
to visit): In a narrow reading it can be seen as a law of admission, and in a wider reading  as a 
provisional content of a law of deliberation.  
In the following chapters I will consider our current circumstances along two main lines. First, I 
will discuss how principles of justice have been given expression and concrete content within the 
dominating institutional order of the modern nation-state (chapter 3), and second, I will consider 
more specifically how the outer circumstances have changed after Kant’s time in ways that are 
relevant to the question of extending the content of cosmopolitan law, as suggested by 
Benhabib’s argument for a law of second admission. I will primarily consider Arendt’s 
perspective on the experience of totalitarianism in this regard (chapter 4).  Together, these lines 
will serve as the background for my discussion of the academic debate on immigration in chapter 
5.  
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Chapter 3: We the people – A State-centric perspective on democratic 
participation 
We are cultivated in high degree by art and science. We are civilized to the point of excess in all kinds 
of social courtesies and proprieties. But we are still a long way from the point where we could consider 
ourselves morally mature.  
- Kant, Idea of Universal History  
An implication of accepting that states are morally obliged to the cosmopolitan law of 
deliberation is that the state must secure foreigners’ right to participate in the decision-making 
processes. In this chapter I will pursue how this conception of cosmopolitan law challenges the 
dominating state-centric conception of politics. By describing in detail some of the central aspects 
of a statist position, I will attempt to clarify how deep-seated assumptions in our public self-
understanding make it difficult even to conceive of the possibility of a democratic cosmopolitan 
reform.  
First of all, I will explain the notion of “state-centrism” and distinguish it from statism and 
nationalism. Further, I will address the state-centric conception on three levels: the 
methodological, our social imaginaries and theory. Regarding the methodological level, Rawls’ 
conception of justice represents a state-centric paradigm. Although his conception can be 
considered a semi-cosmopolitan view, like Kant’s, it could also, as I will show, be described as 
clearly state-centric in its methodological or procedural concerns. In other words, Rawls 
recognizes that the scope of justice is wider than the state (or “bounded society”), but he does 
not recognize cosmopolitan interaction as methodologically relevant.  
The second level concerns our state-centric social imaginaries, i.e. the way in which the moral-
legal principles of freedom and equality are given a specific content not only in positive law, but 
also in prejudices and expectations of everyday social life. I identify the state-centric character of 
social imaginaries by pointing out a tension in the secular social imaginary of civil society between 
the market and the public sphere.  
On the third level, I will consider more specifically how state-centrism has influenced the main 
political theories of democracy. Part of this influence can be explained historically, as the modern 
ideas of democracy emerged as gradual reforms of the absolutist state. In the current theory of 
democracy there are, broadly speaking, two defining elements: The procedures of will-formation 
(voting, interest aggregation, constitutional rights) and procedures of opinion-formation 
(deliberation). The emphasis on either of these elements – in the different theoretical positions 
on democracy – is not only guided by principles, but also inspired by the secular social 
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imaginaries of civil society. In the end of this chapter I consider how the “deliberative turn” in 
democratic theory might open up for the recognition of the perspective of the foreigner by 
emphasizing the democratic significance of the public sphere.       
3.1 The state-centric attitude 
There is a historical background to the way liberal-democratic societies address political issues. It 
is the history of a political culture where the state apparatus has developed parallel to the 
implementation of a new moral order. Part of this modern order regulates the relation between 
political communities according to certain internationally recognized principles, such as state 
sovereignty and liberal-democratic norms of government. This is a combination we have grown 
accustomed to and usually take for granted in the form of the liberal-democratic nation-state.  
It is symptomatic for most perspectives within the modern democratic tradition that they 
conceive of the state as the taken for granted location for political interaction. In the next section 
(3.2) I will present Rawls’ liberal-egalitarian, political conception of justice as an example of such 
a conventional state-centric approach. Although Rawls explicitly distances himself from the realist 
conception of the state on the normative level, his conception is in several ways still related to the 
influence from contractual theory and the implicit concept of state sovereignty inspired by the 
early modern absolutist political thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes.   
A central feature of the way our sedimented tradition has formed our notions of political issues is 
detectible in the categories that are given primacy. By “state-centrism” I mean a perspective that 
gives (usually implicit) primacy to the state apparatus in the definition of political issues. In 
distinction from statist positions, state-centric approaches are not directly concerned with the scope 
of justice. Rather, these approaches tend to take for granted that there is a distinction between 
political and moral issues. To be ‘centric’ is a term that relies on a comparative relation to other 
perspectives. It points at aspects of habitual styles of thinking and implicit procedural preferences 
that manifest themselves in certain tendencies rather than in explicit arguments. The main 
tendencies that are relevant in this context are to exclude individual foreigners from issuing 
consent on the question of justice, to marginalize transnational issues –such as migration– as 
political phenomena, and the neglect of the epistemological relevance of the ‘view from 
elsewhere’.  
To give primacy to the state apparatus in the definition of political issues implies, for instance, 
that imaginary extra-political entities, such as “the people” or “the civil society”, are confined by 
the limits of the territorial border. Rather than viewing borders as arbitrary lines in a continuous 
terrain, the state and its institutional infrastructure is seen as the defining source of boundaries. In 
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historical and geographical terms, this view seems to be confirmed by the diversity of languages 
and cultural identities normally found within a “people”. In the case of nationalism this diversity 
is countered by a political project of ethnic homogeneity within these territorial and institutional 
borders.   
The imaginary of the nation-state is globally dominant,120 but the state-centric attitude is not 
essentially defined by nationalism. First of all, the specification of “for whom” and “for what 
purpose” is to some degree detached from the “nation”, in the sense that “the state” – the 
instrument – encompasses anything from a city state to a multi-national federal union. Second, 
the character of “the people” is subject to political negotiations that are specific to the 
circumstances in each particular state. The relation between the “for whom” the state is the 
supreme legislative and sanctioning competence (as a populous; population), and the “by whom” the 
state offers privacy and the freedom to participate in democratic will formation (as a demos; 
sovereign people)121 is constantly renegotiated. After World War II the idea of homogeneous 
nation-states has been contested. Third, the defining trait of state-centrism is not the blood-line 
of its people, but, in Benhabib’s words: “the policing and protecting of state boundaries against 
foreigners and intruders, refugees and asylum seekers.”122 National belonging is but one of several 
competing concerns to legitimize this border-policing. 
State-centric approaches tend to view the state as a self-sufficient entity, i.e. as a closed, self-
sufficient system. This is conceptually questionable given that a state is part of a relational 
international order. Each state relies on being recognized by other states and hence to be part of 
some interstatal system. This order was given a recognizable form, at least for the European state 
system, in the Westphalian treaty of 1648. Within this international order of sovereign states, a 
state-centric definition of politics is fairly accurate in the sense that it adequately describes 
“politics” as those domestic issues that are habitually related to the territorial state. But from a 
critical perspective, this way of organizing political activity is clearly of a “second” or 
conventional nature. The basic disadvantage of state-centrism is a certain negligence or blindness 
for the political character of issues outside the accustomed institutionalized range of “politics” 
(domestic and interstatal issues). In other words, it characteristically ignores the actual mismatch 
between the conventional definition of politics and what I will call the cosmopolitan level of 
politics. The latter appears from a state-centric perspective either as an abstract utopian ideal of a 
global state, or as a practical anomaly due to non-ideal conditions. As an organizing assumption 
                                                 
120 This imaginary is of course not always responsive to the actual diversity within the states, especially those that 
resemble more an empire or federation than a single state, or that bear the demographic marks of colonial history..  
121 See for instance Nussbaum 2006. 
122 Benhabib 2004, p. 2 
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of social reality, the state-centric conception of politics is in conflict with the possibility of a civil 
society with a “trans-statal” character.   
3.1.1 The state of the people – distinguishing state from nation 
While it is quite accurate to say that the modern notion of ‘the sovereign people’ developed 
parallel to democratic reforms of a state structure inherited from absolutist regimes, the idea of 
‘the state of the people’ understood as a nation-state is a quite recent combination of two concepts 
with separate histories.  
The historical cross-breeding of these two concepts into the nation-state, has infused the 
otherwise quite formal-egalitarian state-centric notion of politics with a socially integrating 
mythical appeal to homogeneity. The constitutional democracy of the nation state is in practical 
terms a successful and efficient combination of the ideas of the sovereign, self-constituting 
people (“we, the people” of the constitution) and the national myth of homogeneity.123 This is a 
powerful combination that solves two basic societal tasks quite well. First: How to legitimize the 
secular state? And second: How to evoke a sense of solidarity and social integration within the 
population of such artificial mass societies as states?  
In the next sections I will look closer at how the answer to the first question is addressed by 
Rawls and how his answer is related to some central traits of the historical development of the 
liberal-democratic theory in general. But, to avoid conceptual confusion, I will first take a look at 
the ambiguous way we use the term “nation” and compare its conceptual history to that of the 
“state”. As already discussed in chapter 2, if we look at the common use of the terms 
“nationality” and “international”, they both imply a conflation of two distinct terms: the nation 
and the state. “International relations” usually refers more precisely to “relations between states”.  
On the one hand “nation” is originally related to the notion of being a native (from latin natus, 
which means birth). To be “a native” thus symbolizes authentic belonging to a group and a place. 
In its modern conception this mode of belonging is associated with the substantial, extra-political 
community (from latin gens; which means people, or the polity) that “aspire for, or exercise, 
comprehensive self-government”.124 The extra-political people is also though to lend its 
legitimacy to an established democratic government. In addition to the “classical nation-states” – 
which evolved from states to nations (such as France) we find within aspiring nations everything 
from regions seeking independence (ex. Norway, from Denmark and later Sweden, with 
                                                 
123 Exactly what this idea of homogeneity is based on can be negotiated and revised, as the civil rights movement of 
the US is an encouraging example of.  
124 P. 704, in Bauböck, Rainer. 2003. "Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism." The International 
migration review : IMR 37, no. 3: 24. 
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similarities to the post-colonial states), regions of states uniting (such as Germany and Italy) and 
(perhaps most spectacular and controversial) projects of “reconstruction” such as Israel and the 
South-African “Bantustans” (or pure constructions like the India/Pakistan-divide).  
On the other hand, “nation” is also used as a synonym for the territorially bounded state. Often 
national self-determinacy is taken as synonymous with the status of being a sovereign state, and 
sometimes these do also (more or less) coincide. Still, we should be aware that the way we talk 
about ‘the nation’ assumes this coincidence in a hyperbolic manner. For instance, when we ask 
for someone’s “nationality”, we usually ask which state the person has citizenship in, but at the 
same time we strengthen the impression that all states are homogeneous (or mono-geneous; 
mono-national). Likewise, when we speak of “international” agreements, we usually intend the 
kind of agreements made between states, and not the kind of agreements made within 
multinational states, such as Spain, Belgium and the United Kingdom. If we look at how separate 
the conceptual stories of “state” and “nation” are, the inadequate conflation of these terms 
becomes even clearer.  
The “state” emerged as the executive branch of the royal household. In addition to protecting 
external borders, its primary function was to uphold internal order by the measures of a standing 
army, a police force and a penal system. The democratic reform, promulgated by Locke, 
Rousseau and Kant, among others, implied that the executive branch was combined with a new 
legislative arrangement. In the liberal tradition, the state was also conceptually separated from 
civil society. At first, this conceptual separation was driven by the opposition against the 
mercantile regime. The liberalists understood civil society primarily to be the market and 
promoted accordingly the functional specification of the state apparatus as a purely 
administrative institution. Consequently, the state should no longer control the market from 
above, but secure and facilitate the infrastructure of production, without direct involvement in 
the productive tasks. Subsequently, other parts of society were recognized as independent from 
the state, such as the public sphere.125  
The “nation”, in contrast to citizenship (civitas) or the populace, was originally associated with 
communities of shared decent and heritage, and with a common geographical and cultural 
background. A nation was thus not necessarily associated with a political people, constituted by 
law. In early Middle Ages into early modern times “nations” functioned mainly to designate 
‘country of origin’ that is, as internal differentiations in trans-border organizations, such as 
                                                 
125 An indication of the wide acceptance of the latter is that even authoritarian regimes like the Russian and Chinese 
that aims to control the public sphere (through firewalls and state-run “civil” organizations), simultaneously wants to 
give an impression of the opposite. Hypocrisy is usually a reliable indicator of hegemony. 
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universities, monasteries, merchant settlements, etc.126 In this practical context, national identity 
was ascribed rather than proclaimed by oneself127: “[…] national origin ascribed by others was 
from the very beginning linked in a conspicuous way with the negative demarcation of foreigners 
from one’s own people.”128 For instance, Bergen was a Hanseatic town with a designated district 
for “Germans” (or the “German harbor”) long before Germany was formed as a nation-state.  
During the 19th century, popular national consciousness gained in strength,129 and the old, non-
political ideas of decent and origin increased in political relevance. The concept of nation 
“became an efficient mechanism for repudiating everything regarded as foreign, for devaluing 
other nations, and for excluding national, ethnic, and religious minorities, especially the Jews.”130  
According to Habermas, the combination of these two concepts into ‘nation-state’ gave our 
current political system a Janus-face. One face is turned forwards, as it were, to the coming 
actualization of a “we” as a democratic people: A sovereign people set to rule by legislation and 
supervise the state in order to fill the lacuna of the old divine legitimacy. But, as it turns out, most 
states has not been able to transform the idea of a political association of the free and equal into a 
sufficiently strong ground for patriotism and social integrity. The somewhat arbitrary ‘people of 
the territory’ do not seem to have had the driving force to establish a convincing second-nature 
“we”, especially when facing the social challenges of urbanization and economic modernization 
(economic inequity and class conflict). The second face is turned backwards toward the nation 
which the state is for. The idea of a pre-existing people has taken on, with the US as at least one 
clear exception, the function of dealing with the task of social integration. It fills a conceptual 
gap, according to Habermas, between the legal construction of the constitutional state and the 
arbitrary social boundaries of those gathered. In retrospect, this notion of a national community 
quite easily takes on the natural appearance of a common heritage; a common language and 
historical destiny, and thus infuses the people of the state with a sufficient degree of 
authenticity.131  
This sense of (mechanic; in-group based) authenticity facilitates a certain level of trust which 
seems to make it easier to reach political consensus on, for example, a welfare-state definition of 
a common good. But, as Roger Brubaker has pointed out, this comes with a price: “[b]y inventing 
the national citizen and the legally homogenous national citizenry, the Revolution simultaneously 
                                                 
126 Habermas 2001, p. 110  
127 Today: ethnicity has to a large extent replaced nation in this function. For instance: Facebook is ethnocentric and 
designates/tracks ethnicity as relevant behavioral factor unless you’re white (i.e. normal). 
128 Ibid., p. 110 
129 It reflects a change in the imaginary from “Adelsnation” to “Volknation”. 
130 Ibid., p. 111 
131 Ibid. 
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invented the foreigner.”132 By interpreting the people as a nation, the citizen and the foreigner 
was symbolically coded in a particular manner that discriminated and excluded heterogeneous 
persons, potentially regardless of formal membership. “Nationals” that happened to be members 
of other states were more easily included, while citizens with an “originally” foreign nationality – 
such as minorities with cultural affiliations to other geographical regions – was met with 
suspicion.   
As such, the “nation-state” reflects a specific collective self-understanding that defines the door-
keeping function of the state in a particular manner. Hence the reference to Janus, the 
mythological god of gates and doorways, takes on a richer metaphorical sense: With one face 
turned toward the “authentic” past of national homogeneity, migration is turned into the 
antithesis of the nation-state and the corresponding vision of the future, where: “Every nation is 
called and therefore authorized to form a state […]. Just as humanity is divided into a number of 
nations, so should the world be divided into just as many states. Each nation a state. Each state a 
national entity.”133    
This might appear as a neat and coherent idea, but has as potentially terrifying consequences in 
form of exclusions that cut across a complex interwoven social reality with a pair of scissors that 
merely follows the arbitrary lines drawn on the fabric. Similar to the imperialist division of Africa, 
nationalism disregards most of the social fabric by lifting up some features as non-arbitrary.134 
When naturalized, the right to national self-determination tends to make no distinction between 
nationals and rightful citizens. Minorities, indigenous or migrants, hence live on the mercy of ad 
hoc grounds of belonging and attachment.  
3.2 Rawls’ state-centric conception of justice 
If we return to Rawls’ account of the political conception of justice as presented in Political 
Liberalism,135 we see clearly how the idea of a constitutional democracy qualifies the right to 
                                                 
132 P. 46, in Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. See also Joppke, Christian. 2010. Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration & Society. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
133 From H-Schulze’s Staat und Nation (p. 225); quoted by Habermas 2001. The quote seems to be based on the 
statement of Johan Caspar Bluntschli, a liberal constitutional theorist. 
134 It should be mentioned that the colonial and nation-state form of government disregards the social fabric in 
different ways. Whereas the nation-state is a way to implement an unjust rule of the majority over minorities, the 
colonial strategy is formed by the ambition to implement the rule of force as a minority. The colonial strategy was 
sensitive to the multi-ethnic fabric of the territory (informed by ethnography) and exploited it to create or enhance 
internal antagonism. From a perspective which takes the nation-state model as its paradigm, the solution to the 
political problems of multi-national decolonized states seems be to divide each territory into numerous sovereign 
states. A more civic approach would address the need to reform the sedimented colonial infrastructure of the state 
apparatus to ensure a better representative system.   
135 Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism, The ¤John Dewey Essays in Philosophy. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
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participate in cases that affect us. First of all, the element of democracy is qualified as the 
sovereignty of a people. The “people” is here understood a semi-formal group of those parties 
that have given their acceptance to the political community as their hypothetical or continuously 
constitutive agent.  
In contrast to a spontaneous democratic assembly or voluntary associations, the idea of “the 
people” already imbues democratic interaction with a sense of a substantial cultural – almost 
natural – boundary. The related problematic tendency is not that “the people” takes on the sense 
of a habitual second nature, but that it is often confused with a “first” nature (i.e. something 
essential and unchanging, like the classical laws of physics). In other words, in regard to most 
issues there is certainly a practical convenience in “the people” for granted, but this should not 
lead us to take it as a natural kind. This is a sensitive issue since the idea of a people is central to 
the (state-centric) legitimation of the state, which in its modern form, is for and by the people. 
Rawls defines the people in Laws of peoples136 as a liberal democratic people. The “people” bears a 
relational symmetry to the citizens as agents of justice on the domestic level. Rawls designates 
three basic features of “peoples”: “a reasonably just constitutional democratic government that 
serves their fundamental interest; citizens united by [common sympathies], and finally, a moral 
nature. The first is institutional, the second cultural, and the third requires a firm attachment to a 
political (moral) conception of right and justice.”137 Characteristic of a modern-secular account, 
the people is understood as partly the constituent of – and partly external to – the state. 
Accordingly, this account understands the “peoples” on the international level as acting both 
through their respective governments and independent of them.  Symptomatically, Rawls’ choice 
of title complies with the Kantian interstatal level (“rights of nations” or “ius gentium”), and 
indicates the marginalized concern for the cosmopolitan category in his state-centric conception 
of politics.  
It should also be noted that Rawls, in commenting on “common sympathies”, is careful to avoid 
any deep-rooted assumptions of the people as ethnos.138 Rawls points out how conquest and 
                                                 
136 ---. 1999. The Law of Peoples : With "the Idea of Public Reason Revisited". Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
137 Rawls 1993, p. 23 
138 The latin word natio has given us the word most commonly used in the political context, namely people as 
“nation”. But, nation has historically retained the ambiguity expressed in two Greek words for people: demos and 
ethnos. The demos is associated primarily with the collective agent that is aspiring to or has been constituted as a 
political community, while ethnos adheres to the idea of a people sharing a history and social tradition. In a brief 
historical summary, the demos established the liberal constitutional states, and the ethnos reconstructed the founding 
act as a genuine expression, in nationalist retrospection. See Habermas 2001 133-43, and 494-5 in Habermas, Jürgen. 
1996. Between Facts and Norms : Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Studies in Contemporary 
German Social Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.  I will later refer to this ambiguity as the Janus-faced 
conception of the nation-state.  
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immigration have caused an historical intermingling of groups with different languages and 
historical memories. The cultural feature of unity through sympathy is thus quite weak, and 
probably closer to what Habermas call the “ethical-political self-understanding of the citizens” 
(demos) [civil religion of the US]139, than a “full range local culture” (ethnos).140 Hence, Rawls is not 
a nationalistic theorist, but takes the state-centric view that the “people” might be multi-ethnic.  
As indicated by the first of Rawls’ three features of ‘the people’, the democratic idea of a 
sovereign people is institutionally married to the liberal constitutional state. While this intimate 
bond to the state is more implicit in Political Liberalism, it is noticeable already in the manner in 
which Rawls formulates the fundamental problem of political liberalism:   
How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal 
citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines?141  
The political conception of “justice as fairness” aims to answer this fundamental question. More 
precisely, it intends to provide an accepted measure, a shared reason or a “point of view from 
which all citizens can examine before one another whether their political and social institutions 
are just.”142 Hence, even though Rawls takes distance from a strong nationalist conception of the 
people, the basic question of justice is nonetheless provided with a limited location internal to the 
state: i.e. between citizens. Universal participation or consent is acknowledged within the formal 
criterion of affectedness as including “all citizens”.143  
The close association between the political and the question of justice provides the connecting 
link between the political and the constitutional state in Rawls state-centrism. Rawls defines the 
domain of justice as the “basic structure of society”, and this basic structure is defined as “a 
society’s main political, social, economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified 
system of social cooperation from one generation to the next.”144 The paradigmatic case is the 
                                                 
139 Habermas 2001, p. 228 
140 Rawls 1993, p. 9 
141
 Ibid., p. 4. For theoretical implications of putting the question in the manner of the possibility of a stable society 
and on the critique of Rawls’ transcendental institutionalism, see Sen, Amartya. 2009. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
142 P. 229, Rawls, John. 1985. "Justice as Fairness - Political Not Metaphysical." Philosophy & Public Affairs 14, no. 3: 
223-251. <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1985APA8500001. 
143 The critique of Rawls which concerns the marginalization of groups within the domestic domain, such as women 
and handicapped, are obviously important issues addressing the assumed neutrality of a liberal perspective on 
diversity. See for instance Nussbaum 2006. There is a relation to the issue of immigration in this critique to the 
extent that foreign residents, and especially irregular migrants, represent one of the most vulnerable groups in this 
regard. I’ll get back to this issue in chapter 6.  
144 Rawls 1993, p. 11 
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
81 
 
modern constitutional democracy.145 In sum, Rawls defines the scope of political issues according 
to the domain of justice, which is explicitly determined by the scope of the modern state.  
3.2.1 Rawls’ explicit methodological state-centrism 
So far, I have merely indicated how implicit state-centric presumptions form the basic premises 
of Rawls’ political liberalism. This is not particular to Rawls. He is, however, noticeable in his 
explication of the state-centric perspective as a procedural preference because of its abstracting 
effect. Explaining how the basic structure orients his further considerations, Rawls assumes that 
this basic structure – the main political, social and economic institutions – belongs to a “closed 
society”. In other words, the perspective is not merely state-centric, but it methodologically 
assumes that this center is given the substantial character of a “self-contained” realm, isolated 
from other societies, where we enter and exit only by birth and death.  
This explicit, methodological state-centric approach is part of Rawls’ procedural terms that define 
the famous thought experiment of ‘the original position’. It is legitimated as an analytical device: 
“That society is closed is a considerable abstraction, justified only because it enables us to focus 
on certain main questions free from distracting details.”146 To be clear; the concept of a closed 
society is not intended as a sociological description or normative model, it has a methodological 
purpose. It works in the manner of an epoché in that it puts in brackets or suspends all distracting 
concerns and thus allows for a certain focus:  
Other questions we can discuss later, and how we answer them may require us to revise 
answers already reached. This back-and-forth procedure is to be expected. We may think 
of these other questions as problems of extension.147  
This tendency to postpone “other questions” is perhaps the clearest implication of what we 
might call an explicit methodological state-centrism. It organizes some questions as primary and 
central and others as secondary and peripheral. Among the peripheral, distracting details we 
would assume to find cosmopolitan issues, but we have to look outside the work of Rawls to find 
examples that address the cosmopolitan problems of extension.148  
In my view, there are consequences of the methodological preference for a “closed society” 
which are not so easily redeemed by the subsequent consideration of “other problems”.149 This 
                                                 
145 In a globalize context, the state-defined scope of the basic structure can be questioned, see for instance Fraser, N. 
2012. "On Justice. Lessons from Plato, Rawls and Ishiguro." New Left review, no. 74: 41-52. 
146 Rawls 1993, p. 12 
147 Ibid., p. 20 
148 The most famous accounts are given by Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. Concerning migration Joseph Carens’ 
work is most relevant. I will return to Carens’ argument in chapter 5. 
149 See Sen 2009 for critique of this preference as procedural parochialism. Addressed in chapter 4. 
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kind of bracketing of the external world when answering the big questions of justice leaves a 
mark on the subsequent re-concretization when lifting the ‘veil of ignorance’; including the 
voluntary neglect of the external world. It bears semblance to planning the basic infrastructure 
for private cars and only then include environmental concerns and concerns for pedestrians. 
Most noticeably in Rawls case, all interactions still seem to take place within a state-centric 
order.150 For instance, the suspension of the external world suggests that all non-domestic issues 
are either subject to interstatal law or to ethical-humanitarian norms. As suggested by O’Neill’s 
critique of Rawls’ notion of public reason, there is hardly any room for relevant cosmopolitan or 
transnational relations. The idea of a global public is at best marginalized.  
Rawls’ methodical approach is perhaps the clearest case within the moderate political spectrum of 
a state-centric bias, but, as I claimed initially, I take it to be symptomatic for the whole tradition 
of democratic theory. The idea of a sovereign people as well as the combination of democracy 
with a liberal constitution runs deep in our tradition. However, the state-centric position is often, 
associated with political realism which conceives of states as strategic agents, seeking security and 
prosperity for its subject in an antagonistic international environment and we should note that 
Rawls’ notion of “the people” deliberately takes some distance from this realist conception of the 
state.  
Since Rawls is recognized as one of the most influential theorists on domestic issues of justice, he 
has often been a target of critique from cosmopolitan perspectives. For instance, an important 
thinker on immigration like Seyla Benhabib is very critical to Rawls’ “closed” account. She argues 
that Rawls’ concepts of “the basic structure” and “the people” makes the question of political 
membership invisible, and hence the phenomenon of immigration is relegated to the margins of 
political reflection as an insignificant, non-ideal anomaly. Rawls even assumes that the causes of 
transnational migration will vanish in the ideal state of “the Society of liberal and decent 
Peoples”.151 In a footnote in the paragraph on the “Role of Boundaries” (§ 4.3), Rawls briefly 
mentions a qualified right to limited immigration (defined by the imperfect, Samaritan duties of 
“well-ordered societies” to “burdened societies”) and basically agrees with Michael Walzer’s the 
communitarian position on the concern for protecting a people’s public culture and 
                                                 
150 A similar defect is noticeable in the performance of the transcendental epoché in Husserlian phenomenology. 
Whereas the intension might be a provisional suspension of realism in order to thematize the environment according 
to its character of being performed by the transcendental subject, the subsequent release of the brackets have a 
tendency to leave the impression that all must relate to the ego. We might call it a ‘substantialist bias’ of the 
performance of an epoché or, in Rawls terms, the procedural bias of a “considerable abstraction”.  
151 For instance, there is little from the latest experience of globalization that indicates that bringing Asians and 
Africans out of extreme poverty will stagger migration. The reverse seems to be the case: the more affluent we are, 
the more mobile we are. 
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constitutional principles.152 It is, in other words, a conception that hardly could be said to take 
cosmopolitan issues seriously.153 It is also a surprising position, given Rawls general critique of 
communitarian positions and his commitment to public reason. 
3.2.2 The public political culture 
Rawls’ argument in Political Liberalism relies on the assumption that we have grown accustomed to 
a liberal state-centrism. Rawls claims that his political conception of justice should be generally 
accepted on the basis that it explicates values and virtues already inherent in the culture of 
constitutional democracies. As reflected in my initial discussion in this chapter, I agree with this 
notion of a shared political culture on the descriptive level, without acknowledging its normative 
legitimacy beyond its coherence.154 I think it is possible to argue against Rawls’ normative 
position in two ways: First, by questioning the soundness of grounding a conception of justice in 
a shared public political culture. I address this as the problem of autonomy. Second, even if we grant 
the possible universal validity of such a political culture, we cannot trust Rawls’ procedure to 
provide a sufficient guarantee against parochial biases in the cosmopolitan revision of this 
culture. Rawls’ cosmopolitan position is at best naïve, and his methodology must answer to the 
problem of procedural parochialism.  
In order to explicate the first argument, Rawls’ notion of a public political culture must be 
clarified. In addition to defining the subject of justice as ‘the basic structure of society’, Rawls 
adds two additional features to his ‘political conception of justice’: First, the political conception 
of justice is presented as a “freestanding view” based on political values and virtues of society. 
While the political conception of justice relies on support from more comprehensive, 
reasonable155 doctrines, it is not derived from any doctrine in particular. Second, and most 
relevant in our context, these specific political values, or “ideas”, are implicit in “the public political 
culture of a democratic society”. Hence, the ground of the political conception is presumed to 
have an implicit general acceptance, in distinction from values and virtues related to more 
particularly held comprehensive doctrines of the “background culture” The background culture 
of the social is the culture of daily life and associations of civil society, while the culture of the 
                                                 
152 Rawls 1999, p. 39 
153 Nor did Kant, if we consider the insignificant amount of paper and ink spent on the issue. But, at least for Kant it 
was a central issue and a regulative idea.  
154 Jørgen Pedersen has made clear to me that, contrary to Habermas’ reading of Rawls as an analytical desktop 
constructivist, that Rawls should be understood (at least in his turn from theory to conception of justice) to take on a 
Hegelian project of foundation, where the validity of the conception rests on its consistency with the ideas implicit in 
the historical-institutional emergence of political life. In this reading, the idea of the political as defined by the 
institutional reality is not surprising at all. My aim is to contest the assumption of its foundational value, but without 
pretending to regain the privileged “theoretical” point of view of justice.  
155 In Rawls specific use of the term. 
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political is related specifically to those aspects of society that are related to the basic structure (i.e. 
to justice).  
The “specific political ideas” are for Rawls basically linked to the articulation of the principles of 
liberty and equality. The strength of his account is that it allows a diversity of competing 
doctrines to agree on a minimal common framework, to which each party may give a more 
comprehensive ground according to their specific doctrines. If we consider its descriptive 
accuracy, it seems to have a well-founded support in the historical accounts of political ideas. For 
instance, Charles Taylor’s historical description of the evolving ‘social imaginaries’ in Western 
political culture depicts a development along these lines. Basically, the theoretical ideas of the 
Enlightenment and the French revolution has spread and intensified to the extent that it has 
become part and parcel of our everyday life and social practice.  
Taylor’s descriptive account (3.3), confirms a deep embeddedness in the public political culture 
of the political ideas that Rawls aims to explicate. However, the fact that the background culture 
relies on the historical dialogue with the ideas that inspired the French revolution and the primary 
institution of the democratic nation-state should make us cautious about their alleged neutrality. 
If the idea is to explicate the values and virtues that accompany the modern (successful) 
establishment of a democratic public order on the state level, this might be reasonable enough. 
However, if we want this historical answer to the question of the scope and character of justice to 
guide a cosmopolitan reform, we have to raise the concern that these Enlightenment ideas were, 
for the most part, articulated to address issues of domestic law. In other words, I accept Rawls’ 
claim that he articulates the conventional view in a clear manner, and I could even be willing to 
grant that he does so in a way that reflects its ideal institutions. But I do not accept that we 
should trust our conventions – our old maps – in all matters, and the issue of transnational 
migration makes the inadequacy of our conventional conceptions of justice particularly acute. 
How can we rely on our political tradition to provide guidelines if it did not evolve in an 
environment concerned with cosmopolitan law?  
Following Waldron’s view (see 2.3), Rawls’s conception could face this challenge in one of two 
ways: It could appeal to a multiculturalist and traditionalist view, arguing that “this is our people’s 
peculiar way of public life”, which would lead to a position similar to the communitarian, which 
seems unacceptable in light of Rawls’ general commitments. Or, it could concede that this 
conception is universalist, but cosmopolitan naïve. This would imply that Rawls conception is 
seen to hold a universal truth of practical political wisdom, although it has not taken 
cosmopolitan concerns into proper consideration. This could to some degree redeem the 
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problem of autonomy which O’Neill has raised. To acknowledge that the conception of justice is 
cosmopolitan naïve would not require it to give up its universalist ambitions, but it would require 
that the conception could be judged as an inadequate compromise of justice given actual 
cosmopolitan circumstances. In other words, it could be seen as a plausible answer to the basic 
structure of society (including domestic law and interstatal law), but it would be vulnerable to 
critique from cosmopolitan conceptions of justice. And, in competition with such other 
conceptions, it would intuitively be left unattractive due to its lack of a balanced concern of 
public right in regard to cosmopolitan law. 
Furthermore, even if Rawls’ conception is able to deal with the problem of autonomy, there is 
still an epistemological problem with the lack of procedural guarantees against parochial biases. I 
will address this critique in the next chapter (see 4.4.2). In the following I will elaborate in more 
detail on Taylor’s account of the modern social imaginary. Taylor gives, in many ways, a historical 
account of the development of the shared public political culture and explains how the 
theoretical ideas of justice could evolve into a shared social imaginary of everyday political life.  
3.3 The state-centric, democratic social imaginaries 
Taylor’s historical account of how the modern moral order of mutual respect and mutual benefit 
has reformed political and extra-political practices, gives support to Rawls claim to explicate 
principles of the ‘public political culture’. If Taylor’s account of how theoretical ideas of the 
enlightenment have spread into almost every aspect of our everyday life is accurate, this 
resonance is however not very surprising. Rather, it seems to question the adequacy of Rawls 
distinction between a public political culture and the cultural background of various doctrines. 
With the concept of “social imaginaries”, Taylor describes how secular modernity implied a 
radical shift in our whole way of relating to each other, our “common sense” so to speak, far 
beyond the formal political sphere. This might not contradict Rawls account, but through the 
perspective of social imaginaries we get a clearer understanding of how different the various 
spheres of civil society are and how civil society should not be thought of as merely defined by – 
or instituted through – the state. In fact, an important aspect of the secular social imaginary is the 
capacity of human individuals to establish civil society on their own initiative. The imaginaries of 
a free market and the free public sphere reflect this idea, and in terms of cosmopolitan reforms, 
the question of basic structures should adapt to the globalizing development of these spheres, 
not the other way around.   
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In his essay Modern Social Imaginaries156 Charles Taylor aims –in the context of the increasingly 
relevant notion of a multi-centered global community and of multiple modernities157– to clarify 
Western modernity on the level of the social imaginary, The essay follows in extraordinary detail 
the history of the transition from the old to the modern moral order. In brief, this story is 
accounted for along three axes: First, the moral order expands from the niche of political 
legitimacy to all areas of modern life. Second, the moral order expands from the level of theory to 
the level of everyday-life imaginaries and recipes of social practice. Third, it goes from giving 
interpretative guidelines for recognizing the legitimacy of status quo (both social differences and 
equality), to provide normative guidelines for realistic improvements (ideal solutions).  
In content, the new moral order breaks with the old in numerous ways. The aspect most 
emphasized by Taylor is the move from an idea of a hierarchical order with its inherent 
teleological form, to an idea of an egalitarian order where the members articulate the common 
good themselves. The old order was based on the idea of harmony among different social orders 
(for instance: those who prey, those who fight, and those who work) as complementary parts of 
an organic totality. Self-interest and conflict was seen as unhealthy to the political body. The new 
order is based on the mutual benefits of free individuals that use the social order as an instrument 
for self-preservation. The common goods of security and economic prosperity were most broadly 
recognized. Accordingly, the pursuit of self-interest and differences of opinion is no longer seen 
as unhealthy, but rather as essential sources of a vibrant and diverse communal life.  
How could this extraordinary social transformation take place? How could it be that these 
ground-breaking ideas, introduced a few centuries ago, already infiltrates our social practices and 
outlook to such an extent that another way of life is hardly conceivable? Or, as Rawls would put 
it, to the extent that, any reasonable doctrine would agree to it? Taylor answers these questions in 
detail; but I will limit myself to some brief remarks on a few critical points: First on the general 
character of the modern social imaginaries, and second on the more specific imaginaries of civil 
society as economy and public sphere.   
                                                 
156 First as article: “Modern social Imaginaries”, Public culture vol. 14/1 (2002), then as book: Modern social imaginaries, 
Duke press 2003. Last as chapter of a book: Taylor, Charles. 2007. A Secular Age. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. The last version from 2007 is extended with a discussion the three main aspects of the 
modern social imaginaries: the economy, the public sphere and the sovereign people. 
157 See Gaonkar, Dilip Parameshwar. 2001. Alternative Modernities, A Millennial Quartet Book. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. See also Eisenstadt, S. N. 2000. "Multiple Modernities." Daedalus : proceedings of the American Academy 
of Arts and Sciences 129, no. 1: 30. Taylor’s account suffers from this restriction in his analysis. Especially: 1) I find it 
questionable that the analysis does not account for the significance of a co-constitutive outside, see for instance 
Lewis Gordon on the development of the notion of Europe, and the distinction between humanitas and antropos. 2) In 
a somewhat similar line, I am critical to the lack of the way the redactions are unmotivated. For genealogical account 
of citizenship, see Isin, Engin F. 2002. Being Political : Genealogies of Citizenship. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
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3.3.1 The modern moral order and social imaginaries 
Similar to Newton’s introduction of homogeneous158 time and space in the physical universe, the 
early modern political thinkers introduced ideas of a social order founded on – and consisting 
only of – events on the same secular-historical plane.159 To Newton, the same laws applied in 
heaven and on earth, and analogously, in modern political thought, there is no “time of origin” or 
“higher time” that explains how the current social order was implemented. It was still common 
to presume a privileged historical event, mostly quite hypothetical (in varying degrees from pure 
abstract speculation to historical hypotheses), that led ordinary men to go from a natural state to 
civil society. To some, this was seen as the articulation of God’s will or the Law of Nature, but 
the crucial point, even in the religiously motivated positions, was that the secular political society 
was formed by human capacities alone. It was human made and could be established and 
improved only within secular history. There was no normative value inherent to the order, rather. 
political society served as an instrument for common, pre- or extra-political purposes.160 
Consequently, the assumption that the family or the state are institutions that by necessity carries 
certain moral and political norms with them, which is found in statist positions, bear traces of the 
old moral order. The modern moral order assigns to these institutions a mere functional value 
according to extra-political purposes. In the case of the modern state, it serves the interests of the 
civil society. Hence, how we understand this civil society to be, have direct consequences for the 
way we understand the proper character of the modern state.  
Taylor points out that a reason for telling this story, is that we should avoid the modern parochial 
bias of thinking of modern society as the result of a “subtraction” from the old regime. This 
assumption tends to tell a story where the removal of social oppression and the corresponding 
deceptive imaginary leaves us naturally with individualism, i.e. the state where individuals seek 
conventional agreements based on mutual benefit. Taylor rejects this assumption and insists that 
the transition involved, and still involves, an inventive and constructive effort.161 These were not 
truths waiting to be discovered.162 For instance, the secular imaginaries are not merely the 
                                                 
158 “-geneous” is used here according to the Greek word for “kind”, genos.  So far I’ve used the term playfully as 
synonym to the Latin “gens”, which means people or more precisely “family/tribe with a shared forefather” (nomen).  
159 The specific way Taylor uses the word “secular” gives us an important clue: “Where the constituting factor [of an 
association] is nothing other than [those common, worldly actions this group of people engages in] – whether the 
founding acts have already occurred in the past, or are now coming about is immaterial – we have secularity.” (2007, 
p. 194) 
160 I prefer to call some of these, especially those related to opinion-formation, proto-political. But, this relies on a 
non-state-centric premise of the definition of the political which I have yet to account for properly.  
161 Taylor 2007, p. 168-169 
162 These perspectives are very similar to Louise Dumont’s studies of India. The idea Taylor pursues is to view the 
modern egalitarian order from the perspective of the traditional hierarchical, rather than accepting the lazy 
“subtraction story” of the modern perspective about the traditional.  
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standing result of removing God or spirituality from the equation. It rather implies a radical 
reinvention of civil society and the way we inhabit social time and space.  
To tell the history of expansion indicated above, Taylor adapts the notion of “social imaginary” 
to be able to describe it in fuller detail. Distinct from social theory or the conceptual level of justice, 
social imaginaries is intended to draw our attention to the historical dimensions of lived 
experience and how we think and act politically in typically modern, everyday-life situations. Put 
differently, with “social imaginaries” Taylor aims for something closer to the perspective of 
ordinary life, i.e. the street-level perspective of the citizen, rather than to the classical master 
perspective of social theory.163 In a Kantian perspective, the concept of social imaginaries 
describes the process where principles of justice are not only given concrete expression in 
positive law, but are also manifested in the content of actual face-to-face interaction.  
Social imaginaries give us a sense of the social terrain and how we all fit together. Since it is not 
only a theory held by a few, it has the practical value of a widely assumed reciprocal image, i.e. 
common sense (doxa). They have in this sense a descriptive aspect to them, they help us interpret 
and grasp our social surroundings. In addition, the social imaginaries also provide the prescriptive 
capacity to point out wrong-doing and ideal cases of collective practices.164  
Taylor distinguishes between roughly three levels within the notion of social imaginaries. There 
are the specific recipes of collective actions (such as how to organize a demonstration), and there 
is the contextual understanding of the function of such actions, which can subsequently be 
nuanced in a narrow and wider background165:  
The immediate sense of what we’re doing, getting the message to the government and our 
fellow citizens that the cuts must stop, say, makes sense in a wider context, in which we 
                                                 
163 “[Social imaginary refer to] the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with 
others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper 
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations. […] I speak of imaginary because I’m talking about 
the way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms; it is 
carried in images, stories, and legends. […] It incorporates a sense of the normal expectations that we have of one 
another, the kind of common understanding which enables us to carry out the collective practices that make up our 
social life.” (Taylor 2002, p. 106, see also Taylor 2007, p. 171-2) 
164 Although Rawls moderated his early analytic theory-oriented view to a more dialectic history-oriented one, 
Taylor’s approach here is quite different. Whereas Rawls still aims for a conception that may articulate a possible 
overlapping consensus of the principles of the public political culture, Taylor aims to describe the impact of these 
principles from a street-level, lifeworld perspective. Where the former seeks to find unity in the manifold, the latter 
seeks to elaborate on the diverse parts of a shared whole or background. 
165 Dreyfus discusses Heidegger in context with Polanyi and Wittgenstein (in general we might discuss the 
anthropological turn in philosophy and the emphasis on tacit knowledge, natural language and lifeworld as pre-given 
features that we cannot break loose from.) The anthropological turn of Husserl implies the conceptual reform of the 
notion of “horizon” from a psychological to a sociological and anthropological concept. “Constitution” 
[Horizontbildung] is not a mere isolated function of the ego, but a collective performance (linguistically and 
corporatively). 
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see ourselves as standing in a continuing relation with others, in which it is appropriate to 
address them in this manner, and not say, by humble supplication, or by threats of armed 
insurrection.166  
In terms of concrete gestures, as civilized moderns we don’t fold our hands to beg for mercy, nor 
do we threaten with violence, we symbolically negate the offer by shaking our heads and claim 
our rightful demands. Further, the social imaginary spans from the kind of immediate and 
implicit grasp of a social map167 that makes the current social situation meaningful – such as the 
role I have in the demonstration and what is appropriate to say and do under these specific 
circumstances, to a grasp of a wider context of where we are in “time and space”. The former can 
be understood as an intuitive understanding of social relevance,168 and it is the lack of this 
intuitive situation-dependent relevance which makes “strangers” or people unfamiliar to the 
circumstances act a bit weird and sometimes even appear to be rude. The latter can be 
understood as the way we imagine our history and the society of which we are members and 
participants. When we encounter people with different imaginaries of society – the “wider 
context” – we easily go from awkward to incomprehensible or unreasonable, and ultimately 
intolerable.169  
Taylor’s main historical thesis is that through “the long march” from the Enlightenment to the 
contemporary situation, the explicit map of the Enlightenment has been woven into and 
transformed into an implicit map of social and political life. The way we understand particular 
actions today in light of the relations we have to other people, to power, to other nations, and the 
way we understand them located in space and time, is colored by the theoretical ideas of people 
like Grotius and Locke. It should also be noted that this is not a one-way process; the theories 
have also been transformed (“glossed”) down the road. Even in academic environments where 
historical progress is generally questioned, this transformation is commonly accepted as a process 
                                                 
166 Taylor 2007, p. 174 
167 “This implicit grasp of social space is unlike a theoretical description of this space, distinguishing different kinds 
of people, and the norms connected to them. The understanding expressed in practice stands to social theory the 
way my ability to get around a familiar environment stand to a (literal) map of this area. I am able to orient myself 
without ever having adopted the standpoint of overview that the map offers me. And, similarly, for most of human 
history and most of social life, we function through the grasp we have on the common repertory, without benefit of 
theoretical overview. Humans operated with social imaginary well before they ever got into the business of 
theorizing about themselves.” (Taylor 2007, p. 173) In a footnote connected to this paragraph, Taylor refers to the 
social trust of economy, and the decisive difference between social trust based on kin and that based on imagined 
societies of strangers. 
168 Schutz, Alfred. 1944. "The Stranger: An Essay in Social Psychology." American Journal of Sociology 49, no. 6: 499-
507. 
169 A particularly difficult question is how to deal with imaginaries that combine religion with nationalism; such as 
Israeli Zionism, Chinese Confucianism, Indian Hinduism, Islamism of Arab nations, and Russian and American 
Christianity (more or less corresponding to Samuel Huntington’s map contemporary civilizations). Taking these 
imaginaries seriously, we should nonetheless also appreciate the significant degree of simultaneity and secularity on a 
global level today. The scenario of a clash might be plausible, but I don’t see it as inevitable.   
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of moral progress or maturing. To draw a simple line of development in modern political theory, 
it has evolved from supporting the absolutist state, through its liberal-international critique and to 
a cosmopolitan redaction.170   
There are of course competing social imaginaries in our current globalized society as well (similar 
to Rawls notion of ‘doctrines’). A central political question is how we should deal with this 
variation and – given that imaginaries provide not only interpretative keys, but normative 
guidance – and how far one can tolerate deviating imaginaries. In the following I will present two 
central modern social imaginaries that represent paradigmatic solutions to these problems. First, 
we have the social imaginary of the economy, which solves the question of diversity negatively by 
restricting the scope of mutual benefit to a minimum. Within a political framework where people 
feel secure, individuals might engage in trading and civil production in pursuit of their own 
interests. A common conception of the good life is not seen as necessary, but is normatively 
grounded in the systemic idea of a common wealth. Second, we have the social imaginary of the 
public sphere, which approaches the question of diversity positively by allowing for the expression 
and confrontation of different conceptions (or doctrines) of the common good. The latter model 
would be critical to the lack of publicity and controversy around the tacitly held common good of 
the market as the general prosperity or providence of society.  
3.3.2 The economy and the public sphere – harmonious order and collective agency 
In the next section (3.4) I will discuss at some length how the principles of freedom and equality 
have developed within democracy theory. To prepare this discussion it is useful to sketch out 
how these conceptions have transformed in relation to the “bifocal” modern social imaginaries of 
the civil society “outside” the governmental institutions – the economic system and the collective 
agency of the public sphere. To give a simple sketch we might say that the social imaginary of the 
economic system co-evolved with the modern notion of liberal freedom. In light of the idea of a 
cosmopolitan law of deliberation, we might say that the right to present oneself to society, or 
simply the liberal freedom of movement, is inspired by the idea of the need for restrictions on 
state interference in the free market. In a roughly parallel manner, the imaginary of the public 
sphere co-evolved with the modern notion of (republican) equality. 171 In recent the recent 
                                                 
170 Benhabib draws this developing line in The Rights of Others (2004). 
171 Although the old republican ideal of direct participation in the public assembly of free men is unfeasible in the 
modern society, the ideas of liberation from necessities and the equality of free men can still find its relevance within 
and outside the representative system of government. Given that freedom in the old mode of production implied 
dependence on the slavery of others, it is clearly not desirable in its original form. In its modern form the emphasis is 
more on the equality of opportunities. In this light the increase in domestic economic inequality is a democratic 
problem to the extent that it reduces the middle-class. This concern rests on the assumption that fairly economically 
secure and well-informed citizens are crucial resources for a democratic society, because they are able to participate 
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decades the deliberative turn in democracy theory172 has made it clear that the equality of 
participation implies more than the individual right to vote and the negative duty of the state to 
abstain from censorship. On a cosmopolitan level, this implies that the “further deliberations” on 
the content of cosmopolitan law should be actively facilitated in the transstatal public sphere and 
not just passively allowed by the states. In order to defend this extended account of cosmopolitan 
law, it is necessary to detach “the political” from the conventional political institutions and 
connect it the life of civil society. Hence, in terms of the “basic structure of society”, the divide 
between the political and the social and economic institutions will be blurred to the point where 
we could say: State- and international institutions should be conceived as means to protect the 
political. The political should not be seen as a means to run the state.  
To suggest how this conceptual detachment is possible, I will describe how imaginary of the civil 
society (“the social and economic”) is already in the process of detachment from the state 
according to secularization. The first sphere of civil society to emerge as separated from the state 
in the modern imaginary was “the economy” or the market. The transition from a mercantile 
system to a free market was not just the “subtraction” of royal (or any central and absolute 
despotic) regulation of the production; it also involved – and partly presupposed – a radical 
change in how we understand human society. This sphere is already to some extent globalized in 
our imaginary. The second sphere, which is still in large connected to the state, is the public 
sphere.   
3.3.3 The economy – the paradigm of an extra-political social system 
The basic idea of the modern economy is that a systematic coordination of free, self-interested 
and rational agents will benefit the general level of wealth. The participants engage in commercial 
activity for their own benefit, but from an observer’s standpoint it has the side-effect of 
generating increased total wealth.173 The early models understood this effect as an expression of 
“God’s providence”, but as Taylor points out, there were some clearly secular and ground-
breaking traits defining these models. The economy was no longer perceived as part of a 
harmonious social order, but as a system of interlocking causes. The system itself was morally 
blind, but has famously been ascribed to the workings of an “invisible hand”. However, this 
image suggested the workings of the hand of a good engineer (mechanics) and not some esoteric 
source of order (teleology).  
                                                                                                                                                        
beyond giving their vote every now and then. To be “liberated from necessities” defines a criterion of the middle-
class which is not related to what you do for a living, but under which conditions one is able to hold a vocation.  
172 See also 3.4.  
173 If the observer relies on tax-revenues, such as the state apparatus, it quite clearly creates its own rationale for 
tending to the vitality of the market. 
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Although the market is no longer understood as part of a predefined social order, the modern 
imaginary of the market still has a tendency to appeal – by its systemic character– to the idea of 
the market as nature. This is also clear in the way the individual agents of the market are defined 
by their generic, psychological makeup. The hand of God (and later: natural evolution) 
introduced the “happy design” of human life, especially of human passions. Mainly, our “search 
for individual prosperity” and “impetus for money-making” was associated with productivity and 
peace. Conveniently, as to secure the order with meritocratic legitimacy, we were also naturally 
inclined to admire the rank and fortune of the rich and well-born.174  
Although these naturalizing psychological hypotheses remain controversial, the rhetorical 
purpose of the arguments is quite clear: They were meant to convince people that state 
interference in the market was unnecessary. This separation from the state is also detectible in the 
altered moral code of civil society and the rejection of military glory as a virtue. As part of the 
civilizing process,175 the economic understanding of society “dethroned war as the highest human 
activity, and put in its place production.”176 A more subtle change involved the radically secular 
understanding of the economic system as a self-sufficient social order consisting entirely of 
ordinary actions of production and trade.177 God might be working in mysterious ways in the 
background, but the society (the market) was itself not established in another time or relying on 
any order besides human nature. It would rather emerge spontaneously as a sphere of 
coexistence, and – if treated properly – play out freely and naturally as an extra-political society, 
i.e. a civil society.  
This imaginary of the market as an extra-political sphere is at the core of the classical liberalism 
of John Locke: “The main goals of organized society were security and economic prosperity. But 
because the whole theory emphasized a kind of profitable exchange, one could begin to see 
political society itself through a quasi-economic metaphor.”178 This transformation of the 
imaginary – and the corresponding ideas of political theory – seems to have introduced a new 
understanding of border-regulation. There is an interesting tension in this regard between the 
spontaneous and border-crossing character of the market as civil society, and the quasi-economic 
                                                 
174 Based on Taylor’s account of Smith, Taylor 2007, p. 190 
175 Elias, Norbert. 1978. The Civilizing Process. 1st American ed., Mole Editions. New York: Urizen Books. 
176 Taylor 2007, p.197 
177 Related to the reformation and the sanctification of ordinary life (Taylor 2007, p. 179): gives the economic a 
central place in our lives, in addition to the importance of family life and relationships (for equality, see chapter 13 in 
Taylor, Charles. 1996. Sources of the Self : The Making of the Modern Identity. 8th printing. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.) No vocations or rituals that rank higher due to connection with “higher time”, neither the king 
(those who fight), nor the church (those who prey). The metaphysics of hierarchical order was dismantled by 
“Newtonian” imaginary. 
178 Taylor 2007, p. 177 
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model of political society which remains interested in securing its tax income (as a common 
wealth).   
In general, we might say that this liberal model has the advantage that it relies on a kind of social 
interaction that does not require the same degree of trust, common sense and shared 
commitments as more encompassing and intimate kinds of interactions do.179 This border-
transgressive character of trade makes it useful both to for overcoming domestic and global 
economic diversity, and creates incentives for a greater tolerance of plurality. On the individual 
level, the economy has the advantage of transgressing territorial and cultural borders more easily 
than “thicker” kinds of interaction. Similar to natural science and arts (at least music and 
gastronomy), exchange can be made without necessarily presupposing any shared commitments 
to deep-seated values or background imaginaries. Economic interactions deal with goods that are 
easily moved across cultural borders and hence are quite easily imagined as potentially 
establishing a global market or global neighborhood. This presents a challenge to state-centric 
conceptions, especially as the economic terrain is increasingly globalized.180 
Historically, the state has taken a “master”-position in relation to the market, as the establisher 
and regulator of the activity at the borders or within the domestic sphere. Given the modern 
understanding of economy as a mechanistic system, the state has taken on a corresponding 
facilitating role of an observer and social engineer. Analogous to the managing of natural 
processes in agriculture, the state should sustain economic growth, but not interfere 
unnecessarily. In terms of the law of admission, this has been done by implementing a selective 
policy of immigration in order to promote trade and strengthening the inner market, by 
welcoming for instance high-skilled workers and tourists.  
In terms of a law of deliberation, the implied objectification of the master-perspective has the 
elitist function of regulating society according to parameters that are measured “behind the back” 
of the agents. For instance, from the perspective of the individual economic agents, the total 
increase of domestic wealth and increased tax revenues is a distant side-effect of their street-level 
                                                 
179 This advantage is sometimes polemically and dismissingly labelled “artificial”, “superficial” and “inauthentic”. I 
find this to be misleading, since a secular imaginary would understand these traits to be essential characteristics of all 
communication. It is more appropriate to speak of thin and thick kinds of interaction. And economic interactions 
tend to be, or at least do not require more than thin interaction in terms of the required scope of shared 
assumptions/imaginaries. 
180 By terrain I mean a field defined by a specific kind of normal interaction, but thought without the boundaries 
(such as borders) that draw certain territories on this terrain. This idea of terrain is inspired a phenomenological 
analysis of attitude toward ones surroundings and can be illustrated by the notion of different cultural “scapes” in 
Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large : Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Public Worlds. Minneapolis, Minn.: 
University of Minnesota Press..  
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engagement.181 This does not, of course, entail that the agents are in fact completely blind, but a 
political model based on the free market tends to de-emphasize the value of participation on the 
part of the individual agents in deliberations on the relevant political questions of how to regulate 
their interactions.  
3.3.4 The public sphere – the paradigm of extra-political deliberation  
As discussed in chapter 1, the moderate positions on either side of the public debate on 
immigration would recognize that the state still plays a significant role in dealing with  globalizing 
tendencies, and on the question of how to regulate the cross-border flow of people and goods. In 
the modern social imaginary of the public sphere we find a rival paradigm to the economy and 
the political imaginary of the commercial sphere/the market, which is also reflected in different 
models of representative democracy (see chapter 2). Partly, this competing imaginary can be said 
to rely on an influence from the humanist tradition and the ethic of republican self-rule. But it 
would be a mistake to ignore the revisions of these republican ideas in the modern promoters of 
this imaginary of the public (the forum). There is a parallel development of the public sphere as 
an extra-political entity to what we find in the emergence of an understanding of the economy as 
part of civil society. We see this tendency clearly in thinkers like John Stuart Mill, Hannah Arendt 
and Jürgen Habermas.182  
Habermas describes the emergence of a new concept of the public opinion. This is the imaginary of 
a common view formed by people that are dispersed physically, but still associated in the same 
common space and time by media (printed and electronic). Tellingly, the ritual performance of 
the community is not saying one’s morning-prayer, but reading in the newspaper about the 
contemporary world. The concept bears clear parallels to early contractual theory and the 
understanding of how public opinion legitimizes the social contract, but it has undergone 
important revisions along the way.  
Most importantly, the character of the given public consent changes dramatically. The modern 
contractual theory, although at the beginning hypothetically and once and for all, breaks with the 
assumption that the consenting people already existed. The mundane, historical act of the 
contract is seen as the constituting act of society itself. Pushed further, the secular requirement of 
public consent was intensified: “The original demand for once-for-all historical consent, as a 
condition of legitimacy, can easily develop into a requirement of current consent. Government 
                                                 
181 Similar alienating parameters of government are found in the biopolitical measures based on demographical 
information on army reserves, work force, health services, etc.  
182 Taylor’s account of the public sphere also relies heavily on Habermas’ analysis in Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Studies in Contemporary German 
Social Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [German version: 1962] 
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must win the consent of the governed; not just originally, but as an ongoing condition of 
legitimacy.”183  
In Habermas’ account, the ‘public sphere’ served as the imagined location where the legitimizing 
public opinion could be formed and manifested.  On the one hand, the imaginary of the public 
sphere is descriptive and hermeneutic, in that it provides a new understanding of how 
communicative actions and media are linked together in a single space as its wider context. On 
the other hand, it is normative in that it suggests how such a public debate should be conducted 
in order to reach (ideally) an impartial and enlightened public opinion.  
First of all, and most importantly, the public sphere is a secular imaginary. It is a kind of social 
interaction which does not presuppose any extra-ordinary foundation or intervention (other-
worldly or merely times of origin). This might seem quite trivial and commonsensical today, but 
as mentioned above, the notions of a ‘time of origins’ or a ‘higher time’ were essential to pre-
modern imaginaries. We still find traces of them in the way we imagine and speak of a nation’s 
“founding fathers”, or the “timeless character” of places, ideas or ritual traditions. In this light, 
national myths have a “non-secular” character, alluding to something existing before, or 
transcending, the homogeneity of time. In contrast, the public sphere is – like the economy – self-
constituting: 
The public sphere […] is an association that is constituted by nothing outside of the 
common action we carry out within it: coming to a common mind, where possible, 
through the exchange of ideas. Its existence as an association is just our acting together in 
this way.184  
This “coming to a common mind” has a normative epistemological aspect to it that is peculiar to 
the Enlightenment notion of public opinion as rational, impersonal and impartial.  This common 
viewpoint or general will that defines the common good is not a mere aggregation of preferences 
(like a survey or opinion poll), but is seen as representing the best that the public has to offer. 
Hence, political authority is assumed to be wise to follow its advice and to make its decisions 
available for public scrutiny (the “principle of supervision”). Contrary to the economic system, 
this part of the process should not happen “behind the back” of the agents involved. This 
recognition of the reflective perspective of the participating agents is crucial to a notion of 
political integrity that is not directly derived from the representative system of decision-making 
procedures of the state.  
                                                 
183 Taylor 2007, p. 188 
184 Ibid., p 192 
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The requirement that political power must be controlled from some “outside” is not a new idea, 
but the nature of the supervision certainly is: “It is not defined as the will of God, or the Law of 
Nature (although it could be thought to articulate these), but as a kind of discourse, emanating 
from reason and not from power or traditional authority. […] Power was to be tamed by reason.” 
185  
The location of this “outside” is crucial to understanding its inventive character. Taylor clarifies 
the location of this “outside” by qualifying it as an imagined, “metatopical” space. It has a similar 
character to some topical social spaces, such as a forum or stadium, concrete locations where we 
meet and organize for a shared purpose and collective action, but the public sphere is more abstract. 
It’s imagined, and links dispersed discussions together as parts of one great exchange: “We might 
say that it knits together a plurality of spaces into one large space of non-assembly. […] I want to 
call this larger kind of non-local common space “meta-topical”.”186  
Metatopical social organization was already part of the old imaginary, in the church and the state. 
In order to constitute an outside, the public sphere had to be understood as a metatopical space 
separated from the political institutions.187 Obviously, public discussion continued in more 
informal terms in the ancient polis and republics as well, but these discussions were taking place 
among the same people who wielded institutional power. In a sense the difference between the 
old and the new notion of public debate follows the modern distinction between lobbying and 
public debate. The latter is for everyone and to everyone; the former is more partisan and always 
involves representatives of the state. The public sphere would voice the concern and opinion of 
those detached from and outside the institutional interests of the state – and in some cases even 
include foreigners, at least from other civilized countries. 
This last point touches on the issue of a cosmopolitan law of deliberation. In a similar manner to 
the way the economy, the public sphere easily spread in a cross-border pattern. The deliberations 
of public reason can be border-transgressing and transstatal. For instance, the following holds 
equally well for a “republic of letters” as a national public: “It is understood that widely separated 
people sharing the same view have been linked in a kind of space of discussion, wherein they 
have been able to exchange ideas together with others and reach this common end-point.”188  
However, even if the public sphere to some degree transcends national borders, it is more 
dependent than economic transactions on translation of languages. And, translation is not a 
                                                 
185 Ibid., p. 190, paraphrased from Habermas. 
186 Ibid., p. 187 
187 Ibid., p. 189 
188 Ibid., p. 186, see also p. 191. 
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simple alternation of information, as if it was convertible according to something like the 
exchange rate of different currencies. Communication has its own boundaries defined, in addition 
to language barriers, by different regional, historical-specific backgrounds (such as the conception 
of authority, international relations, cosmopolitan tradition, etc.). Hence, the transnational public 
sphere tends to be segmented according to affiliations of a cultural, religious, intellectual or 
ideological character. The transnational public sphere also creates its own kinds of asymmetry 
and discrimination, such as the main direction of translation (from western to other), the location 
of global cultural centers and spokesmen/academic stars; “where it’s at”, so to speak.189  
In the course of the 19th century this metatopical space (or sphere) became increasingly 
nationalized in terms of language and political function. Benedict Anderson describes this 
historical development from the time of Kant, when the printing press was still sustaining an 
international Latin “world of readers”, to the nationalization of the printing press (which seems 
to define Rawls perspective).190  This gives an example of how states can regulate civil spheres 
and how the introduction of language standards influences the possibility of domestic and cross-
border relations. The border-transgressing possibilities are still of course partly there, and 
increasingly so today, given the internet, social media and the function of English as a 
cosmopolitan language. In these terms, Rawls’ idea of a public debate among “peoples”,191 where 
the communicative interaction happens on a strictly international level or through public 
representatives, seems straight-jacketed and restricted to very specific forums, like the EU or the 
UN.  
… 
Taylor describes how our Western background culture during the last centuries has become 
secularized and integrated the Enlightenment principles of freedom and equality in a secular 
imaginary of time and space. I’ve here given two central examples of how the legitimacy of the 
political is defined in relation to specifically secular, extra-political social spaces: the market and 
the public sphere.  
Although these secular spaces can be understood to have a border-transgressing potential, they 
are also marked by their historical development within the international order of states and the 
associated regulation of borders through taxation, homogenizing national languages, etc. In this 
                                                 
189 See Sakai, N. & Solomon, J.. Traces 4: Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, HKU, 2006. Project MUSE 
190 Anderson, Benedict. 2006. Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised edition. 
ed. London ; New York: Verso. 
191 Rawls 1999, p. 54 ff (§6. Societ of Liberal Peoples: Its Public Reason.) 
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sense “extra-political” has partly taken on a nationalized or domestic character as in national 
markets and national publics. In the following, I will explore in more detail how the democratic 
ideas of the intellectual elite of the Enlightenment have adopted to this historical development. 
Especially, the next section highlights how the deliberative turn in democracy theory has 
reformed the paradigm of political theory from one civil sphere to another; from the market to 
the public sphere.  
I should perhaps make clear that this paradigm is related to the imaginaries of the economy and 
the public sphere, and not to the sociological reality of these spheres. Since Rawls conception of 
justice answers to the same question of justice that the theoretical ideas of the Enlightenment 
attempted to answer, i.e. the question of the legitimacy of the state, Rawls’ reliance on a public 
political culture seems to rely on the historical echo of these ideas through the development of 
the modern social imaginaries.     
3.4 The theory of democracy and its deliberative turn 
The historical context of the articulation of the Enlightenment ideas suggests that the main 
reason for the state-centric notion of politics is found already in the early articulation of the 
modern ideas of freedom and equality in Locke and Rousseau. Their liberal and republican 
principles where not simply adapted to a new spontaneously assembled sovereign people, but 
were situated within an already established state apparatus related to the Westphalian system of 
absolutist states. In this context they can be read as pioneer reformers of the modern state 
through liberalization and democratization. These reforms can be said to be based on universal 
principles, but these principles were configured to address specifically domestic political issues 
and not, strictly speaking, cosmopolitan ones. They reforms also inspired, eventually, the 
emergence of an international order defined by certain normative expectations regarding how 
each state conducted their internal affairs. But, to a large extent, these reforms did not address 
cosmopolitan problems associated with interactions between states and non-citizens. As 
reformers, their ideas challenged and renewed the normative ground for the legitimacy of the 
state, but they did not address the basic premise of locating politics within the state as such. The 
scope of justice remained taken for granted. 
The basic idea of democracy – the rule of demos – can be articulated as the rule of popular 
sovereignty, which primarily refers to a set of practices associated with a representative and 
constitutional system of government. This idea of democracy implies certain institutions and 
norms, such as elections, holding politicians responsible, having rights as citizens and the rule of 
law. In short, the modern notion of democracy evokes a whole range of ideas and practices that 
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
99 
 
refers mainly to the way political life is organized in the democratic liberal state. In this context 
democracy does not simply mean rule by the majority vote, but has also built into it institutional 
and legal functions that intend to secure everyone against abuse and concentration of power 
(here understood either as force of incentive or physical force, in contrast to communicative 
power). To some degree, this functional protection has not been established by democratic 
participation. It would for instance not make sense to say that minority rights are legitimate only 
if recognized by the majority vote. 
Democracy as a form of government might be distinguished from democracy in a performative 
sense, as a way to discuss and solve public issues. Considered purely as a form of government, 
democracy is a system for making decisions in a political community. The purpose of this 
decision-making procedure is external to the system. Hence, the value of democratic procedures 
is instrumental and, depending on the conditions, other forms of government might serve this 
purpose more appropriately. In contrast, as a type of interaction or performance, democracy or 
democratic participation is understood as the way a political community manifests itself through 
deliberation. Because deliberation is a political form of communication, it cannot simply be 
reduced to its instrumental function of transmitting information or making decisions. It also has a 
value in itself, in the sense that actualizes the condition which we might refer to as a 
“community” or a “public”; i.e. a common space where reasons and perspectives can be shared.   
3.4.1 The constitutional democratic ideas of the Enlightenment 
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s republican contractual theory, as revolutionary as it was, is an interesting 
example in this regard. It is also, compared to Locke’s version, the clearest secular account of the 
two. Rousseau’s critical engagement with Hobbes’ theory can be said to mark a theoretical 
parallel to the later political transition from the absolutist to the democratic state during the 
American and French revolutions. His ideas also no doubt influenced the revolutionary 
movements themselves. Nonetheless, Rousseau’s thinking inherited Hobbes’ absolutist definition 
of the political.   
As with most contractual thinkers, the question of the legitimacy of the sovereign state is at the 
center for Rousseau. Like Hobbes, Rousseau understands this legitimizing ground to be inherent 
in the civil contract itself. The political is seen as identical to a civil state order. In addition to 
conceiving the state – legislation in particular – as the obvious locus of politics, he adopts from 
Hobbes the idea that the initiation of the political order is simultaneously moral in character.192 
                                                 
192 For instance, both Rousseau and Hobbes identifies legal norms as unconditional norms (Kant later adopts the 
same idea under the heading of the categorical imperative), essentially backed up by an executive and sanctioning 
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There is, in other words, no pre-political moral reason in the natural state (as Locke’s conception 
of a normative ‘natural law’ suggests), which for Rousseau is thought as prior to the emergence of 
a common language and social-economic dependency.  
Further, Rousseau thus preserves Hobbes’ idea of the savage man as self-sufficient,193 but rejects 
that he is either naturally good or wicked. Nonetheless, the drive for self-preservation (amour de 
soi) and natural sympathy (pité) for others, lays certain generic psychological premises for a good 
civil order. In the pre-political state men are free from substantial and formal dependency on 
each other, and they are equal insofar as their substantial inequalities have no social-formal 
relevance. So even if the freedom of the natural state is understood as mere independence from 
others, and the natural equality is seen as the mere lack of social order, it sets certain premises for 
how Rousseau assesses the transition to a legitimate political state.  
Famously, Rousseau states that “man is born free, but everywhere in chains”. Although the 
metaphorical “chains” here evoke a sense of constraints opposed to freedom, Rousseau’s account 
is more nuanced than this indication would suggest.  First of all, as with Hobbes, moral equality 
and moral freedom first become relevant questions when the substantial conditions (of scarcity194 
or mode of production195) imply dependency and inequality of a moral/formal import, as Kant 
says later: when people cannot avoid interacting with each other. At this point there is no turning 
back from the chains, the “fundamental maxim of all political right” is that people constitutes a 
                                                                                                                                                        
state apparatus. Similar to the Ten Commandments, which has the categorical form of a legal code, law in general is 
impersonal (an abstract “thou”) and unconditional (no one is excused). In contrast, natural rights or individual and 
group interests can be articulated in the hypothetical form of “If you will X, then you should Y”. For instance: If you 
will survive, you should seek to initiate a social contract of security with others (minimal state). If you (in addition) 
aspire to a stable and functioning democracy and civil society, you should seek to establish an egalitarian welfare 
model (Nordic model). 
193 Hobbes assumed that the eternal nature of Man was both self-sufficient and disposed with a range of “civilized” 
emotions, Rousseau emphasized the historical conditions of Man as part of a community and reason as part of 
civilization. Similar to Rawls epoché of other states, Hobbes atomistic design of the hypothetical scenario leads to 
substantial assumptions about the natural, pre-political individual. These assumptions are not easily remedied as the 
veil is lifted. The key-interpretative effect of this individualist abstraction is easily noticeable in Locke’s revision of 
the pre-political individual rights as given with thick moral significance (including property rights). Rousseau is also 
an individualist, but in a more minimal sense, admitting only self-preservation (amour de soi) and concern for others 
(pité; pity) as first-nature. In contrast to Hobbes, vanity (amour propre) is not a natural passion for Rousseau.  
194 Hume is clearer on this criterion by defending the need for right to property from “circumstances of justice”. 
Rousseau and Hume share a similar moral psychology and critique of Locke’s moral understanding of pre-political 
natural rights. 
195 Rousseau points out large-scale agriculture Harari supports this old biblical claim to a large extent, although 
foresters/nomads too had quite advanced forms of small-scale social organization. See Harari, Yuval N. 2015. Sapiens 
: A Brief History of Humankind. First U.S. edition. ed. New York: HarperCollins Publisher.  
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sovereign “to defend freedom and not to enslave themselves.”196 To be free from enslavement 
and arbitrary rule some mutual constraints are necessary.  
This urge to preserve some kind of independency (as freedom, or more precisely: autonomy) is 
paramount to Rousseau’s project197 and is reflected in his formulation of the political problem of 
state legitimacy:   
The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the 
whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while 
uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.198  
The kind of freedom assumed here is inspired by the old republican idea of freedom; the 
establishment of the state through conventional agreement. The aim is freedom from 
enslavement and domination (rule of force), through the establishment of rule of law. As such, 
freedom is achieved through constraints associated with the legal status of the citizen, and not 
through the solitude of the highland walker or the travelling merchant: "Let us then admit that 
force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers."199 The 
legitimacy of these constraints was not defined by liberal norms, but by democratic procedures. 
Furthermore, there is implied in Rousseau’s account of contractual theory a critique of Hobbes’ 
reliance on the psychologically implausible200 and normatively intolerable assumption that the 
contractual subjects would accept a once-and-for-all, unconditional subjection to the sovereign. 
To be sure, Hobbes also sought a similar freedom from dominion through the rule of law: the 
first and fundamental law of nature according to Hobbes, is “to seek peace and follow it”,201 and 
the second includes the obligation “to be contented with so much liberty against other men as he 
would allow other men against himself.”202 203 
                                                 
196 From Rousseaus’ Second Discourse, p. 176 in Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and Victor Gourevitch. 1997a. The Discourses 
and Other Political Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
197 Leo Strauss calls him the first philosophers of freedom because Rousseau holds (like Kant after him) the 
individual free will to be a good in itself.  
198 Rousseau, The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right. Book 1, chapter 6, my italics, in Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 
and Victor Gourevitch. 1997b. The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of 
Political Thought. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
199 Rousseau 1997, Book 1, chapter 3. “The Right of the Strongest.” 
200 Contrary to Locke’s response to Filmer, Rousseau agrees with Hobbes that we are not born with a rational and 
political nature (or inherent value). But, he rejects Hobbes “thick” notion of natural capacities by arguing that 
Hobbes pre-political model still retains the passions and needs of the political (such as vanity, or amore proper). The 
bracketing of the scaffolds of the political civilization does not make the correlating, “other-depending” passions 
natural. 
201 Hobbes, Leviathan I, chapter 14, p. 98 [64], in Hobbes, Thomas, and Aloysius Martinich. 2005. Leviathan. Parts 1 
and 2, Broadview Editions. Peterborough, Ont. ; Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press. 
202 Hobbes 2005, p. p. 98 [64] 
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
102 
 
The idea of a human-made political order is thus central to both Hobbes and Rousseau. This idea 
was not new, but the secular idea that its legitimacy rests merely on the ground of free men giving 
their consent is a clear break with a patriarchic notion of natural order, as found for instance in 
Robert Filmer’s work.  
In Rousseau we see a clear continuity from Hobbes criterion of popular consent, but with a 
clearer drift toward democratic realism.204 In this way, Rousseau radically democratizes Hobbes’ 
secular contractual approach by insisting that the community – the people – remained the 
legislative power of the state. Rousseau’s reform of the contractual theory is in this sense not an 
unchaining from the constitutional, absolute state, but a democratization of it.205 In other words, 
Rousseau agrees that some chains are necessary, but that the chains should consist only of laws 
that would retain the autonomy of the subject (in order to avoid domination and unsustainable 
inequality).  
Whereas Hobbes sees the sovereign as the servant of the people and public interest, mainly its 
security206, Rousseau comes close to identifying the sovereign state with the people itself. There is 
a deep and crucial assumption that leads Rousseau to this conclusion. Inspired by Hobbes’ 
absolutist conception of the political, Rousseau seems to accept the requirement that the private 
interest of those in government should not be in conflict with the public interest. And, even 
though he is reluctant to accept an absolute sovereign, Rousseau does not reject the underlying 
ambition of aligning private and public interest.207 Unlike the modern, liberal idea of civil society, 
Rousseau does not make the distinction between state and society clear.  
                                                                                                                                                        
203 It refers to the negative Golden rule, which is basically the ‘harm-principle’. Both Locke and Kant adopts this as 
the principle of negative liberty. If we compare it to the “universal principle of rights”, as mentioned above (3.2.1), it 
is quite similar. The latter makes sense though, both interpreted with a negative and a positive concept of liberty. 
After all, Kant adopts his notion of autonomy and the categorical imperative from Rousseau.  
Kant breaks decisively with Hobbes on two interconnected points: 1) External, linguistic acts do not necessarily 
reveal the same idea or image in me as in others, or in any case, there is no way we could tell. 2) Freedom of 
conscience (as Rousseau): the sovereign does not stand in a position to dictate faith because it is hopeless to sanction 
the internal will by law.   
204
 They both shared the conception of equality of human nature based on physical strength (animalis) and practical 
wisdom (techne), in contrast to legal equality, through constitutional order (political act, praxis). For Rousseau this 
political action or participation is continuous (and the natural inequality becomes relevant first within a ‘nascent 
society’ where this equality of participants is not yet the case), as for Hobbes it is a once-and-for-all, hypothetical act.  
205 For instructive discussion, see Krefting, Ellen. 2015. "“Rousseau – Equality and Freedom in the Community” " In 
Philosophy of Justice, edited by Guttorm Fløistad, Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, 191-211: Springer Netherlands..  
206 “The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth [monarchy, aristocracy and democracy] consisteth 
not in the difference in power [equally sovereign, varies in stability], but in the difference of convenience or aptitude 
to produce the peace and security of the people, which end they were instituted.” (Hobbes 2005, p. 141 [95]) 
207 As Peg Brimingham shows, Arendt understood this assumption as part of an old imaginary of sovereign power 
and the notion of a “powerful will” also found in Augustine. According to the underlying idea, a power full will must 
be one with itself. A divided will is impotent. (2006, p. 42-43) 
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Rousseau is in this sense still on the “old” side, compared to the modern appreciation of actions 
motivated by mere private interest as more than just expressions of a corrupted will. The 
imaginary of a free economy, as discussed by Taylor above, is still somewhat strange to Rousseau 
and associated primarily with the way the right to private property tends to create inequality and 
oligarchic accumulation of capital. In this sense it is understandable that Rousseau was both a 
radical democratic thinker and skeptical to trust the public debate to ensure rational decision-
making. To avoid that legislation should favor any particular individual or group interest, 
Rousseau seems to have put his trust in the private reasoning of the educated elite. Only the few 
were able to take the view point that should represent the genuine will of the whole political 
body. If we follow O’Neill’s reading of Kant’s notion of public reason this calls for a clear point 
of departure from Rousseau.  
To nuance this point, we might say that as long as the general will is merely conceptual, i.e. 
formal, empty and unspecified, it more or less complies with Kant’s analysis. For instance, a 
general requirement such as equality before the law seems evident, independently of public 
scrutiny. As long as we derive principles of negative freedom from the innate right to individual 
autonomy, equality before the law seems uncontroversial. The controversy arises when ‘the 
general will’ goes from expressing certain analytical boundaries (implicit to the concept of 
autonomy), to the ambition to determine a specific content of the public right, not to mention 
the determination of the general good. On this ground, Rawls critique of the dependency of 
metaphysical presuppositions seems to hit Rousseau much harder than Kant. In any case, there 
seems to be a gradual development within the concept of democracy with an increasing weight 
given to rational debate and public scrutiny. However, even as we reach the deliberative turn, the 
state-centric approach remains strongly influential.  
If we look closer at the modern concept of “constitutional democracy”, we see, as John Rawls 
and Jürgen Habermas notes, a deep conflict 208 or dialectics209 in the current theory of democracy 
between two traditions on how to interpret liberty and equality: liberalism and radical democracy 
(egalitarianism, civic republicanism)210. Both Rawls and Habermas identify the democratic 
tradition in with Rousseau’s republican answer to John Locke’s liberal interpretation of liberty 
and equality. What unites them as “contractual” thinkers is the concern for state constitution and 
the establishment of a rule of law to keep the sovereign in check.  
                                                 
208 Rawls 1993, p. 4 
209 P. 44 in Habermas, Jürgen. 1997. "Popular Sovereignty as Procedure." In Deliberative Democracy : Essays on Reason 
and Politics, edited by James Bohman and William Rehg, xxx, 447 p. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
210 See Berlin, Isaiah. 1966. Two Concepts of Liberty : An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 31 
October 1958. Oxford: Oxford university press. 
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Rawls understands both these traditions as attempts to answer the fundamental question of 
political justice211, briefly put: the question of the fair terms of social cooperation between 
citizens.212 “Justice as fairness” is a way to answer this question by specifying two principles of 
justice in lexical order.213 Rawls aims at a balanced account between formal constitutional rights 
(liberty) and substantial guarantees of equal opportunity and mutual advantage (equality). His 
proposed conception is still situated within the liberal tradition, however, which tends to 
emphasize the primacy of constitutional liberties. It is important to note that Rawls offers, as he 
sees it, a political conception of liberalism that seeks to transcend the conflict between the liberal 
and republican divide. He does so by introducing the principle of equal opportunities and 
economic equity, hence his conception is considered to be liberal-egalitarian.  
In “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure”214 Habermas’ account of these traditions differs in an 
interesting way from Rawls’ deliberative conception, which reveals a revolutionary aspect of the 
idea of democracy that is not so tightly related to the imaginary of “a sovereign people” and “a 
constitutional state”. Habermas takes his point of departure in Rousseau’s understanding of 
liberty as “the autonomy of the people, as equal participation of each person in the practice of 
self-legislation”215 From this egalitarian perspective (also found in Kant) the exercise of popular 
sovereignty as a unified will is seen as primary, and the constitutional protection of diversity 
through the articulation of liberal rights as secondary.  
The advantage of Rousseau’s account is that the legitimate source of political authority is no 
longer anchored in the natural law of some imaginary state of nature (as in Locke). Rousseau 
expresses in this sense an early and radically secular version of democracy. The source of 
legitimacy is located in history, not some mythical or hypothetical time which resonates with a 
transcendent “human nature”.  
The standard objection against Rousseau is that he takes for granted the homogeneity of modern 
society.216 In Habermas’ reconstructed narrative, this acknowledged weakness led to a liberal 
redefinition of popular sovereignty in the mid-19th century, by figures such as Julius Fröbel (1848) 
and John Stuart Mill (1859) which sought to conceptualize how “sovereignty should express itself 
                                                 
211 It is «fundamental» on state-centric terms.  
212 Rawls 1993, p. 3 
213 Ibid., p. 6 
214 Habermas 1997 
215 Ibid., p. 44 
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under the discursive conditions of an internally differentiated process of opinion- and will-
formation.”217  
While emphasizing the importance of individual liberal rights as normative constrains on 
government, this new position of Fröbel and Mill also sought to retain Rousseau’s republican 
conception of autonomy: That one should only obey laws that are self-imposed; otherwise they 
become (heteronomous) orders or commands. This autonomy is in turn – due to the fear of a 
tyranny of the majority rule – subordinated to a legal, systemic framework that regulates the 
transition from opinion-formation to will-formation. This implies a system that disperses power 
on several governing departments, and that minority opinions should be considered. Given the 
need for practical agreement in the procedural decision-making in the state apparatus, the 
participants that hold a minority opinion are forced to accept the consensus, but only as a 
conditional and provisional decision. Ideally, this system is open-ended and constantly in re-
negotiation on previous decisions. This secures the self-legislative aspect not so much by direct 
participation in the will-formation (i.e. by vote), but in the preceding and to-be-continued process 
of opinion-formation (i.e. by continuous public debate). 
In short, there seems to be a line of liberal and republican reforming ideas of the absolutist state, 
which has led to a quite rich account of how the public sphere (of the secular imaginary) can be 
integrated in the will-formation on a state level, both to improve and to legitimize the state as 
democratic. Primarily, this public sphere is understood in ways similar to the “res publica”, as the 
people’s opposition to the crown. Hence the scope of the public sphere seems to follow the 
“demos” and as an entity challenging political power from the outside.  
3.4.2 The lifeworld and the system: Opinion- and will-formation 
As Jon Elster points out in the article “The market and the forum”218, the tension between 
opinion- and will-formation is still a characteristic of the central dilemma within deliberative 
democracy theory. This dilemma corresponds quite well to the two sides of democracy that we 
mentioned above: as system and as participation.  
As system, democracy is considered the adequate form of government in a nation-state to address 
the failures of the modern ‘free market’ economy. From this rather instrumentalist perspective 
democracy is understood as a set of political institutions designed to solve tasks of social choice 
that involves interest struggles and compromise between otherwise irreconcilable preferences. In 
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other words: democracy is understood as an instrument of systemic will-formation. Its advantage 
is that it offers efficient procedures for aggregating the preferences of all. It provides a pragmatic 
solution to decision-making in a mass-society sieged by time-pressure. It can force agreements 
between unsolvable differences of opinion when a quick decision is better than none. The 
disadvantage is related to how reliable these aggregations are (such as polls). For instance, the set 
of alternatives available to the voters might affect the reported preferences – providing the polls 
with an unreliable impression of neutrality. The main objection is, however, that it approaches 
the political tasks of the forum by simulating the task of the market. In the market, the 
alternatives are valued primarily by how they affect the buyer, whereas in the forum the 
alternative outcomes also differ in the way they affect other people and the community at large.  
As participation, democracy is understood as informal or procedural conditions of opinion-
formation, i.e. as ways to refine the normative perspectives on the common good.219 In terms of 
the system, Elster articulates Habermas’ discourse-ethical emphasis like this:  
The core of [Habermas’] theory is that rather than aggregating or filtering preferences, the 
political system should be set up with a view to changing them by political debate and 
confrontation. The input to the social choice mechanism would then not be the raw, quite 
possibly selfish or irrational, preferences that operate in the market, but informed and 
other-regarding preferences.220  
The basic assumption is that public reasoning over contesting conceptions will give a 
decentralizing effect on the perspectives and preferences of the participants. Aware of the fact 
that the political system of mass society only allows for participation in quite formalized and 
representative/indirect forms, Habermas seeks the participatory element of democracy in its 
purest and perhaps most radical form: the anarchic model of the voluntary association. 
Predictably, considering the regulatory and organizational needs of modern society (carried by 
economic and bureaucratic systems), Habermas does not consider anarchism a viable project, but 
he nevertheless recognizes its methodological usefulness. The idea of voluntary associations is 
valuable because it articulates an informal, prototypical communicative and constitutive process 
at its basic level:  
The horizontal contacts at the level of face-to-face interaction were supposed to coalesce 
into an intersubjective practice of deliberation and decision making strong enough to 
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maintain all the other institutions in the fluid condition of the founding phase, more or 
less preserving them from coagulation.221  
The main concern about “coagulation” in the cosmopolitan context would be that political 
institutions get fixated on the statist scope, which serves the rights and interest of its own citizens 
exclusively. Further, this potential institutional lack of flexibility and adaptation is reflected in 
coagulated attitudes and imaginaries on how the social world is rigged. The statist conception of 
justice and state-centric conception of politics then becomes self-confirming elements of a 
coagulated institutional condition, adapted to a situation where cosmopolitan problems were less 
urgent.  
In a cosmopolitan public such parochial “banners of justice” should perhaps be expected. As 
long as these competing conceptions of justice are cosmopolitan naïve and not appealing to a 
strong cultural relativist position, a living global public should be able to offer the necessary 
dynamic to somehow transcend these conflicting perspectives. In the participatory model, this 
transcendence is not forced by systemic aggregation of irreconcilable preferences, but by “the 
willingness to solve problems and coordinate action through mutual understanding.”222 Could 
this model also be applied in also the process of deliberating on the content of cosmopolitan law?  
3.4.3 The pure ideal of participation 
For Habermas, this radical idea of participation and mutual understanding serves as a contrast to 
bureaucratic systems and formal legislative, decision-making processes. Contrary to the 
individualistic natural law-tradition, the participatory model enables us to appreciate the 
spontaneity and informal processes of opinion-formation in civil society (the public sphere), 
“outside” organized politics. Parallel to the liberal idea of politics as the task of facilitating a free 
market, the idea of democratic participation implies a political concern for the flourishing of civil 
society (presumably regulated through education and public media, and the amount of spare time 
from paid work). Ideally, these horizontal network-processes can exercise their “communicative 
power” in the manner of a siege (as Habermas puts it): “It influences the premises of judgment 
and decision making in the political system without intending to conquer the system itself.”223  
The advantage of the participatory approach is that it gives – in contrast to a preference-
formation of consumers – a “thick” account of political opinion-formation. Consider for instance 
the uncoordinated demands in a market compared to a coordinated consumer campaign. The 
communicative coordination of the latter cannot be explained simply as a process of aggregation. 
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In a way, it bears more resemblance to a siege of the “free market”-system. A similar coordinated 
corrective is also possible when addressing the formal procedures of will-formation in the 
political system of government. In this sense, civil society has supervising and legitimizing 
functions for the state, and potentially also for international institutions.  
The participatory approach also considers the public opinion as a valuable legitimating source for 
the political system. The disadvantage in terms of will-formation is that it relies, at least in 
Habermas’ case, on the assumption that communicative rationality will force the participants of a 
debate to agreement. Even if we grant this assumption some ideal validity, it will never be 
actualized under realistic conditions.224 Hence, the approach would (due to the shortage of time) 
rely procedurally on the market-like aggregation of preferences. In a pluralist society we might 
very well imagine an endpoint where we all agree, but for all practical purposes the discursive 
transformation of preferences is perhaps best understood as a valuable supplement to the 
articulation of actual options.   
Hence, the reasonable point of emphasizing the participatory aspect would not primarily be to 
replace in a mass society the bureaucratic system or the formal-procedural legislation with 
something else. Whether the opinion formation takes place in a national or global public sphere, 
it must somehow establish a kind of symbiosis with the system of (fairly) autonomous states. For 
instance the public sphere could reform this symbiosis by articulating new rights of domestic and 
cosmopolitan law to protect its own conditions.   
3.4.4 Strong democracies and the cosmopolitan reform of the state 
As discussed in chapter 2, Benhabib has promoted a contribution to the further deliberations on 
cosmopolitan law. Benhabib’s main argument against Kant is that his conception of the 
cosmopolitan law does not go far enough. To overcome the unbridgeable gap between the right 
to visit and the right to be a guest, Benhabib suggests a cosmopolitan right to political 
membership as a way to articulate the right of foreigners to second admission. This right 
corresponds to the state obligation not to hinder foreigners from seeking civil association.  
Further, Benhabib argues that if we restrict our concerns to how cosmopolitan law can be 
addressed and developed within an international order, then the relevant question of future 
deliberation on cosmopolitan justice should first of all be addressed in the context of state 
reforms. Developing a promising account within the deliberative tradition, Seyla Benhabib 
incorporates collective self-reflexivity as a central feature of a strong democratic community that 
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conceives itself as an “open society” – that is, a society that tends to appeal to cosmopolitan 
values and that seeks to adjust the activities of the polity to how it affects the global community.  
To even consider the actual option of extending the cosmopolitan law requires, according to 
Benhabib, a moral learning process where the citizens are able to perform repeating 
interpretations or iterations of their political identity.225 They have to realize that the collective first 
person, “we, the people,” is a reflexive concept: i.e. “a concept that anticipates self-
transformation through encounters with others”.226 This indicates that Benhabib is not only 
concerned with the issue of admission alone, but appreciates the way an extended cosmopolitan 
law of admission will protect and promote deliberations of a cosmopolitan character. An open 
society is in her account a reflexive, cosmopolitan self-conception of participants that are 
concerned with the global effects of their collective actions and appreciate the educative 
encounters with foreigners.  
From a cosmopolitan perspective the potential consequences of a strong and open democracy – 
i.e. the strengthening of civil society and education of its members – are not arbitrary side-effects. 
From a domestic perspective these side-effects might not be the primary motive of politics,227 but 
in regard to the emerging cosmopolitan domain they provide the fertile soil of sustainable 
transnational interaction. In a field like the cosmopolitan with no direct institutional address in 
the form of a global state, the way states operate and facilitate democratic participation both 
formally and informally is crucial to the emergence of a transnational public sphere.  
Benhabib conceives the implementation of cosmopolitan law as a reforming process of an open 
society. According to her account, it is characterized by mitigation between universal moral 
principles and democratic legislation. Benhabib’s concept of “democratic iterations” is inspired 
by the legal concept of “jurisgenerative politics”, which “refers to the dialectics between 
constitutional norms and democratic will formation.”228 This juridical term describes the political 
                                                 
225 The notion of iteration or iterative acts has a clear phenomenological influence. Benhabib refers to Derrida’s term 
“iteration”. “In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply produce a replica of the first original 
usage and its intended meaning: rather every repetition is a form of variation. Every iteration transforms meaning, 
adds to it, enriches it in ever-so subtle ways. In fact, there really is no ‘originary’ source of meaning, or an ‘original’ to 
which all subsequent forms must conform.” (Benhabib 2004, p. 179, restated p. 454 in Benhabib, Seyla. 2007. 
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226 Means 2007, p. 409 
227 See Elster 1997 for argument against the paradoxical and incoherent notion of “politics for its own sake”.  
228 Means 2007, p. 406 
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
110 
 
process associated with the constitutional court. It is a legal concept that is intended to transcend 
the oppositions between natural right and legal positivism.229  
Democratic iteration is meant to describe an analogous political process where the norms of 
international law – including cosmopolitan norms – are interpreted and “scheduled”230 in an 
individual polity. It is defined by Benhabib as:  
[…] a complex process of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which 
universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and 
revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in 
the associations of civil society. These can take place in the “strong” public bodies of 
legislatives, the judiciary, and the executive, as well as in the informal and “weak” publics 
of civil society associations and the media.231  
It refers to the “iterative acts through which a democratic people that considers itself bound by 
certain guiding norms and principles reappropriates and reinterprets these”232 in concordance 
with the principle of public autonomy, i.e. as co-authors.233 In Benhabib’s framework, the 
cosmopolitan norms are conceived as moral (not ethical) norms that present universal claims of 
inclusion and participation. Combined with the principle of public autonomy, which implies 
some sort of exclusiveness and closure, these ideas create a conflict or a dilemma in any given 
situation of practical implementation.  
To exemplify the notion of democratic iteration, Benhabib describes in some detail three cases 
from France and Germany. In each case, universal norms and the way they are understood within 
the respective political community, are challenged and renegotiated in the light of questions 
presumably brought up by immigration. There’s the scarf affair in France, and a German 
                                                 
229
 In this way Benhabib complies with a non-metaphysical reading of Kant. When it comes to the anti-essentialism 
of iteration, Benhabib seems to have her own agenda, addressing the “various constitutive illusions such as the 
homogeneity of the people and territorial self-sufficiency” (2004, p. 171). This addresses deep-seated social 
imaginaries, which Benhabib nonetheless understands to be transformable through a self-reflexive process of 
interpreting the “rights of others”.   
This agenda is demanding because it adopts the complex relational analysis of social science. From these 
analyses Benhabib attacks substantial notions of peoples as moral agents, i.e. as self-sufficient and unified agents.  
And, it promotes a reform of political concepts into complex and dynamic notions defined by interpretive acts in 
relations to “others”. 
Benhabib refers to T.H. Marshall’s classic works on citizenship to stress the significance of social struggle in 
the evolution of cultural solidarities. Only a more static vision of the formation of collective identity allows Walzer 
and Rawls to assume that aliens are a threat. I think this point is particularly strong when she contrasts the idea of 
liberal democracy to the promotion of the high degree of cohesiveness and culture-centeredness they both promote. 
(see 2004, p. 173) 
230 In Kantian terms this would imply the process of articulating principles according to a concrete content. Taylor 
uses the term “schematizing” to illustrate the same process. A term that is usually associated with perception and 
understanding, and not concepts of reason, such as principles of practical reason. 
231 Benhabib 2004, p. 179   
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equivalent, both concerning the display of religious symbols in public (mainly concerning the 
hijab or foulard). In these cases, the reflexive self-understanding of a public finds itself in 
negotiation with the principles of religious freedom and tolerance for diversity.  
The third case involves a case in the German constitutional court regarding the right of non-
citizen but long-term resident foreigners to vote in provincial elections in Schleswig-Holstein. 
The argument against this right of foreigners to vote appealed to the role of national belonging in 
a democracy. This argument is interesting to Benhabib because it represent “the swan song of a 
vanishing ideology of nationhood”.234 The following quote states clearly the distinction between a 
cosmopolitan and the nativist-ethnic interpretation of politics:  
In an almost direct repudiation of the Habermasian discursive-democracy principle, the 
court declares that [the constitutional law] does not imply that “the decisions of state 
organs must be legitimized through those whose interests are affected in each case; rather 
their authority must proceed from the people as a group bound to each other as a unity.” 
235 
The position of Habermas that Benhabib refers to in this passage corresponds to Habermas’ 
methodological emphasis on the principle of participation of the affected parties. The argument 
of the court, on the other side, seems to rely on a principle of participation grounded in being a 
stakeholder. In implies that participation in “strong” publics like elections, require reciprocally 
binding relations such as those of citizenship. To admit foreign residents as relevant subjects of 
law in this manner is to me clearly a case of mitigating between this universal democratic 
principle and the competing political norms. As discussed earlier, it is however not clear to me 
that to extend the right of participation to foreign residents is a case of applying cosmopolitan 
law. It seems rather to depend on an extension on the concept of “member” within domestic 
law. The court clearly did not accept this extension of membership when it came to the issue of 
the right to vote. In order to change the scope of voters, the court concludes, one would have to 
alter the laws regulating the acquisition of citizenship. 
To Benhabib, this case addresses the core of the dilemma mentioned above, as “the paradox of 
democratic legitimacy, namely that the outsiders (whose rights to inclusion or exclusion from the 
demos are being decided upon) will not themselves be the ones to decide upon these rules.”236 
According to the democratic principle of universal inclusion, the question of how to include 
foreigners in a democracy does certainly provoke the kind of dilemma Benhabib refers to. But, is 
this specifically a cosmopolitan dilemma? If we follow the Kantian framework, would not 
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inclusion in terms of reforming the notion of citizenship also imply that the cosmopolitan 
relation is converted to a domestic relation? In my mind, the question of how to include the 
foreigner as a foreigner, or as a world-citizen with his or her own implied sense of being a 
stakeholder, is not addressed by Benhabib.  
To be sure, Benhabib’s notion of “democratic iterations” is first and foremost a descriptive term. 
It draws on a complex relational social ontology which is broadly accepted within social science, 
but can hardly be said to have acquired the status of common sense in the general public. Her 
agenda is, however, also normative in the sense that she thinks that a self-reflexive community 
would improve its understanding of its cosmopolitan responsibility and dependency on other 
state and non-state agents. Benhabib articulates certain normative constraints which ensure a 
“just, fair and open process of democratic iteration”. These concerns are related to cosmopolitan 
law, at least in the sense that the cosmopolitan rights of admission (i.e. to visit and to 
membership) are understood to affect the morality of the legislating process.237 In this way, the 
descriptive critique against the constitutive myths is integrated into the way we assess the very 
process of democratic meaning formation. The idea of a homogenous citizenry, the original 
assembly of consent, is not only a distorting description of history; it also undermines the 
normative potential of democratic constitutionalism.238 In particular, it affects the capacity of self-
transformation through encounters with foreigners.  
Although deliberative approaches appreciate the value of democratic participation in the public 
sphere and the qualitative opinion-formation of public right it entails, this is by no means – as we 
have seen with Rawls – a guarantee against state-centrism. In other words, the promotion of 
deliberative democracy does not imply recognition of the need for deliberations on the content 
of cosmopolitan law. Nor does it necessarily recognize the need to protect the conditions of a 
transnational civil society.  
In this context, Seyla Benhabib represents a moderate cosmopolitan position. She explicitly 
criticizes state-centric approaches and the lack of attention given by other cosmopolitan political 
theorists to the need for an extended cosmopolitan law. She also articulates options for an 
extended content of cosmopolitan law of admission which situates her thinking clearly within the 
“further deliberations” on cosmopolitan law after Kant. Furthermore, she recognizes a central 
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epistemological value of cosmopolitan deliberations in the way democratic social imaginaries are 
transformed in the encounter with foreigners’ perspectives. Although this expresses a deep 
cosmopolitan concern in Benhabib’s thinking, her main distinction between moral and political 
norms leaves her position somewhat unclear on the distinction between universal moral norms in 
general and the specific moral-legal character of cosmopolitan norms. Since the process of 
democratic iterations is understood as consisting of mitigations between moral and political 
norms, the epistemic value of foreign perspectives is situated within this domestic mitigation. 
Expressed in Kantian terms, the implication of this lack of clarity between the universal and the 
cosmopolitan seems to lead Benhabib to emphasize the content of cosmopolitan law merely 
within the law of admission, whereas the law of deliberation remains domestic in its content.239  
Conclusion – the democratization of cosmopolitan rights 
In many ways Benhabib’s notion of democratic iteration describes a process where the 
cosmopolitan and statist concerns are repeatedly and continuously in negotiation. The task of 
finding a middle ground, or some acceptable balance between the competing concerns, defines 
the political situation.  
As discussed in chapter 2, if we accept the situational ontology of conventional politics, it only 
allows us to define cosmopolitan law in formal terms as the moral-legal norms that regulates 
interaction between a state (and its citizens) and non-citizens. Given the specific character of this 
domain, it requires laws and individual rights that are distinct from the laws and rights issued to 
solve domestic or interstatal problems. In this sense, cosmopolitan rights are neither the universal 
ground of domestic law, nor its ethical supplements. They are better understood as a distinct type 
of universal moral claims of foreigners, analogue to the claims of citizens, but addressing other 
kinds of insufficiency and injustice in the positive law of the state or international institutions. If 
cosmopolitan rights are claimed without a specific addressee, the corresponding duties of the 
states seem to be quite weak in character. But, ‘territorial residency’ gives a relevant criterion for 
specifying which state is obliged to protect these rights. In the next chapter I will also consider 
systemic obligations of states which go beyond this territorial criterion. 
Although it is problematic to speak of reciprocally binding agreements on the cosmopolitan level, 
I’ve suggested we distinguish between the kind of moral-legal norms that address the 
cosmopolitan problems of cross-border migration directly, as the cosmopolitan laws of 
admission, and those norms that seek to protect the relations of transnational civil society, i.e. the 
cosmopolitan laws of deliberation. In regard this last point, this chapter has discussed the 
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obstacles of democratizing the domain of cosmopolitan law. As Benhabib’s examples indicate, 
this democratization is already on its way, but the association of democracy with the status of 
national belonging is still quite strong. And, even if the criterion of national belonging has been 
widely questioned after the Second World War, the state-centric idea of politics is still dominant. 
Citizenship is still seen as the taken-for-granted marker of being a stakeholder and having a right 
to participate. A cosmopolitan reform of democracy would have to challenge these assumptions 
by asking questions like: Do not all affected parties have a right to participate? Are not all of us 
stakeholders in a globalized world? 
If we look to Rawls for answers we are bound to be disappointed. We might grant that Rawls 
accurately describes the current legitimizing ground of the secular state, but we have seen how his 
appeal to the political culture leaves his position relying on the heteronomy of tradition in a 
situation that calls for renewal. If we ignore the problem of autonomy, and Rawls reliance on a 
historically shared public political culture, we might even be open to the possibility that his 
conception have universal validity in the domains of domestic and interstatal (or inter-popular) 
law, without thereby having any relevance or validity for cosmopolitan law. Does his conception 
give us any normative guidance as to how to reform the statist nation-state? Indeed, in The Law of 
the Peoples Rawls even provides an account of how a state should deal with foreign affairs, i.e. with 
international law regulating relations between “peoples”. I also agree with the anti-utopian 
position of Rawls, that we should take a reformist approach to the current international order 
rather than aiming for a global state.240 However, in terms of prescribing how we should deal with 
phenomena like immigration and the globalization of civil society, I hold Rawls state-centric 
conception to be increasingly inadequate.241 Rawls’ conception marginalizes cosmopolitan 
problems related to the physical and political exclusion of foreigners. Because of this, I hold his 
position to be cosmopolitan naïve.  
There are generally two reasons supporting the extending the cosmopolitan law with a law of 
deliberation, which would include the right of foreigners to participate in the decision-making 
processes of an alien state. First, it complies with the democratic ideal that subjects of law should 
also be the authors of the law. Even if this consent is given only hypothetically, this ideal 
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beginning of his procedure influences the way Rawls address issues as the veil is lifted and the basic structure is 
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delegitimizes the use of brutal force and pure orders against foreigners. Since foreigners are 
subjected to the laws of immigration, this concern is relevant to the cosmopolitan law of 
admission. Second, there is an epistemological value associated with reflexive self-transformation 
in considering the perspectives and standards of justice of others. The democratic participation of 
foreigners helps us avoid the risk of naïve cosmopolitan positions. Neither of these arguments 
implies that we should simply let foreigners dictate our immigration laws, but it does suggest a 
concern for potential improvement in the practical implementation of a cosmopolitan order 
through state reforms. As a third argument in support of a democratic cosmopolitan law of 
deliberation, it also gives its own reason for a generous freedom of movement. This reason is not 
founded in the aim of fulfilling the needs of an individual life, but argues in favor of freedom of 
movement on the ground that it promotes and protects the concern for a strong transnational 
public sphere.  
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Chapter 4: We refugees – The actuality of cosmopolitan law 
So far I’ve presented the cosmopolitan law – i.e. a theoretical specification within public right – 
as the moral-legal domain which is most relevant to the debate on immigration. I’ve also 
indicated that understanding cosmopolitan law as the provisional legal protection of a new public 
domain, challenges state-centric assumption in dominant political theory as well as in our shared 
and deep-seated social imaginaries. This assumption – namely that politics is properly located 
within the public of a sovereign state, between individual citizens – is perhaps what is most 
clearly provoked by the suggestion of democratizing the domain of cosmopolitan law.   
In chapter 3, I considered some of the obstacles that make it difficult to conceive a cosmopolitan 
reform of democracy, which would involve the political inclusion of foreigners. In this chapter, I 
will argue that there are nonetheless good reasons to extend the cosmopolitan law beyond Kant’s 
‘right to visit’. This implies taking issue with the legitimacy of marginalizing the phenomena of 
cross-border migration and political exclusion of foreigners from deliberations on public right. 
First, I will consider those migrants who are worst off, i.e. people that are subjected to forced 
displacement and long-term encampment. Two ways of facing these challenges on the conceptual 
level will be discussed: On the one hand, we might widen the notion of a refugee in order to 
make it more inclusive, and on the other, we may consider extending the content of the 
cosmopolitan law of admission beyond the right to asylum. The right to asylum is here 
understood as the only generally recognized cosmopolitan law in the current framework of 
international law. Second, I will consider Kant’s account of the circumstances of justice that led 
him to conclude that the cosmopolitan law was actualized as a moral-legal obligation already in 
his time. These circumstantial considerations led Kant to argue in favor of a right to visit as an 
adequate content of cosmopolitan law, which, at least in some readings, have a wider content 
than the right to asylum. Third, I will elaborate on Arendt’s historical witness to how the need for 
an extended cosmopolitan law actualized itself in its radical negation through the totalitarian 
regimes and Holocaust.  The circumstances had reached a point where the right to visit simply 
could not respond adequately to the harms caused by the international order at the time. At the 
end of this chapter, I will present a response to these circumstances, following two 
interconnected paths. The first path is concerned with Arendt’s own response within the legal 
discourse, issuing the fundamental “right to have rights”. This path solves the problem of 
autonomy by criticizing the old doctrines of right and introducing a new political principle. The 
second path is concerned with the epistemological relevance of foreigners’ perspectives. The 
latter path is inspired by Amartya Sen’s procedural critique of Rawls’ original position and the 
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procedural alternative Sen finds in Adam Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’. This path is concerned 
with the problem of procedural parochialism. Both of these paths prepares my discussion on 
immigration in political theory in chapter 5 and the subsequent critique of Benhabib: To what 
extent is Benhabib’s notion of a strong democracy and self-reflexive deliberation captures the 
adequate response to the issues at hand?   
4.1 We refugees 
Undeniably, the current institutional regulation of cross-border migration is an imperfect 
compromise. But although the current system causes some to live in intolerable situations, we 
should be careful not to paint too gloomy a picture. In a broader historical perspective we find 
ourselves today in a generally peaceful period.242 The numbers of refugees were on a stable yearly 
decrease until the civil war in Syria led extraordinary numbers of civilians to flee their country.243 
Also, if we look at the general line of policies on immigration, most groups have experienced a 
positive improvement. For instance, most cross-border migration within the EU-region is free 
and legal.244 Compared to the situation that Arendt describes in the first half of the 20th century, 
we might also argue that the legal integrity of stateless and irregular migrants has improved within 
the regime of international law. A state is – at least within reasonable limits – responsible for the 
human rights of any human being residing on their territory.  
Still, for some groups the regional and bilateral agreements on migration among states imply 
inhuman and strategic measures are applied in order to limit immigration. The non-arrival 
measures described in chapter 1 seek to reduce the amount of asylum seekers arriving at state 
territory is one clear example of this. For these undesired groups –in general from the global 
south– the legal and physical access to crossing borders is worsened and the measures taken to 
prevent them from travelling irregularly are hardened. The recent agreement on border-regulation 
between EU and Turkey reflects this darker side of the current situation. 
The most vulnerable of these groups are the victims of forced displacement, or “refugees” in the 
wide sense of the term. They count currently somewhere between 65.3 and 72 million 
                                                 
242 Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature : Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking. 
243 The count of displaced persons has increased dramatically since the start of the Syrian war (for illustration of 
UNHCR numbers, see http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/06/refugee-crisis-




244 In 2015, the immigration to the EU of non-members was 2.7 million. (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics ) The estimates within Europe is about 40 
million for 2015. 
(http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationR
eport2015_Highlights.pdf ) 
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displaced/refugees in the world, which amounts to about 1 % of the global population.245 What 
makes forced displacement a relevant cosmopolitan issue, even when they reside within their 
domestic territory, is that they present the world society with individuals that have nowhere to 
call their own. However, since internal displacement is a more complicated issue in terms of 
cosmopolitan law (related to the asymmetry between the right to emigrate and the lack of a 
corresponding right to immigrate), I will base my further argument on those situated outside their 
own country. 
The reintegration of displaced persons is a “systemic” practical matter because even though we 
assume – hypothetically – the good intentions and moral soundness of the way each nation-state 
operates within the international order (as in an ideal-theoretical setting); it concerns every 
member of this order that most victims of forced displacement within the current system are 
likely to find themselves in a long-term situation of rightlessness. Put otherwise, if we recognize 
the issues of irregularity and statelessness as cosmopolitan issues, the legal status of foreigners 
should not rely solely on the goodwill of the parties involved. All beneficiaries of the public 
system are responsible for the situation of those excluded from it, especially if those excluded 
have nowhere else to go.  
4.1.1 The definition of a refugee – narrow and wide terms of worthy victims 
If we look closer at the definition of a refugee in the “UN convention relating to the status of 
refugees”, the term “refugee” is restricted to persons who qualify in respect to one of the 
following reasons of “well-founded fear of being persecuted”: race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. In other terms, the UN convention 
recognizes individuals as refugees when the persecution is based on features generally held to be 
non-alterable or that one should not be forced to alter. In addition, there is the territorial 
condition of displacement, which excludes the internally displaced from this definition of 
‘’refugee’’. 
Compared to the right to visit (in the wide reading), the conventional right to asylum is 
considerably narrower. Given the unconditional character of the corresponding duty to the right 
to asylum, such narrowing restrictions might be expected from a state-centric international 
community, but it also leads to weakened loyalty to the cosmopolitan spirit that accompanies this 
“lex specialis” on refugee issues. From the start, this right was initially designed to deal with the 
refugee problem in Europe after the Second World War, and it was only later extended as a 
global convention. Second, the right to asylum has, due to its restrictive conditions, highly 
                                                 
245 About 65 million people are considered «refugee-like» according to UNHCR, including internally displaced. 
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discriminating consequences within the group of displaced persons. The convention might not 
have much to say on who is allowed to enter a refugee camp, but it is decisive for the kind of 
entitlements246 and worthiness247 individuals are met with further on.  
As Serena Parekh points out, there is an important exclusionary side-effect of this conventional 
distinction between genuine and false (illegal, rejected) refugees: Those denied legitimate status 
both suffer the harm of displacement and are placed in “a unique state of vulnerability” (as 
stateless).248 In the worst cases we might speak of being socially dead. Unlike victims of genocide, 
the displaced persons – i.e. those who cannot find a state to recognize them as members 
(Benhabib), or those who belong to no internationally recognizable community (Arendt) – 
continue living as the undead or as the living dead.249 Genocide has been recognized in recent times 
as a crime against humanity, the same should be the case, in my opinion, for those treated as 
human waste. In becoming in Arendt’s terms “superfluous people”, these individuals are 
deprived of their humanity, excluded not only from “our” political community, but from 
humanity as such.  
The narrow conventional definition of “refugee” – or of “those in need of protection” – seems 
to have a broad support both legally and morally (although it varies somewhat according to 
context). The consensus seems to overlap two different positions on the character of the 
obligations in question: on the one side the cosmopolitan positions that recognize the negative 
duty of states implied; on the other sider the moderate statist positions that recognize it on the 
conditional ground of mutual aid. In a new situation of mass migration, the consensus is 
challenged because the statists and the cosmopolitans tend to react differently to the question of 
how to adapt and reform the response to it. On the one side, the statists will insist on the weak 
character of the obligation associated with the right to asylum, and consider it as part of register 
of positive (supererogatory) humanitarian duties to aid those in need. On the other side, the 
cosmopolitans who hold the right to asylum to be a strong obligation, will tend to seek to extend 
this obligation in one of two ways: Either through widening the definition of refugees, such as 
already briefly discussed above (in 1.3), or to argue for a more general widening of the 
cosmopolitan law (which I tend to support), which would follow the line suggested by Kant (cf. 
Chapter 2) and argued further by Arendt and Benhabib below in this chapter.  
                                                 
246 Non-refoulement is such an entitlement; a principle of international law, which prohibits the return or exclusion 
of a true victim of persecution (i.e. a refugee) to his or her persecutor. 
247 The group considered worthy of sympathy and compassion (and mutual aid) is usually much larger than those 
fitting the narrow category of genuine refugees.  
248 P. 11, Parekh, Serena. 2017. Refugees and the Ethics of Forced Displacement, Routledge Research in Applied Ethics. 
249 Arendt compares the effect on human rights on these people as equal to animal rights. If our dignity is based on 
human nature, being left stateless amounts to being treated as a specimen of the human race, and no longer as a 
political/human person.  
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4.1.2 Widening the definition of refugees 
Widening the definition of “refugee” would address the problematic consequences of strategically 
‘leaving out’ those fleeing from generalized violence and war. This wider definition already has 
some institutional support; The African Union has since 1969 operated with such a wider 
definition, and the UNHCR includes all persons in “refugee-like” situations.250 Parekh supports 
Joseph Carens251 definition, which corresponds quite well to the broader account of UNHCR, 
defining refugees as: “[…] people who are outside their own countries and unable to return, 
“owing to serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from 
generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order.” 252  
To give some impression of how this group of co-world citizens are treated by the international 
community, Parekh highlights two alarming examples: First, within the wider category of 
refugees, the average duration of this excluding state of displacement (either urban or in camps) 
is 17 years(!). Second, only less than 1 % of the official refugees (in the narrow, conventional 
definition) are likely to be resettled in a third country – that is, without having to travel illegally.253 
Obviously, these examples go together. If the issue of resettlement is solved, the average duration 
of long-term displacement or encampment is also likely to decrease. By widening the definition 
of those “in need of protection” one would be able to get better numbers on those in actual need 
of resettlement.  
From a cosmopolitan perspective, i.e. to the extent that “we the people” understand itself to be 
collectively committed to assist refugees and displaced people, we should not be content with 
treating those that reach our shores and border with decency. Given that we are members of an 
international community and morally obliged to comply with the cosmopolitan law, we should in 
my view be highly concerned with the fact that encampment is still the standard approach toward 
displacement and question how our own immigration policies contributes to these systemic 
failures. 
4.1.3 Widening the cosmopolitan law 
The problem of the systemic failure that long-term encampment represents seems somehow to 
escape not only the statist positions, but also those that we might call state-centric cosmopolitan 
positions. While this neglect is predictable when it comes to statist positions, which deny any 
systemic or binding obligations whatsoever, there is also a tendency in some cosmopolitan 
                                                 
250 Parekh 2017, p. 12-3. To be cynical: There is obviously an interest in UNHCR, like in all client-based institutions, 
to define their base of clients broadly.  
251 P. 201, in Carens, Joseph H. 2013. The Ethics of Immigration: Oxford University Press. 
252 Parekh 2017, p. 13 
253 Ibid., p. 17 
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positions to ignore this problem. Whereas the statists would deny any strong obligations toward 
foreigners, the state-centric assumption seems to lead some cosmopolitans to restrict the 
cosmopolitan law to a set of laws of admission. Because politics is still considered to take place 
primarily between citizens, foreigners are considered moral equals as individuals, but are not 
recognized as stakeholders in a larger whole. Hence, when we discuss widening the cosmopolitan 
law, we are not primarily discussing whether it has a humanitarian or moral-legal character. The 
decisive issue is whether the obligations on the part of the state answer to the needs of individual 
foreigners, or to foreigners as parts of a globalized whole, i.e. a civil society. Although an 
individualist conception of the cosmopolitan obligation might capture the restrictions of a life 
project in long-term encampment, it seems less able to capture the problematic political exclusion 
involved.  
If we consider Kant’s right to visit as a widening of the cosmopolitan law, it could perhaps – in a 
generous reading – provide a few additional entitlements compared to the current legal situation 
of refugees. If we read the right to visit as a right to safe passage, refugees would at least be 
protected against the most inhumane non-arrival measures and allowed to travel more freely. Still, 
if we restrict our reading of “the right to visit” to its content concerning the law of admission, it 
adds little to the UN conventional protection: The right to visit does not commit states to 
provide a right to permanent residency. The practice might be quite generous in some states in 
terms of “guest rights” and even membership provisions, but it is not considered a moral-legal 
duty required by Kant, nor by the current international law. Furthermore, similar to the right to 
asylum, the right to visit implies a specified corresponding duty only when the foreigner stands at 
the border or resides within the territory of the given state. Neither of these rights addresses the 
kind of international arrangement that would be necessary in order to avoid the systemic 
problems associated with long-term encampment.  
In distinction to the UN convention, the right to visit does not only address refugees, but any 
foreigner seeking to establish peaceful cosmopolitan relations. In this cosmopolitan spirit; I have 
argued in chapter 2 that it hardly seems reasonable to limit the interpretation of the right to visit 
to the scope of the cosmopolitan law of admission. It can also be read as part of a law of 
deliberation, which seeks to protect not only the foreign individual from harm, but the emerging 
civil society with a cosmopolitan character. This may open up for a strengthening of the political 
integrity of the foreigner, which is not explicitly articulated in the conventional right to asylum. 
However, this would require another view on the possible widening of cosmopolitan law, than 
the current state-centric notion of “politics” would allow.  
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The development since the Second World War has no doubt strengthened the status of temporal 
residents and their guest rights, compared to the preceding periods. In at least some aspects, we 
might even speak of a “mellowing of citizenship’s exclusive edges”254 and more “porous 
borders”255 which goes beyond the scope of Kant’s right to visit. With a concern for the 
transnational civil society and the systemic issues excluding some of its stakeholders, it is 
worrisome that most of the extensions are issued within the law of admission. It should, 
however, be noted that a recent statist counter-tendency – focus on security-aspects, which has 
been increasingly influential since 9/11 2001 – has challenged even this moderate cosmopolitan 
reform of the state. What we might call the “nativist backlash” in current politics, challenges even 
the bear minimum of cosmopolitan law as implemented in international law. This seems to make 
further extensions of cosmopolitan law in international law unfeasible for the moment.  
On these terms, an ambitious widening of cosmopolitan law might not seem very realistic. This is 
particularly clear when it comes to the critique of long-term encampment as a kind of political 
exclusion of foreigners. This is an unusual idea because we are accustomed to think of political 
exclusion or misrecognition as violations of citizen rights, located within state borders.256 A 
cosmopolitan recognition of the political integrity of foreigners (both as affected and as 
stakeholders) obviously also requires circumstances that are considerably more globalized than 
those faced by Kant.  
In the following I will argue that the current circumstances require us to reform the state, as well 
as our collective self-understanding in this cosmopolitan direction. Historically, there is a 
tendency toward increased relevance and sometimes urgency of an extended cosmopolitan law, 
indicated by the comparison of Kant’s and Arendt’s account of the circumstances of their times. 
Arendt’s response was to suggest a widening of the cosmopolitan law from a right to visit to a 
‘right to have rights’; exactly how to understand the character of this response will be a central 
concern for the rest of this dissertation.  
4.2 Kant’s cosmopolitan right – The outer circumstances of justice  
To recap the argument presented in Chapter 2: In addition to the purely conceptual clarification 
of cosmopolitan law as distinct from Samaritan duty and positive international law, there is an 
empirical premise in Kant’s argument regarding the circumstances of justice. The question is 
whether there are in fact interactions between states and foreigners that actualize the content of 
cosmopolitan law. More specifically, the question is whether these interactions are necessary in the 
                                                 
254 Joppke 2010. 
255 Benhabib 2004.  
256 Lysaker, Odin. 2013. Menneskeverdets Politikk : Anerkjennelse Av Kroppslig Krenkbarhet. Oslo: Abstrakt. 
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morally relevant sense. That is, if the interacting individuals stand ‘unavoidably side by side’. 
Hence, it is not enough to confirm positively that there is cross-border migration, and that there 
are in fact empirical incidents which fit the formal category of cosmopolitan interaction. We also 
have to confirm that the outer circumstances define these interactions as part of an unavoidable 
moral co-existence. If these two premises can be fulfilled, it follows from Kant’s concept of 
public right that a state is morally obliged to pursuit the legal protection of cosmopolitan 
relations. The first premise has been discussed at length in chapter 2, and I take it as the 
conceptual framework of the current discussion. Within this framework it seems undoubtedly 
true that we do, in fact, interact with foreigners. The following discussion will be concerned with 
the second premise.  
As indicated in Chapter 2, Kant understood this second premise to be fulfilled already in his own 
time: “Since the community of the nations of the earth has now gone so far that a violation of 
right on one place of the earth is felt in all, the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastic and 
exaggerated way of representing right […].” 257 I will continue by elaborating on Kant’s argument 
before discussing how Arendt understands these circumstances to have gained in moral relevance 
in our times.  
The main circumstance is almost too obvious to mention. The content of the cosmopolitan law is 
first of all actualized by the fact that we happen to inhabit the earth. According to Kant, the 
cosmopolitan right to visit: 
[…] belongs to all human beings by virtue of the right of possession in common of the 
earth’s surface on which, as a sphere, they cannot disperse infinitely but must finally put 
up with being near one another; but originally no one had more right than another to be 
on a place on the earth.258  
When we consider the physical premise of Kant’s argument, the spherical shape of the earth, it 
becomes quite clear that the law of hospitality practically relies on empirical circumstances. If the 
world had the shape of an infinite plane, i.e. a flat earth with no ends, the problems of conflict 
could be solved simply by keeping a distance. From this physical-geographical premise of the 
spherical earth it hypothetically follows that the conditions of “Lex iustitiae” is fulfilled when all 
land on our spherical earth is occupied, and we “cannot help but associating with others”.259  
To be clear, Kant’s argument is not based on a simple naturalistic fallacy, which would imply that 
Kant was inferring normative principles from merely empirical state of affairs. The point is that 
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259 MM, p. 6:237 
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the spherical shape of the earth represents a relevant fact for the ‘circumstances of justice,’ which 
defines “the conditions of our possible agency” to which external laws must adequately 
respond.260 Hence, we might think of space in terms of scarcity: “Nature has enclosed [all the 
nations] together within determinate limits (by the spherical shape of the place they live in, a 
globus terraqueus).”261  
The specific idea of the cosmopolitan law is that the earth’s surface not only encloses states 
together (which solicits the need for an interstatal law), but also each one of us as individual 
members of the human species. We inherit the earth as a common “possession”262. This implies 
that we might interact with other states (or its citizens) as world-citizens (not representing our 
state) as long as we behave in a civilized or hospitable manner, both as visitors and as hosts. 
Correspondingly, Kant rejects the idea that we have a natural right to behave inhospitable toward 
foreigners or foreign states. Further on, not all interaction beyond the domestic sphere is defined 
by states. This is provokingly clear in cases of displaced persons, with no specific belonging to 
any state, but the economic and communicative relations of civil society also counts.  
Corresponding to the fact that we live in a “community of possible physical interaction 
(commercium)”, individuals have “a right to make this attempt without the other being authorized 
to behave toward it as an enemy because it has made this attempt.” 263 Beyond stating that there 
is a potential for interaction, Kant’s assumption that the circumstances of cosmopolitan justice 
are actualized relies on the degree to which states are in fact bounded and closed systems. This is 
of course a matter of discretionary judgement which is difficult to prove in absolute terms. The 
guiding normative idea would be that the more interdependent individuals and states are, the 
more relevant does it become to establish peaceful relations and to avoid the kind of harmful 
events that would affect us all. In this sense, we see in Kant’s work the emerging intellectual 
recognition of a global interdependence. This is especially noticeable in his concern for to the 
imperialist endeavors of the European nations, which displaced a lack of hospitality as guests, 
inflicting harm through uncivilized practices of brute force, such as slavery and forced 
appropriation of occupied land.  
Even if we were to accept Kant’s suggested content of the cosmopolitan law as adequate 
according the circumstances of his time, this does not necessarily remain the case today. As 
                                                 
260 See Waldron 2000, who compares Kant analysis to Hume’s notion of outer circumstances of justice. See also 
Flikschuh, Katrin. 2000. Kant and Modern Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
261 MM p. 6: 352 
262 Kant rejects the absolutist or libertarian idea of territories as private properties. The common possession of the 
earth is then consistent with this specified as the possibility of physical interaction.  
263 MM, p. 6:352. Corresponding to the transition from a Westphalian to a liberal vie won foreigner, Kant here marks 
a watershed according to Benhabib. 
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discussed in Chapter 2, due to the historical contingency of the international order and the 
shifting circumstances, I do not think we should understand the law of hospitality as the final 
form of the rationally willed cosmopolitan civil condition. It seems rather to serve as a 
provisional content which promotes the regulative idea of a civil order in its early stages. At the 
same time, it is not simply a positive law bound to be outdated. It is a law thought of as an 
unwritten code, which is privileged in its uncorrupted truthfulness to the principle of justice and 
to its regulative idea of global civil condition:  
[…] this right to hospitality – that is, the authorization of a foreign newcomer – does not 
extend beyond the conditions which make it possible to seek commerce with the old 
inhabitants. In this way distant parts of the world can enter peaceably into relations with 
one another, which can eventually become publicly lawful and so finally bring the human 
race ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution.264  
“Commerce” here refers to relations in civil society in general, including the extra-political parts 
in the market and the public sphere. It should not be read exclusively as economic interaction – 
although trade was at the time thought to have a calming and civilizing effect. “Commerce” here 
alludes more broadly to the Enlightenment notion of communication and its assumed positive 
epistemic or educating effects. As a child of the early stages of globalization, this notion might be 
said to have the characteristic optimism which is rare in our days.  
In specific cosmopolitan terms, this regulative idea is not merely any kind of international order, 
but requires a balanced international order that complies with all three domains of public right 
(domestic, interstatal, cosmopolitan). In practical terms, we should of course admit that the 
aspiring “community with all” is not possible as a full institutional reality. The cosmopolitan 
federation of states is a regulative idea, which, since Kant’s time has (for the most part) only been 
weakly implemented as a collective pressure of the international and global society by “naming-
and-shaming”. In recent times it has also to some degree been implemented as positive 
international law under the sanctioning protection of international courts. The content of 
cosmopolitan law, however, has not been extended considerably (if at all) since Kant’s proposal.  
In fact, Kant’s law of hospitality can still be considered quite radical and progressive. If we take 
Kant’s claim seriously as a right to first admission, the current international system is highly 
discriminatory in its distribution of the cosmopolitan right to seek commerce or interaction 
elsewhere.265 Large parts of the global population are currently kept out of the process of 
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265 This is defining the current relation between north and south, which is based on highly selective terms of 
inclusion. After the “immigration stop” in Europe, the right to visit is reserved to economically similar regions. Only 
high-skilled workers and exchange students are allowed from poorer countries (guest rights).  
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establishing a global community. This stagnation in the implemented content of cosmopolitan 
law does, however, not reflect the increased relevance according to the changes in the globalized 
circumstances of justice.  
4.3 Arendt and the impossibility of finding a new home 
In the discussion above I considered the right to visit as the adequate content of the 
cosmopolitan law, and as a proposal it could reasonably be considered as an extension of the 
current portfolio of conventionally recognized cosmopolitan rights. According to Arendt’s 
diagnosis of our changing circumstances, however, this Kantian extension is far from sufficient. 
The circumstantial changes are depicted by Arendt in the following way:  
The first loss which the rightless suffered was the loss of their homes, and this meant the 
loss of the entire social texture into which they were born and in which they established 
for themselves a distinct place in the world. […] What is unprecedented is not the loss of a home 
but the impossibility of finding a new one. Suddenly, there was no place on earth where migrants 
could go without the severest restrictions, no country where they would be assimilated, 
no territory where they could found a new community on their own.266  
Whereas Kant’s law of hospitality to some degree could be seen to respond to the consequences 
of losing one’s home (as a right to asylum), it has no adequate response to the new experience of 
the devastating consequences of the systemic impossibility of finding a new one. For instance, as 
argued above, the provisional cosmopolitan right to visit could be understood to recognize the 
cosmopolitan integrity of individual non-citizens, regardless of their affiliation to a foreign state, 
but it does not, however, respond to a global situation where the nations are enclosed to such a 
degree that it is impossible to find a new home.   
The crucial difference between Kant’s circumstances and those described by Arendt, were 
reflected in the experienced horror of the Nazi-regime, Arendt’s personal escape and subsequent 
life as a refugee. Arendt bore witness to how the formal perplexities of the international system 
that proclaimed its moral support of human rights, created a humanistic vacuum where ordinary 
people were treated as a “new kind of human beings – the kind that are put into concentration 
camps by their foes and internment camps by their friends”267 as she phrases it. This probably 
contributed to her clearer recognition of the distinction between “humanity” as a factual 
community, and Kant’s notion of humanity as a regulative idea.268 The international state-order 
had “civilized” (i.e. territorialized) the whole planet to the point where it had become an 
                                                 
266 Arendt 1968, p. 293 
267 P. 111, in Arendt, Hannah. 1994 [1943]. "We Refugees." In Altogether Elsewhere : Writers on Exile. Writers on Exile, 
edited by Marc Robinson, xxii, 415 p. Winchester, MA: Faber and Faber.    
268 Arendt 1968, p. 296 
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inevitable fact. For those seeking a new home, there was nowhere to go. As such, humanity as a 
fact became the condition under which any weakness of the implemented order had unforgiving 
consequences. Hence, the inadequacy of the current compromise led to unprecedented degrees 
of exclusion. It put individuals in a state of rightlessness, which manifested in practical terms the 
aporia of human rights: That the stateless, those left only with their status as human beings, 
found these human rights inapplicable. The globe was organized, but not in a way that was able 
to respond adequately to the stateless.  
4.3.1 The loss of a home and the impossibility of finding a new one – depoliticization and 
dehumanization  
As is well known, Arendt was critical to the “human rights” 269 as we know them from the French 
and the UN declaration of human rights.270 The historical events that confronted Arendt in her 
life, confirmed her skepticism: “For Arendt, the central experience of the twentieth century is this 
crisis point: that whoever ceases to count as the citizen of a particular state loses not only his or 
her civil rights in that particular state, but paradoxically also his or her human rights.”271  
This striking impotency of human rights is usually explained as a lack of international sanctioning 
power, and this is of course part of the reason, but according to Arendt there is a deeper habit of 
thought associated with the international society that fails to provide conceptual clarity or 
guidance, especially in those situations where its assistance is most needed:  
The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of human being as 
such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for 
the first time confronted with people who indeed has lost all other qualities and specific 
relationships – except that they were still human. The world found nothing sacred in the 
abstract nakedness of being human.272  
On one side, this quote reveals a republican influence in Arendt’s thinking, a “naked” human 
stripped of the functionary roles and personal features that society provides, is no longer a moral-
legal equal. We could perhaps compare it to how pornography, either of the body or the social 
(reality-TV), rarely (if ever) leaves us with the impression of something sacred, but rather tends to 
                                                 
269 To avoid further confusion, I will use “citizen rights” or “rights of Man” when talking about rights in the 
domestic sense of universal rights, as these are associated with the nationalist interpretation of French and American 
revolutionary constitutions. I will use “human rights” when referring to the declaration and conventions of the UN, 
and I will use “cosmopolitan right” to refer to the specific rights articulated in the philosophical arguments made by 
Kant and Arendt. These last ones are ideas that have had some influence in the literature on immigration and global 
justice, but they are not dominant in society as such. They are both based on a moral idea of humanity. 
270 She was more positive to the American “bill of rights” which is more explicitly a set of restrictions on the state 
(primarily duties of the state, and not rights founded in human nature).  
271 Quoted from p. 743 in Menke, Christoph. 2007. "The "Aporias of Human Rights" and the "One Human Right": 
Regarding the Coherence of Hannah Arendt's Argument." Social research 74, no. 3: 24.  
272 Arendt 1968, p. 299. Menke refers to the article from 1949, “The Rights of Man, what are they?” and quotes this 
passage in a manner that is only slightly edited in the latest version from 1951.  
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evoke a sense of one-dimensional attraction or mere disgust (depending on one’s preferences). 
On the other side, the quoted “nakedness” bears witness to a missed opportunity. The naked and 
undetermined can, like when we receive a newborn child, be a source of wonder, curiosity and 
hope. The international community of human rights failed to find this response to it.273     
The process that leads some people to appear as ‘nothing but human’ is sketched by Arendt as a 
two-step process of loss. In the case of displaced persons, the first loss is the loss of a home, 
which implies the loss of the “entire social texture” and their integrity as political and speaking 
animals.274 They lost their status as legal persons, and the relevance of their actions and voice as a 
responsible being. In “We Refugees” Arendt describes this in a more personal, collective first-
person address to her own Jewish community:  
We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, 
which means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, 
which means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected 
expression of feelings.275  
The second loss is negatively described as the unprecedented “impossibility of finding a new 
one” and to be rendered, even worse than a slave, as utterly useless and superfluous. To 
understand the severe harm inflicted by this second loss, Parekh introduces a useful distinction 
between a formal (de jure) deprivation of legal status and the substantial (de facto) deprivation.276 
The loss of a home entails a loss of a political community and the corresponding legal identity. 
The subsequent incapacity to find a new home entails the additional existential deprivation of 
appearing as a human person as such. This second loss is therefore sometimes referred to as 
being reduced to “mere life”, which deprives the individual of his or her integrity as a person, 
reduced to a mere specimen of the human species (homo sapiens). This corresponds to Arendt’s 
suspicion against grounding human rights in human nature. Not to put a too fine point on it; 
human rights are in way reduced to a subcategory of animal rights, which, while recognizing the 
vulnerability and bodily integrity of embodied creatures, fail to recognize the vulnerability of 
human persons and the fragility of human affairs. If human rights are conceived as akin to a 
                                                 
273 Birmingham elaborates on this second notion of zoë as the “disturbing miracle of the given”. (see 2006, p. 75 ff.) 
With reference to Arendt’s doctoral dissertation on Augustine, Birmingham points out the central significance of 
“love” in Arendt’s early account of naked life. This love is not primarily related to the biologically drives of mating 
and child-care, but to the existential and unconditional “I want you to be”.273 In other words, we can only respond to 
this difference – as Arendt refers to Augustine – with an attitude of love or gratitude of the mysteriously given (i.e. 
the non-human made).  
274 Schaap 2011 
275 Arendt 1994, p. 110 
276 Parekh 2017, p. 83 ff 
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subcategory of animal rights, we are unable to see long-term encampment clearly a moral 
problem, as long as the specimens are treated well and given a proper habitat.  
Arendt analyses the context of Holocaust as a series of events that eventually led to the perverse 
conclusion that denaturalizing the superfluous and unwanted implied that the state could treat 
them as if there was nothing “sacred” present. The circumstances for this horrific event were 
partly the unwillingness of the states that had announced their loyalty to the Human Rights to 
receive those excluded from the states that denounced these rights. To the extent that they did 
receive them, the refugees remained stateless and interned in camps. Hence, to be deprived of 
one’s legal status implied in many cases expulsion from humanity. The regulative idea of 
Humanity was contrasted with the grim consequences of the inevitable fact of the “completely 
organized humanity”:  
The trouble is that this calamity arose not from any lack of civilization, backwardness, or 
mere tyranny, but, on the contrary, that it could not be repaired, because there was no 
longer any “uncivilized” spot on earth, because whether we like it or not we have really 
started to live in One World. Only with a completely organized humanity could the loss 
of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether.277 
The enclosed inter-state order on a spherical earth had become an inevitable fact in the 
unforgiving sense. It became clear that the problem was not that of space, but of political 
organization.278 One could say that it is first in a completely organized world that the problem of 
the superfluous emerges.279 Physically, the scarcity of land forced the expelled to seek to enter the 
civil society of a foreign state. Provided that no state was willing to receive them except from the 
inhospitable treatment of encampment, the circumstances could not “forgive” the systemic 
inadequacy by providing the excluded with new territories. There was nowhere to go for those 
who had fallen victim to the civilized order. For the first time people could be permanently 
expelled from humanity.  
In Kant’s time, one could still perhaps to some degree send off the undesirable and expect them 
to “stop associating with others (us included) and shun all society (to settle on their own).”280 
After all, this is how religious sectarians and political opponents were treated in Europe. As 
Arendt describes in extensive detail, the imperialist area involved superfluous men following 
superfluous capital to new continents. In the historical situation of the mid-war period however, 
this was no longer an option. In the end it actualized the potentially excluding consequences of 
                                                 
277 Arendt 1968, p 297 
278 Ibid., p. 294 
279 See also Ibid., p. 293 
280 paraphrased from Ulpian; Lex iuridica, MM, 6:236, my insertions 
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the inadequate self-conception and institutional compromises. Hence, the idea of the need for a 
civil international order on a global scale was no longer based on global sympathy for the 
occasional victim of transgressions of cosmopolitan law, made by hostile states or powerful 
guests. It was based on the recognition that statelessness the current international order, 
unavoidably implied disastrous and unpreceded exclusions from humanity as such.  
4.3.2 The mismatch: human rights as response to homelessness 
The central question in Arendt’s critique of human rights could be formulated like this: How 
could an international community of democracies, proclaiming their loyalty to “the rights of 
Man”, fail in such a disastrous manner? Arendt’s original answer is found in the missed 
opportunity of responding adequately to the “nakedness of being human”. This missed 
opportunity seems to express a kind of surprise and un-readiness in the bad sense that the 
international community did not stand prepared in a time of emergency. Arendt’s main 
explanation is not that the human rights lacked the institutional force of a monopoly of violence. 
Rather, she explains it as due to human rights’ state-centric character. Both prior to, and after the 
horrific experiences of the first half of the 20th century, the content of human right took the form 
of domestic and not cosmopolitan law. 
Because of this lack of adequate content to addressing the problems at hand, Arendt was worried 
that the UN declaration would contribute nothing more than a futile clinging to old moral 
doctrines. There was no clear conception of what the general human rights, which the rightless 
people had lost, really were.281 From a cosmopolitan perspective, the question of what human 
rights “really where” was not just a matter of the traditional dispute between the political right 
and left over separating the right from the good; the civil and political from the economic, social 
and cultural. It should also, more to the point, concern the deepest character of the human rights 
as a specific domain of public right: The majority of the rights declared, were designed to solve 
domestic problems; they were citizen rights. And, as is tautologically true of citizen rights: “Only 
the members of a political community can be bearers of rights.”282  
The notion of the “human” in human rights was in this sense not only too abstract, but 
misleading. It relied on an abstraction of human dignity from a tacitly assumed and specific 
notion of the political. To some extent, Arendt gives her consent to the English critique of the 
French declaration in 1789, associated with Edmund Burke and Jeremy Bentham. According to 
this critique, “rights” are only meaningful as legal claims raised within a community with 
                                                 
281 Arendt 1968, p. 293 
282 Menke 2007, p. 745 
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corresponding duties, such as the “rights of an Englishman”. In this perspective, human rights 
merely refer to normative demands that distort the political conditions on which such claims rests 
and under which they could be realized.  
This distortive effect is made painfully clear in the short-comings of the individualist conception 
of human dignity and rights.283 As Arendt critically points out, these short-comings amount to an 
incapacity to express the right that corresponds to the loss of a polity and the subsequent 
exclusion from humanity:   
Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man, without losing his essential quality 
as man, his human dignity. […] The decisive factor is that these rights and the human 
dignity they bestow should remain valid and real even if only a single human being existed 
on earth; they are independent of human plurality and should remain valid even if a 
human being is expelled from the human community.284  
To Arendt this is an absurd consequence of founding rights on a notion of individual autonomy. 
It seems conceptually unconcerned with the dehumanizing consequences of being expelled from 
the human community. In this way, Arendt is not only concerned with the inadequate content of 
international law. While it is clearly problematic that cosmopolitan law becomes generally 
conflated with the universal status of (and/or the international agreements on) citizen rights. A 
more deep-seated problem is however that the guiding conception of dignity and political 
principles was unable to guarantee against the exclusion from the human community. Unless one 
is willing to reproduce the state model on a global level, as a global state with us all as its citizens 
(which neither Kant nor Arendt supported), it follows that “these supposedly inalienable 
universal human rights were from their inception inseparably tied to the sovereignty of a 
people”285 in an inadequate, state-centric manner. This could be seen as the background for the 
title of chapter 9 in Arendt’s Origins: “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights 
of Man”.   
Contrary to the English critique of human rights, Arendt seems to recognize that there is nothing 
wrong in establishing agreements on citizen rights on the international level. There are good 
reasons as to why states should supervise each other’s compliance with certain standards for 
                                                 
283 The theoretical starting point for most political philosopher of the modern tradition of natural law and human 
rights, was the individual. Arendt’s notions of a right to a framework of action and a right to belong to an organized 
community, are, on the other hand, fundamentally relational terms. That is to say, these terms are not reducible to 
some pre-modern idea of a social body, but conceive the individual distinctness of a human being as a mode of being 
that requires the presence of others. (See Chapter 6). 
284 Arendt 1968, p. 297-98 
285 Quoted p. 36, in Birmingham, Peg. 2006. Hannah Arendt & Human Rights : The Predicament of Common Responsibility, 
Studies in Continental Thought. Bloomington, Ind. Chesham: Indiana University Press ; Combined Academic, 
distributor.  
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domestic problem-solving. After all, this is how a state is conceived as legitimate within a liberal 
international order. Domestic affairs are as such not merely a concern of each sovereign state. We 
should however be careful with naming them “human” rights, because it gives the conceptual 
impression that these are rights that are guaranteed even for foreigners. This becomes urgently 
clear in the case of the most vulnerable, the stateless or “naked” foreigners.286 Correspondingly, 
the experienced rightlessness of the stateless reveals how worthless human rights are without 
citizenship. That is, without a specified state carrying the duty corresponding to these rights.287  
Commenting on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Arendt points out its 
conceptual confusion and lack of clarity.288 Arendt expressed a certain disappointment, but also a 
deep concern for the inadequacy of turning to the eighteen century ideas of “the rights of Man” 
without rethinking these rights in light of their complete failure in the face of totalitarian politics. 
Obviously, if we look at the preamble of the UN declaration, the Nuremberg process and the 
later consolidation of a soft international law based on human rights, it suggests that the view on 
human rights had changed considerably.289 They were to be understood as existing independently 
of any state’s positive law and the citizenship status of any individual. To understand why this 
would not silence Arendt’s concern, we have to spell out her critique of the underlying 
conception and sense of reality in the declaration. In brief, the denationalizing practices of the 
totalitarian regimes of (Hitler’s) Germany and the Soviet (of Stalin) put the civilized order to an 
extreme test never before encountered. To Arendt, the UN-declaration was conservative to the 
point where it seemed like nothing new had happened.  
As Menke points out, the article from 1949 is interesting because it precedes the more famous 
articulation of the same critique in chapter 9 of Origins published two years later (1951). In Origins 
Arendt captured in her formulation of the “perplexities” or aporias of the Rights of Man, the way 
in which totalitarian politics called into question not only the practical feasibility of human rights, 
by the very idea of such rights. Arendt’s title might suggest that this anti-human right politics was 
in the end successful and that it indeed marked the end of ‘rights of man’, which would suggest a 
                                                 
286 Interestingly, Arendt points out that initially their status as stateless ensured the migrants with the status of being 
world citizens. They were perceived, in this account, as an innocent mass of potentially assimilated new national 
citizens (without baggage; like blank slates). When this assumption was negated by experience; when they insisted on 
their foreign nationality, their statelessness was also rejected by the European states (first with the Russian and 
Armenian refugees), and their status and situation radically deteriorated. The current language of ‘illegals’ or 
‘rejected’, and so on, still has a flavor of this refusal to conceive the migrants as “stateless”. They are undesirable, 
damaged goods, potentially non-assimilating, and at best deportable (“back home”/to where they belong). Hence, 
similarly to “sans papiers”, being “stateless” is an activist term, adopted for protection (or deception) and a claim of 
being treated as human independently of any specific affiliation.  
287 [ex. right to emigrate without the right to immigrate, or duty to allow immigration] 
288 Arendt 1949, quoted from Menke 2007 
289 Moyn, Samuel. 2010. The Last Utopia : Human Rights in History. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
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flat out rejection from Arendt’s side á la Burke.290 However, if we look at the German title of this 
early text it expresses a more optimistic view: “There is only one Human Right”.291 As Menke 
argues, this suggests an alternative understanding of the idea of human rights which does not 
depend on the modern natural law or on the idea of individual liberal rights in general.292  
The “one human right” refers evidently to Arendt’s notion of “the right to have rights”. Exactly 
how we should interpret this right is a complicated question. The crucial point is to recognize 
that although Arendt takes distance from the statist conclusion of the English critique of the 
rights of Man, she is also eager to distance herself from conventional moral cosmopolitan 
positions which derive the status of human rights from the simple fact of being human:293 
“Equality is not an attribute of people as individual natural beings, but an attribute of political 
members, and therefore the very reference to the natural human being destroys every claim to 
equal rights.”294 Hence, the most obvious answer to what Arendt could have understood as ‘the 
one human right’ is the cosmopolitan right to political membership.  
4.3.3 Facing the totalitarian regime – the distillation of rightlessness  
To explore further the experiential, historical background to Arendt’s response, we may look 
closer at her discussion of “denationalization” in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1968). Without 
dwelling on the complex historical circumstances of the interwar period, it should suffice to point 
out that Arendt refers to the “nationality problem” that occurred after the First World War and 
the collapse of the Russian, Ottoman and Hungary-Austrian empires.  
The nationality-problem emerged through the establishment of nation states in the wake of the 
old empires. It was further provoked by the – in Arendt’s view – inadequate response by the 
League of Nations  in the form of a minority treatise that only seemed to confirm that every 
properly represented nation had its own state. The “Nansen-passports” solution speaks to this as 
well. These passports where travel documents intended to give people a safe passage “home”. 
Unable to satisfy all nationalities, the amount of “nationally frustrated peoples” were significant 
and the level of mistrust increasing.  
                                                 
290 Ref. to someone who reads Arendt this way? (Ranciere? Agamben?) 
291 «Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht.”, Menke 2007, p. 741. 
292 Menke 2007, p. 741. See also Gu ̈ndogdu, Ayten. 2015. Rightlessness in an Age of Rights : Hannah Arendt and the 
Contemporary Struggles of Migrants: Oxford University Press. 
293 The fundamental point however is this: That the declaration of rights of man tried to reduce politics to nature. A 
point that becomes much clearer in the Human Condition. [sameness = implosion of distinctness into a “mass” = 
the extinction of humanity] 
294 Menke 2007, p. 746 
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In this context, denationalization (or denaturalization, i.e. to deprive someone of their 
citizenship) was used as a powerful political tool both to homogenize one’s own population and 
to destabilize neighboring states. And in Arendt’s view it was also a tactic test to the ability of the 
democratic states to uphold their promised guarantees for human rights. To localize the root of 
evil here, Arendt does not merely criticize this practice, which is possibly the cruelest form of de-
politicization, but she also attacks the very presumption that defines the “nationality problem”; 
the nationalist ideal of a harmonious nation-state order295:  
The worst factor in this situation was not even that it became a matter of course for the 
nationalities to be disloyal to their imposed government and for the governments to 
oppress their nationalities as efficiently as possible, but that the nationally frustrated 
population was firmly convinced – as was everybody else – that true freedom, true 
emancipation, and true popular sovereignty could be attained only with full national 
emancipation, that people without their own national government were deprived of 
human rights.296  
Although Arendt rejected this nationalist interpretation of a political community, she regrettably 
confirmed that it stated the character of human rights as they were understood at the time.  
The subsequent decline of the nation-state implied - in concordance with the social imaginary – 
the end of the rights of Man. The first sign of this was, according to Arendt, the abandonment of 
the cosmopolitan right “par excellence”: the asylum right.   
The first great damage done to the nation-states as a result of the arrival of hundreds of 
thousands of stateless people was that the right of asylum, the only right that had ever 
figured as a symbol of the Rights of Man in the sphere of international relationships, was 
being abolished.297  
In other words, one of the few rights that could actually pass as designed to solve cosmopolitan, 
and not just domestic problems, was the first to be abandoned.  
The second step of denaturalization implied in many cases a full collapse of the distinction 
between stateless refugees and normal resident aliens (historically those with guest rights). 
Statelessness spread like a disease and deteriorated the status of all who were not considered to 
                                                 
295 In The inclusion of other (2001), Habermas also notes that precisely because nationalism is such an efficient 
instrument; it is also easily misused by elites (European imperialists, Nazi-populists, international oligarchs) for 
propaganda purposes, which hardly comply with republican principles. Reflecting on the post-war German 
experience in particular, Habermas therefore argues that we have entered a post-national period where the awareness 
of the horrific dangers associated with playing with the nationalist fire has made us more careful. Today this post-
national understanding of the situation is more contested both in Germany and in the rest of Europe. We should 
therefore, in my view, look for more peaceful and less alienating variants of state-centrism. 
296 Arendt 1968, p. 272 
297 Ibid., p. 280 
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“belong” – among them the German Jews.298 This created an unprecedented situation of 
homelessness, which Arendt describes as a fundamental deprivation of human rights. It’s a 
situation so unbearable and degrading, that you would even benefit from committing a crime.299 
In this way, the nationalist understanding of political membership – based on “the homogeneity 
of the population and the rootedness in the soil” – was creating an unforeseen problem, i.e. 
masses of stateless (of national minorities or expatriates). The nation-state interpreted co-
habitation in a very strict manner, irresponsive to the heterogeneity and diversity of human life, 
and with potentially devastating consequences.  
The denaturalization policies created a situation where the stateless, a group of innocent people 
deprived of political and legal integrity, could emerge. According to Arendt, the inhumane 
treatment of this group from all European states, became, for the despotic and totalitarian 
regimes, the confirmation “that no such thing as inalienable human rights existed and that the 
affirmation of the democracies to the contrary were prejudice, hypocrisy, and cowardice in the 
face of cruel majesty of the new world.”300 This was further confirmed by the betrayal by the 
democratic states against the stateless, leaving them with nowhere to go. In practice, this 
confirmed that human rights could not guarantee the stateless integrity, neither as world-citizens, 
nor as neighbors in need of Samaritan aid.  
The practical inertia of human rights idealism is also reflected in the recorded experienced of the 
victims of this denaturalization policy. Partly based on her own experiences as a stateless, 
German Jew encamped in southern France, Arendt pinpoints the contrast between belief and 
practice in her description:  
No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the 
discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on 
regarding as “inalienable” those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the 
most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves. 
Their situation has deteriorated just as stubbornly, until the internment camp – prior to 
the second World War the exception rather than the rule for the stateless – has become 
the routine solution for the problem of domicile of the “displaced persons.”301  
                                                 
298 See for instance Nuremberg laws.  
299 Arendt 1968, p. 286 Today this option of illegality is easily imaginable through human smuggling, illegal residency, 
and so on, but Arendt has in mind the rather simple fact that as rightless, being brought to a court is in itself an 
improvement of one’s depoliticized situation. Committing a crime then, is one of the few ways to be taken seriously 
and actually become recognized as a legal subject with certain rights associated with the “courtesy” of the court 
house.   
300 Arendt 1968, p. 269   
301 Arendt 1968, p. 279 
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Arendt describes a situation where Europeans seemed helpless in their attempt to deal with the 
growing numbers of stateless persons. We might think of it as a situation of the past, but as noted 
above, encampment is still a common way to deal with refugees. It is as if the moral shock has 
left us stuck in a moral paralysis when it comes to thinking about the obligations states have to 
foreigners. The UN declaration reflects at best the good intentions of an international society 
worn out by war. In Arendt’s view is was merely a recoating of old doctrines (of rights of Man) 
without adapting them to the new circumstances.  
4.4 Two possible responses – extending the cosmopolitan law and acknowledging 
the view from elsewhere 
Given the severity of the harm inflicted on people in long-term encampment, we owe them a 
proper response. I will present two theory-oriented options at the end of this chapter, and situate 
them in the more practically oriented debate on migration in the next chapter.  
First, we might respond, inspired by Arendt’s analysis, by recognizing the right to have rights as a 
necessary extension of cosmopolitan law. It should be noted that this is a specific Kantian 
reading of “the right to have rights” which emphasizes Arendt’s republican view on equality as 
associated with belonging to a political community.  
Second, if we consider displaced persons not only as a problem of the legal and social status of 
each individual victim of dehumanization, but as a problem associated with the character of the 
international order itself, we could also respond in an epistemologically minded fashion by 
asking: By which procedures can we arrive at the best answer to the cosmopolitan reform 
required by the circumstances? Could we not, for instance, consider the most vulnerable group of 
migrants, which are at risk of the inhumane consequences of the current order’s selective 
immigration policies, as a “worst off”-group in this international order? According to Rawls’ 
procedure in the original position, this group would have a privileged position in a cosmopolitan 
version of this thought experiment. Rawls did however only recognize the domestic and 
interstatal (or interpopular) version of this procedure.302 To address the problematic aspects of 
this procedural constraint, I will present Amartya Sen’s argument against Rawls procedural 
parochialism.  
As we will see in the next chapter, the first response relates to Benhabib’s position in the 
immigration debate Benhabib interprets and promotes Arendt as the central contributor to the 
                                                 
302 Sen seems to accept Rawls’ argument against this cosmopolitan version that entail global membership 
entitlements to the original position, because he argues against it on more pragmatic terms of an institutional 
lacuna.(Sen 2009, p. 140-1) In the next chapter I will present a similar concern against Joseph Carens application of 
this cosmopolitan version in the immigration debate.  
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extension of the cosmopolitan law of admission. The second response addresses more indirectly 
the epistemological position of Benhabib, which recognizes the relevance of foreigners’ 
perspective in self-reflexive collective deliberations.    
4.4.1 The cosmopolitan right to political membership 
With the fundamental deprivation of human rights, that of rightlessness, Arendt refers to an 
experience that reveals the notion of “human rights” in a more concrete and deeper sense than 
those we might refer to as the liberal-democratic individual rights of citizens. This becomes clear 
in the following famous quote:  
Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are rights of 
citizens, is at stake when belonging to a community […] is no longer a matter of course 
[…]. This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of people deprived of human rights. They 
are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to 
think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion. Privileges in some cases, injustices 
in most, blessings and doom are meted out to [the rightless] according to accident and 
without any relation whatsoever to what they do, did, or may do.303  
This kind of personal disempowerment turns into a severe, dehumanizing form of exclusion 
which affects even one’s sense of human agency. On this background, and because this 
dehumanizing process involved millions, did we, according to Arendt, become aware of the 
human right304 in its most basic sense as ‘a right to have rights’. Before these atrocities, Arendt 
notes, this basic notion of a “human right” 305 was thought of as the taken-for-granted human 
conditions that no political circumstances could possibly deprive us of.306 
In contrast to the traditional liberal set of civil rights, Arendt articulates the rights of action and 
opinion as the adequate content of public right in order to capture the transgression experienced 
in denationalization. The articulation of this human condition answers to Arendt’s diagnostic 
remark in the beginning of Origins, which indicates that this is not merely a question of the 
content:  
[…] human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political 
principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of 
humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly 
defined territorial entities.307 
                                                 
303 Arendt 1968, p. 296, my emphasis 
304 Note that “human rights” in the quote refers to the right to action and opinion, which are elements of the right to 
have rights. 
305 Menke (2007) underlines the lack of plurality in this «right» by refering to the German translation of «The Rights 
of Man: What are They?»  (1949), later part of Origins, chapter 9: “Es gibt nu rein einziges Menschenrecht.”  
306 Arendt 1968, p. 297   
307 Ibid., p. ix.  
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As noted above, Arendt was dismissive to the individualist notion of human dignity based in a 
human nature, transcending the history of political communities. This notion was unable to 
articulate a right that could guarantee against the dehumanizing consequence of being expelled 
from the political organization of the ‘family of nations’. Her famous response to this need for a 
new political principle is articulated in the context of a “we” that has experienced the thought-
provoking horror of the Second World War:   
We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a 
framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to 
some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost 
and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation.308 
There are several ways to interpret this response. Why does Arendt, who is clearly skeptical to the 
individualist notion of rights, use the same language to express her new political principle? What 
does it mean “to live in a framework”? Is it the same as “belonging to some kind of organized 
community”? Did Arendt have the state-centric notion of a modern state in mind? 
What in any case seems quite certain is that the reference to terms “action” and “opinion” point 
to her influence from the Greek notion of praxis, and her attempt to revitalize its political 
significance. This is a central feature of Arendt’s philosophical project, which seeks to redefine 
political thinking from poiesis – i.e. politics understood as social engineering – to praxis – i.e. 
politics understood as communication. It is also quite clear that her reference to “newly defined 
territorial entities” and “organized communities” she speaks of non-nationalist, civic states, where 
nationality is not a relevant criterion for membership. The only relevant affiliation is that of 
belonging to humanity. 
Since Benhabib’s interpretation of “the right to have rights” has been influential in the debates on 
immigration, I will start by presenting her reading of it. This will exemplify how “the right to 
have rights” is usually understood in the current debate. I will return to the controversies on how 
to interpret Arendt in chapter 6, and suggests an alternative reading as preferable to Benhabib’s 
moral reading.  
Benhabib’s interpretation of “the right to have rights” situates this fundamental right as an 
extension of the Kantian cosmopolitan right to visit.309 In terms of immigration, Arendt’s notion 
addresses a short-coming in Kant’s minimal account of cosmopolitan law of admission. Given 
the new historical circumstances discussed above, the right to visit (including the right to asylum) 
                                                 
308 Ibid., p. 296-97 
309 Benhabib 2004, p. 55 ff 
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addresses more accurately than most human rights the problems of a cosmopolitan character. 
Still, it is not adequately designed to address the issue of statelessness. Simply put, it does not 
guarantee a right of the foreigner to become a member somewhere else, a guarantee which is 
urgently needed by those foreigners with nowhere to go.  
In this light, Benhabib seems to understand the right to have rights to belong to the same moral-
legal domain that Kant distinguished as cosmopolitan law. It has an unspecified address, and is at 
best addressed to humanity as such. It calls us “to recognize membership in some human 
group”.310 In contrast to legal norms that are enforced by a state apparatus, Benhabib identifies 
“the right” as a moral imperative. More specifically, it is a moral claim to membership: “Treat all 
human beings as persons belonging to some human group and entitled to the protection of the 
same.”311  
While Arendt did not support the metaphysical presumptions of Kant’s notion of human dignity, 
the right has a clear universal appeal. It concerns us as human beings and seeks to transcend 
cultural and historical contingencies. Further, Benhabib refers to the humanity-formula of Kant’s 
categorical imperative – namely, to act in such a way that you treat humanity in all your actions as 
an end, and never as a means only – which legitimizes the “the right of humanity” in one’s 
person.312 And it is along this line, according to Benhabib, that Arendt provides a positive 
specification through “the right to become members of civil society” (and the negative duty not 
to refuse others from seeking it).313 This association with Kant is decisive for Benhabib’s 
determination of what it is that gets violated in rightlessness: the basic condition of human 
agency is denied when one is refused to enter into civil society with others.  
Accordingly, in addition to the “right to become members” there is a second kind of “rights” 
which is interpreted by Benhabib as the kind of rights we enjoy within civil society. That is, it 
refers to entitlements that create reciprocal obligations among consociates as members of a legal 
                                                 
310 Ibid., p. 56 
311 Ibid., p. 56 
312
 This is somewhat confusing, given Kant’s conceptual framework. Arendt’s basic moral right emphasizes a certain 
“framework” and “organized community” [Benhabib tends to conflate the two] of which protection we are all 
entitled to. Although Benhabib situates Arendt’s “right” as an extension of a moral cosmopolitan law, she also 
compares it to a political version of Kant’s right of humanity: “This right [of humanity] imposes negative duties upon 
us, i.e., duties which oblige us never to act in ways that violate the right of humanity in every person. Such violations 
would occur first and foremost if and when we were to refuse to enter into civil society with one another, that is, if 
we were to refuse to become legal consociates.” (Benhabib 2004, p. 58) This is confusing in the sense that on the one 
hand, Benhabib seems to compare the right to have rights with a general principle of moral norms (i.e. the right to 
humanity, see 2.2.1, although she refers to the ethical notion of an “end-in-itself”), whereas the form it takes, can 
also be read as an extension of the more specific cosmopolitan law, as a content of a cosmopolitan law of second 
admission. With the risk of misunderstanding Benhabib, I’ve chosen to emphasize the latter alternative.  
313 Benhabib (1996) notes that Arendt uses “civil society” sometimes also to include the formal-institutional 
structure, and not merely the “extra-political” public. 
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community. Benhabib understands this reciprocity as defined by the triangular relation between 
the subject of rights; the others upon whom this obligation creates a duty; and the protection of 
rights through the state. Hence, the right to have rights is a moral right to citizen rights. Or, as 
specified in the context of Kant, “the right of humanity entitles us to become a member of civil 
society such that we can then be entitled to juridico-civil rights.”314  
4.4.2 The public sphere and the view from elsewhere - Sen on procedural parochialism315 
In addition to the option of extending cosmopolitan law to offer protection against 
dehumanization, there is also the option of giving a positive argument for the “politicization” or 
strengthening of the democratic integrity of the foreigner, which is especially relevant when it 
comes to deliberations of cosmopolitan law and cosmopolitan reform of the current legal order. 
The benefit of this epistemological argument is that it has a more clearly “civil” character in the 
sense that it can appreciate the openness of a global civil society, as in the shape of an extra-
political public sphere, without relying on the legal entitlements of the foreigner as such. The 
concern for the practical necessity of this legal protection is analytically “bracketed” so to speak.  
Although Benhabib clearly recognized the epistemological value of the perspective of the 
foreigner, it is Amartya Sen that presents the most explicit critique of Rawls’ procedural 
parochialism. By “parochialism” I refer to a mentality that focuses on, or favors, partial 
perspectives, rather than considering the whole context.316 Unlike the implicit egocentric 
character that comes with being a situated, embodied consciousness317, parochialists embrace this 
centeredness as a non-universalist ground of legitimacy. Some particular, traditional way is 
legitimate because it is “our way”. Epistemologically, parochialism has connotations to being 
narrow-minded or having a narrow outlook. In ethics it is associated with the tribalism or 
ethnocentrism of favoring “us” over “them”, termed for instance “parochial altruism”. In politics 
this is related to taking the common point of view of a certain community, either as a state or as 
an “aspiring” nation. It is in this last sense that Sen uses it, to draw attention to a specific 
procedural weakness in Rawls’ design of the original position as a thought experiment. Hence, 
although Rawls did not take an explicit statist view, his methodological setup seems to make his 
position vulnerable to parochialist or ethnocentric biases. This confirms the state-centric 
tendency in Rawls’ theory to marginalize the perspective of foreigners and the concern for his 
naïve cosmopolitan attitude (see 2.3 and 3.2). 
                                                 
314 Benhabib 2004, p. 59 
315 An earlier version of this text has been published as part of the paper titled: … 
316 The Latin root of “parochial” translates into parish, which is associated with small communities or division, such 
as a church parish. 
317 I.e. one that intuitively prefers the destruction of a whole, distant world (such as China), to a scratch in one’s little 
finger.   
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It is in particular Rawls’ abstraction of the subject of justice; the basic structured of society, as a 
“closed system” that Sen addresses. As seen in chapter 3, Rawls allows for considerable ethnic 
diversity within a state. When he talks about a political culture shared by a people, we might 
therefore speak of a “democentric” conception rather than an ethnocentric conception. Sen is 
however, not convinced by Rawls guarantee of a fair procedure, because the original position has 
no procedural protection against such demo-centric biases. In this manner Sen pinpoints the 
epistemological neglect characteristic of state-centric perspectives.   
4.4.2.1 The Original Position as an expository device – open and closed impartiality 
Rawls ‘original position’ is an expository (or representational) device with a certain procedural 
setup. To specify Sen’s diagnosis, it is important to note that he is not addressing all elements of 
the original position, such as lifting of the veil of ignorance or the requirement of reflective 
equilibrium. What Sen is worried about is the conflict between on the one hand the ambition of 
impartiality, and on the other the initial state-centric constraints imposed by the application of the 
contractual principle of reciprocity. This constraint is part and parcel of the way ‘the veil of 
ignorance’ is designed in the two variants that Rawls applies. In other words, Sen is concerned 
quite specifically with a methodical restriction in the way Rawls invokes impartiality.  
To clarify this point, Sen makes a distinction between two ways of invoking impartiality: open 
and closed impartiality. Closed impartiality is associated with the contractual principle and refers to 
the procedure of making impartial judgments which invokes only the positions of members 
within a bounded society or, as we have seen in the international version of the OP, the positions 
of peoples as members of the international community. No outsiders are involved. In contrast, 
open impartiality may invoke the judgment and perspective of both insiders and outsiders, in some 
cases generalized as the “view from elsewhere” or “the eyes of the rest of mankind” is considered 
ideal in order to avoid parochial bias.318  
Within the domain of domestic law, the first variant of the veil of ignorance addresses perfectly 
well the domestic problem of impartiality: How to go from the self-centered individual to the 
best collective equilibrium of interests? It enables individual agents to see beyond their personal 
interest. It might even do quite well in finding the analogue equilibrium of the international 
community of peoples, enabling each people to see beyond their specific group interests.319 But, it 
does not address adequately the cosmopolitan issue where the collective interest of a people is in 
conflict with individual (or non-governmental groups of) foreigners.  
                                                 
318 Paraphrased Sen 2009, p. 123. 
319 We’re here facing a problem analogue to Greene’s challenge of transition from the problem of the commons (Me 
and Us), to the problem of common sense (Us and Them). 
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More precisely, there is no “procedural barricade” against prejudices of this state-centric kind:   
[…] the procedure of segregated ‘original positions’, operating in devised isolation, is not 
conducive to guaranteeing an adequately objective scrutiny of social conventions and 
parochial sentiments, which may influence which rules are chosen in the original 
position.320  
How can Rawls restrict his ambition of reaching a general standpoint, “from afar,” in such a 
manner? It is, as already indicated, related to the state-centric confinement of the procedural 
preference of the contractual principle, where the focal group is identical to the (native) members 
of bounded society. As O’Neill pointed out, the notion of “the people” does not seem to escape 
this assumption. Those recognized as “mutually disinterested” behind the veil of ignorance are 
limited to the persons directly involved in the contract.  
To defend the open impartiality as the preferable attitude when answering the question of justice, 
Sen presents three arguments. The first is that “closed” conception of justice, which accounts 
only for the statist obligation we have to others within our territorial neighborhood, is too 
narrow. Sen shares with Kant the recognition of cross-border affinities. Obviously, the legal 
borders of a national state are central in-group cues, but we (now more than ever) identify and 
share “common sympathies” with people across national boundaries as well (through cues such 
as class, language, literature, professions, etc. – even humanity). This could be called a 
sociological argument, as it criticizes the descriptive state-centric premise that the public sphere 
necessarily is a national sphere. It basically refutes the idea of the public sphere as organized in 
‘Stoic circles’, where citizen/foreigner is the most relevant distinction of social distance: 
There is something of a tyranny of ideas in seeing the political divisions of states 
(primarily, national states) as being, in some way, fundamental, and in seeing them not 
only as practical constraints to be addressed, but as divisions of basic significance in ethics 
and political philosophy.321  
The second argument concerns the circumstances of justice in cosmopolitan terms. Sen points to 
the fact that the institutions (both domestic and foreign) and policies of one country influence 
lives elsewhere. This is particularly clear when it comes to issues involving cross-border migration 
and the policies concerning entitlements and political membership to non-citizens, as discussed in 
this chapter. It does of course also relate to a wide range of global issues, such as environmental 
damages and economic exploitation, which I do not address directly in this thesis.   
Third, with reference to Adam Smith, Sen presents the epistemological argument that “objectivity 
demands serious scrutiny and taking notice of different views from elsewhere, reflecting the 
                                                 
320 Sen 2009, p. 127 
321 Ibid., p. 143 
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influence of other empirical experiences.”322 Not all outsiders’ views are uncompelling or 
irrelevant. We might summarize this third point as the enlightenment relevance of the view from elsewhere. 
323 This stands in contrast to what Sen calls “membership entitlements” and in potential conflict 
with the advantages of the contractual element when it comes to commitment and loyalty.324 
Rawls problem, according to Sen, is not that he does not recognize the value of impartiality, –
Rawls account of publicity and public scrutiny is after all central to his political conception of 
justice– the problem is his lack of recognition for the enlightenment relevance of positions 
outside the group sharing political membership entitlements, as if the public was circumscribed 
by the same constraints as the basic structures of society.  
4.4.2.2 Three problems of closed impartiality 
According to Sen, closed impartiality deals poorly with three problems: exclusionary neglect, 
inclusionary incoherence and procedural parochialism.325 Inclusionary incoherence is related to the 
non-identity problem and the concern for future generations. The non-identity problem deals 
with the issue of how the group size itself is sensitive to the decisions made (for instance on 
environmental issues and migration). It is too complex to be given proper treatment here, so I’ll 
restrict my discussion to the problem of procedural parochialism and distinguish it clearly from 
the problem of exclusionary neglect.  
Exclusionary neglect refers to the epistemological injustice of excluding voices of those people 
who are affected, but do not belong to the focal group and do not possess membership 
entitlements. The gravity of the transgression is relative to the degree to which the actions or 
decisions of a state (and civil society) have influence on the situation of outsiders and the general 
environment. Similar to Kant’s argument, neglect of foreign perspectives does not pose a 
problem in the extraordinary circumstances of completely separated communities (similar to 
“divided world”-problems), i.e. in circumstances that do not fulfill the conditions that actualize 
cosmopolitan law.326  
                                                 
322 Ibid., p. 130 
323 This point has strong parallels to Arendt’s political reading of Kant’s notion of common sense in § 40, in Critique 
of the power of judgement. Especially the second maxim of common sense, which emphasize the condition of 
taking the position of the other in order to reach a general point of view. (See chapter 9) 
324 In the end, this raises a series of questions regarding motivation and theoretical preferences which we will not go 
into here. It is related to Sen’s critique of ideal theory and the transcendental institutionalism that strives toward 
principles that firmly establish the basic structures of society through common agreement. Sen has a more pragmatic 
attitude (distinguishing “niti” from “nayaya”) and is willing to admit a lack of full agreement and unresolved conflicts 
of ordering preferences, in favor of open impartiality of differently situated perspectives.  
325 Sen 2009, p. 138-9 
326 The question of non-relational obligations is in this sense not relevant to cosmopolitan problems. 
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Given that we live in an interdependent world, the consequences of decisions taken in one 
particular polity will affect parties that are non-members. We have two ways to mediate these 
interests within the Kantian framework: through interstatal and cosmopolitan law. The problem 
with ‘closed impartiality’ is that it insists on the social contract model, which is based on binding, 
reciprocal agreements among members. By giving the institutional structure primary – as that 
which is in need of legitimacy – the social contract model also tends to conflate the level of 
public right with the level of institutional implementation. Hence, for Rawls, there is no clear 
difference between the interstatal accounts of the interest of affected foreigners and the 
international level of implementation of them. This is perhaps most clearly detectible in Rawls 
rejection of the “cosmopolitan” version. For Rawls position, the cosmopolitan way to mediate 
interests of foreigners is primarily understood as the institution of a global state. Hence, it follows 
that the cosmopolitan way is unrealistic. Many have addressed the lack of a cosmopolitan account 
in Rawls conception of justice, and The Law of Peoples does not seem to give us a satisfying answer 
because it is restricted to the interstatal (or inter-geneous) domain.327 But few, if any328, have 
deliberately addressed the possibility of implementing cosmopolitan law on both institutional 
levels: the state and international level.   
This possibility also goes well with the idea of open impartiality and a global public. In contrast to 
Rawls’ closed impartiality it would agree that the scope of the relevant public should follow the 
character of the problem (according to public right; domestic, interstatal, cosmopolitan) and not 
the institutional framework (state or international). Hence, a cross-border, “extra-political” public 
is relevant and should be influential (in some cases more than others). Sen is inspired by Smith’s 
open “public framework of thought”, which concords with O’Neill’s reading of Kant’s global 
notion of public reason.  
Benhabib would also agree on this appreciation of a cosmopolitan openness to foreigner’s 
perspectives in the “weak” publics, arguing that we have a moral (although not moral-legal) 
obligation to consider their voices. One might criticize open impartiality for downgrading the 
institutional integrity of the interest and perspectives of foreigners. What is gained, however, is 
independence from the rigid mediation of perspectives through the bottle-neck structure of state 
(people) representatives. With the idea of a cosmopolitan law of deliberation in mind, I will argue 
that there are moral-legal norms that oblige states to protect the conditions of these weaker 
publics of the transnational civil society.  
                                                 
327 See for instance Nussbaum 2006 and Fraser 2012 
328 Arendt and Benhabib can be read in agreement with this line, but none of them are explicit in this regard. 
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In distinction to the problem of exclusionary neglect – i.e. the problem of how to include the 
perspectives of those that are actually affected – Sen also criticizes closed impartiality for dealing 
poorly with procedural parochialism, mainly addressing the procedural design of the original 
position (for discussion on methodological state-centrism, see 3.3.1). Procedural parochialism 
refers to the problem of providing guarantees of the theoretical procedures against cultural 
relativist (explicit parochialist) or naïve universalist (implicit parochially biased) views. Sen 
suggests that his notion of open impartiality might contribute to solving this problem in a 
pragmatic and comparative manner through the appreciation of what he calls “the enlightenment 
relevance of the view from elsewhere”. It could, in other words, improve the future deliberations 
on cosmopolitan law on the level of contemplative procedures (i.e. thought experiments).  
Sen’s epistemological argument is, in other words, not so much concerned with the actual 
inclusion of all affected, as it is with the problem of procedural parochialism. This problem is not 
so frequently addressed in the critique of Rawls. Sen’s critique does not directly address the 
problem of asymmetry between those with membership entitlements (citizenship) and those 
indirectly affected by the policies (irregular migrants, low-skill workers, etc.), but it addresses an 
epistemological consequence of the exclusionary neglect in procedural terms. Sen points to a 
theoretical contradiction between Rawls non-parochial (or non-statist) intentions and the lack of 
a procedural guarantee against local group prejudices and interests.  
Sen guides our attention to an unattractive procedural preference in Rawls: “that the basic 
structure is that of a closed society: that is, we are to regard it as self-contained and as having no 
relation with other societies.”329 In this sense, the diagnosis of procedural parochialism points 
toward a kind of epistemological solipsism: The “failure to have any systematic procedure for 
correcting the influence of parochial values to which any society may be vulnerable when detached 
from the rest of the world.”330  
Are the ideas and experiences from elsewhere merely distracting details? This is a question 
concerned not only with the fairness of the decisions made by a policy. Unlike exclusionary 
neglect, the problem of procedural parochialism is not primarily concerned with the extent to 
which policies like infanticide, torture or subsidies for fossil fuels are procedurally fair by taking 
all affected into consideration. The primary concern is the implied epistemological lack of 
comparative perspectives when foreign perspectives are excluded. The point being that thought 
experiments that exclude foreign perspectives has a lower guarantee against parochial bias than 
                                                 
329 Rawls 1993, p. 12 
330 Sen 2009, p. 90 
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procedures that parochially valued policies are actually the best options compared to other ways 
of organizing society. 
4.4.2.3 The impartial spectator – an alternative procedural device  
As mentioned, Sen suggests that the “view from elsewhere” offers a promising barricade that is 
lacking in Rawls conception. The general idea is expressed elsewhere by Sen in an article on 
Smith:  
It is this limitation of reliance on parochial reasoning [ignoring or neglecting many 
challenging counterarguments], linked with national traditions and regional 
understandings, that Adam Smith wanted to resist by using the device of the 
impartial spectator, in the form of the thought experiment of asking what a particular 
practice or procedure would look like to a disinterested person – from far or near.331 
In order to achieve this in contemplative terms, it is not enough to use the impartial spectator in 
order to gain a common point of view. In a footnote, Sen attends to a subtle difference that 
seems to have escaped many readers of Smith.332 Smith’s device requires a stronger sense of 
psychological concreteness of a perspective than what the generic “view of everyone” can offer. 
The use of the “impartial spectator” is therefore also used as a “dialectical device to question and 
dispute commonly agreed beliefs.”333  
There is a connection between the “impartial spectator” and “the common point of view” in the 
sense that they both rely on a psychological capacity to understand the perspective of others. 
Primarily this is the perspective of particular others, but as we grow up, this perspective is 
habituated into a “generalized other”. Smith refers to this generalized ability to imagine oneself 
from the position of the other as the “self as spectator” – as the man-within, the viewpoint of 
human kind – contrasted to oneself proper as an agent. While obviously useful as a capacity of 
conscience (not to mention the concern for one’s public reputation), the “self as spectator” in its 
generalized form also runs the risk of being colored by the unavoidably egocentric or demo-
centric character of one’s life experiences.   
                                                 
331 P. 63, in Sen, Amartya. 2010. "Adam Smith and the Contemporary World." Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and 
Economics, no. 3: 50-67. And he continues: “Smith was particularly keen on avoiding the grip of parochialism in 
jurisprudence and moral and political reasoning. In the chapter in The Theory of Moral Sentiments entitled “On the 
influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation” Smith gives various 
examples of how discussion confined within a given society [for instance the Greek philosophers about infanticide] 
can be incarcerated by a seriously narrow understanding.” (Sen 2010, p. 63, my comment) 
332 For instance, in Rawls’ consideration of a cosmopolitan version of the impartial spectator as an alternative 
procedure to the contractual principle, he seems to be operating only with two options; the contractualist and the 
utilitarian. His misreading of Smith as a utilitarian seems to have led him to avoid considering a third alternative to 
invoke impartiality through the “view from elsewhere”.   
333 Sen 2009, footnote p. 125 
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To provide a remedy for this parochial blindness of our “man-within”, Smith suggests that we 
need to (re-)introduce the presence of an ideal spectator, this time not as a controversial 
metaphysical construction (as an omniscient or Archimedean point; a “view from nowhere”) but 
as a real spectator, preferably in the figure of a stranger or foreigner. In The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments we find an illustrating and frequently quoted description of how the ability to recognize 
the presence of another through the sympathetic imagination, may sober up and reorient our 
attitude:  
In solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves […] The 
conversation of a friend brings us to a better, that of a stranger to a still better temper. 
The man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and 
conduct, requires often to be awakened and put in mind of his duty, by the presence of 
the real spectator: and it is always from that spectator, from whom we can expect the least 
sympathy and indulgence, that we are likely to learn the most complete lesson of self-
command.334  
We might say that the real presence of the stranger sets up the most favorable circumstances for 
revision of the impartial spectator – “the man within the breast.”  
If we want to implement this insight – based on the best psychological knowledge available – we 
seem to have two distinct options: On the one hand, we might think of it in terms of a 
contemplative device. As such, it will of course be less than convenient to seek a stranger’s 
company every time we want to repeat the “view from elsewhere.” We might understand Sen’s 
proposal therefore, as suggesting how we imaginatively can exploit this effect in individual 
exercises. On the other hand, we might also think of it in terms of public procedures of opinion-
formation, which brings us closer to the discourse-ethical position of Benhabib. In this sense, the 
concrete ‘view from elsewhere’ is appreciated for its sobering and comparative effects, even when 
the foreign perspective is not considered as an affected party or a representative of another 
state/group.  
As a thought experiment, ‘the impartial spectator’ has first of all the advantage that it does not 
rely on our ability to take the point of view of everyone or anyone within a certain community, 
global or local. By relying on the imagination of one or several specific alternative perspectives it 
draws on the critical reflections of comparisons. Second, it encourages us to accept the value of 
different views and to appreciate the decentralizing epistemological effect of being open to the 
views of outsiders. The point is not to rely on foreigners to be virtuous manifestations of the 
perspective of the ideal spectator, but to engage in comparative dialogue with perspectives that 
                                                 
334 Quoted in Sen 2009, p. 125, from III.3.38 Smith, Adam. 1759. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. London,: A. Millar. 
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are less likely to share our parochial prejudices with the same “sympathy and indulgence” as those 
equally minded to us.335  
If we consider the relevance of the “real spectator” as mentioned in the quote above, it seems at 
least plausible to understand this contemplative device as part of a practice associated with, and 
depending on, interaction in the public sphere. Whether or not this was Smith’s original 
intension, a discourse-ethical understanding of the value of the perspective of others would 
certainly appreciate both the ideal discursive setting of a thought experiment, where we imagine a 
dialogue partner, as well as the real setting of actual communicative practice in the public sphere, 
where we engage in a dialogue with real strangers. What is genuinely valuable in the contribution 
of Sen’s reading of Smith is that he stresses the cosmopolitan point of not restricting this 
rehearsal to strangers (from “elsewhere”) within the same modern state.  
Conclusion  
As we saw in chapter 2, Kant defined the right to asylum (the right to visit) as an unconditional 
cosmopolitan right. In other words, it is held to be a duty without exceptions of the hosting state 
to allow foreigners to seek refuge if necessary, and, depending on the reading, also a right to 
present oneself to society. In either case it is one of the first expressions on an idea of a legal 
order constituted by the status of each individual as a world-citizen.  
Hannah Arendt’s appropriation of this idea is interesting because it situates the cosmopolitan idea 
in a crisis of mass migration facing European modern states; states holding humanism and 
human rights in high regard. The way millions of national minorities were left homeless and 
“excluded from humanity”, bore witness to a great betrayal of these ideas. Tellingly, the first step 
was to abandon the right to asylum, which created a class of stateless with nowhere to go. 
Disastrously, the second step was the abandonment of the right to state citizenship, which 
rendered minorities (and potentially everyone) without formal protection against statelessness.  
Arendt is in line with Kant’s empirical premise of the public right when she claims that the 
problem of statelessness is not simply lack of space, but rather a problem of political 
organization. We could say that there is an institutional and conceptual mismatch between the 
state-centric international order and the cosmopolitan problem of the stateless.  
The parallel to today’s situation is in many ways striking: The strong democracies – which are 
loyal to universal core principles – are again under pressure by authoritarian states to abandon 
                                                 
335 It addresses the enlightenment relevance of outsiders, but perhaps not so much of the interested and affected 
outsiders (such as irregular immigrants), as any outsider with an epistemologically privileged perspective. 
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their international obligations and cosmopolitan ideals. The crisis has, as of now, not yet turned 
into a complete disaster, but some parallels are worrisome. For instance, the right to asylum is 
compromised by a hardened rhetoric and non-arrival measures against undesired groups of 
immigrants. 
Arendt aimed to explain why we have a problem with recognizing the mismatch mentioned 
above as revealed by the cosmopolitan problem of the stateless. The problem is located in what 
she calls the aporia of human rights, which refers to the paradoxical experience that at the very 
time people are thrown into a position where they have nothing but their world-citizenship left, 
the apparent cosmopolitan rights accompanying them, their “human rights”, turn inapplicable. 
Arendt’s critique of the UN declaration was that it had learned nothing from the preceding 
disaster. This might be too harsh, but is carries a kernel of truth: The cosmopolitan discourse 
applied in the re-articulation of citizen rights as human rights, conceals their reliance on state 
membership and gives the false impression that all human rights are applicable to cosmopolitan 
issues. It creates a false sense of readiness to meet similar situations in the future.  
Usually, the problem of rightlessness is seen as an institutional lacuna: Since these individual 
rights cannot be backed up by a global monopoly of violence, there is no enforceable inalienable 
rights attached to being “stateless”, “irregular migrants”, “sans papiers”, etc. Hence, in practice 
the transposition of citizen’s rights to the cosmopolitan level seems to rely on the charity of 
foreign states. There is no perfect moral-legal duty corresponding to the human rights.  
As Arendt argues, part of the reason for this failure is also a conceptual confusion, which could 
be dissolved by making it clearer which human rights count as citizen’s rights and which count as 
cosmopolitan rights. The current language of “human rights” is confusing, because the discourse 
in general refers to international agreements that combine both civil and cosmopolitan rights. If 
we take the UN declaration of universal human rights from 1948 as an example, only § 14 would 
be considered a cosmopolitan right proper according to Kant’s framework.336 The other rights are 
for the most part an articulation of a universal standard of interaction between a state and its 
citizens.  
I have here addressed the problem of democratic deficit in the cosmopolitan domain based on 
the idea of the democratic legitimacy of law. By evoking Sen’s notion of “the enlightenment 
relevance of the view from elsewhere” we may more easily capture the state-centric tendencies in 
our understanding of politics. As an illustration of these tendencies, one might speak 
meaningfully of a democratic deficit on the domestic (state) and international levels, including 
                                                 
336 § 13-15 touches on issues with clear relevance to transnational migration.  
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regional (EU) and global (UN) organizations. However, to actually recognize a foreigners’ right to 
democratic participation in state policies, may seem quite outlandish. In general, this reaction 
seems reasonable, given that foreigners are not always affected by the legislation of a state. But 
when it comes to immigration policies, this is definitely not the case: these policies affect 
foreigners more directly than citizens. Should we not, at least in cases involving severe 
depoliticizing and dehumanizing consequences for those involved, acknowledge the democratic 
deficit and the epistemological value of taking the perspectives of the worst-off into 
consideration?  
These are in my view the basic elements of a proper cosmopolitan conception of justice: First of 
all, such a conception should establish the kind of problem that can only be properly responded 
to by cosmopolitan law. Second, the proper conception should issue responses that ensure legal 
protection against the dehumanizing consequences of the international order, and promote the 
democratic participation of foreigners in deliberations on issues that affects them.  
As we have seen, within Kant’s cosmopolitan framework, the right to settle (or to be a neighbor) 
is weighed against the potential exploitation by powerful global actors.337 We might read ‘the right 
to have rights’ as a proposed step toward adjusting the balance for the guests that are in the 
“worst-off” position in this border-performing relation: the “scum of the earth”, the superfluous, 
the stateless, the denaturalized or denationalized, the outcasts, and we could go on. How do we 
avoid “savage conditions” created in the midst of civilization?  
In a relational perspective, the problem of statelessness concerns us all, because if we exclude 
someone from humanity, we do in effect also exclude ourselves. To guarantee against this it is 
conceptually helpful to articulate a cosmopolitan right to political membership, but how can such 
a right be implemented in practice? Is it feasible in the current situation? To consider this 
question, I will situate this concept of cosmopolitan law in the debate on immigration. The 
debate on immigration is relevant because it represents the central cosmopolitan issues and forces 
us to explicate the implications of extending cosmopolitan law and balance these implications it 
against other principle and pragmatic concerns.  
 
 
                                                 
337 It is quite essential, especially these days to distinguish the problems associated with the privileged global elite of 
“frequent flyers” and tax-evading international corporations, etc. on the one hand, from the problems associated 
with the “scum of the earth”, and those escaping impossible material conditions on the other; either as “economic 
migrants” or as “refugees” on the other. They still converge in one sense: a border regulating policy must deal with 
both groups at the same time.  
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Chapter 5: The academic debate on immigration - the distributive justice of 
membership and the question of just membership 
The initial question, and main problem of this thesis, was concerned with the state’s obligations 
toward foreigners. So far, I’ve mainly considered the argument for a Kantian inspired 
cosmopolitan scope of justice. I have presented competing statist views on the question of the 
scope of cross-border obligations and discussed how state-centric assumptions about politics and 
binding legal agreements tend to weaken the obligations a state might have to people beyond its 
borders. These state-centric assumptions can be found also in more moderate positions on both 
sides of the statist-cosmopolitan axis. I’ve also considered the concrete content of cosmopolitan 
law along two lines, according to the shifting circumstances of justice: One line answers to the 
issues of admission, immigration and membership. The other line answers to the issues of 
involvement of affected parties and the epistemic value of outside perspectives, especially when it 
comes to further improvement of the content of cosmopolitan law.  
In the absence of a global state, there seems to be no “hard public” to which foreigners can claim 
a right to participation as an affected party without either a) acquiring membership in an alien 
state or b) mediate one’s opinion through government representatives in international arenas. 
According to the idea of an open impartiality, there is an obligation (at least of a non-sanctioned 
character) to acknowledge the foreigner a right to partake in the softer spheres of the public 
debate (including their mediation through NGO’s). This soft public spheres might even be 
considered global in character. I will argue more strongly still that a global public is a concern for 
a cosmopolitan law of deliberations, and that the current circumstances implies that states have 
moral-legal (sanctionable) obligations to promote and protect the interactions of the transnational 
public sphere.   
In this chapter I will sidestep the issue of a cosmopolitan law of deliberation and discuss the issue 
of admission. I will reconstruct the debate between the communitarian and liberal standard 
positions on immigration through academic representatives of statist and cosmopolitan 
positions.338 In the end I will promote Seyla Benhabib’s discourse-ethical mediation of these 
opposing positions of the liberal and communitarian. From Benhabib’s position we can say that 
each standard position emphasizes one horn of the dilemma of democratic legitimacy as the 
solution to the issue of immigration policies. The communitarian position, the conventional “closed” 
                                                 
338 In the immigration debate these positions are more or less overlapping. To clarify Rawls’ position, which is only 
marginally part of this debate, he is clearly positioned as a liberal thinker in general. But, due to his state-centric 
tendencies, Rawls seems to end up in a communitarian position, quite close to Walzer, when it comes to the issue of 
immigration. Carens develops his liberal position partly from an adaptation of Rawls ‘original position’, but re-
designs it in a way that alters its state-centric character.   
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view, tends to emphasize the autonomy of a self-defining political community, while the liberal 
“open border” position promotes our cosmopolitan commitment to the right to free movement for 
all. Benhabib seeks a position which does not aim to solve the dilemma, but to emphasize the 
value of continuous democratic renegotiation of the dilemma, preferably in ways that opens up 
this process to the influence and inclusion of foreigners. This offers a “porous border” position on 
migration policies. 
The issue of migration policy is highly complex. To give a superficial impression of the field we 
should at least distinguish two central, but closely interconnected aspects: first admissions and 
membership distribution. First admission refers to the regulation of territorial border crossing (visa, 
asylum seeking), while membership distribution involves the (usually subsequent) formal 
recognition (naturalization) of a person as a citizen of the state (also called “second admission”). 
These aspects are interconnected in the sense that admission often leads to informal attachment 
to society, and informal attachment (it can be argued) gives one a claim to formal membership. 
There is a certain asymmetry between the positions in the debate in the sense that the 
communitarian position regards membership distribution as the primary issue from which 
regulation of first admission can be derived, whereas the liberal “open border”-position, takes 
point of departure in free first admissions and make certain non-ideal qualifications, including on 
membership distribution, according to this. 
Although I will in the end be critical to Michael Walzer’s framing of the debate on immigration as 
primarily a question of membership distribution, his framework has been too influential to ignore it. 
The advantage of Walzer’s definition of the issue of the debate is that it brings to the forefront 
the peculiar character of immigration as a distributive issue: “membership” sets the framework 
through which other distributive issues are dealt with. But, it also has the narrowing implication 
that “first admission” is given disproportionate weight as the political question – due to Walzer’s 
understanding of attachment and social justice. After presenting Walzer’s definition of the 
framework, I will present the three positions in the debate.  
1) The conventional view holds that states have broad discretion on immigration policies 
and that they by and large are unencumbered by moral restrictions (what I have called a 
statist view). This view has the advantage of protecting public sovereignty, but risks 
ending in an irresponsible ethical particularism.  
2) The “open border” cosmopolitan view holds that states have a prima facie duty to admit 
all. Any restrictions must be conditioned by morally sound concerns. This position deals 
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well with the concern for moral equality, but tends to devalue borders as a condition for 
democracy and political decision-making.  
3) The “porous border” cosmopolitan view emphasizes – like the conventional view – the 
value of public autonomy and appreciates the implicit dilemma between public autonomy 
and a commitment to universal values. This dilemma is moreover seen as an inherent 
aspect of the responsible formation of a reflexive democratic self-understanding. 
Although the two latter positions represent perspectives that are grounded in a methodology that 
takes a global point of view, I will in the end argue that cosmopolitan views that are restricted to 
the content of cosmopolitan law related to issues of admission are not able to properly address 
the problems of transnational migration. Even the “open” and “porous borders” positions suffer 
from a peculiar state-centric bias in the sense that they constrain the issue at hand by defining it 
in terms of “immigration”. It narrows the scope of migration to the concern for those foreigners 
residing within the hosting state’s territory. In the end this leads these perspectives – although 
critical to the conventional view on migration – to neglect the systemic outcomes of current 
admission policies (long-term encampment included) and more generally the need to protect the 
political integrity of the foreigner through a cosmopolitan law of deliberation. 
5.1 Membership as a distributive good 
In Spheres of Justice339, Michael Walzer presented what has become a central reference in the  
debate on the ethics of immigration. Even though Walzer’s communitarian definition of the 
problem at hand is not uncontested, his account is widely recognized as the main articulation of 
the problem and its conventional response.340  
First of all, Walzer presupposes that membership “in some human community” is a primary good 
because it sets the necessary boundaries within which all our other distributive choices can be 
made. It is, in other words, the proper site of justice. Distribution of membership defines the 
scope of other issues of distributive justice. Second, assumed that membership in “our” 
community is already a given, it is a social good, constituted by our understanding. “[Its] value is 
fixed by our work and conversation; and then we are in charge (who else could be in charge?) of 
its distribution. But we don’t distribute it among ourselves; it is already ours. We give it out to 
                                                 
339 Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice : A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books. 
340 Peculiar to the debate on immigration is that the communitarian view (often taken as the controversial proponent 
of group rights in the discussion of rights on the domestic level) in this case is the most widely held position. It is so 
dominant, that even most proponents of a liberal view hold a communitarian or, at least, a state-centric position on 
this particular question. John Rawls is one prominent and highly criticized example. 
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strangers.”341 Unlike most other goods, such as material goods, this social good cannot easily be 
exported. It requires the foreigners to move instead.  
Unlike the possibly unlimited distribution of first admissions (i.e. temporal legal territorial 
residence; visa), which could – at least in principle – leave the political community intact342, the 
distribution of membership (naturalization; i.e. formal citizenship, or at least partial entitlements) 
regulates who “we, the people” are, in both material and symbolic ways. Materially, by altering 
the demographic signature of the group that defines itself, and symbolically by altering the 
narratives and images that mediates the representations of the “we” (closed/homogenous vs 
open/heterogenous).   
Since the normative distinction of “us” and “them” is essential to the distribution of 
membership, we might say that it has an irreducible parochial or group-centric character to it. In 
this sense, the issue of membership distribution easily comes in conflict with the more well-
known and established cosmopolitan accounts of redistributive justice that we find in the works 
of Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. As Benhabib points out, although these cosmopolitan 
accounts have criticized the state-centric approach of Rawls, none of them have addressed the 
“cornerstone of state centrism”: The conventional view on transnational migration, which is 
strictly regulated, non-liberal and non-cosmopolitan. On this issue these accounts have been 
“curiously silent”.343   
There are of course good reasons to think of migration in the context of global redistribution, 
but this relation is not essential to the issue of immigration and it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to treat it adequately.344 In order to provide a certain background to Walzer’s argument I 
will briefly mention one possible and quite common solution to the conflicting concerns between 
migration control and redistributive justice in particular, or political closure and moral equality in 
general. 
A possible way to redeem the conflict between migration control and cosmopolitan redistributive 
justice is found in the consequentialist camp, which regards the issue of migration not primarily 
as an issue of membership distribution, but as one among several means of redistributing 
                                                 
341 Walzer 1983, p. 32 
342 It is of course highly unlikely that the membership of a state would be unaffected by large amounts of non-
member territorial residents. 
343 Benhabib, 2004, p. 2, see also p. 94 ff.   
344 It is non-essential in the sense that migration is not likely to stop or cease to be valuable if the redistribution of 
wealth is ideal. There are certainly good reasons to think of economic inequity as push- and pull-factors in 
migrational behavior analysis. The same is probably true of an instrumental redistributive function of migration. But, 
neither is exhausting the phenomenon of migration and does not directly address the political integrity of the 
foreigner as such. Nor should the value of migration be reduced to the individual level, as Joseph Carens and David 
Miller tends to do.  
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
156 
 
wealth.345 Within the utilitarian framework, there are no principle restrictions on free distribution 
of membership. Nor are there any principle restrictions on a very strict distribution of 
membership. Any utilitarian ‘law of hospitality’ would rely on the dependable predictions of its 
redistributive (and other relevant) consequences. 
This is of course perfectly legitimate within a utilitarian procedure, but it relies on dependable 
predictions of the consequences. More precisely, the procedure presumes reliable predictions on 
how the hosting community will behave and deal with immigration. Unless the community reacts 
to immigration in an institutionally stabilized manner (which implies a conventional consensus on 
these issues), how can we rely on behavioral prediction for normative guidance? To me, it seems 
unlikely that we can rely on behavioral prognosis of policies that change the pace of immigration. 
It seems unlikely that sympathetic and xenophobic reactions should be considered simply natural 
phenomena, devoid of contextual and interactive factors.  
I will not go into an extensive discussion on a utilitarian ‘law of hospitality’, but only briefly 
mention its advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that it quickly adapts new 
knowledge about migration and membership distribution into its answer. A universalist utilitarian 
position is also less attached to state-centric prejudices.346 A disadvantage associated with the 
ability of the utilitarian approach to include new knowledge, is its reliance on the predictability of 
highly complex interactive systems. For instance, the redistributive effect of immigration relies on 
a fairly stable and predictable response to the immigrants in the hosting community. The main 
disadvantage is still, as I see it, that the utilitarian approach offers no guarantees to migrants. 
Migrants are, unless the global society collapses, a global minority whose interests will be weighed 
against those who stay put. Hence, on the one hand the utilitarian approach gives us no stable 
criteria to assess the value of social cohesion or public autonomy against freedom of movement. 
And, on the other hand it offers no principled protection of vulnerable individuals in a highly 
complex interactive – and I would add: highly unpredictable – context.  
                                                 
345 In an overview article, Shelley Wilcox summarizes the debate on open borders by including her own position as 
the third, which is referred to as the distributive argument. She promotes the mediating position that argues that 
liberal states have broad external duties on grounds of distributive justice, but not open borders per se. See Wilcox 
2009. 
Although this position seems able to solve the conflict between migration and distribution, Wilcox’s approach also 
postpones the central issues of the other positions in the debate: the decrease of internal cohesion in the receiving 
country (Sidgwick, Walzer), the inherent value of freedom of movement to each world co-citizen (Carens, 
Oberman), and the public autonomy of the receiving political community (Benhabib). These concerns are postponed 
in the procedural sense that they are reduced to (extremely complex) consequential issues that the calculus measuring 
the total effect of migration will have to include (or reject as metaphysical nonsense).  
346 Although it has a tendency, like Sigdwick’s position, to take existing models of social ditance for granted, where 
the distinction between citizens and foreigners is central. 
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In the following I will present Walzer’s articulation of the conventional, state-centric view on 
immigration as a defense of the inherent value of state membership. This view is characterized by 
its emphasis on the sovereignty of the political community and strong restrictions on any 
commitment to external principles that might constrain the state’s autonomy. In opposition to 
this view I will present the most well-known response to Walzer, articulated by Joseph Carens. 
This is essentially a cosmopolitan revision of Rawls’ original position that, (in contrast to both 
Beitz and Pogge) addresses the issue of migration as the central question. I will refer to Carens’ 
position as the “Open Border” account. Finally, I will suggest that Seyla Benhabib’s “Porous 
Border” account is a promising mediating position between the two. 
5.2 The conventional view: the self-determining community 
The principle point of departure for the conventional view that Walzer represents, is quite clearly 
located within the Westphalian tradition that conceives each state as sovereign. And, there seems 
to be no good reason to divert from convention:  
The distribution of membership is not pervasively subject to the constraints of justice. 
Across a considerable range of the decisions that are made, states are simply free to take 
in strangers (or not).347  
Walzer’s argument is based on the conventional assumption that the exclusion of foreigners is 
justified by the right of communities to self-determination.  
The idea of public autonomy has a strong position in modern liberal democracies. Usually, 
however, the liberal perspective also includes commitments to a liberal international order of 
justice that defines external principled constraints on each state. It is quite clear from the quote 
above that Walzer’s holds no such constraints to be backed by a strong consensus with regards to 
laws of admission, and that in most cases the states are “simply free” to make up their own 
policies. This is not very surprising given a communitarian position. What is more striking, 
however, is that this communitarian view in fact represents the conventional view of modern liberal 
democracies on the specific issue of immigration. The conventional view in other words 
combines the respect for a liberal international order on citizen rights, with a denial of any strong 
obligations to foreign immigrants. In consequence, the conventional view does not recognize any 
cosmopolitan rights. 
Although Walzer defends the conventional view that allows political communities “to distribute 
membership for their own particular reasons”348, he also admits that one should recognize the 
                                                 
347 Walzer 1983, p. 61 
348 Ibid., p. 35 
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external principle of mutual aid to put constraints on these particularities in some cases. The right 
to asylum seems to correspond to an obligation of mutual aid in Walzer’s framework. As a group 
of “needy outsiders”, refugees are peculiar in Walzer’s understanding, because they’re in need of 
the membership itself: “The liberty that makes certain countries possible homes for men and 
women whose politics or religion isn’t tolerated where they live is also non-exportable.”349 This 
idea of goods that are non-exportable is quite concretely a case of how the issue of refugees are 
defined and restricted to an issue of admission from the perspective of the hosting state.350 The 
question becomes: “What may the host offer the visitor?” Correspondingly, it exemplifies how 
the debate on migration is construed as a debate over the ethics of admission, which for Walzer 
implies a dilemma between moral equality and political closure.351  
Walzer understand “mutual aid” to be a formalized principle based on the historical 
acknowledgement that strangers from beyond our political boundaries “sometimes might be 
entitled to our hospitality, assistance and good will.”352 Historically speaking this is a considerable 
improvement: Strangers are no longer necessarily enemies, but mere “persons in general” outside 
our group of members. However, I would hold – with the cosmopolitans – that today’s 
circumstances call for more than this Samaritan revision.  
In a descriptive manner, Walzer simply points out that even though mutual aid could serve as an 
external principle of distributing membership, it lacks the cohesion of a cooperative arrangement:  
Given the indeterminate requirements of mutual aid, these decisions are not constrained 
by any widely accepted standard. That’s why the admissions policies of countries are 
rarely criticized, except in terms suggesting that the only relevant criteria are those of 
charity, not justice.353  
In other words, the principle of mutual aid might be universal in its obligation, but it is restricted 
to the conditions of charity, not moral-legal obligations. That is, it commits no one to give 
assistance or hospitality that would imply excessive costs to the host, be it economically or 
                                                 
349 Ibid, p. 49 
350 It is also striking how Walzer confirms the conventional, narrow definition of a refugee by emphasizing the non-
material conditions as “non-exportable”. Intuitively it seems correct that one cannot export the rule of law or basic 
liberties in the same manner that one exports material goods, such as vaccine, clothes and food. It relies on 
institutions that are domestic and protected by the sovereignty of the state. However, it also reflects the prevailing 
asymmetry between political and moral relations. It is as if political relations are defined by immaterial conditions 
(such as respect for human dignity, autonomy and basic liberties) while moral relations are to be defined in terms of 
material needs. In some exceptional cases, such as the refugees, the political boundary might be crossed and new 
relations established. But, the idea of extending political relations across these borders seems unthinkable within this 
imaginary, as if foreigners are somehow ontologically (and not just legally) different from “us”.   
351 Parekh 2017, p. 53-4 
352 Walzer 1983, p. 33, Parekh considers this a break with the conventionalist assumption of mere negative duties 
toward foreigners. I tend to think of it as a revision, which adds a humanitarian obligation to the cosmopolitical one.  
353 Ibid, p. 34 
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otherwise. At the same time Walzer admits the precariousness associated with being stateless. 
“Being without membership is a condition of infinite danger”.354  
Since immigration potentially affects the very shape of the community, Walzer holds charity in 
this context to be a political matter. It is political in the sense that it is a matter addressing “us” as 
a political community, regarding our duties to admit (and in some cases this means to help) 
foreigners into our territory. Admission is not considered a cosmo-political matter,355 insofar as the 
foreigner still retains a non-political status as a passive subject of charity. The distribution of 
membership must be seen as politically organized charity, agreed upon by the original members. 
Since it is organized, Walzer argues, the charity is more coercive than individual charity. It is 
legitimate because it involves a “range of benevolent actions” that would affect the current 
members only in an impersonal, distant and marginal manner.356 In other words, the extent of 
mutual aid can be stretched much further before it involves “excessive costs” to the provider of 
aid, in this case the members of the hosting country.  
To identify the costs of immigration, Walzer points beyond the economic aspects. He draws on 
the classic sociobiological insights of Henry Sidgwick to emphasize the effects on social cohesion. 
In line with the old liberal ideal of minimal state interference, Sidgwick held open borders to be 
an ideal line of policies. But, when considering the reality of the current society, one has to 
consider the concrete consequences of such a policy-line.357 Sidgwick argued against a 19th 
century globalist political economy (similar to that of Milton Friedman) that promoted a view of 
free migration in a “global neighborhood”. Sidgwick’s consequentialist argument is reconstructed 
by Walzer in this manner:  
Immigration might lead to  
1) lack of cohesion/risk of anomie and decrease of patriotic sentiments358 
2) welfare stagnation or decrease 
3) destabilization of political institutions due to de-homogenization of moral and intellectual 
culture 
                                                 
354 Paraphrased Parekh’s (2017, p. 54) reading of Walzer (1983, p. 32). 
355 From the strict distinction made between humanitarian and cosmopolitan issues discussed in chapter 1 and 2, I 
would claim that this discussion of mutual aid tends toward the kind of issues brought up in the use of § 38 and the 
practice of humanitarian exceptionalism. 
356 Walzer 1983, p. 45 
357 Sidgwick argument was based on the assumption of an increased social distance measured in the gradually 
decreasing distribution of benevolence It should however be noted that this presumption relies on a 
citizen/foreigner-distinction as a predetermined and dumbfounded factor of social distance.  
358 A possible line: compare the Durkheimian moral psychology of Jonathan Haidt against Seyla Benhabib’s critique 
of Walzer’s reliance on the ‘lack of cohesion’-argument. 
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Sharpening the focus, Walzer points out that the two last of Sidgwick’s arguments rest on the 
first.359 They describe the expected consequences of the lack of cohesion, or de-homogenization.  
Walzer accepts the idea that lack of cohesion may be a serious cost of liberal distribution policies 
on membership. Walzer is however critical to the way concern for cohesion is reduced to an 
instrumental value for something else (presumably for the sum of utility for the individual 
members) in Sidgwick’s argument. By recognizing lack of cohesion merely as a consequential 
argument, Sidgwick’s account undermines the inherent value of political communities. It is this 
inherent contingency of Sidgwick’s conclusion that worries Walzer:  
It is only if patriotic sentiment has some moral basis, only if communal cohesion makes for 
obligations and shared meanings, only if there are members as well as strangers, that state 
officials would have any reason to worry especially about the welfare of their people (and 
of all their own people) and the success of their own culture and politics.360  
Hence, we might read Walzer as a critical response to the utilitarian-liberal view on immigration, 
which gives –as mention above – no such morally principled basis. What Walzer sets out to do – 
in order to describe or perhaps also secure such a moral basis – is consequently to explain the 
nature and the value of the political community. For instance, Walzer claims that there are certain 
membership criteria that are impermissible and clearly undermine the legitimacy of patriotic or 
xenophobic sentiments, such as race, bloodline, ethnicity, sexual orientation (i.e. criteria based on 
immutable characteristics that one cannot deliberately alter).  
Positively, he will have to defend why the distinction between members and strangers is not a 
morally arbitrary one. Walzer’s argument is based on an assumption of the value of homogeneity 
and cultural distinctness as conditions of identity. From this perspective, the justified exception 
against homogeneity is made (similar to Rawls) with respect to the historically contingent 
heterogeneity of people already within the territory. In other words, he does not propose 
denaturalization and expulsion of indigenous people and historical minorities (such as former 
slaves or guest workers). Still, the claimed value of homogeneity is stronger than that of a purely 
civic community based on constitutional patriotism. 
                                                 
359 In the latest decades of globalization one might argue that there are other factors than lack of cohesion that drives 
immigration to cause welfare stagnation. In the old industrialized countries, such as the US, it seems the “goverments 
courting of international financial markets and transnational firms rather national wage-earners and their 
organizations” (Jordan and Düvell, 2003) has left the national labor-markets vulnerable to “social dumping” and in 
some countries, slavery-like conditions for illegal immigrants. In large globalization has implied free trade, i.e. free 
float of goods and finance, rather than free movement of people. Hence, lower wages and standards of working 
conditions have been turned into a valuable competitive asset on the international market. In some cases, the welfare 
stagnation caused by globalization seems rather to decrease social cohesion by giving blame to the immigrants (who 
tend to take the lowest paid jobs in the market, and hence becomes a symbolic symptom of the problem). These 
xenophobic tendencies has clear anti-social and anti-patriotic implications in pluralist state societies.     
360 Walzer 1983, p. 37-8, my emphasis 
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5.2.1 Three analogies of the political community: the neighborhood, clubs and families 
In order to defend his communitarian view, Walzer defines and describes the nature of a political 
community. The analysis takes its starting point in the common experience of the modern state 
society as meta-topical in its character:   
[…] few of us have any direct experience of what a country is or what it means to be a 
member. We often have strong feelings about our country, but we have only dim 
perceptions of it. As a political community (rather than a place) it is, after all, invisible; we 
actually see only its symbols, offices, and representatives. I suspect that we understand it 
best when we compare it to other, smaller associations whose compass we can more 
easily grasp.361  
By appealing to the abstract character of a modern political mass-community, Walzer evoke 
associations to the discussions on social imaginaries that are based on phenomenological 
concepts. As discussed in chapter 3, this is associated with the emergence of an imagined people 
or imagined community, which was taken to provide the state with continuous legitimacy. Insofar 
as Walzer would describe how the political community is actually seen through “its symbols, 
offices, and representatives”, this could be recognized as a project of social science on 
nationalism or civic religion/constitutional patriotism. Walzer’s recommendation of comparisons 
must however be scrutinized beyond their obvious illustrative value. They become problematic 
when they take on the paradigmatic effect of a guiding analogue or proto-type.362 I struggle to 
find a critical distance on these matters in Walzer’s comparisons. The risk is consequently that the 
comparison with the smaller associations takes on the function of mediating certain features to 
the imagined society that is commonly attributed to topical associations based on face-to-face 
interaction.  
It is for instance well-known historically that family-life has been used as a model to attribute 
certain features to the political community. This has also been a central part of nationalist 
propaganda, appealing to motherland, fatherland, homeland, etc. I do not claim that Walzer makes 
exactly this mistake, but rather that he uncritically risks making similar mistakes when comparing 
                                                 
361 Walzer 1983, p. 35 
362 My concern is here that the comparison takes on the character of analogies or “darstellungen”/manifestations, in 
which the idea of the state community (which can never be experienced directly) gains content by seeing the 
“neighborhood”, “club” or “family” as manifestations of the state. We see the state as a family. This also easily takes 
on an idealized form, as mentioned in Taylor’s discussion on social imaginaries, where a peculiar kind of 
neighborhoods, associations and family-structure becomes associated with the culture and virtuous life of good 
citizens.  
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the modern state community to neighborhoods, clubs and families.363 With this critical concern in 
mind, Walzer’s comparisons are at the same time illuminating and thought provoking.  
The Neighborhood 
The choice of the neighborhood-analogy is motivated by the way economic cosmopolitanism 
have embraced the idea of a ‘global neighborhood’, modelled after the state-bordered version of 
a free and open market. Walzer responds to this idea by referring to the imperial and colonial 
experience of open borders. It had, he argues, a tendency to result in closed neighborhoods 
(regulated associations; segregation). As far as we know, Walzer claims, open neighborhoods that 
behave as random associations, presuppose the presence of closed or regulated borders on a state 
level.  
Walzer’s point seems to be that open neighborhoods and free internal migration requires strict 
border regulation on a state level, otherwise the neighborhoods will gate themselves.364 A 
potential state of affairs he refers to as “a thousand petty fortresses”. There is a possibility that 
the open neighborhood might be realized on a global level, according to Walzer, but only by the 
means of extensive cohesion against the emergence of closed neighborhoods. In practical terms 
this would imply a strong global state. Hence Walzer draws the following conclusion:  
If [the distinctiveness of cultures and groups] is a value, as most people (though some of 
them are global pluralist, and others only local loyalists) seem to believe, then closure 
must be permitted somewhere. At the level of political organization, something like the 
sovereign state must take shape and claim the authority to make its own admissions 
policy, to control and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants.365  
Similar to the imaginary of a nation-state, Walzer understands the cultural distinctness of a 
community to serve as the corner stone of the moral basis for patriotic sentiment. Presumably 
with reference to the segregated pattern of neighborhoods in the US, it also seems reasonable to 
say that he prefers the distinctness of a political culture to the tribalization that we might 
associate with the fragmented landscape of an open-border state. One way to put this concern is 
to assess the level of cultural competence expected in a political community. The communitarian 
perspective tends to emphasize a quite high threshold of competence, while the cosmopolitan 
perspectives tend to negotiate closer to its sustainable minimum.  
                                                 
363 These analogies have been criticized (quite predictably) from a liberal position. See for instance see Benhabib 
(2004, p. 124ff). And, p. 266-7 in Carens, Joseph H. 1987. "Aliens and Citizens - the Case for Open Borders." Review 
of Politics 49, no. 2 (Spr): 251-273. <Go to ISI>://WOS:A1987K262000005. 
364 Significant economic differences seem to have similar effects. It would be interesting to compare the increasing 
inequality of distribution of economic resources with the rate of gated communities, and “hostile”, security-oriented 
urban architecture. 
365 Walzer 1983, p. 39 
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The argument then goes something like this: If a distinct and highly competent political culture 
(i.e. a thick context) has a value, the necessary closure (between “us” and “them”) in the form of 
enforced immigration control is a non-arbitrary and legitimate discrimination in moral terms. If 
migrants come in small numbers, there is no problem. And, if they are needy refugees we have a 
strong moral obligation to help them. However, this obligation is Samaritan not only in the 
economic sense of costs; it is also trumped by the concern to preserve “communities of 
character”. High rates of immigration, Walzer fears, will lead to the decrease of cultural 
distinction and ultimately the loss of a communal “self”. Hence the regulation of admissions is 
essential to the idea of collective self-determination (and, we might say; self-designs). If we 
consider how adequately this position responds to the problem of extensive statelessness, Walzer 
would readily admit, in line with the current “nativist backlash”, that when numbers are large 
“their” way of life must be sufficiently similar to “ours” in order for the Samaritan obligation to 
remain strong.   
Clubs 
Further, the club-analogy is intended to address the constraints that this right to immigration 
control might entail. In other words, given that we accept that border control and limited 
distribution of membership is morally permissible in a non-arbitrary manner, are there any criteria 
that should be seen as morally arbitrary and hence impermissible as criteria for exclusion? 
First of all, Walzer notes that there is a moral asymmetry between immigration and emigration. In 
most states, like in a club, the right to emigrate or to withdraw one’s membership freely is 
respected (although this might also have quite profound effects on the shape of the political 
community in question). The right to immigrate corresponds to the right to seek membership in 
a club in the sense that the admission committee in both cases may present legitimate criteria for 
exclusion and selection.  
Distinguished from a private club and with reference to some historical cases of restricted 
immigration in the US context – which promoted the categories of “white” and “Protestant” (i.e. 
race and religion) – Walzer suggests that these are potential illegitimate claims.366 Before 
qualifying further what kind of constraints these cases might entail in general on the legitimate 
criteria, Walzer stresses the political character of these decisions. The distribution of membership 
and its criteria are essentially political matters of self-determination.  
                                                 
366 Walzer 1983, p. 40. See also Walzer’s critical discussion of “White Australia” policies (p. 45-47) against poor 
migrants from South-East Asia. 
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Similar to the founders of a club, the community has to answer the question of what kind of 
community they want to have. Walzer genuinely conceives this as a matter of collective self-
definition. This might have decisive consequences for immigration policy. For instance, 
depending on the level of cultural competence the community ends up aspiring to, the degree of 
political and cultural affinity required of the immigrants would vary correspondingly. There is 
also an obvious rhetorical aspect to the way a definition of a political community structures the 
image of that community. Being a “country of immigration” or “multinational” sets the 
framework quite differently from “our fatherland”, not to speak of the derogatory notion of 
“Fortress Europe”. 
This point is of central importance to Walzer, and here I think his statist position is quite 
different from Rawls semi-cosmopolitan position in the sense that Walzer is sensitive to the 
dilemma universal moral equality poses on self-determination. Walzer in this sense shares a 
presumption with the cosmopolitan position: the decision on immigration policies is not just any 
political matter; it is at the very core of political matters. Admission policies are situated at the 
basic level so to speak, which goes beyond the matter of pursuing national interest of security and 
prosperity. It is a matter of identity:  
At stake here is the shape of the community that acts in the world, exercises sovereignty, 
and so on. Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They 
suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could not be 
communities of character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women 
with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their common 
life.367  
Interestingly, Walzer qualifies the limit of the analogy by pointing to the special bond between 
the political community and the territory. This implies a certain constraint that private clubs don’t 
have. Since the legitimacy of the territorial state is derived from the individual’s right to a place 
(according to Walzer’s reading of Hobbes, and in line with Kant), a new state or government 
cannot denaturalize or expel inhabitants that interrupts its homogenizing gaze.368 Some 
heterogeneous elements literally “come with the territory”.  
In the end, it is also important to notice another central assumption in Walzer’s argument that 
goes against a purely ethno-centric position. He seems to hold that informal attachments to the 
economy and attachments of social membership in a state provide foreigners with the rightful 
claim to acquire formal citizenship/membership.369 By accepting this criterion, Walzer argues that 
                                                 
367 Walzer 1983, p. 61-62 
368 It mirrors § 15 (2) in the UN Universal Declaration of HR from 1948.  
369 Similar to Kant’s concern for the circumstances of justice.  
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the relevant political issue is moved from membership distribution (second admission) to legal 
residency (first admissions). This is because legal residents quite easily get attached and integrated 
as social members, and consequently if you let them in you’re very likely to grant them 
membership by default. In other words, for Walzer the right to be a visitor is intimately linked to 
the right to be a permanent guest and eventually a full political member. 
Families 
Although Walzer seems to defend the trinity between nation, state and territory, he opens up 
with “families” the idea of extended relations of the nation beyond the state borders. In this way 
Walzer articulates certain positive moral duties that seem central to the admission policy of 
political communities. This could for instance be illustrated by the close cultural affinities by the 
Scandinavian countries or the German community. Today, the global English-speaking 
community seems to challenge these older linguistic boundaries. 
The main point Walzer develops by this comparison is based on the cultural proximity of ethnic 
or national “relatives”. With relatives is meant individuals or groups that are culturally and 
historically affiliated, but that does not necessarily share a formal political membership. 
Historically, Walzer comments, such affiliations have been observed, especially in times of 
trouble. The case of Germans fleeing from the Königsberg-region during the WW 2 is a well-
known example. 
Furthermore, the kinship principle is taken in a less metaphoric sense when it comes to family 
reunification. This is thought of, as Walzer accurately points out, not a cosmopolitan concern, 
but a domestic one. Family reunions are grounded in the recognition of the needs of those who 
have already acquired a membership in the community.  
A quite different and clearly cosmopolitan case is the ideologically affiliated. For instance, liberal 
democracies have a tendency to prefer political refugees (i.e. the paradigm of dissidents) that are 
promoting their world-view in not so like-minded parts of the world. Walzer formulates the 
dilemma of cosmopolitan right by presenting ‘the right to have a place’ as a conflicting concern 
to state sovereignty, formulated as no right to external cohesion of hosting states. The right to 
asylum is one of very few institutions that mitigate this dilemma. Still, as discussed above, the 
primary ground is for Walzer state sovereignty as the protection of the culturally distinct and 
communal character of the state as a membership organization: “The principle of mutual aid can 
only modify and not transform admissions policies rooted in a particular community’s 
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understanding of itself.”370 In other words, when the claim of someone’s universal rights 
challenges the national identity of a state, the national identity always wins.  
5.2.2 Summary 
Since Walzer is hesitant to take a clear stance on the question on what can be considered a 
legitimate self-understanding of a community, the normative conclusions reached are usually 
negative (in the form of certain uncontroversial constraints). It is nonetheless quite clear that he 
goes quite far in promoting an external obligation of mutual aid, which is intended to go beyond 
the current line of policy, insofar as it does not threaten the ability of the community to maintain 
its cultural distinctness.  
Whether one agrees with Walzer or not, his communitarian-historical approach has the benefit of 
giving a quite realistic account of the way “we” – i.e. those situated in a modern state, globalized 
social imaginary – actually think about immigration and the dilemmas it evokes. Walzer’s project 
is certainly quite successful when it comes “to describe the internal and external principles that 
govern the distribution of membership.”371  
The disadvantage of his approach is that since it relies on the existing “widely accepted standard” 
it tends to become embedded in our historical situatedness, and hence fails to address the 
possible biases and parochial prejudices that cannot be avoided by repeated self-confirmation 
among those with shared opinions. Critical, reflexive exercises seem to rely on – or at least 
benefit from – outside perspectives. Hence, the underlying statist position in Walzer’s account is 
problematic: “Membership is important because of what the members of a political community 
owe to one another and to no one else, or to no one else in the same degree.”372 This is a 
presumption has state-centric implications, based on a map that guided us in very different 
circumstances from the global contemporary ones.   
  
                                                 
370 Walzer 1983, p. 51 
371 Ibid., p. 34 
372 Ibid., p. 64. See also Rawls TJ, p. 115 & p. 339. See David Miller for contemporary defense of a similar view. 
Miller more readily admits the problem of long-term encampment and the rightful claim of refugees to make a 
decent life, but is not ready to commit to revision of state sovereignty to address it. See Miller, David. 2016a. "Is 
There a Human Right to Immigrate?" In Migration in Political Theory : The Ethics of Movement and Membership, edited by 
Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi, 11-32: Oxford University Press. ---. 2016b. Strangers in Our Midst : The Political Philosophy of 
Immigration. 1. printing. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ---. 2007. National Responsibility and Global 
Justice. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. Parekh  discusses Miller (2017, p. 58ff) and is quite dismissive 
about Miller’s ability to provide a theoretical response to the moral challenges and defects of the status quo. 
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5.3 Radicalizing Rawls: the “Open Border” cosmopolitan response 
If we turn to Walzer’s opponents, we find several cosmopolitan theoretical positions that provide 
us with valuable resources for responding to the issues in question. Joseph Carens pioneering 
work has promoted a liberal argument against the conventional position defended by Waltzer.373 
Carens’ main idea is that immigration policies should respect the moral equality of all. This 
implies that freedom of movement is a default moral position, and that any constraints on this 
freedom must be justified as exceptions. Based on the principle of equal moral worth Carens 
defines the basic scope of justice this way: “[…] anyone who wants to be moral will feel obliged 
to justify the use of force against other human beings, whether they are members of the same 
society or not.”374 To be sure, the enforced border control of a state is precisely such a case of 
using force and hence in need of justification.  
Carens is critical of the “closed” conventional view, which he defines as follows:  
The power to admit or exclude aliens is inherent in sovereignty and essential for any 
political community. Every state has the legal and moral right to exercise that power in 
pursuit of its own national interest, even if that means denying entry to peaceful, needy 
foreigners. States may choose to be generous in admitting immigrants, but they are under 
no obligation to do so.375 
If we compare the concrete policies suggested by Carens and Walzer, they are not that different, 
and Carens point is not to criticize Walzer for having a restrictive position on the pace of 
migration as such. The disagreement concerns the question of the scope of justice, and in the 
context of the immigration debate the issue can be summarized as follows:  
Is it the sovereignty of the state or the universal freedom of movement that is the primary 
principled concern?  
                                                 
373 As Angelia Means interestingly points out, the current liberal articulation of the problem of immigration takes its 
point of departure in Grotius’ formulation of the legal fiction of an original commons. The interstate system and 
private property is derived from this fiction, and not from the conception of individual property as natural law (as in 
Locke and Nozick). This leads Kant to provide the world inhabitants with residual rights, such as the general right of 
visitation (the law of hospitality). (Means 2007)  
Interestingly, on the issue of migration the Libertarian approach reveals its quite purely globalist 
understanding of property in the radical sense that it deals with the problem of commons on an individual level. 
Consequently it reduces all migration to a question of trespassing on private property. As attractive as this might 
seem to international corporations, it does not seem well-suited (at least not in its neo-liberalist form) to protect the 
middle-class structure of well-functioning democracies. It also speaks against a valuable institution in the Nordic 
context called “allemannsretten”. In terms of migration I take this to be a very interesting paradigm.  
374 Carens 1987, p. 256 
375 Carens 1987, p. 251, Carens repeats the exact definition from 1987 in 2014. See p. 555-56 in Carens, Joseph H. 
2014. "An Overview of the Ethics of Immigration." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17, no. 5: 
538-559. 
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Carens’ liberal argument promotes the primacy of the latter.376 In general, Carens argues that all 
liberal standard positions – the Rawlsian, the libertarian and the utilitarian – would be committed 
to an open border, cosmopolitan position. Whereas the libertarian reduces the problem of 
migration to a case of trespassing private property, and the utilitarian tends to rely on the 
contingency of whether the economic benefits of migration outweighs the downsides, the 
Rawlsian position must undergo a certain revision in order to demonstrate this commitment to 
principle. Because Carens emphasizes and endorses this revision of the set-up of the Original 
Position (OP) in a cosmopolitan way, one might sum up his position as a radicalized Rawlsian.  
In the following I will present Carens argument in more detail.377 Second, I’ll look at his argument 
against Walzer more directly, and at the end I’ll refer to Carens later work on the issue of 
resettlement as a way to pinpoint that the theoretical resources that Carens provides may also 
have practical implications that distinguishes his from Walzer’s position.  
5.3.1 The analogy-argument and the moral equality-argument 
We find two main arguments in Carens work: an ‘analogy’-argument and a ‘moral equality’-
argument.378 If we look at the pioneer article “Aliens and Citizens” from 1987, Carens applies the 
‘moral equality’-argument first. When demonstrating how the three different liberal approaches 
can support the “open borders”-argument, he points out that the basic, shared assumption is the 
equal moral worth of individuals. As mentioned, the Rawlsian approach is most extensively 
treated. Carens demonstrates how Rawls’ approach can be used to reveal the arbitrary moral 
character of borders and citizenship (comparable to the what Carens calls “feudal birthright” 
when considering the poor and rich countries).  
The ‘analogy’-argument is presented on two occasions: First, it occurs in the elaboration of the 
principles chosen from “the global view of the original position”. Second, it is brought up in 
Carens’ discussion of Walzer’s neighborhood-analogy. Rather than concluding that we would 
                                                 
376 The conventional view holds that “morality has little role to play with regard to admissions”. See ---. 2003. "Who 
Should Get In? The Ethics of Immigration Admissions." Ethics & international affairs 17, no. 1: 95-110.  
I deliberately explicate “Carens’ argument from the liberal position” because he tends to separate his 
arguments in two: 1) the Rawls-inspired argument represents an ideal-theoretical perspective and the gradual lifting 
of the veil, and 2) an internalist perspective from the conventional point of view.  
377 Even though Carens has a tendency in his later work to begin within the conventional position (as a political 
theory from the ground up), I’ll follow the original sequence and begin with his revision of Rawls.  
For instance his last book, The Ethics of Immigration (2013), begins with a part on the concrete practices of 
naturalization and acquisition of citizenship and rights as a resident. The second part treats the question of how 
democratic states ought to control admissions. Similar to Walzer, these questions can be seen as intertwined, since 
admitting entrance leads to the question of rights and consequently the threshold of attachment.  
378 Wilcox 2009. See also book review of The Ethics of Immigration, by Matt S. Whitt (in Ethics and Global Politics 7:384-
384), that support a similar structure in the most recent argument presented by Carens. According to the principle of 
autonomy and equal moral worth, freedom of movement is an inherent value. It may also have an instrumental 
value, as a redistributive effect. Since these arguments are widely accepted within borders, within the closed account 
of justice, they should also be accepted on a global scale.     
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have chosen the principle of free movement from behind the veil of ignorance, this second 
argument takes its departure in the general public opinion that supports freedom of movement 
on the domestic level. The analogical structure is as follows: If the argument for domestic 
freedom of movement holds, then the same should be applicable to the cosmopolitan level.  
The underlying, tacitly presumed assumption in this analogy is that state borders are morally 
irrelevant for the individual life project. To the extent that this premise holds, the analogy is 
basically a matter of consistency.379 
In the following I will primarily consider Carens’ revision of Rawls and the implications of his 
moral equality-argument in the debate on immigration and the long-termed encamped in 
particular. Similar to Rawls, Carens utilizes the OP not only to seek consistency, but also to take 
the position of the other.  
5.3.2 The cosmopolitan original position 
The basic idea of Joseph Carens is to revise Rawls procedure of the OP to adjust it to the cases 
where we think about justice across different societies. 380 In cases such as cross-border migration 
and trade, we do, like Kant also assumed, address a different kind of interaction than domestic or 
interstatal interactions. Hence, the background conditions, the legal framework or the basic 
structure in question, is also of a different kind.  
This difference is reflected in the various ways one might define the original position. It is worth 
noticing how radically the relevance and preferences related to migration alters, depending on the 
way this thought experiment is set up. Carens does not make explicit the threefold distinction 
between the domestic, interstatal and cosmopolitan,381 but jumps from the domestic level to the 
global quite effortlessly: “let us assume a global view on the original position”.382 To give it a 
more systematic reading, we should consider the three options available within the Kantian 
framework and how neatly they fit Rawls’ and Carens’ overlapping use of the OP:   
(1) The original use of the OP, as we know it from Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, is as we 
might call it, the domestic variant. It addresses the question of “citizen rights” as principles that 
regulate the basic structures of a state society. The OP is taken by the “citizen to be”. From 
                                                 
379 See Miller 2016 for argument against this analogy-argument. To the extent that Miller is correct in questioning this 
analogy-argument is irrelevant for the cosmopolitan project of Kant, which is based on the emergence of a global 
civil society. Carens’ premise is in this conceptual framework an ethical argument, whereas Kant’s argument is moral-
legal.  
380 Carens 1987 
381 To be fair, Carens wrote this essay before Rawls published his final version of the proposal to an account on 
international law, based on the OP-approach. 
382 Carens 1987, p. 257 
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behind a veil of ignorance, they should pretend to know nothing about their own personal 
situation (class, race, sex, natural talents, religious beliefs, individual goals and values, etc.). Quite 
obviously, they do not have to neglect their nationality, but in order to make it more generic they 
are encouraged to think about their community in general terms as a liberal democratic society. 
The intent of this procedure is to exclude any natural or social contingencies, which are 
considered arbitrary from a moral point of view, and present the principles that will be preferable 
for anyone willing to repeat the same procedure. In this version of the OP, migration is in 
principle excluded as a topic, since the state society is described as a closed system.  
(2) In The Law of the Peoples we find the international variant. In this case the person inhabiting the 
OP relies on the imaginary character of the non-statal people. A ‘people’ (acting through the 
state) can be conceived as a moral agent with the capacity to engage in reciprocally binding 
agreements.383 The situation of the interstatal OP-design is in this sense analogous in structure to 
the domestic. The basic structure in question is the content of interstatal law and the 
corresponding international institutions. The case of migration is briefly mentioned, as we have 
seen, and in general seen as an anomaly that would be a quite marginal phenomenon in an ideal 
world setting. Migration is in other words held as a subject of non-ideal theory, a product of the 
unjust actions of others and historical conditions.      
(3) Rawls did not himself present any cosmopolitan variant of the OP.384 The main reason given by 
Rawls is that this design would render the sovereign state in an unrealistically weak institutional 
position, considering the current world order. Seeking to balance the statist realism with what 
Rawls conceived as a utopian cosmopolitanism, this rejection of a cosmopolitan variant might be 
an adequate response to the redistributive cosmopolitan designs found in Beitz and Pogge. 
Rawls’ objection, based on realistic idealism, seems also to affect Carens’ set-up, which has a 
quite utopian character as well. Carens point is however not to articulate a realistic ideal, but 
rather (perhaps in more analytic terms than the late Rawls) to articulate an ideal as such. Carens is 
                                                 
383 There is a nuance in Rawls revision of Kant that is worth noticing: Rawls prefers to refer to the moral person of 
the interstatal design as a “people”. The people acts through the state and its representatives. In other words, it 
appeals to the extra-political or pre-political sense of “the nation” or sovereign people before its marriage to the state 
institutions. The title “The laws of the Peoples” also bears clear associations to the age old “ius gentium” which 
served as an external corrective standard to power long before the modern ideas of natural rights and civil society. In 
Kant’s work it is also used to refer to international law or “rights of nations”. “People” is however, for Kant, 
primarily defined quite neutrally as “a multitude of human individuals”.   
384 To be clear: When Rawls speaks of a cosmopolitan variant, it seems to be with a utopian global state in mind, 
where every individual is included in the same order and on the same level. The same is true for Carens as far as I 
can see. They both deviate from the Kantian idea of the cosmopolitan as specifically the perspective of the foreigner 
and understand cosmopolitan as synonym to a globalist position.  
Accidently, Carens emphasis on immigration makes his design very close to what a cosmopolitan variant 
(properly speaking) would look like. And, similarly some of Rawls formulations of “urgent rights” in LP, might be 
read as cosmopolitan rights. See for instance Birmingham 2006.  
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also the only one who applies the cosmopolitan variant to address immigration and hence faces 
the state-centric, domestic variant heads on.385 Carens ambition is not to undermine the 
institutional integrity of the sovereign state, but rather to address cosmopolitan duties associated 
with the international system from the perspective of a world-citizen.  
More or less similar to the domestic OP, Carens’ cosmopolitan design of the OP situates the 
subjects as world-citizens. The question of justice is considered from a highly abstract position in 
which they would not know their place of birth or their particular membership-status, 
circumstances that are morally arbitrary from behind the veil of ignorance. The global view would 
neglect particular concerns or interests like: “Whether one is a citizen of a rich nation or a poor 
one, whether one is already a citizen of a particular state or an alien who wishes to become a 
citizen – this is the sort of specific contingencies that could set people at odds.”386  
Carens pinpoints the poor-rich divide of countries as the most relevant issue, and does even 
compare being born in the rich countries to the birthright privileges of feudal societies.387 I think 
he is right to point this out as a potential bias for all cases when one is considering cosmopolitan 
rights from the perspective of the global north/1st World. In any case, these economic 
circumstances are much easier to grasp as possible sources of partisan bias, than the more 
complex cultural-historical aspects that forms us as members of a particular nation-state.388  
In Carens’ set up each individual is recognized as a world citizen. Compared to the conventional 
view the burden of proof is turned around; from this perspective, to be a member of a political 
community is a social contingency, and purely arbitrary from the moral point of view. Hence, 
behind the “veil of ignorance” one may reasonably assume that people would choose freedom of 
                                                 
385 It is a further question whether any of these applications are compatible with the two first versions of the OP, or 
perhaps better still, if they could be made compatible, given that the “closed society” in the domestic and “people” in 
the international were revised. As I see it, a strong interpretation of Kant’s three requirements of a legitimate nation 
state, would require consistency in order for a Rawlsian framework to be cosmopolitan responsible. In the critique 
that Benhabib confronts Rawls with, it becomes clearer that Rawls design cannot be understood as merely theoretical 
restrictions, which are of course in general legitimate for any kind of analysis. The reduction of the domestic and the 
international to closed accounts have intolerable normative consequences that in the end betrays, according to 
Benhabib, Rawls own liberal position.  
386 Carens 1987, p. 256 
387 See Carens 2014, p. 556, for recent version of this one. He argues that the open borders argument is especially 
strong in the north-south case where poor migrants besiege and enters the rich states. He compares citizenship in the 
global north to the feudal birthright privileges, born into nobility: “Citizenship in Western democracies is the 
modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances.”  
388 This second difference is often oversimplified as a modern-traditional division. There are of course significant 
differences between modern constitutional traditions as well. For instance, there is a difference between former 
colonies uniting together to constitute a current superpower (the US), and a former colony/estate becoming a small 
sovereign state (like Norway).  
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movement as a basic liberty.389 In contrast to the state-centric methodology of Rawls, Carens 
does not have to presume society as a closed system. Or, if he does, it is of the global society as 
defined by the basic circumstances of justice as mentioned in chapter 2: the contingent practical 
limitation due to the spherical shape of the earth (and our relative – for most of us (for now) – 
incapability of going anywhere else).  
5.3.3 A qualified position within the Rawlsian framework 
Within a Rawlsian approach the moral equality of all is one of the presuppositions (or egalitarian 
moral intuition) that the procedure is meant to help us stay consistent with in our choice of 
principles of justice, and subsequently, our preferred institutions based on said principles. The 
procedures are intended to mute conditions that otherwise might distract or distort our 
reflections. A main concern is to avoid specific individual- or group interests that depend on who 
you are. On a global scale this also entails the kind of group interest associated with the political 
communities. Hence, the veil of ignorance is especially useful in my view, for those of us who are 
lucky enough to be born in an affluent country (with a functioning system of redistribution) and 
who must – if we seek consistency with our intuition about moral equality – be prepared to share 
our current use of the limited global resources with others.  
From the global view of the original position, Carens assumes (like Pogge and Beitz) that one 
would still choose the same two principles of justice as in the domestic variant: 1) basic liberties 
and 2) social and economic equality (or more precisely equity).  
The next step is to decide – still within an ideal theoretical setting390– which institutions best 
implement these principles, this time from a cosmopolitan perspective. First of all, Carens admits 
that for the sake of decentralization of power we could recognize linguistic, cultural and historical 
differences in order to justify the existence of political communities fairly similar to the sovereign 
states we are familiar with.391 But, unlike the communitarian position of Walzer that recognizes 
no strong duties based on external principles, Carens suggest that both liberal rights (like the 
freedom of religion) and an international difference principle (regulating economic inequality 
among states), should be implemented precisely as external commitments of the state. Carens 
                                                 
389 As part of the privileged part of the world’s population, it would be dramatic obstruction against “my plan of life” 
if this freedom was taken away from me. I can (quite literary) only imagine how humiliating the current asymmetry of 
mobility must be for those “worst-off”. 
390 Within ideal theory:  
1) All people will accept and generally abide by the principles chosen in OP 
2) No historical obstacles to the realization of just institutions 
391 Carens 1987, p. 258 
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tends to address economic inequality on a state-level, so it is consequently somewhat unclear 
exactly how Carens thinks about the cosmopolitan character of these principles.   
When it comes to freedom of movement his position is much clearer. Carens forwards his 
argument against the original Rawlsian account on migration: “Even in an ideal world people 
might have powerful reasons to want to migrate from one state to another.”392 A number of 
possible circumstances are mentioned: economic or cultural opportunities, falling in love with a 
foreigner, belonging to a religion with its main community abroad, in large, circumstances that 
“might prove essential to one’s plan of life.”393 This freedom is clearly linked to how each of us –
as world-citizens – should be able to move across borders.394  
In this context Carens presents the first form of the ‘analogy’-argument:  
More generally, one has only to ask whether the right to migrate freely within a given 
society is an important liberty. The same sorts of considerations make migration across 
state boundaries important.395  
Since the freedom of movement seems to be in line with the implementation of the two basic 
principles of justice, we would have to take the position of the worst-off in order to justify 
restrictions. That is, any restrictions on the freedom of movement must also be acceptable for 
those most disadvantaged by the proposed restrictions. In the case of immigration, the most 
relevant worst-off positions are arguably those suffering from long-term encampment and de 
facto statelessness. But since the cause of this suffering is related to non-ideal conditions, this 
discussion is postponed in the Rawlsian procedure.  
In the context of ‘ideal theory’ Carens detects only one possibly valid restriction on the freedom 
of movement, which draws on a general argument that Rawls makes, grounded in liberties’ 
dependency on the public order and security. 396 Carens refers to this as the “public order 
restriction”. It is basically a worst-off argument that assumes that a pace of immigration that 
would lead to chaos would leave everybody worse off, including the immigrants. This entails that 
there is room for restricting the liberty of movement in order to promote this liberty in the long 
run. This is a consequential concern, quite similar to the one rose by Sidgwick (See also Singer in 
Chapter 1). However, there is an important qualification in ‘public order’-restriction that is quite 
relevant to the case of xenophobia:  
                                                 
392 Carens 1987, p. 258 
393 Ibid, p. 258 
394 Notice how all reasons given are grounded in the liberty of the individual. Unlike Kant, no explicit concern is 
given to the civilizing or epistemological (egalitarian, democratic) relevance of migration/diversity. 
395 Ibid., p. 258  
396 Ibid., p. 259, paraphrasing Rawls Justice as Fairness (1985, p. 212-3)    
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Restrictions would be justified only if there were a “reasonable expectation” that 
unlimited immigration would damage the public order and this expectation would have to 
be based on “evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all”. […] Finally, the threat to 
public order posed by unlimited immigration could not be the product of antagonistic 
reactions (e.g. riots) from current citizens.397  
So, similar to Walzer’s argument against Sidgwick, Carens recognizes the value of some internal 
cohesion. At the same time (at least within ideal theory), there are certain common sense- or 
public opinion-requirements related to this value. The decline of citizenship or lack of cohesion 
would have to be the cumulative effect of individually just actions. Xenophobia surely is a real 
phenomenon, but within this ideal theoretical framework it is seen as an unjust ground for 
actions or reactions and counts as an element of the non-ideal world. For instance, we might 
acknowledge a sense of fear when faced with the phenomenon of mass migration. This fear 
becomes unjust only if we act on it in ways that are not founded in reasonable expectations of the 
consequences for the public order. 
When Carens considers the restrictions to freedom of movement in non-ideal theory398, the range 
of possible public order restrictions grow quite considerably. Under real world conditions – 
without globally shared standards of liberty and fair distribution – the case of state sovereignty is 
significantly strengthened, though the demand of “reasonable expectations” remains. To justify 
restrictions one would still have to prove that the damaging consequences of unlimited 
immigration are more than hypothetical possibilities, i.e. that they are built on well-founded and 
generally acceptable reasons.  
For quite obvious reasons this restriction can be misused for partisan interests. Along these lines 
Carens considers the risks of damage to the public order in cases where the consequences of 
migration from culturally distant societies – people that might not share our democratic values – 
is quite weakly founded. Historically it used to be the Jews and the Catholics, Asians and 
Africans, now399 it is perhaps most present in the guise of the Muslims. According to Carens, a 
more strongly based concern is sheer numbers, especially of poor people migrating to the rich 
                                                 
397 Carens 1987, p. 259 
398 Within non-ideal theory: 
1) Actions of others might be unjust 
2) Historical obstacles (See Stranger on this one, organized hypocrisy) 
399 If we are able to look beyond the security risk of terrorist attacks from extremist who perceive themselves in 
violent conflict with the West or the Secular.  
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countries. Restrictions might be legitimate here, not to maintain the current state of unequal 
welfare distribution, but to protect the public order in the receiving states.400  
This is a considerably weaker claim than the one Walzer makes regarding the right to self-
determination. In a similar manner, Carens draws on a Rawlsian argument to claim that no 
particular culture can claim the right to be protected from migration, due to the non-preferable 
nature of the principle of perfectionism in the original position.401 
In his later work, Carens is also aware of the moral obligation toward the worst-off in terms of 
migration that might be located outside one’s own territory. In this manner the cosmopolitan 
concern is relocated from the narrower focus on the issue of immigration and admission. 
Addressing the problem of long-term encampment, he argues that resettlement ought to be a 
duty and not merely an act of charity.402 In addition to the kind of obligations that are attached to 
direct responsibility of harm or more general philanthropic/humanitarian concerns, there is also a 
third kind of obligations related to the “normative propositions of the modern state system”: 
“Because the world is divided into sovereign states where each state is responsible for its citizens, 
obligations arise when this system breaks down, as it does in the cases of refugees.”403 This leads 
Carens to the conclusion that states have a collective (cosmopolitan) responsibility to resettle 
refugees that can be organized internationally.   
5.3.4 “Bounded justice” – a meta-ethical digression 
Accordingly, even if the non-ideal theoretical account of historical obstacles, etc., allows for 
stronger commitment to state sovereignty, Carens is generally critical to a case made for the 
moral distinctiveness of the nation-state as an organized community.404 In addition to the 
principle argument based on Rawls procedure, Carens also sometimes argues from an ‘internalist’ 
perspective.405 From this perspective, Carens appeals in this approach to freedom of movement 
as a widely held liberty within society. The intention, it seems, is to attack the communitarian 
                                                 
400 I think the combination of cultural difference and economic inequality must be the worst. When these coincide, 
there is a stigma in being different that works in a self-enforcing manner of stereotypes in the general society. Being 
different becomes associated with being poor and unskilled. In this environment the presumed lack of democratic 
values might prove to be a self-fulfilling prediction due to the looking-glass effect in majority-minority relations.  
401 A similar question has been raised in comments by Fabricio Pontin on my thesis. For instance, is the strong 
democracy (which Benhabib promotes) a case of perfectionism? Could the same be said about the Nordic model? I 
don’t have a good answer to this challenge at the moment, except I think “emerging national economies” such as 
Brazil would benefit from taking their inspiration from models of thick democracy and extensive redistribution, 
rather than models of thin democracy and free-market economy that has been the dominating paradigm of 
development in the last decades. What is recognized as “good enough” should be pushed further in order to benefit 
those that are in the middle and lower classes.   
402 Parekh 2017, p. 70ff 
403 Ibid., p. 71 
404 Carens 1987, p. 267  
405 I.e. non-foundational, immanent critique of immigration, see: Carens 2003, p. 95 
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position from the inside. It exploits how liberal principles are already an integral part of our 
current dominating self-understanding. Consequently, the emphasis on the primacy of state 
sovereignty is problematic according to Carens. In more recent works, this critique has developed 
into a general attack on the state-centric position of “bounded justice” as represented by Michael 
Walzer, David Miller and John Rawls.406  
Michael Blake, among others, has answered this critique by appealing to the peculiar status of a 
membership in a political community enforced by a legalized (and sometimes coercive) 
sanctioning power. Citizenship is morally significant exactly because it marks out the boundaries 
of the state’s coercive authority (and the attached legitimizing privileges of its members).407  
This critique is somewhat remedied by Carens’ claim that any defender of this sovereign authority 
confuses the question of who ought to have power to make a decision or sanctions (sovereignty), 
with the question of whether the decision is right (normative objectivity/legitimacy).408 In other 
words, a sovereign decision can still be morally flawed. This is, as I read it, an appeal to the 
distinction between the descriptive account of citizenship (as a place of justice regulated by the 
political norm, defined as the distinction between citizens and foreigners) and the normative 
account of citizenship (as regulated by a set of external principles of justice). The problem of 
bounded justice is not directly that the monopoly of violence is limited within certain boundaries, 
but that the debate and answers to questions like “What kind of a people are we?” and “How 
should we treat foreigners?” are valid as long as the “we”, the sovereign people, has formed an 
unconstrained public opinion on the matter. In other words, the character of the external 
obligations is not decided in communication with foreigners.  
… 
When Carens appeals to widely held liberal principles, he appeals to the normative conception of 
citizenship. The question is not about the popular support or legality of a political decision, but 
its moral-legal soundness. Curiously, the way Carens makes this appeal – mainly as a non-
metaphysical description of opinion (which both OP and the internalist approach ultimately relies 
on) – makes him vulnerable to the criticism that his theory is dependent on heteronomous 
sources of reason, in a way similar to the communitarian position. More specifically: liberal values 
seem to rely on support from a specific community.  
                                                 
406
 “[…] the bounded justice view provides only ‘some contingent and self-limiting arguments that justify restriction 
on immigration under certain circumstances’ (287). […] in light of Carens argument, political theory’s widespread 
assumption that state boundaries inscribe the appropriate site of justice is revealed to be just that – an assumption” 
(Whitt, p. 139) 
407 Wilcox 2009, p. 817 
408 Carens 2003 
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As Peter C. Meilander points out,409 this creates a methodological paradox: A communitarian 
position might end up as liberal as long as the communities involved are liberal. On the one 
hand, Carens utilizes the fact that “our culture” (the American) is “contained” by the liberal 
tradition in the communitarian approach. Since Walzer is committed to let each society form 
their policies according to their shared, particular conception of membership, Carens could imply 
an indirect support for liberal principles. That is, in cases where the distinct culture is liberal and 
universalist, the consequence seems to be that the communitarian position would also have to 
admit an open border immigration policy. Meilander, on the other hand, counters this strategy by 
arguing that what Carens gains in the cases of already liberal democratic societies, he loses in 
critical power against societies that are far from liberal. In other words, the appeal to liberal and 
Universalist principles from within does not seem to contradict Walzer’s larger claim about 
communal self-determination.410  
Can we find autonomous reasons for Carens universalism? In this context his answer to the 
“constructivist” critique of Rawls (which challenges the heteronomous source of legitimacy in 
traditional values) is not very comforting, but it might be the best we have without making 
ourselves dependent on a strong metaphysical program.  
In “Alien and Citizen”, Carens claims that the OP does more reflective work that merely 
summarizing a culturally influenced and shared intuition.411  
The “veil of ignorance” offers a way of thinking about principles of justice in a context 
where people have deep, unresolved disagreements about matters of fundamental 
importance and yet still want to find a way to live together in peaceful cooperation on 
terms that are fair to all.412  
It is unclear how strong this claim is. Does it claim that the OP is a procedural device that might 
straighten out deep and unresolved global disagreements? Probably not. But does it promise to 
identify principles that might provide an overlapping consensus? Quite plausibly yes, at least if we 
restrict this consensus to states that already have a democratic human rights culture that 
recognizes liberal-democratic values. To what extent this consensus is marked by the 
                                                 
409 Meilaender, P. C. 1999. "Liberalism and Open Borders: The Argument of Joseph Carens." International Migration 
Review 33, no. 4 (Win): 1062-1081. http://dx.doi.org/Doi 10.2307/2547363. 
410 Could this dispute be solved by arguing that Meilander’s response is basically moving the communitarian position 
to a meta-ethical level (similar to a cultural relativist position), whereas Carens paradoxical argument seems to be 
closer to a reductio ad absurdum? The absurdity would be: How could a liberal and pluralist society emphasize their 
cultural distinctness as the primary concern of justice without contradicting itself? 
 Terje Tvedt argues, on the other side, that the Norwegian state contradicts itself by giving the impression – 
as a pluralist state – of having no culture. (Det internasjonale gjennombruddet. Fra “ettpartistat” til flerkulturell stat. (2017))  
411 Check Rorty’s article on HR for a claim in this direction. 
412 Carens 1987, p. 257 
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interpretation of justice from the point of view of the affluent, Western and modern, Carens does 
not address.  
In his article summarizing The Ethics of Immigration, Carens reflects on the cosmopolitan 
perspective in the following manner: A commitment to democracy and moral equality does not 
require every action or institution to consider all human beings. But, “[i]t does […] entail a 
commitment to justification through reason-giving and reflection that does not simply 
presuppose the validity of conventional moral views or the legitimacy of existing arrangements or 
our entitlements to what we have.”413 Perhaps the global view of the OP can help us achieve this 
to some degree? 
5.3.5 Summary – comparing Walzer and Carens  
Carens admits to some degree that historical circumstances make relevant the institutional level 
of sovereign political communities, similar to the international order that dominate today. In 
disagreement with Walzer, Carens hold that sovereignty should be constrained by external moral 
principles and obligations. We are not only obliged to provide help to needy foreigners as far we 
can without sacrificing our cultural distinctness, we also have a collective moral duty to care for 
those who suffer the worst consequences of our international system. Similar to the way owners 
of property are obliged to assist those with no property within the domestic system of property 
rights, states (and its political members) have an obligation to assist and include those with no 
place to go and no membership to claim.   
In this manner, Carens provides a valuable critique of the state-centric premises found both in 
John Rawls’ and Michael Walzer’s works. My concern is, however, that where Walzer tends to 
put too much emphasis on the moral significance of the value of ‘communities of character’, 
Carens might go too far in his lack of concern for the formation of collective self-understanding 
that is required by a strong democracy, which seeks to establish will-formations beyond the mere 
aggregation of opinion. In short, whereas Walzer has a too thick requirement of these conditions, 
Carens’ requirements seem too thin.  
This is where Benhabib’s balancing approach becomes interesting, not only on a meta-ethical 
level regarding the grounding of norms for political communal life, but also on a practical level in 
the sense that her approach sheds light on how we form and secure the conditions of a reflexive 
self-understanding as a political community. Ultimately, how we do this affects our ability to 
                                                 
413 Carens 2014, p. 556 
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make adequate practical judgments about the pace of migration in general and the obligations 
toward refugees in particular.  
5.4 Rejecting Rawls: the “Porous Border” cosmopolitan view  
In The Rights of Others – Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (2004) Seyla Benhabib advances an argument 
for the right of foreigners to political membership. The argument is inspired by Kant and Arendt 
and is developed within the framework of Habermas discourse-ethical revision of Kantian 
rationalism. In agreement with Carens, Benhabib understands migration as a normal feature of 
human life. She also shares with Carens the cosmopolitan assumption that immigration should be 
conceived from a global point of view, or rather (which is an important nuance in Benhabib) 
from the “world society”-perspective, which includes broadly the global civil society, including 
international legal institutions. Benhabib’s notion of an ideal state can be summarized as follows: 
“[…] a federal republic (Arendt) […] situated within a cosmopolitan federalism (Kant).414 
Regarding the circumstances of justice, Benhabib’s position also clearly differs from that of 
Rawls. Benhabib emphasizes the radical interdependence of states and individuals in a global 
market and civil sphere as a guiding premise for the question of justice. On the state level this 
implies that Benhabib rejects the state-centric idea of states as self-sufficient entities which makes 
unilateral decisions without impacts on foreigners. “Sovereignty is a relational concept.”415 In a 
world with radical economic and political interdependence all decisions have multilateral 
consequences. According to the notion of circumstances of justice, Benhabib holds that our 
moral responsibility increases with our knowledge about these circumstances: “The more we 
become aware of our interdependencies and the effects of our actions on others, the more 
responsible we become.”416 As we become aware of new cosmopolitan problems, it appears then 
that we have both a responsibility to elaborate on the proper scope of cosmopolitan rights and to 
secure the epistemological conditions for more knowledge about these interdependencies.   
Benhabib is also a radically secular thinker (in Taylor’s sense) in that she situates the emergence 
of the legitimacy and principles of politics within a thick historical context. Through the 
descriptive notion of “democratic iterations” human rights and moral norms are formed and 
given a worldly content through the interpretative practices of people that understand themselves 
as members of a self-constituting community. The “people” is, unlike the mechanic “we” of 
traditional identities, a reflexive “we” that participates actively in the narrative of its own 
becoming. It understands itself, not only to be guided by binding norms and principles, but – 
                                                 
414 P. 410, in Means, Angelia. 2007. "The Rights of Others." European Journal of Political Theory 6, no. 4: 406-423. 
415 Benhabib 2004, p. 21 
416 Parekh 2017, p. 66 
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according to the modern idea of revolution – to be able to agree upon theoretical principles that 
may remake our political life.  
This thick account of norms finds resonance in a modern communitarian position, such as the 
one represented by Walzer. There is however a crucial difference, since Benhabib understands 
this historical process to include interpretations of moral norms (such as human rights) that 
obliges the political community to a much stronger degree than Walzer admits. To exemplify this 
disagreement: whereas Walzer holds that a sovereign state has the privilege to limit admissions in 
order to preserve a community of character, Benhabib understands the way a community 
regulates its relation to non-members as a crucial feature of its character. Further, in disagreement 
with Walzer, Benhabib holds that this character can be judged according to external standards of 
justice. The mediation of these standards into the political domain implies certain restrictions 
related to just regulations of cosmopolitan relations (between state and foreigners). 
In sum, we might say that Benhabib aims to find a balance between a “thin” cosmopolitan and a 
“thick” statist position. Through description of concrete membership practices she points out 
certain tendencies that she values normatively as guiding for further cosmopolitan revisions of 
our citizenship models. 
  
5.4.1 Political membership from the perspective of global society  
We might say that Benhabib’s discourse-ethical account is based on a fundamental critique of 
Rawls state-centric position. Since Rawls does not even seem to recognize immigration as a 
relevant problem, Benhabib’s critique of Rawls on these matters is more intricate than her 
critique of Walzer. As seen in chapter 3, Rawls’ response to the issue of distribution of 
membership or migration in general is quite limited and is generally in line with Walzer’s account, 
i.e. it does not go beyond the “duty to assist”. Migration is from the state-centric perspective an 
anomaly, and Benhabib rejects this premise by changing the perspective.  
Like Carens, Benhabib does not consider transnational migration as a marginal phenomenon, 
revealed first when the veil of ignorance is lifted and the “real world” dawns on the participants 
in the OP. Benhabib criticizes Rawls for grounding his account and the procedural designs on a 
state-centric and closed conception of justice. In the domestic version of the OP (the first 
considered above), this is quite explicit, as Rawls defines the society of the domestic version as 
complete and closed. In the second, interstatal version, it is to be found in a more subtle way in Rawls 
choice of “people” as the relevant level of unity (as the relevant moral agent).  
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Unlike Carens, Benhabib does not merely revise Rawls procedural approach. Rather than 
extending the individualistic procedure to the next level as Carens does, Benhabib offers a 
balanced critique that seeks to maintain and appreciate the normative significance of both the 
individual and collective levels. In this way Benhabib’s critique responds not only to the domestic 
account of OP, but also the interstatal (or inter-popular) version in The Laws of the Peoples. Her 
main point is that the self-understanding of a political community should be thought of as self-
reflexive, iterative and standing in a relational interdependency to other communities of the same 
character. Rawls’ account of “people” is in this context, according to Benhabib, historically 
inaccurate, sociologically inadequate and normatively irresponsible.417  
If we accept the distinction between an interstatal and a cosmopolitan setup of the OP, one 
might argue that Rawls’ concern for the “people” is not really relevant for the distribution of 
membership. After all, Carens’ redesign of the OP seems to address the issue at hand quite 
adequately from a liberal point of view. While Benhabib recognizes Carens’ contribution, she 
seems to consider his account of moral cosmopolitanism as too radical. Carens’ account is not 
adequately balanced against the concerns of public autonomy and the need for democratic 
closure. In short, it is unclear what political implications Carens derives from his ideal-theoretical, 
moral cosmopolitan account.418  
To avoid this pitfall of utopian cosmopolitanism, Benhabib accepts Walzer’s articulation of the 
problem as a dilemma between state sovereignty and moral equality, but she emphasizes the 
relational character of political communities, and how the self-reflexive understanding of 
membership is deeply entangled with the way foreigners are conceived. Benhabib points out –
quite accurately – that there is an inherent risk in determining membership as a distributive good: 
One might end up with the impression that membership is a good that has substance without – 
and before – its performative manifestation. Rather than speaking of a just distribution of (our 
kind) of membership, she prefers to discuss the issue of “just membership”.  
                                                 
417 I support the rejection of state-centrism, but I do not necessarily agree with Benhabib though, if this implies the 
rejection of individualistic TE’s, like OP, as such. I think Rawls position might have a value as a simplifying, didactic 
device. The relational account of the social is highly complex when it operates on a metatopical level. Individualism 
should not be viewed as an attempt to describe social interaction on a topical, but to solve a problem of social 
imaginary on the metatopical level of categorical identity. At this level the question of inadequacy is to me less 
obvious because the pragmatic aspects of time-consumption and common sense (being shareable) come into play. 
Like a complex algorithm, the relational model might solve the problem in the richest and most distinct manner, but 
it is not given that it will solve it within reasonable time and in a way that is accessible for the public.       
418 It should be noted to Carens defense that he also offers a conventionalist perspective, wherein the Rawlsian 
approach is meant to clarify certain ideal solutions and not to offer a full conception of justice. Further, Benhabib 
does not state this explicitly, but it also seems likely that there are different procedural preferences here between the 
communicative-dialogical and individualistic-abstractive designs 
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To underline this point, Benhabib offers her own definition of political membership which 
emphasizes the border-performing aspects of it:  
By political membership, I mean the principles and practices for incorporating aliens and 
strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers into existing polities. 
Political boundaries define some as members, others as aliens. Membership, in turn, is 
only meaningful when accompanied by rituals of entry, access, belonging and privilege.419  
When Benhabib speaks of the reflexive character of the political community, it is closely related 
to the self-understanding of the community and its membership practices. Unlike a general public 
without border, the self-reflective reform of the political community is intimately connected to 
the critical assessment of its own performative procedures of membership. According to Parekh, 
“[Benhabib] aims to lay a moral foundation for democratic states to mediate between the 
legitimate claim of outsiders who seek entrance into a given state with the will of citizens that, 
often at least, would prefer to exclude many or all outsiders.”420 From this moral foundation she 
offers a critique of membership practices that incorporates or excludes foreigners in an unjust 
manner. This makes her approach a promising cosmopolitan conception of justice, since it is 
sensitive to both the need for cosmopolitan law and the procedural challenge of including views 
from elsewhere.  
5.4.2 Solving the dilemma by mitigating three normative concerns  
As Benhabib understands it, transnational migration brings the core constitutive dilemma of 
democratic legitimacy – between universal norms421 and the sovereign people – to the forefront 
of our attention. This dilemma is also reflected in the paradox of democratic legitimacy. On one side, 
democratic sovereignty draws its legitimacy from a constitution that refers to principles that are 
context-transcendent and somehow commits the sovereign from “outside” the formalized 
political sphere. These principles are universal in the sense that they potentially include all human 
beings (although they mainly articulate citizen rights). On the other side, a constitution is the 
ground for a particular political community “circumscribed in space and time, sharing a particular 
culture, history and legacy”422. It constitutes the “demos”, which is defined by its arbitrary social 
boundaries.  
Benhabib summarizes the debate on immigration by pointing out how each standard position 
ends up on each horn of the dilemma, and consequently how they overemphasize one 
                                                 
419 Benhabib 2004, p. 15 
420 Parekh 2017, p. 64 
421 It’s important to note the difference here between universal norms in general and cosmopolitan law is particular. 
The dilemma of democratic legitimacy may concern other norms of public right which are not cosmopolitan in the 
strict Kantian sense. It is mainly a dilemma between universal and particular norms.  
422 Benhabib 2004, p. 43 
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constituting element at the expense of the political as a distinct normative domain. First, the 
communitarian position of Walzer argues for the primacy of state sovereignty by appealing to the 
legitimizing function of the “ethnos”. The reconstructive imaginary of a distinct political 
community and culture is emphasized as the starting point for considerations on immigration 
policies and criteria of membership. Second, the liberal-cosmopolitan position of Carens argues 
in favor of the primacy of freedom of movement by appealing to its consistency with the 
universal principle of moral equality. Both approaches seem to forget the “demos” as a self-
legitimizing, secular community with its inherent norms of exclusion.  
To give a concrete example of what she’s aiming at, Benhabib refers to how the German 
Constitutional Court engaged in reflexive negotiations regarding the right of foreigners to 
participate in local elections. Although the Court held a classical model of national citizenship, 
where the rights to participate in elections were closely connected to “nationality” (which 
outranked the principle of being affected), it also recognized the procedural legitimacy of the 
demos to redefine itself by altering the criteria for membership. In the German case, this led to a 
process of rearticulating German citizenship “in line with the composition of the population”, 
presuming that the old ideology of national belonging did not recognize adequately the residents 
of foreign origin as proper members of our people.   
Benhabib interprets this decision as a progressive event in the reformation of citizenship as we 
have been accustomed to think of it in state-centric terms, to an understanding of citizenship 
more inclusive to foreign residents and also involving dispersing democratic agency to 
supranational levels. On a deep level, and here Benhabib relates to a broader Enlightenment 
narrative of expanding recognition, these steps are related to an assumption of moral progress 
associated with the ideal of universal emancipation (or universal inclusion). In its conventional 
form, the progressive narrative involves the way demos, as the group in possession of public 
autonomy, includes larger and larger parts of the populous that were earlier excluded from 
participating in the sovereign decision.423  
Curiously, the presence of the foreigner re-actualizes the kind of struggles and redefinitions of 
the demos that we have seen historically related to the political status of workers and women. On 
the one side, this resonates with the paradox facing domestic struggles for emancipation: that 
those affected by the democratic decision of inclusion are not themselves to be the authors of 
this decision (beyond the persuasive power of an unjustly excluded outsider). The inclusion into a 
democracy is not based on a democratic decision, i.e. it is not able to live up to the democratic 
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ideal of emancipation. This is the paradox of democratic legitimacy in its purest form, “[…] 
namely that those whose rights to inclusion or exclusion from the demos are being decided upon 
will not themselves be the ones to decide upon these rules.”424 Foreigners are in this sense like 
workers and women before them, subjects to laws that they are not themselves the authors of. 
Benhabib claims that the “sovereign people” will never be a fixed quantity: “it is of the essence of 
democracy that the boundaries between the “we” who decide and the “they” about whom 
decisions are made will always be subject to questioning and contestation.”425  
On the other side, according to Benhabib, the presence of foreigners also provokes a new 
conflict of principles at the heart of the democratic legitimacy. With the other groups (the 
workers and women), the argument of moral equality could be met on the domestic level of 
populous without being confronted with the basic principle of closure in any sovereign state, 
namely the exclusion of foreigners. There is in other words a conflict between the universal ideal 
of inclusion and the partial need for democratic closure. Simply put, if foreigners’ claim of the 
universal right of inclusion is met fully, it will undermine the distinctness or integrity necessary 
for the public autonomy of the community to which they claim inclusion. In consequence, the 
border-performing rituals between the domestic and cosmopolitan domain would lose their 
content. 
To be clear, Benhabib’s notion of just membership does not rely on a definition of political 
membership that is morally grounded. Rather, Benhabib’s critique of the standard positions must 
be understood through her view of the non-foundational relation between three normative 
domains: the ethical particular, the moral universal and the political. The relation between these 
norms is not understood as hierarchical or foundational, but one of “simultaneous disjunction 
and mediation”.426 
Briefly, the ethical domain is associated with particular claims of group concerns and our “close 
ones”. Benhabib criticizes Walzer for reducing moral demands to such claims of specific, ethical, 
cultural and political communities.427 In this way the “cultural-communitarian” approach 
apparently solves the dilemma of membership distribution (between sovereignty and moral 
                                                 
424 See also Bauböck, Rainer. 2007. "The Rights of Others and the Boundaries of Democracy." European Journal of 
Political Theory 6, no. 4: 398-405.. On the republican argument against a global state, see also Benhabib, 2004, p. 219 
ff. It seems to rest on the idea that, unlike an empire without boundaries, the republic requires a limited territory and 
smaller scaled community. 
425 P. 206, in Benhabib, Seyla. 2000. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, Modernity and Political Thought: 
AltaMira Press. 
426 Benhabib 2007, p. 451. The idea of equi-primordiality or co-originality [Gleichursprunglichkeit] is also instructive 
here.   
427 Benhabib 2007, p. 447, 2004 p. 15 
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equality) by claiming that the primacy of self-determination rests on the grounds of ethical 
particularism. The cultural and social proximity of the group trumps any external principles and 
founds the legitimacy of the normative distance between members and foreigners. This is 
however, Benhabib argues, achieved at the cost of conflating the ethical particularism of cultural 
communities with politics.428  
The moral domain has a universal and context-independent character. Benhabib’s suggest that the 
extension of cosmopolitan law is located here. Associated with this domain, Benhabib addresses 
the problems of devaluing the democratic self-determination of political processes. This is a 
problem that we find in a wide range of accounts, from the natural right libertarians, to the liberal 
cosmopolitans. Joseph Carens radical “Open border”-account is also criticized for reducing the 
question of membership to a moral question by Benhabib. However, Benhabib does not seem to 
rely on a conceptual distinction between universal moral norms in general and moral-legal norms 
in particular. For instance, she reserves the notion of legally binding norms for the political 
domain of positive law (with its own inherent norms).  
The political domain is associated with the system of formal procedures of law making and 
legitimate decision-making. The central norm of the political domain is, as we have seen, the 
norm of membership, which distinguishes insiders from outsiders. In defense of this domain 
Benhabib criticizes other conceptions of the “political”. She criticizes the “realists” and the 
“postmodernists” for being skeptical to any external moral constraints to the political. Similarly, 
she also criticizes “civic-republicanism”429 for holding that the value and meaning of the 
institution of citizenship is intrinsically linked to the “bounded community”. The problem in the 
latter case seems to be that self-determination is not based on universal principles of democracy, 
but on the inherent value of the political norms themselves (which ends in a kind of legal 
positivism). In other words, the political membership is given a self-legitimizing status, detached 
from the international regulation by human rights.  
Overall, Benhabib holds that the standard positions in the debate, including those that take the 
political domain to be a normatively isolated domain, all overemphasize one normative domain at 
the expense of the others. Benhabib promotes a less conclusive balance between several 
concerns. The relation between these concerns is not understood as a foundational hierarchy as it 
                                                 
428 Still, Benhabib acknowledges that Walzer was the first to recognize this dilemma between the universal values and 
the communitarian or particular concerns. See also Benhabib 2004, p. 122 for references to long debate among them 
on this issue, and on p. 123 Benhabib questions the way Walzer eliminated the conflicting or fractured identities of 
members of democracies by favoring the right to collective self-determination to the point where there is no 
balancing anymore.  
429 In the figure of David Jacobson’s Rights across Borders (1997) 
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is an interpretative endeavor situated in history. It follows the model of “the hermeneutic circle” 
rather than infinite the regress of a foundational questioning. From the perspective of the 
political domain, this implies a balancing of concerns:    
Just as we cannot cease to mediate the needs of our loved ones with the demands of 
impersonal, institutional obligations; just as we cannot cease to measure the actions of our polities 
in light of the claims of strangers; just as we cannot cease to participate in dialogues with those 
who worship different gods than ourselves, so too we cannot collapse the moral universal 
into the particular, the legal and the functional.430 
In this passage it is tempting to understand Benhabib to acknowledge that the state (or the 
political “we”) has obligations to take moral claims of foreigners into account. This moral 
obligation is not foundational to the political domain as such, but should mitigate the policies of 
a state when called for.  
If this reading holds, one might assume that Benhabib would agree with the idea that the “claims 
of strangers” would imply mediation internal to the moral-legal domain of public right, given the 
Kant’s conceptual framework (as discussed in chapter 2) between the domestic and cosmopolitan 
law. Hence, the state’s obligations to its own citizens would be balanced against its obligations to 
foreigners (or to every human individual). Yet, Benhabib seems to have another understanding of 
this mediating relationship.  
In Situating the Self431 Benhabib uses “stranger” in a more generic sense of “people we don’t 
know”, and which primarily would imply “other citizens of the same state that I don’t interact 
with in everyday life.” In this context, Benhabib understands recognition of the claims of the 
stranger as a way to mediate between moral right and ethical virtue; or between the public virtue 
of impersonal justice and the private virtue of goodness. In this sense, the stranger stands 
somewhere in-between the “generalized other” (the legal subject of moral-legal norms) and the 
“concrete other”:   
Between the basic institutions of a polity, embodying principles of the morally right, and 
the domain of moral interactions in the lifeworld, in which virtue often comes to the fore, 
lie the civic practices and associations of a society in which individuals face each other 
neither as pure legal subjects nor as moral agents standing under ties of ethical obligations 
to each other but as public agents in a political space. The gap between the demands of 
justice, as it articulates the morally right, and the demands of virtue, as it defines the 
                                                 
430 Benhabib 2004, p. 16-7, my emphasis  
431 Benhabib, Seyla. 1992. Situating the Self : Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. New York: 
Routledge. 
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quality of our relations to others in the everyday lifeworld, can be bridged by cultivating 
qualities of civic friendship and solidarity.432   
In this quote Benhabib uses the “political” in a way very close to Arendt’s notion (which I will 
come back to in part 2). The political is here seen as the intersection between the institutional 
public and the private; between the equality of legal subjects and the uniqueness of concrete 
persons. For Benhabib, this way to “personalize justice” is closely connected to the moral 
/discourse-ethical obligation of the “enlarged thought”: to think from the standpoint of everyone 
else. It is also related, Benhabib argues, to the political requirement (here “political” in the more 
ordinary sense) to create “institutions and practices whereby the voice and the perspective of 
others, often unknown to us, can become expressed in their own right.”433  
The claims of the foreigner is in this sense a somewhat exceptional case of the claim of strangers, 
since it is not strictly speaking (as a citizen) even a “pure legal subject” in the first place, and one 
would usually not think of the political institutions and practices as obliged to guarantee the 
perspectives of involved foreigners.  As we will see in 5.4.5, Benhabib is somewhat positive to the 
idea that some communities are able to extend their sympathy and affects to groups beyond the 
political community itself and thus recognize moral and political obligations toward the claims of 
foreigners. 
To provide an overview (which includes all three domains; the moral, political and ethical), I 
should also mention that Benhabib proposes overall the cosmopolitan-federalist approach (Kant, 
Arendt) as preferable. Unlike the idea of a global state of world co-citizens, this approach 
balances the moral recognition of world-citizens against the principle of public autonomy on a 
state level. The principle of public autonomy implies a commitment to ‘the logic of 
representation’: “Representation involves demarcation.”434 From Hobbes, Benhabib borrows the 
idea that there must be a unit that authorizes some representatives to act in their name. Whether 
this unit is defined by national borders or some other kind of organization is an open-ended 
question to Benhabib. In any case, Benhabib defines the cosmopolitan-federalist approach by a 
twofold constraint on the political process: 
The normative constraints I defend are twofold: respect for universal human rights 
principles and a just, fair and open process of democratic iteration which mediates 
between interests of all those affected and the democratic citizens.435  
                                                 
432 Benhabib 1992, p. 140 
433 Ibid., p. 140 
434 Benhabib 2007, p. 448 
435 Ibid., p. 449 
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In order to retain the constitutive tension between the normative fields, Benhabib proposes that 
the way we understand democratic sovereignty must undergo a reform – exemplified by the 
German case above – from a closed, ethnos-based account to an open, demos-based account. It 
is in this context that Benhabib proposes the idea of the human right to membership, which is 
inspired by her interpretation of Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’. It is the central idea of the porous 
border-account; a cosmopolitan right to second admission that would give residents of foreign 
origin a right to political membership. This right is qualified under certain criteria, which will be 
discussed in the following. I’ll begin by explaining Benhabib’s procedural approach (and the 
notion of communicative freedom) and her notion of democratic iteration.  
5.4.3 Moral discourse as methodology – a discourse-ethical approach 
If we want to make a simple contrasting comparison between Benhabib’s discourse-ethical 
approach and Rawls procedural approach, one way to do this would be to read them as different 
post-metaphysical, quasi-transcendental436 adaptions of Kant. Rawls (and Carens) integrates the 
morality of legality into his framework of ‘justice as fairness’ via the contemplative procedure 
called the original position. Benhabib, however, draws on another hypothetical scenario to 
exemplify how taking the position of the other is relevant to moral insight.  
First of all, Benhabib draws on Habermas’ intersubjective reinterpretation of Kant’s Universality 
formula of the categorical imperative. On these terms, the discourse-ethical approach is based on 
an appropriation of a deontological claim, expressed in the meta-norm “(U)”:  
[…] only those norms and normative institutional arrangements are valid which can be 
agreed to by all concerned under special argumentation situations named discourses.437  
Both procedural approaches are different techniques which take into account the perspectives of 
all concerned by the outcome. Similar to other liberal accounts that presume the equal moral 
value of all human beings, the discourse-ethical procedure has incorporated an egalitarian 
criterion of accounting for “all concerned”. Quite distinct from Rawls’ thought experiments and 
utilitarian calculus, the discourse-ethical procedure takes the form of a justificatory process 
through dialogue between the concerned parties. The inclusion of all concerned is not just a 
requirement of a fair procedure of political consensus; it also articulates a moral-epistemological 
requirement of “enlarged thought” to think from the perspectives of others. This second 
requirement defines the actual confrontation with others point of view in public as essential. 
                                                 
436 Based on how self-performative contradictions reveal norms that are already constitutive for the practices that we 
are a part of and take for granted. Procedures are designed mainly to achieve higher degrees of consistency and 
clarity in our understanding of these norms.  
437 Benhabib 2004, p. 13. See also Habermas 1990, Moral Consciousness and communicative action. It is understood 
as a discourse-ethical revision of Kant’s principle of justice, i.e. the “universal principle of rights”.  
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
189 
 
Hence, although dialogue can be simulated, it is a requirement that ultimately cannot be met 
practically in solitary thought experiments.438 In this way it responds better to epistemic 
conditions that Sen recognizes in the impartial spectator and the deliberative theory of 
democracy. Still, these justificatory processes are considered, by Benhabib, to be moral 
argumentations of a specific kind called “discourses”. The normative component drawn on by 
Benhabib in these discourses is the “constraints which a discourse ethic imposes on any 
deliberative process in order for it to be deemed justifiable”439, such as the quasi-transcendental 
aspects revealed by performative self-contradictions.  
Benhabib clarifies the relation between these hypothetical scenarios and actual political 
procedures in the following manner: In the case of articulating moral rights such as universal 
human rights, these discourses take on a quite abstract character. They are situated in an 
imagined, ideal speech situation and should, in a non-forced manner, be valid for (or at least 
agreeable to) all human beings. Obviously, one cannot demand that all human beings give their 
actual concern. The criterion of actual consent, or at least of procedural legitimacy, takes us to 
the real speech situations of civil society and the political institutions of representation. This is 
where the notion of democratic iterations comes into the picture, in order “to analyze how real 
processes of democratic discourse within and across state boundaries can create or fail to create 
justification through legitimation.”440 
Every negotiation on how to mediate the relation of moral rights to the norms of specific 
“juridico-civil” communities can be seen as a realization of this potential affirmation.441 
According to Benhabib, there is a noticeable tension in the discourse of liberal democracies 
between the moral principles (such as “the principle of right”) and the specifically articulated 
variations of norms in a particular political community – called “the schedule of rights”.442 The 
degree of the realism of the “discourse” seems to correlate with which end of this scale of rights 
one is addressing; from the principle to the scheduled right. Along this continuum, the 
cosmopolitan right to political membership will be located somewhere on the more conceptual 
side. The notion of “democratic iteration” is assigned to account for the concrete negotiating and 
                                                 
438 Benhabib 1992, p. 140 
439 Benhabib 2007, p. 455 
440 Ibid., p. 456 For ‘jurispathic’, see Bonnie Honig in Another Cosmopolitanism (2006) 
441 Benhabib 2004, see p. 133-34 
442 In «Situating the Self» Benhabib terms this «scheduling» a «political ethics» which concerns «the creation of 
institutions, the formation of practices, and the sustaining of civic values that cultivate the ability of enlarged thought 
and the universalist-egalitarian commitment which inspires them». (Benhabib 1992, p. 139) Benhabib breaks with 
Arendt at this point, because of a concern for the lack of attention Arendt devotes to the normative principles in her 
political theory. I think Benhabib is mistaken on this point and underestimates the influence of Montesquieu in 
Arendt’s thinking. (See also Birmingham 2006) 
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reflexive processes as they actually take place within a specific community. The normative 
component that defines a justified process in the discourse-ethical approach is more generally 
based on the integrity of the communicative freedom of every individual. In general this can be 
articulated as a formal dialogue between “you” and “me”, where “your” communicative freedom 
is respected as the capacity to agree or disagree with “me” on the basis of reasons which equally 
apply to us both.443  
To provide an example of the abstract level of the moral kind of arguments, the following is how 
Benhabib articulates the justificatory frame of the human right to membership in an ideal, 
imagined context:  
If you and I enter into a moral dialogue with one another, and I am a member of a state 
of which you are seeking membership and you are not, then I must be able to show you 
with good grounds, with grounds that would be acceptable to each of us, why you can 
never join our association and become one of us. These must be grounds that you would 
accept if you were in my situation and I were in yours. Our reasons must be reciprocally 
acceptable; they must apply to each of us equally.444  
Notice how this discourse has a form quite close to a thought experiment. It is a formalized and 
hypothetical conversation, not relying on the actual participation of any other person. Actually, 
the performance seems to rely on their absence. Still, the design is quite distinctly different from 
that of Carens’ re-design of Rawls’ individualistic procedure.  
In the following I will look closer at how Benhabib’s approach plays out in the debate on 
immigration. As will become clear, her originality is not necessarily in the concrete criteria for 
membership that Benhabib articulates, but rather in her understanding of the process that 
articulates and affirms these criteria. Hence, the emphasis will be put on Benhabib’s account of 
the communicative freedom of the foreigner and its procedural recognition. As we will see, the 
recognition of the foreigner is quite unproblematic when we consider ideal and ‘soft public’ 
contexts, whereas the integrity of the foreigner in terms of a moral-legal cosmopolitan right 
becomes more difficult within the “hard public”. The issue of scope (of who ought to be 
included) comes to the center when we consider the legitimacy of decisions made by a sovereign 
democracy. 
As Walzer pointed out, it is a widely shared assumption that norms of membership (including 
citizenship) are articulated by those who are in the position to distribute it. If one still wants to 
sustain the claim of accounting for “all concerned,” this seems to confront the discourse-ethical 
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theorist with the democratic dilemma. Any decision on where to draw the line of closure will 
inevitably lead to a compromise with excluding consequences: Those directly affected by the 
articulation of membership norms involves also those who are excluded, either they risk 
deportation or are deprived of the future possibility of seeking admittance.445 Does it not 
unavoidably lead to cases of exclusionary neglect? And, can this be sensibly remedied by 
appealing to the epistemological value of a global public debate? 
5.4.4 “Porous Borders” and communicative freedom – the middle way of discourse ethics 
Based on the discourse-ethical approach, Benhabib articulates her own account of immigration 
policies in terms of a set of cosmopolitan rights that is justified by the notion of communicative 
freedom. Her account is in close dialogue with Kant and Arendt, and can be read as an attempted 
improvement of their respective contributions:  
Do the communicative reformulation of basic or human rights help us resolve the puzzles 
which Kant and Arendt were struggling with? Kant could not bridge the gap between the 
right of temporary visitation and the right of permanent residency, Arendt saw the 
practice of denaturalization and the condition of statelessness as being almost equivalent 
to the loss of rights altogether.446  
The puzzles Benhabib is referring to is in Kant’s case the problem of imperialism (presented in 
chapter 2) and for Arendt the paradox of Human rights (presented in chapter 4). As a response 
to his particular puzzle, Kant promoted a cosmopolitan right to first admission and short-term 
visits, but was critical to a right to permanent residency if it conflicted with the autonomy of 
other peoples. In other words, the distribution of membership was for Kant a voluntary matter 
of each sovereign state (including distinct peoples without agriculture and a modern state 
structure). Arendt, on her side, proposed an extended version of the cosmopolitan law in the 
wake of what she understood to be the revealing of the helplessly abstract character of an 
individualist conception of human dignity in the face of processes of massive denationalization.  
Benhabib’s puzzle is defined by her own context: the increasing transnational migration of “real” 
refugees (i.e. conventionally recognized) and other forced migrants (such as war refugees, 
economic migrants, climate refugees, etc.). Benhabib also points out that Arendt’s concern for 
the poor legal status of the stateless has been addressed (at least to some degree) institutionally 
through the UN system and the founding document of the Universal declaration of Human 
Rights from 1948. Hence the new political principle, which Arendt saw as the only solution, is 
now somewhat met by soft international arrangements of every state to treat foreigners as human 
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rights-subjects when residing on its territory. Despite this positive development, especially when 
it comes to the conventions protecting refugees and stateless, Benhabib also recognizes the low 
status of unwanted migrants: “Even in one of the most developed rights regimes of our world 
[referring to the EU], refugees and asylum seekers still find themselves in a quasi-criminal 
status.”447  
The ‘soft-law’ international order relies heavily on nation-state institutions. Still, Benhabib 
optimistically claims, the acceptance of rights, such as cosmopolitan rights, has a tendency to 
change how we think about ourselves as a political community.448 In other words, they have the 
potential to reform the political self-understanding reflexively in a more cosmopolitan and open 
direction. Appealing to consistency, Benhabib for instance points out that if we are ready to 
condemn homogenizing practices of denaturalization (such as ethnic cleansing), we should also 
be ready to accept the heterogenizing practices of naturalization (such as policies promoting 
diversity). Unlike Kant, Benhabib is not too concerned with the potential imperialist domination. 
Consequently, Benhabib revises Kant’s (and Walzer’s) closed account of membership distribution 
and proposes a “porous” migration policy in accordance with a human right to political 
membership. “You may stipulate criteria of membership, but they cannot be of such a kind that 
others would be permanently barred from becoming member of your polity.”449  
An open cosmopolitan account of migration thus need not be an ‘open border’-account, nor 
necessarily take open borders as the default position. To illustrate this, Benhabib imagines having 
a dialogue with a foreigner: If I were to agree with you in a non-forced situation on fair 
immigration policies, what could they be? 
At first, this seems to imply more or less a conventional view. For instance, Benhabib claims that 
the current distinction between immigrants and refugees is in agreement with the communicative 
freedom of the foreigner: “Clearly, first admission conditions for immigrants are of a different 
sort from those of refugees and asylum seekers. States have more discretion to stipulate 
conditions of entry in the case of immigration than they do when facing refugees and asylees.” 450  
                                                 
447 Benhabib 2004, p. 168 
448 This might sound too optimistic these days, but I guess it should be noted how split the inhabitants of Europe is, 
and how the other side of this split has a remarkably open attitude toward migration and membership distribution.  
449 Benhabib 2004, p. 135 
Curiously, one effect of this right to membership is, according to Benhabib, that “voting with one’s feet” is not only 
recognized by the sending state (via the right to emigrate), but also by the right of the receiving state (via the right to 
immigrate). This is to some degree already recognized through the practice of political asylum, but then in quite small 
numbers and preferable to the ideologically affiliated. The hosting of Islamic extremist or other totalitarian/fascist 
political refugees have less support by public opinion.  
450 Benhabib 2004, p. 137, Benhabib continues, clarifying her distinction between the legal and moral: “Their 
obligations to the latter groups are moral and for those states who are signatories to the Geneva Convention on the 
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When it comes to the criteria of second admission, Benhabib sorts out morally relevant criteria in 
line with a just membership practice. The basic distinction is between criteria related to those 
attributes that are ascribed and non-elective (such as race, gender, religion, ethnicity, language 
community, or sexuality) and to those attributes that are (at least partly) relying on personal 
responsibility (such as certain qualifications, skills, and resources, for instance length of stay, 
language competence, a certain proof of civic literacy, demonstration of material resources, or 
marketable skills).451 This is not very far from the selective, ‘high-skill’-preferring membership 
practices between the global north and south.452   
There is however a potentially radical critique of the current system in Benhabib’s approach. 
Benhabib holds that the human right to membership entails a critique of Kant’s distinction 
between the temporary right of sojourn and the longer-term right of visitation, because Benhabib 
finds no good reason (acceptable in this imagined discourse) that would justify that “you” should 
remain a permanent stranger.453 The current transformation of membership which extends rights 
in terms of residency (populous; jus soli), rather than cultural identity (ethnos), is perceived by 
Benhabib as a sign that (moral) cosmopolitan norms are becoming embedded in our polities.  
Further, referring to the criminalization of undocumented migrants, refugees and asylees, she 
claims:  
The right to universal hospitality is sacrificed on the altar of state interest. We need to 
decriminalize the worldwide movement of peoples, and treat each person, whatever his or 
her political citizenship status, in accordance with the dignity of moral personhood. This 
implies acknowledging that crossing borders and seeking entry into different polities is 
not a criminal act but an expression of human freedom and the search for human 
betterment in a world which we have to share with our fellow human beings. First 
admittance does not imply automatic membership.454  
In this passage, Benhabib offers the outlook of a radical reform of the current framework, where 
a right to visit (in its radical form) is combined with the right to membership, which given certain 
criteria implies that all human individuals have the opportunity to seek membership elsewhere. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Status of Refugees (UN 1951) and its 1967 Protocol they are legal.” For Benhabib, in other words, moral norms 
would include norms that according to Kant’s terminology have a legal form, but is unwritten.  
451 Benhabib 2004, p. 138 
Compared to Walzer and Carens, these criteria are quite similar. [see Benhabib 2007 for comments on these criteria: 
p. 452: two principles of this selection] 
452 Is this the price of maintaining the perfectionist ambition of strong democracy? 
453 The consequence is quite similar to Walzer’s argument for closed borders: “once admission occurs, the path to 
membership ought not to be blocked.” (Benhabib 2004, p. 140) Quite obviously, Benhabib arrives at a different 
conclusion on the question of first admission, represented in the term “porous borders”. But, on closer inspection, 
Walzer and Benhabib are not very far off in these matters. Walzer would also recognize the right to asylum as an 
exception to the general discretionary sovereignty on first admissions.  
454 Benhabib 2004, p. 177 
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We might call this a general, idealized specification of the principle of rights. However, how they 
are to be ‘scheduled’ in a particular context, Benhabib leaves quite open. In the debate following 
The Rights of Others, she has not, to my knowledge, been willing to determine the specific pace of 
migration beyond her notion of porous borders.455  
5.4.5 Strong democracy and the inclusion of foreigners 
As mentioned earlier, Benhabib’s position on immigration is closely linked to a meta-historical 
(”historiological”) account of how the self-understanding of a political community develops 
through what she calls “democratic iterations”. This is understood as a process of 
reinterpretation that may open for new modes of political agency and interaction. In some 
passages Benhabib quite clearly suggests that migration and the naturalization of newcomers will 
itself have positive effects on this process. For instance, it actualizes a kind of diversity in the 
domestic sphere which brings the ‘view from elsewhere’ nearer: “Elsewhere is here”. 
As history has shown, the meanings of right claims can be altered when someone outside the 
expected scope of subjects (the domestic “others”) perform the same claims. The main 
expansions in the standard-progressive HR-narrative include the eventually successful claims of 
residents without legal property, such as slaves, workers and women456. Benhabib also assumes 
that the presence of individuals that are culturally distant from the majority may introduce a 
similar process, perhaps first through changing the laws (“jurisgenerative politics”) and parallel 
through changing our shared self-understanding (democratic iterations in general). We (i.e. us and 
the foreigners) become, according to Benhabib, hermeneutical partners that interpret our 
institutions and cultural traditions in new ways.457  
As a condition for this positive reflexive, epistemic/hermeneutic effect of immigration, Benhabib 
specifies that “only polities with strong democracies” possess the reflexivity to view even the 
right of citizenship as open to reinterpretation.458 In order words, the condition of being a 
“strong democracy” becomes essential to the cosmopolitan rescheduling of “the right to 
membership” where the view from elsewhere is appreciated.  
                                                 
455 In concrete terms this results in a “porous borders”-account and admits only that labor market condition might 
allow for constraints on first admissions (Benhabib 2007, p. 453). There might specific historical and group 
obligations as well (Ibid., p. 454).   
456 The legal property of women is likely to be more extensive and nuanced than the other groups, but historically 
their property rights have generally been inferior to men.  
457 paraphrased, Benhabib 2004, p. 169 
458 Benhabib 2004, p. 212, see also Means, p. 408 
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Commenting on Benhabib’s work, Angelia Means explains how “reflexivity” involves that 
citizens understand themselves as a sovereign people in a quite strong deliberative meaning-
formation. “We, the people” is a reflexive concept:  
[It is] a concept that anticipates self-transformation through encounter with others who 
not only visit ‘us’ and interact with ‘us’ in civil society but becomes one of ‘us’ in the 
political sense.459  
The leap taken from Kant’s Enlightenment idea of communication, from short-term visiting to 
membership, is quite striking. This contrast tells us something about how reflexivity is historically 
sensitive to the specific understanding (the particular iteration or redaction) of the idea of public 
autonomy. This criterion of success can be vaguely expressed as the democratic strength of a 
community: “[…] only strong democracies can achieve integration while minimizing 
discrimination, including cultural discrimination. The weaker a democracy, the more it is 
compelled to hold onto its natural transitional object, the close ties that bind ‘us’.” 460  
Benhabib understands this integration to be performed by some historically situated collectivity, 
driven by the tension within the paradox of democratic legitimacy and aspiring to find a common 
ground of peoplehood. She does not accept the homogenizing analogy between moral person 
and peoples that the interstatal OP presumes. Rather she emphasizes how ‘people’ develops 
through history. The diversity within a people drives the development of making sense of a 
common “moral nature” through contestation of its current terms and meanings.461 This is the 
classic story of moral-political progress in Benhabib’s account, emphasizing the role of “others”:  
The normative content of collective identity is thus a product of the increasingly self-
conscious iterability of identity, a consciousness that has occurred because others have 
demanded their rights and proclaimed that their differences are relevant to the 
interpretation of democracy’s moral horizon and the laws that affect us all.462  
Benhabib stresses this point, especially the tension between ethnos and demos.463 She accuses 
both Rawls’ notion of a self-enclosed society (including the “people”) and Walzer’s notion of the 
decline of citizenship for neglecting this tension in the constitution of peoplehood. In doing so, 
the status of the foreigner is also neglected:  
The presence of others who do not share the dominant culture’s memories and morals 
poses a challenge to the democratic legislatures to rearticulate the meaning of democratic 
                                                 
459 Means 2007, p. 409 
460 Ibid., p. 413 
461 Benhabib 2004, p. 80 
462 Means 2007, p. 411 
463 Ethnos is the idea of a community of shared fate, memories, and moral (or shared) sympathies. The concept of 
demos is the democratically enfranchised totality of all citizens; the civic community. 
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universalism. Far from leading to the disintegration of the culture of democracy, such 
challenges reveal the depth and the breadth of the culture of democracy.464  
She immediately qualifies this bold statement by underlining that only strong democracies have 
this capacity. The ideal characteristic of such a democracy is not found in the imaginary of states 
as homogeneous entities. This imaginary, Benhabib warns, is not merely a bad sociological 
concept; it also excludes those who reject the hegemonic moral code, and in so doing, it betrays 
the liberal principles that made the historical development of the culture of democracy so vibrant 
in the first place.465  
In my view, this conditional requirement (for openness) of a strong democracy seems to imply 
that such iterations require a quite high degree of cultural competence in terms of language skills 
and civic competence. In terms of tolerance and non-discrimination of foreign perspectives 
(cultural or otherwise), this competence should apparently be preferred. But, it also introduces a 
conflicting concern because, as Means points out, it gives us good reason (in line with Walzer’s 
perspective) to restrict the pace of civically unskilled or culturally distant migrants. In order 
words, the right of membership that is to provide porous borders, rests on presuppositions that 
are potentially quite restricting in relation to the pace of immigration. According to Means, these 
potentially restricting presuppositions reveal an ambivalence in Benhabib’s position in the 
immigration debate:  
While Benhabib is clear that certain reasons for excluding others are justifiable, the 
difference between her principle of closure and the principles of closure provided by 
political liberalism and left communitarianism, on the one hand, and the radical 
democracy thesis, on the other, remains ambivalent. I think this ambivalence occurs 
because she is more comfortable detecting unjustifiable exclusion than justifying democratic 
exclusion.466  
Benhabib answers this concern by insisting on the difference between the various reasons given 
for being restrictive. In Walzer’s case, it is the assumption that political communities are based on 
ethnic communities and their shared understanding that is perceived as threatened. Especially, as 
we have seen, by the imperial effects of an “open border”, that is, the thin and liberal order of a 
global neighborhood. In the case of civic-republicans it is the devaluation of citizenship that is 
considered to be the cost of absorbing too many immigrants. It is not the diversity of cultures, 
but the diminishing of civic life into a community of strangers that must be remedied.  
Benhabib situates her own discourse-ethical position is relation to the paradox of democratic 
legitimacy. Historically, this paradox has been associated with a question of the difference 
                                                 
464 Benhabib 2004, p. 212, my emphasis 
465 Ibid., p. 81, see also Benhabib 2004b, p. 1767    
466 Means 2007, p. 410 
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between the residents subjected to territorial jurisdiction (the “for whom”; the populous) – 
including the “others” of democracy: slaves, workers, women – and those privileged to be 
citizens and hence included in the “political discourse” (the “by whom”; the demos). 467 Benhabib 
points to the “logic of democratic representation”.468 She accepts this premise, but only to the 
extent that the communicative freedom of each individual is respected. Clearly the political 
exclusion of adult residents cannot be justified from Benhabib’s position. Non-residential 
foreigners can still be excluded as long as the terms are acceptable for both parties. Briefly put:  
Democracies are inherently bounded, and ought to be so to the extent that people might flow 
legally across its borders. “Porous borders” are hence not a non-ideal alternative to open borders, 
but a compromise that stays true to the logic of democratic representation.469  
Means criticizes Benhabib for being hesitant on the question of the pace of migration. It seems 
reasonable enough to claim, as Benhabib does, that this is a question best answered by the 
citizens themselves. As long as the citizens are committed to the twofold normative constraints 
on the “democratic self-reflexivity of politics” – the human rights and the norms of the process 
of democratic iteration – Benhabib has no further answer.  
I still think Means has a case when she addresses the deep interdependency between the pace of 
immigration and the character of the process of democratic iteration. Too little migration and 
you get a closed society where the iterative process stagnates. Too much, and the process 
presumably goes into hyper-drive and results in postmodern radical democracy that has low 
cultural competence and is threatened by populism. The latter, in the form of defensive reactions 
to open or porous borders are highly relevant today, and perhaps something Benhabib does not 
take seriously enough.  
5.4.6 Summary – Benhabib’s version of a cosmopolitan reform of the statist 
representational system 
In an effort not to solve the dilemma of democratic legitimacy – as it is actualized by the debate 
on immigration – Benhabib accepts the distinction between a moral and political level of 
normative discourse. From the perspective of a moral hypothetical dialogue, Benhabib includes 
foreigners in the articulation of certain moral constraints on “the scheduling of rights” in the 
                                                 
467 For similar treatment from a capabilities approach see Frontiers of justice, (Nussbaum 2006).  The problem of scope 
is a general problem for discourse ethics. Since the metanorm presupposes the principle of universal moral respect, 
which again relies on ‘the capacity for speech and action’, very young children (literary “infants”), the mentally ill, 
even religious and sentimental people, present hard cases to this approach. Benhabib argues that most of these can 
be solved by moral advocacy and representation. 
 The case of the foreigner is similar in the sense that the principle of democratic closure will not allow non-
members to make the final decision on policies, especially not on the criteria for membership. On the other hand, 
the foreigners are different in the sense that they do not depend on moral advocacy or representation. That is, as 
long as they are recognized as co-citizens of the world, and not misrecognized (depoliticized) or non-recognized 
(dehumanized).  
468 In this sense, Benhabib maintains the state-centric prejudice, and one might also question to what degree it 
reflects a practical distinction between national publics of strong and weaker democracies.   
469 Benhabib 2007, p. 448 
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national policies on first admission and membership distribution. In practical terms, Benhabib 
also invites the foreigner into the public discussion in the media and the institutionally weak fora 
of civil society. All those who are affected by a norm, a law, a practice, should have a say. 
When it comes to the strongly institutionalized level of political discourse, the right to 
participation is still restricted to the members of the community, i.e. its citizens. When it comes 
to the representational systems of government and parliament, as well as the right to vote on a 
national level, all which involves the formal procedures of decision making in a democratic 
system, Benhabib is quite restrictive. A legitimate decisional structure requires democratic 
closure. The opening for participation of residential non-citizens on the local level, as the 
German example illustrates, indicates nonetheless a development in the democratic iterative 
process that may develop further.470     
Although Benhabib does not propose a way to untie the Gordian knot tying territoriality, 
representation, and democratic voice together, she agrees with Sen that the ideal of territorial 
self-sufficiency underestimates the tremendous interdependence of the peoples of the world. She 
also recognizes that there can be non-territorial based models of representation, for instance 
based on the “community of those affected”. I’ll take this as a guiding clue for possible new sites 
and new logics of representations in relation to global issues, such as environment, taxation and 
migration. 
By and large, Benhabib promotes a revisionary account of the state-based order of “bounded 
justice”. She aims to reform the political institutions according to certain moral concerns, and 
providing space for our ethical commitments to our close ones. A central aspect of this reform is 
the implementation of the cosmopolitan right to membership, which secures the political 
integrity of long-term residents of foreign origin.  
Conclusion  
In general we might say that immigration laws are of a specific significance since they regulate the 
border between the domestic and cosmopolitan domain of public right. As explained, Walzer 
represents a statist communitarian position in the debate on immigration that emphasizes the 
moral value of group integrity on nation-state level. He defends the state as the proper site of 
justice. Walzer’s account of immigration is relevant because he (unlike Rawls) acknowledges the 
problem of membership distribution as a primary issue for the collective self-understanding of a 
political territorial community. This position enables Walzer to specify membership as a 
distributive good in itself, and not just as an instrument of distribution. Although Walzer’s view is 
statist and communitarian, he still holds a moderate position in the sense that he recognizes some 
external obligations of the political community. These obligations, and the corresponding rights, 
                                                 
470 See the study of the emergence of “disaggregated citizenship,” practices such as providing foreigners with the 
right to vote in local elections could be a sign of a transition to a more cosmopolitan system.  
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such as the right to asylum, are nevertheless lexically subordinated to the sovereignty of the state. 
As such, external obligations are understood within the framework of Samaritan or imperfect 
moral duties. For these reasons, Walzer’s position relies in the end on moral confinements that 
contradict the cosmopolitan idea. These confinements are criticized by Benhabib for their 
reliance on an ethnically grounded ethical particularism.    
Carens – in diametrical contrast to Walzer – represents a cosmopolitan individualism that 
emphasizes the moral value of individual freedoms. Carens attacks the state-centric restriction of 
the political question of justice to the state. He coins this restriction the apt term “bounded 
justice”. Carens’ position is moderate to the extent that it, from within the procedure of the 
original position, recognizes the value of maintaining public order. This constraint is considerably 
thinner than the concern for the moral value of social cohesion that grounds Walzer’s position.  
Carens helps us realize that Rawls’ procedural approach, when based on the assumption of a 
“closed system,” excludes questions about immigration.471 And Carens acknowledges the 
cosmopolitan duty to resettle displaced persons more explicitly than both Walzer and Benhabib. 
There is, however, a clear disadvantage in Carens position in that it only offers a limited account 
of a cosmopolitan conception of justice, limited to a promotion of the freedom of cross-border 
movement as an individual right to immigration, and leaves little concern for the epistemic value 
of the comparative perspectives of the other. According to Benhabib’s critique, these short-
comings are located in Carens’ strong reliance on an individualist moral cosmopolitanism, which 
tends to undermine the political domain as a distinguished normative field. It reduces the 
question of democratic legitimacy, provoked by immigration, to a question of moral foundation. 
Compared to these two positions, Benhabib seems to come closest to address the cosmopolitan 
problem of exclusion in an adequate way. In a way, Benhabib offers a middle ground that 
respects both the non-instrumental value of membership emphasized by Walzer, and at the same 
time seeks to mediate the moral commitments of cosmopolitanism. Consequently, Benhabib has 
a fairly open conception, which endorse the essential value of diversity in the community and 
rejects permanent exclusion of residing foreigners. In terms of the basic elements of a 
cosmopolitan conception of justice, her account provides a wider range of state obligations to 
protect foreigners – which explicitly includes the right to political membership, as well as 
hypothetical and democratic procedures that, at least to some extent, include the comparative 
perspectives from elsewhere.   
  
                                                 
471 Carens 1987, p. 255 
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Part 2 Rethinking human dignity – A phenomenologically informed revision 
of the right to have rights 
As discussed in part 1, articulating an adequate content of the cosmopolitan law of admission 
requires a balancing concern between state obligations toward foreigners and the obligations 
concerning the citizens. It seems we have to accept an imperfect compromise. Benhabib’s 
account of “porous border”, I’ve argued, provides us with the most adequate compromise 
available, given the current circumstances. There are, however, problematic aspects of Benhabib’s 
position, which suggests room for further improvements. More specifically, there seems to be a 
mismatch between the institutionalized politics and the scope of justice required by the actual 
circumstances. In this second part of the dissertation I will argue that an adequate extension of 
cosmopolitan law might require that we take Arendt’s ambition to rethink Kant’s conceptual 
framework more seriously when interpreting her “right to have rights”.  
As quoted in part 1, the whole phrase goes: “[…] a right to have rights (and that means to live in 
a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some 
kind of organized community, […]”.472 I suggest a reading of “the right to have rights” that 
considers the human condition of plurality and the principle of meaningfulness as the 
interpretative keys. According to this reading “the right to have rights” is understood to express 
the aspect of uniqueness of plurality, also articulated as “the right to appear” or “the right to 
distinguish oneself”, whereas “the right to belong to some kind of organized community” is 
understood as the expression of the aspect of equality, which can also be articulated as “the right to 
belong” or “the right to humanity”. Although the latter, i.e. the right to belong, can be understood 
to include spontaneous assemblies, it is more clearly connected to the institutionalist aspect of 
Arendt’s thinking and relates quite well to Benhabib’s proposal of a right to membership.  The 
former moral-legal claim, i.e. the right to appear, seems to appeal to another, more performative 
and agonistic aspect of the political relation. This aspect is not reducible to formal equality and 
even tends to escape formalization in a way similar to the notions of freedom, autonomy and 
dignity. I read the “right to have rights” not so much as a suggested content of cosmopolitan law, 
as Arendt’s basic notion of public right or human dignity. 
To contextualize the motive for promoting a reconceptualization of human dignity, I will present 
three possible objections against Benhabib’s account:  
(1) The first possible objection concerns the sophistication of Benhabib’s account. As discussed 
above, Benhabib recognizes the value (both epistemological and moral) of including the 
                                                 
472 Arendt 1968, p. 296 
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foreigner’s perspectives and claims of justice in domestic decisions-making processes. In order to 
actualize this value, Benhabib’s position relies on the strong criteria of the presence of collective 
self-reflexivity, a characteristic of strong democracies. Although I support Benhabib’s account as 
a normative ideal, it might face pragmatic challenges for at least two reasons:  
First of all, the notion of “democratic iterations” provides us with a sophisticated descriptive and 
diagnostic concept, a concept which reflects the highly complex historical and social dynamics of 
the way in which a modern imagined community continuously integrates abstract rights into its 
legal and political self-understanding. This concept is, however, also – cognitively speaking – 
highly demanding and requires a certain level of intellectual finesse, both as a descriptive concept 
and as a normative guide for the future inclusion of foreigners. Hence, its sophistication might 
diminish its usefulness for most public debates, including those among the global public outside 
the academic “world of readers”.473  
Second, even if we do find communities where the public debate is able to adapt Benhabib’s 
conception, strong democratic publics would require a high level of cultural (or civic) 
competence among its participants. Such competence levels could, in turn, also serve as a strong 
communitarian argument for restricting immigration. From an egalitarian position one could 
argue that this leads us toward a democratic perfectionism that has unattractive costs of 
exclusion. The communitarian argument of competence rests on the empirical premise that 
foreigners are less democratically competent than the citizens of strong democracies are. 
Although there are regions, such as failed states, where the level of education and practice of 
democracy is low, it does not seem plausible as a general premise.474 It is, however, likely that it 
could legitimate a selective immigration regime, similar to the positive discrimination of high-
skilled immigrants we’re facing today. In other words, one is free to move and settle elsewhere as 
long as one is economically self-sustained and politically competent. I fear that an empirical 
ranking of political communities could have a self-enforcing discriminating effect, grounded in 
the fear of undermining the very condition of a strong democracy, where strong democracies 
welcome foreigners from other strong democracies, while employing more restrictive 
immigration policies toward presumable weaker democracies and authoritarian states.  
                                                 
473 From a Rawlsian perspective, the discourse-ethical approach has been criticized for presuming a too complex 
account of social reality. Counter wise, Benhabib questions if the Rawlsian is not oversimplifying it to the point of 
the irresponsible. 
474 This is obviously a question of where you set the bar. Proponents of moderate epistocracy, like Jason Brannan, 
would probably hold that the competence of the electorate in well-established democracies is also worringly low. The 
election of Trump for presidency seems to have proven their point.  
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(2) A second objection is concerned with the inadequate restriction of the content of 
cosmopolitan law to the law of admission. Although this is understandable if we locate 
Benhabib’s position in the debate on immigration, it reflects a general limitation of positions 
within this debate: the positions deal poorly with systemic problems of transnational migration. 
As Parekh has pointed out, there is a tendency in this debate to conceive the phenomenon of 
transnational migration as a question of immigration and view it primarily from the perspective of 
the hosting state.475 So, even if Benhabib critically addresses the “curious silence” in most other 
cosmopolitan positions on the issue of migration, she also tacitly commits to a state-centric 
perspective by accepting Walzer’s defining framework of the debate as a dilemma between 
universal moral commitments and the parochial restriction of the scope of justice associated with 
democratic sovereignty. This seems to expose Benhabib to her own critique of a state-centric 
tendency in political philosophy because it leaves little concern and low political integrity for 
extra-territorial foreigners.  
As discussed in chapter 3, this may be explained by the deep-seated state-centric tendencies in 
our secular social imaginaries. Within cosmopolitan law this tendencies are manifested in the way 
cosmopolitan rights – the right to asylum and the right to political membership – are understood 
as restricted to the territorially proximate foreigners. My point here is not to reject 
implementation of cosmopolitan reforms on the state level, but to raise concern about this 
emphasis on the rights to first and second admission as the complete account of its adequate 
content. In general, this emphasis seems to protect the interests of foreigners primarily by 
converting their status to ‘quasi-domestic’ members. This conversion seems to suggest that states 
will provide the best protection of cosmopolitan relations by treating them as domestic relations. 
In other words, this mode of state provision of foreigners’ interests makes cosmopolitan relations 
implode.  
Parekh labels this dominating emphasis in the debate on migration “the ethics of admission”.476 It 
gives the whole discussion a state-centric character where transnational aspects of migration are 
given scant attention; the specific issues attended to – such as emancipation of legal immigrants 
and the ‘sans papiers’ – simulate domestic problems and historical struggles of emancipation. 
This simulation may solve some problems related to a cosmopolitan reform of the state, but it 
also marginalizes problems related to the systemic consequences of the international order, such 
as the problem of long-term encampment. Partly, this could be addressed by a reform within the 
                                                 
475 See also Bauböck 2003 for analysis of this process from the perspective of the sending country. It is for instance 
not necessarily in the interest of the sending state that their expatriates changes or have to give up their original 
citizenship. 
476 See Parekh 2016, chapter 2. 
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law of admission that includes systemic and transnational perspectives. The implementation of an 
extensive reform on the international level seems unfeasible, but it can nonetheless be defended 
as a sound moral-legal requirement. I will argue that Benhabib’s reading of “the right to have 
rights” fails to stress this systemic issue, which seems to be crucial to Arendt’s ambition of 
articulating a new guarantee of human dignity. 
(3) A third possible objection – which might be considered an implication of the state-centric 
bias of ‘the ethics of admission’ – Benhabib’s conception of “politics” seems to imply a 
depoliticization of the cosmopolitan domain beyond the law of admission. This problem is not 
related directly to the problems of admission or statelessness, but to a concern for the democratic 
character of the future deliberations on cosmopolitan law. By establishing a sharp distinction 
between the moral and the political, and relating the latter (quite strongly) to the current 
institutional framework of sovereign states, Benhabib seems reluctant to release the political 
domain from its state-centric chains in the dominant imaginary. I argue that this restricted scope 
of politics has procedural and epistemic implications relevant to the content of the cosmopolitan 
law of deliberation.  
Considering that Benhabib is certainly open to democratic reforms on the non-state level, this 
restriction is somewhat puzzling. But, even if we understand Benhabib’s narrow notion of 
politics as motivated by a pragmatic concern of institutional realism, it nevertheless leaves 
Benhabib’s conception with few openings on the cosmopolitan law as a distinct political field of 
moral-legal norms, entitled to its own specific legal and institutional protection.   
In this light, Benhabib can be said to promote a “weak cosmopolitanism”, strongly moderated by 
a demarcation of the political domain derived from the “logic of democratic representation”. By 
acknowledging only the moral obligation to take the claim of the foreigner into account, the 
recognition of the moral-legal character of the cosmopolitan domain risks being lost. The moral 
obligation to recognize the foreigner as a participant in the soft public does to some extent 
counter the nationalization of the “extra-political” public sphere, but at the same time, the state’s 
obligations to protect cosmopolitan deliberations on the content of cosmopolitan law might be 
obscured by assigning them a non-political (or merely morally negotiable) character.  
In terms of democratic procedures, this weak cosmopolitanism narrows the scope of possible 
institutional and representational protections of foreigners’ perspectives. (We could imagine 
several possible implementations like for instance the institutional representation of an 
ombudsman; participation in semi-public ‘civil society’-processes (such as hearings [høringsrunder]) 
and parliamentary seats on the state level; veto-rights and court appeals of affected parties on the 
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international level; and so on.) There is thus an epistemological concern that could be raised 
against the emphasis on second admission: Whereas it might solve the problem of exclusionary 
neglect for the territorially proximate foreigners477, it also favors these perspectives compared to 
affected foreigners in general.  
As an epistemological privilege of the territorially proximate foreigners, this favoring is 
problematic and can be understood as a case of procedural parochialism. Procedurally it 
marginalizes non-residential foreigners. On the level of systemic exclusion associated with 
admission policies, this tends to weaken the integrity of those worst off and leave the 
deliberations on these issues less informed. In general, the political privilege given to residential 
foreigners weakens the adequate comparative perspective. For instance, the situational interest of 
the newcomers might even give them socio-economic incentives to promote quite restrictive 
immigration policies. This creates a conflict between the concern for exclusionary neglect and 
procedural parochialism: On the one side the perspectives of immigrants seem to have a 
legitimate claim to be taken into account. On the other side, it is not given that these newcomers 
(being here) are representative of the global diversity of views from elsewhere merely because of 
their foreign background. Benhabib’s insurance that “elsewhere is here” does not answer this 
problem convincingly. 
In order to face these objections I will suggest an alternative, constructive reading of Arendt’s 
“right to have rights” which emphasizes the “proto-political” character of the global public 
sphere. It primarily contests Benhabib’s reading of “the right to have rights” as “the right to 
political membership”. Compared to the conventional interpretations, such as Benhabib’s, the 
alternative reading of Arendt emphasizes her ambition to redefine the political principles that 
give political institutions legitimacy. The idea is to make it clearer how the cosmopolitan domain 
should be understood on its own terms and given institutional protection accordingly, implying 
for instance the extension of cosmopolitan law beyond addressing territorial admissions. 
To separate this proto-political reading from Benhabib’s position, I will maintain Benhabib’s use 
of “the political” as referring to the conventional, state-centric location of politics to the “hard” 
public. My alternative reading of Arendt will in distinction emphasize the political character of 
the “softer” public sphere in general as its “proto-political” character. I doubt this reading will be 
able to fully remedy the first objection against conceptual sophistication. This alternative reading 
stresses even more than Benhabib, the need for a relational revision of the concept of human 
                                                 
477 Second admission can be justified as an exception to democratic closure on the basis of the territorial proximity 
and the way proximity specifies the holder of the duty in question.  
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dignity. It does however have advantages when it comes to addressing the systemic and 
procedural issues of exclusion of foreigners.  
A decisive difference between the state-centric and proto-political location of politics is related to 
Benhabib’s distinction between political and moral norms. This distinction fails to capture a 
crucial difference between universal moral norms in general and universal moral-legal norms in 
particular. The latter set of norms has an irreducible political character which is captured by the 
proto-political concept of Arendt: It is moral-legal not because of the possibility to sanction, but 
because of the character of the relation. Further, cosmopolitan norms should not be understood 
as synonymous with the entire set of universal moral-legal norms. It refers more specifically to a 
subset of these norms.  
The difference can be illustrated by considering the dominating political imaginary which 
Benhabib’s account relies on. The public and intellectual debate on immigration policies could be 
said to manifest a negotiation of the democratic self-understanding of a community in terms of 
cosmopolitan law. As Walzer quite precisely captures this imaginary, the core of this debate is a 
dilemma between the universal moral obligations and the statist commitments of a sovereign 
state. This dilemma reveals a certain tension in the modern social imaginary of the state and its 
legitimacy, which corresponds to the positive institutional levels of domestic and international 
law (mediated by constitutional courts). But, if we follow the threefold framework of public right 
in Kant, this dilemma should be nuanced: In so far as the legitimacy of the state is considered to 
rest on universal liberal-democratic principles, the state has traditionally found itself primarily in a 
tension in relation to its obligations toward its own citizens (domestic rights) and toward other 
states (international law). The difference in the case of state obligations toward foreign 
immigrants is that this tension is here (strictly speaking) regulated by cosmopolitan norms - such as 
the right to asylum. Hence, the relevant conflict of obligations does not have the structure of a 
dilemma (between political and moral norms), but rather as a trilemma of obligations internal to 
the public right.  
Arendt’s critique of abstract human rights relies on this nuance between universal moral-legal 
norms in general and cosmopolitan norms in particular. Arendt criticizes most articulations of 
human rights for being designed to solve domestic issues. Hence, as I understand her critique, 
Arendt does not criticize civil domestic rights for their universal character as such, but for their 
inadequacy regarding cosmopolitan issues such as statelessness and mass migration. The reasons 
why human rights are inapplicable can thus be explained by the lacuna of cosmopolitan rights in 
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the conventional international protection of human rights. Benhabib recognizes the lacuna, but 
she restricts her response to the issue of second admission.  
To remedy the limited protection of foreigners in international conventions, Arendt aims to 
articulate ‘a new political principle’ which can guarantee human dignity and ensure the protection 
against exclusion from the international community. This response can be interpreted as original 
on two levels: On the first level, it seeks to extend the content of cosmopolitan law. In this sense, 
‘the right to have rights’ is understood, in concordance with Benhabib’s reading, as a 
cosmopolitan right to domestic rights and political membership, which protects the status of 
foreigners, including the stateless. This fills a gap in the current portfolio of conventional human 
rights, but provides only limited protection. On the second level, the articulation of this new 
political principle also takes issue with the way human dignity is conceptually understood in 
individualist moral cosmopolitanism. On this level Arendt does not merely seek to articulate a 
cosmopolitan norm, but to rethink the general principle of humanity (also articulated as a “right to 
humanity” by Kant) that reflects a competing, relational conception of human dignity grounded in 
the human condition of plurality.478 It is relational in the sense that it stresses the degree to which 
we depend on others, rather than our individual attributes.  
The notion of “human dignity” is still seen as the conceptual framework to which the duties, and 
corresponding individual rights (of public right), must comply. Since the condition of plurality is 
irreducibly “political” (i.e. proto-political) in its character, there is no clear distinction in Arendt’s 
rethinking between the principle of humanity and ‘the new political principle’ as a principle of 
justice. I understand the principle in question to be “meaningfulness”, which corresponds to the 
human condition of plurality (I will hereafter mainly refer to this principle as the principle of 
plurality). Accordingly I interpret “the right to have rights” as a general principle of public right, 
and not as a specific cosmopolitan right. “The right” in question refers in my view primarily to 
“the right to appear”, and the “rights” accordingly to the rights to action and to an opinion. This 
basic right might be given specific content in the form of individual rights of both domestic and 
cosmopolitan law, especially concerning the public presence of perspectives of people we don’t 
know personally.  
To avoid confusion it should be made clear that although Arendt’s “right to have rights” is 
obviously articulated in an individualist legal language, the new conception of justice Arendt seeks 
to provide as its guidance and legitimacy clearly is not. This non-individualist conception does 
                                                 
478 I could have added the interconnected terms of natality and narrativity here to reflect the broader account Arendt 
makes of political action and political change and renewal. I’ve chosen to use plurality, because it is most directly 
related to action and speech, and hence to the framework or guarantee required by the right to have rights. 
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not imply a flat-out dismissal of individual rights as such. It is rather an attempt to explicate 
philosophically (or metaphysically)479 the human reality of the public space (i.e. as a human state 
of being) and the way this space constitutes the necessary conditions for such individual rights 
(including domestic and cosmopolitan rights) in the first place. In terms of the legitimacy of a 
state (of law), we might still appreciate the way individual rights express the state’s obligations 
toward its citizens and foreigners, but the primary ground of legitimacy will shift from the 
protection of the interest of separate individuals to the protection of the relational, public spaces 
that enable their appearance as individuals.  
In my view this proto-political reading suggests a more adequate response to stateless foreigners, 
faced by the extreme exclusion from humanity. This reading captures the severe violation 
involved in this kind of exclusion as transgressions of the basic public rights of action and 
opinion (including, as it will hopefully be redundant to mention in the future, the global public). 
According to this reading, ‘the right to have rights’ guarantees not only domestic rights (such as 
the “juridico-civil” rights to freedom and to think), but also cosmopolitan rights (such as those 
articulated in the cosmopolitan laws of admission and deliberation).  
An interpretation of ‘the right to have rights’ on this second, cosmopolitan level further opens 
for the widened content of cosmopolitan law. As such it does not reduce the level of 
sophistication associated with Benhabib’s account, but it does in my mind offer a clearer 
conception of the moral-legal domain and its possibilities. It further specifies the need for an 
extension of cosmopolitan law according to actual circumstances.  
First, Arendt’s relational concept of human dignity explicates the severe violations of human 
dignity associated with the systemic exclusions from the international community. It conceptually 
clarifies that the kind of harm suffered by exclusion from humanity, as experienced in long-term 
encampment. In positive terms it explicates the political integrity of the foreigner and the 
corresponding right to participate in the global public sphere in terms of the cosmopolitan law of 
deliberation.  
In chapter 6, I will address this comparative advantage of Arendt’s conception to Benhabib by 
specifying the normative level of the corresponding rights to appear and to belong. I argue that 
they belong to a level of obligations which are detached from the specification of obligations 
associated with territorial proximity and citizenship. In chapter 7 and 8 I will defend this reading 
of Arendt in terms of a phenomenologically informed account of the mentality of action and the 
legitimacy of political institutions according to the principle of meaningfulness.   
                                                 
479 Provided Arendt’s reserved support for these terms.  
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
208 
 
Second, Arendt’s wider conception and clearer recognition of the political character of state 
obligations as according to cosmopolitan law, is also better suited to address problems of 
deliberation on the cosmopolitan level. These problems include those raised against Benhabib’s 
account, such as the procedural neglect of the view from elsewhere. By explicating the political 
(and not merely moral) integrity of the foreigner, the burden of proof shifts from defending their 
inclusion to defending their exclusion from domestic decision-making. This possible implication 
can be articulated as a content of the cosmopolitan law of deliberation: the cosmopolitan right of 
foreigners to participate in decision-making processes that affects them. This extension of 
cosmopolitan law will be discussed in the concluding chapter 9.  
In sum, I argue that Arendt’s conception provides the adequate specification of the moral-legal 
character of state obligations beyond the territorial sphere, both in terms of cosmopolitan law of 
admission on the systemic level and the cosmopolitan law of deliberation beyond foreign 
participation in the domestic “hard” public. Although these obligations might face us with highly 
demanding institutional tasks, I understand the circumstances to require no less of us as members 
of the current political order.  
In practical terms, this account does not pretend to provide a perfect compromise of the 
trilemma of public right. It does however imply an ambition to articulate the provision of an 
institutional protection of the global public space in order to improve the political integrity of the 
foreigner as a normal member of humanity. Hence, the idea would be to contest a social 
imaginary that does not recognize the civil society (or public life) as the main political concern.  
In minimal terms this could provide a buffer against the severe harm caused by dehumanizing 
practices of encampment by pointing out the harm caused already by the preceding 
depoliticization of individuals. From the perspective of a hosting community, if we start down-
scaling our standards for treatment of the most vulnerable foreigners, there is also an inherent 
risk of transmitting the same arguments and techniques of alienation to vulnerable domestic 
groups.480 From the perspective of a potential group of refugees, and with a sense of reciprocity 
of justice, we risk being met with the same practices in return from our potential hosting states.481 
 
                                                 
480 The extreme case – used by Arendt – is how the rule of force of imperialism and its techniques of 
dehumanization was imported back to Europe. But, a more actual (and less physically violent) concern is in my view 
the discursive dehumanization of foreigners as purely strategic agents, which has already been imported to the 
domestic sphere by the administrative rule of force through economic incentives. In this sense we are all becoming 
“foreigners” with a contingent economic attachment to the political community. 
481 The historical version of this argument emphasizes how the European communities, such as the Norwegian, have 
previously benefited from generous migration policies of other states in times of need.  
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Chapter 6: The right to have rights – a proto-political interpretation 
In this chapter I will develop my argument further by considering a proto-political reading of 
Hannah Arendt’s thinking in detail. Primarily, this reading seeks to go beyond the conventional 
interpretation of “the right to have rights” as “the right to political membership”. This has at 
least two main implications. First, by making clearer that “the right to have rights” refers also to a 
more basic “right to appear”, the “right to belong to an organized community” can also be 
nuanced to include both informal and formal political associations. As such, the right to have 
rights explicates the deep violation of humanity associated with rightlessness, beyond the 
violation of the right to membership associated with statelessness. This explication promotes a 
scope of justice that includes victims of the international system and makes clearer the intolerable 
and dehumanizing consequences of long-term encampment. Second, by emphasizing the 
importance of membership in the civil society as an informally organized community, the implied 
scope of justice associated with the right to have rights expands more naturally to all members of 
the global civil society. States have responsibility to protect the global civil society in ways similar 
to their responsibility to protect the environment. My aim is to show how the secular imaginary 
of spontaneously emerging public spheres can play a decisive role in understanding the 
obligations associated with further deliberations on cosmopolitan law. The emergence and 
protection of a global public sphere is a central concern in this regard.  
I will criticize the conventional reading of Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’ that emphasizes this 
“right” as a cosmopolitan response, and rather suggest that this right reflects a more fundamental 
ambition; to revise the conception of rights according to a new political principle. Benhabib’s 
interpretation, in this perspective, seems to skip the grounding philosophical significance of the 
‘in-between’ and plural character of the human condition of action in Arendt’s thought. 
Benhabib’s interpretation jumps, somewhat impatiently, to the significance of this “right” for the 
content of a cosmopolitan law of second admission.482 I argue that Benhabib’s interpretation 
mistakes the levels involved in expressing this new political principle, and that this leads her 
account to narrow the scope of cosmopolitan law in an inadequate manner.  
To identify the conceptual weakness of the conventional “political” reading of Arendt, I will 
consider the problem of non-recognition as a central objection against Arendt’s position. This 
problem is concerned with the aporia of human rights and the implied rightlessness of those 
excluded from humanity. In addition, and more seriously, this objection attacks the relational 
                                                 
482 It should be noted that Benhabib’s earlier reading of Arendt (1992) is more in line with my argument that her later 
reading (2004).  
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premise of Arendt’s conception of human dignity by questioning the possibility of political 
actions for those who are not recognized as able to speak.  
I will answer this objection by arguing that it mistakes a diagnosis of rightlessness for a 
deprivation of ‘the right to have rights’. According to this assumption, statelessness implies the 
loss of all “rights”. By offering a proto-political reading – which emphasizes the basic human 
rights of action and opinion – the loss of political membership is not identical to absolute 
rightlessness. My preferred reading seems to correspond better with Arendt’s critique of the kind 
of mentality that led the conventional understanding of human rights into such an aporia.483 The 
reason millions of stateless found human rights inapplicable when they were most needed, 
Arendt explains, is related to a conceptual weakness in the understanding of these rights. I argue 
that “the right to have rights” should be read as part of the constructive response that seeks to 
avoid this unsolvable problem, and that seeks to issue a new guarantee of human dignity against 
its ultimate violation in the state of rightlessness.  
To be clear, statelessness certainly entails a strong violation of the cosmopolitan law and can be 
addressed by a human right to political membership. In the circumstances Arendt describes, 
statelessness also implied a deprivation of a homely framework for action and speech, but these 
are not conceptually identical. In order to recognize the difference between them, I will argue 
that we have to develop a reading of Arendt that focuses on the emergence of public spheres, rather 
than on their already established institutional “coagulation” on the state level. 
This emphasis on the pre-institutional character of politics does to some degree also answer the 
additional objection against Arendt’s relational account of human dignity and the implied 
problem of the contingency of recognition by others. That is, since the proto-political reading 
detaches human dignity from the status of citizen, and relates it primarily to political integrity as a 
member of humanity, citizenship is not the only relevant form of political recognition. This 
reading does not solve every problem associated with severe cases of mis- or non-recognition, 
but stresses the importance of the moral-legal integrity of foreigners on the level of the social 
imaginaries and the regulative ideas of political society.  
6.1 Conventional and proto-political readings 
In chapter 4 I discussed Arendt’s critique of human rights. Arendt identifies the “fundamental 
deprivation of human rights” quite originally with “the deprivation of a place in the world which 
                                                 
483 The aporias is used by Arendt, it seems, to uncover inconsistencies or ruptures in the conceptual framework of 
the dominating social imaginary. In this case the aporia is caused by the mismatch between the conceptual 
understanding of human rights (as citizen rights) and the international system of nation states at the time. 
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makes opinions significant and actions effective”484. What is deprived in the basic violation of 
human dignity is not an individual property but a “home”. It is not as in the individualist 
conception of human dignity the deprivation of bodily needs or formal rights of citizenship. The 
relevant human rights are in this context, Arendt specifies, not the traditional citizen’s rights, but 
the basic human rights that secure the human condition for all, including foreigners. According 
to my proto-political reading, these rights count as follows: First, “the right to have rights”, which 
entitles every human being to the right to action and the right to opinion. These answer to the 
basic conditions for making oneself at home within a “framework”, in other words; to distinguish 
oneself or to deliberate. It is “home” both in the sense of “the familiarity of daily life”485 and in 
the sense of a “public life in which the right to opinion and action is guaranteed”486. Second, “the 
right to belong to some kind of organized community”, which can be further specified, as 
Benhabib suggests, as “the cosmopolitan right to second admission”, but it expresses primarily a 
general right to belong to humanity (given the fact of a completely organized humanity, see 
chapter 4).  
As Arendt phrases it in Origins:  
We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a 
framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to 
some kind of organized community […].487  
I have emphasized the “and” in order to question the obviousness of the identical meaning of 
these two expressions of a “right”. Is the “right to live in a framework where the rights to action 
and opinion are enacted” (presumably a “home”) the same as “the right to belong to some kind 
of organized community”? The conventional reading tends to take the identity of these two rights 
for granted. For instance, Benhabib assumes, like most other commentators, that a “right to have 
rights” means, in Benhabib’s words: “the right […] to become a member of civil society such that 
we can then be entitled to juridico-civil rights.”488 As pointed out in the last chapter, this seems to 
imply a conflation of “civil society” with a modern state community. To the extent that the 
conventional reading recognizes the difference between “the right to have rights” and “the right 
to belong” it seems to amount to the complementary relation between “the right to have civil 
rights” and “the right to citizenship”. I do agree that these are complementary, one can hardly 
think of a framework outside an organized community, the crucial point in my opinion is that 
                                                 
484 Arendt 1968 [1951], p. 296 
485 Arendt 1994 
486 Benhabib 1992 
487 Arendt 1968, p. 296-97, my italics 
488 Benhabib 2004, p. 59 
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this “organized community” is not synonymous with “citizenship”, but can range from fairly 
spontaneous assemblies to global organizations.  
If we isolate the first part of the quoted passage from Arendt, the conventional interpretation of 
“the right to have rights” distinguishes between two classes of rights. On the one hand, we have 
the fundamental moral “right in virtue of humanity” as Kant would put it. Michelman refers to 
this “right” to have rights as an acquisition right; i.e. it refers to a class of moral obligations or 
entitlements (background rights) that rests on an idea of the inherent dignity or humanity of 
every human individual. On the other hand, we have the “further” rights, as the positive legal 
rights of an institutionalized civil society.489 Michelman identifies these as object rights; which refer 
to a class of rights as empirical matters of actual social practice (positive law; institutional 
rights).490 Within the Kantian framework we might speak of the “right” (to have rights) as an 
acquisition right of both domestic and cosmopolitan rights. Benhabib seems to interpret or 
specify this acquisition right as a cosmopolitan right to second admission.  
Admittedly, Benhabib’s interpretation makes perfect sense within the context of the immigration 
debate. In light of the problem of the stateless, it seems obvious that the “right to have rights” 
should be read as a moral right of non-citizens to a membership which grants them further rights. 
From this conventional interpretation we get to the idea of a “universal abstract human moral 
right” as a moral right to the precondition of having empirical rights. So far, I think the 
conventional and proto-political understandings of rights are in agreement. The misguided 
“jump” occurs when “empirical rights” are directly associated with the actual state of affairs, i.e. 
‘the right to have rights’ becomes the right to the acquisition of “membership in the society of a 
law-dispensing state”.491 It jumps from the level of moral-legal norms of public right in general to 
the domestic level by conflating the acquisition right with the issuing of citizenship. This hasty 
skip, neglects the possibility of the rights of non-residential foreigners. 
To be fair, this hasty association is also found in Arendt’s own work. Arendt is quite explicit here; 
the only right that does not spring from within the nation is “the right of every human being to 
membership in a political community.”492 The right to have rights simply means the acquisition 
“right of men to citizenship.”  
                                                 
489 Note that Benhabib and Michelman uses “civil society” in a different manner than Taylor. Taylor’s use is closer to 
the original modern use of “civil society” to describe the state-independent character of first the free market, and 
later the public sphere and the sovereign people.  
490 Michelman, Frank I. 1996. "Parsing "a Right to Have Rights"." Constellations 3, no. 2: 200-208. 
491 Michelman 1996, p. 202 
492 Menke 2007, p. 748 [from Arendt 1949, p. 34, the English version: “The Rights of Man: What are they?” Modern 
review, p. 24-36] 
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As Menke has pointed out, this understanding of this ‘one human right’ responds to some of the 
central points in Arendt’s critique of the “rights of Man”. It establishes that Arendt’s critique 
does not imply a straight-forward rejection of human rights493, but that it insist on a distinction: 
“[…] between appearance and reality; between what is called “human rights” but in fact refers to 
the rights of the members of a political community, and what really is a human right.”494 This 
seems to succeed in providing a guarantee for applicable human rights which transcends the 
historical dependency associated with citizen rights of particular political communities, such as 
“the right of an Englishman”. This transcendence is crucial to the legitimacy of the Nuremberg-
process and the prosecution of crimes against humanity in general. It confirms the universality of 
state obligations toward its own citizens, and adds a (institutionally vague) systemic guarantee to 
those unfortunate enough to lose their citizenship.495  
The conflation of the moral acquisition right with a right to citizenship is, however, problematic. 
In the conventional reading, the human right to citizenship is understood as a fundamental moral 
right that grounds the legitimacy of citizen’s rights. It informs for instance Benhabib’s account of 
“just membership”. To question this conventional reading, we could ask what is made of the 
notions of action and opinion within this framework. Is it not too convenient to ignore the 
significance of a framework, i.e. a “home”, referred to in the parenthesis? Does it not allow one 
to move effortlessly from the paradoxical phrase of “the right to have rights” to the seemingly 
more familiar “right to belong to some kind of organized community”?  
I argue that this interpretation neglects Arendt’s ambition to express a new political principle in 
her articulation of these rights (the right to appear and the right to belong). And, that this 
conventional interpretation reduces Arendt’s conception of human rights to a question of the 
content of a cosmopolitan law of admission. Hence, it narrows Arendt’s possible contribution to 
the public right in general, and to cosmopolitan law in particular, included the cosmopolitan law 
of deliberation.  
There are good reasons to read Arendt in this conventional manner. Superficially, it provides us 
with an answer that seems to address the problem of statelessness directly. At times, Arendt is 
also quite explicit in her demand for the equalizing institutional protection of a state for the sake 
of maintaining a space of appearance. In this way, Arendt aligns the civil condition of a state with 
the proper framework for action and opinion. The stateless would then be the perfect example, 
                                                 
493 As some readers tend to suggest, see: Giorgio Agamben, Jean Cohen. 
494 Menke 2007, p. 749 
495 The specification of the subject of duty (the responsible state) is presumably connected to territorial proximity of 
the subject of right (the foreigner). Hence, it is similar to Benhabib’s account. 
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theoretically speaking, because they explicate the state as a proper home for human beings. 
However, on other occasions Arendt refers to the possibility of public spaces (or “frameworks”) 
on a pre-institutional level. Some commentators describes this level as the “ontological” character 
of public space; i.e. the sociality of action.496 I’ve referred to this pre-institutional level as proto-
political to emphasize its moral-legal character (rather than the mediation of the political and the 
moral). This character is clearly manifest in underground movements, but can also be described 
as the “living” aspect of coagulated public spheres.  
To be clear, this proto-political concept of the public does not address the problem of 
statelessness as such (although this amounts in most cases to losing one’s home), but to the 
permanent condition of rightlessness (i.e. the unprecedented impossibility of finding a new home).497 
A state-centric conception of politics will not be able to see the difference between these two 
conditions, whereas the proto-political account sees it as crucial to understand Arendt’s systemic 
critique and the dominating view on the adequate scope of justice. The new problem, which 
raised awareness of “the right to have rights”, was not statelessness as such, but the way the 
organization of states in a complete international order left millions in a condition where the re-
entrance into the public as a human being (and not necessarily as a citizen) was made impossible. 
The proto-political understanding of publicity places its emphasis on “the political” in a different 
manner compared to the conventional reading. What one is deprived of in a condition of 
rightlessness is not merely a formal right of acquisition, but the very framework which makes 
human life possible at all. It suits the deliberations on cosmopolitan rights very well, because it 
describes a public sphere with a pre-institutional (or extra-institutional) character that maintains 
its political character in a similar manner to the way Kant assigns the status of cosmopolitan law 
as an unwritten code of the global public sphere.498 According to this reading, states have moral-
legal obligations toward foreigners as members of this global civil society. 
To be sure, on a proto-political level the global public sphere is institutionally unprotected, but it 
also has the potential of being assembled “wherever you go”.499 Like the market and alternative 
or underground public spaces in a domestic context, the global public sphere is understood in the 
modern social imaginary to be self-constituting. If this is accepted, the primary obligation of a 
state, according to the cosmopolitan law of deliberation, would be not to hinder this constitution. 
The empirical fact that most states do not live up to this negative obligation is hardly a sound 
                                                 
496 See Benhabib 2000 and Parekh 2016 
497 See chapter 4 for details on this distinction. 
498 See chapter 2. 
499 P. 198, in Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition, Charles R Walgreen Foundation Lectures. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. Hereafter HC. 
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counter-argument. The second, extended obligation would be to protect the global public sphere 
institutionally. In other words, the concept of the proto-political enables us to describe the kind 
of interaction that could emerge between anyone, including between citizens and foreigners, and 
the cosmopolitan space that emerge out of this interaction has a structural similarity to, but is 
institutionally distinct from, the relations between citizens. Consequently, it is in need of a 
distinct set of cosmopolitan laws to protect it (i.e. a law of deliberation).   
If we reserve the use of “political” to its conventional use, i.e. as the domain institutionally 
protected by state membership, boundaries and laws, the “proto-political” points to the aspect of 
the political that is found in the performance of a human action (in praxis) and the shared space 
that emerges “in-between” us in its wake:  
[…] the political realm rises directly out of acting together, the “sharing of words and 
deeds.” Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship to the public part of the 
world common to us all, but is the one activity which constitutes it. It is as though the 
wall of the polis and the boundaries of the law were drawn around an already existing 
public space which, however, without such stabilizing protection could not endure, could 
not survive the moment of action and speech itself.500  
A polity makes human deeds imperishable, walls and laws take on the function of a kind of 
organized remembrance. This endurance can be provided on various levels. Today we are 
accustomed to think of the territorial state level as the proper institutional level, although this 
requires a tremendous leap of faith toward strangers compared to the old city states. The actual 
circumstances seem to call for a similar leap toward strangers on the international level of 
protection.  
Further, Arendt makes an interesting comment, which points toward the crucial metatopical 
character of the proto-political element of the “polis” as a “web of relationships”:  
The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the 
organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true 
space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen 
to be.501  
This passage continues with the clearly cosmopolitan minded phrase: “Wherever you go, you will 
be a polis.” This could be read in the narrow sense of people of affiliation, be it the Hellenic 
traditions or Liverpool-fans. But, the term “proto” intends to suggest a more open character to 
this affiliation, in the sense that it “predates and precedes all formal constitution of the public 
                                                 
500 Arendt 1958, p. 198 
501 Ibid., p. 198 
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realm and the various forms of government”.502 It is related to political power in the sense that 
power is what keeps the public space, the potential proto-political space of appearance, in 
existence.503 Institutional power is however legitimate, in Arendt’s account, only to the degree 
that it manifests political principles that reflects these proto-political conditions. This opens, in 
my view, for the possibility of reading Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’ in a way that rests on a wider 
conception of rights than the right to citizen’s rights.  
To nuance the picture somewhat, we should add that what is characteristic of the conventional 
reading of Arendt is that it questions the possibility of uniting the praxis-inspired proto-political 
elements with the radical institutionalist approach that Arendt brings in with Burke’s critique of 
human rights. The conventional reading seems to opt out the parenthesized “framework”, which 
underlines the praxis-inspired terms of action and speech/opinion, and emphasize the 
cosmopolitan revision of the institutionalist aspect, i.e. the institutional implications of “the right 
to belong to an organized community”. The theoretical consequence of this is, at least in 
Benhabib’s case, a separation of Arendt’s political solution (the right to have right as a moral 
acquisition right) from a philosophical grounding in a new political principle (or more specifically 
in Benhabib’s reading: the lack thereof). Benhabib identifies at least two main weaknesses in 
Arendt’s theory:  
First, it does not give an answer as to why we should recognize someone as human.504 Benhabib 
readily admits that Arendt’s thinking is deeply grounded in “plurality”, which Benhabib associates 
with an “anthropological universalism”.505 This universalism implies an ethical gesture toward 
other members of the same species. It is operating on a level of abstraction where one is coming 
to one’s senses regarding some elements of what it is to be human,506 including: being 
fundamentally dependent and embodied creatures immersed in a human condition of plurality (of 
                                                 
502 Ibid., p. 199 
503 This is Arendt’s own and quite original definition of political power.  
504 Benhabib 2000, p. 196 
505 Ibid., p. 195-6 
506 I think this is true, but Benhabib ignores a ready possibility developed by one of her students, Anthony Steinbock: 
That this anthropology is an anthropology not of the species (and the implied abstraction of any specimen of it), but 
of the encounter (which gives us the abstraction of a relational structure, and this leaves us with a very different 
conceptual vantage point). The notion of the encounter is irreducibly normative, since it relies on the responsiveness 
of each part to the limit-claims of the other. See Steinbock, Anthony J. 1995. Home and Beyond : Generative 
Phenomenology after Husserl, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Evanston, 
Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 
This notion is, however, not so easy to adapt in the social imaginary in a highly productive manner. It’s not 
like the mature principle of harm, which has basically infiltrated every little situational redaction of tolerance, micro-
aggression, etc. (a heightened sensitivity to harming others which I celebrate, but which is met with resistance in 
parts of the reactive members of the public sphere). The point is that Arendt’s theoretical idea is on a very different 
generative stage, with barely any back-up within the current social imaginary (i.e. roughly speaking with no common 
sense or doxa). It has barely reached the state of common sense, i.e. of publicity. 
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equality-in-difference); an ethics of radical intersubjectivity (related to Arendt’s critique of 
Heidegger, see chapter 7). Still, there is something lacking according to Benhabib:  
It is the step leading from the constituents of a philosophical anthropology (natality, 
wordliness, plurality, and forms of human activity) to this attitude of respect for the other 
that is missing in Arendt’s thought. […] Arendt does not examine the philosophical step 
that would lead from description of the equality of the human condition to the equality 
that comes from moral and political recognition.507  
Arendt does not clarify the step from “is” to “ought” according to Benhabib. To be equal (in 
terms of being human) is not the same as being equal (in terms of moral dignity or formal 
equality). However, Benhabib’s critique relies on the assumption that Arendt’s concept of the 
“human condition” is merely part of a descriptive anthropological universalism. A proto-political 
reading of Arendt offers a defense against this objection by arguing that it is a mistake to read 
Arendt’s account of the “constituents” or human conditions as morally neutral in character. In 
chapter 7 I will explicate this argument by clarifying the decisive difference between the various 
human activities and mentalities inspired by principles based on the constituents associated with 
these activities. The key to understand the philosophical step that Benhabib calls for is the 
relation between the principles of action and the human conditions. The new political principle 
that Arendt promotes is meaningfulness, which corresponds to the human condition of plurality. It 
is according to this political (or moral-legal) principle Arendt aims to rearticulate the concept of 
human dignity, our imaginary of legitimate institutions and regulative ideas of territorial and 
global collectives.  
Second, in the context of the immigration debate, Benhabib claims that it is clear that Arendt 
provides us with an “ought”, but it is a political “ought” that is not clearly philosophically 
grounded:  
Arendt herself was skeptical about such justificatory philosophical discourses, seeing in 
them a form of metaphysical foundationalism. For this reason, she was able to offer a 
political but not a conceptual solution to the problems posed by the state prerogative of 
denationalizations.508  
And,  
Just as Kant leaves unexplained the philosophical and political step that could lead from 
the right of temporary sojourn to the right of membership, so too Arendt could not base 
                                                 
507 Benhabib 2000, p. 196 
508 Benhabib 2004, p. 59 
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“the right to have rights,” i.e. to be recognized as a member of some organized human 
community, upon some further philosophical principle.509  
This second theoretical problem will of course partly be addressed by responding adequately to 
the first since it is partly caused by the alleged lack of a conceptual bridge between Arendt’s 
anthropology of praxis and the moral-legal right to have rights. I argue that a successful bridge-
building will be able to address the concern of the first quote above. The conceptual solution is 
to be found, I argue, in Arendt’s preference of the principle of praxis – which I will call the 
principle of meaningfulness, which answers to the condition of plurality510 – to the alternative 
principles available. This point is crucial in order to understand Arendt’s recognition of the 
significance of abstract concepts for adequate acting and thinking. Her distancing from some 
metaphysical styles did not lead her to dismiss the value of such concepts. This is made quite 
explicit in Arendt’s discussion of Montesquieu (see also 6.3.2). 
The second quote does however also concern how we interpret Arendt’s right to have rights in 
the first place, and how it compares to Kant’s cosmopolitan law of hospitality. In Kant’s case we 
could defend his inadequate account as a matter of changing circumstances. The extension 
Benhabib suggests is clearly in line with Kant’s regulative idea of a global civil condition, but I see 
this less as a theoretical flaw on Kant’s part than a sign of Kant’s suggested content of 
cosmopolitan law as clearly provisional and open to “further deliberations”, for instance over the 
possibility of a right to membership.511 The missing philosophical principle in Arendt’s case, relies 
in my view on Benhabib’s own reading of Arendt. When Benhabib reads ‘the right to have rights’ 
as “the right to membership”, she explicates in an exemplary manner the steps needed to secure 
an extension of cosmopolitan law by a law of second admission. The problem in my view is that 
her reading also suggests that Arendt’s whole ambition was to articulate a moral-legal norm as an 
addition to the content on the level of cosmopolitan law.  
My proto-political reading will contest this suggestion. By arguing that it seems more reasonable 
to read ‘the right to have rights’ as an expression of the principle of meaningfulness on a more 
generic level of justice, I hold that this right must be placed conceptually above the threefold 
distinction of public right into different moral-legal domains. As mentioned, it is partly unclear 
exactly how Arendt herself understood the conceptual status of the right to have rights. I will 
                                                 
509 Ibid., p. 65 
510 See chapter 7 for detailed discussion on the principle of meaningfulness. 
511 This reading of the right to have rights understands it to imply an imperfect duty, Michelman argues, because 
“there is no ascertainable agent […] who specifically bears the duty (of admission somewhere) correlative to the 
claim (against exclusion everywhere) of any particular refugee.” (Michelman 1996, p. 203) Unless, we might add, they 
stand on the border, or are already within the territory of a specific foreign state. Michelman concedes, we would be 
close to a Kantian moral law of freedom, as an obligation of reason; the “duty to accept [or allocate to a specific 
other state] into juridical membership each stateless person who comes along.” (Ibid., p. 203). 
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defend a proto-political reading of Arendt by suggesting that this lack of clarity is improved by 
reading Origins in dialogue with The Human Condition. In some early passages from 1949 it seems 
clear that Arendt understood the right to have rights as a cosmopolitan right of second 
admission. In order to defend a proto-political reading, I will argue that this identification did not 
seem to satisfy Arendt, and that her later work suggest a conception of this right which is more in 
line with the development of a new, relational notion of human dignity according to the notion 
of political action (and speech or opinion) and the corresponding principle of plurality. This was 
already indicated in the introduction of Origins, written the summer of 1950.512  
Hence, as an answer to Benhabib’s critical designation of a lack of a philosophical principle in 
Arendt’s account of rights, a proto-political reading claims that this lack is solved by a different 
reading of “the right to have rights” and “the right to belong to some kind of organized 
community”. A proto-political reading understands these rights as general moral-legal rights that 
attempts to articulate the central elements of the condition of plurality within the limitations of a 
conventional rights-discourse of political theory. The right to have rights is read as the right to 
have the rights to action and opinion, or more precisely to the framework of the performing 
activity of action. This is the only human activity, according to Arendt, which allows us to 
distinguish ourselves as human. The right to belong to some kind of organized community is 
read as the right to some institutionalized equalizing recognition and protection of being a 
member. Together they articulate the right to equality, understood both as an equality of power 
(which refer to the capacity to act and speak) and the equality of dignity (as a protected member 
of public life).  
To support the point that the critique of Arendt seems to be misguided by a certain reading of 
her political theory, I will in the following section present a central critique of Arendt, which is 
more dismissive than, but at the same time seems to share the central premises of Benhabib’s 
reading of Arendt. In the last section I will counter this critique by outlining an alternative and 
preferable reading of Arendt in more detail.  
6.2 The problem of non-recognition 
As mentioned above, Benhabib’s critique of Arendt seems to rely on a reading of the right to 
have rights as expressing a political solution to denationalization and the succeeding exclusion 
from the international community, but that this solution is philosophically unsupported or in lack 
of a conceptual bridge to the existential anthropology of praxis. 
                                                 
512 Arendt 1968, p. ix 
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So far I’ve considered how this can be articulated as a theoretical challenge to the proto-political 
reading of Arendt. There is however also a practical problem implied in the separation of praxis 
(and especially the agonal aspects of it) from the political “ought”. In general we might say that 
this separation is what distinguishes Benhabib’s position from more radical and anarchic 
democratic theories. In this context, I want to concentrate on a well-known critique of Arendt 
voiced by Rancière, which, in a similar fashion to proponents of radical democratic theory, holds 
a notion of politics which emphasizes the agonal, performative aspect of political action. 
Critical to the conventional notion of “politics”, Rancière promotes a notion that understands 
“politics” as contesting the current political compromise. Politics does not happen inside the 
compromise, but in the negotiations on the implicit line between the included and the excluded. 
According to Rancière, politics is not something happening merely within the walls of the polis, but 
it is rather seen as an ongoing negotiation on the character of the protective borders of the 
community. Rancière’s position contests the validity of democratic closure and the paradox of 
democratic legitimacy (see chapter 5). And, by criticizing Arendt under the assumption that she 
held a conventional notion of politics (as something taking place within the walls), this critique 
actually comes to the aid of my proto-political reading as it explicates the problematic 
implications of the conventional reading.  
Rancière’s argument is basically that if we depoliticize the anthropology of praxis – i.e. of the 
human being as a speaking animal – and turns it into a neutral, ontological ground for politics, we 
basically risk concealing the central issue of political struggles for emancipation and recognition. 
The practical implication of this concealment is of crucial significance to foreigners because they 
are rendered without political status and with no voice to contest the violation of their human 
dignity.513  
The problem of non-recognition is associated with Arendt’s description of dehumanization, i.e. 
the exclusion from humanity and the implied loss of human rights. In the conventional reading 
this has the implication that a loss of citizenship and the status of being stateless or “de jure” 
“rightless” also implies the loss of the capacity to be political. The state-centric and institutionalist 
connection between ‘being political’ and ‘being a citizen’ consequently rejects the value of human 
rights as a strategic means in the struggle of the non-recognized to be included. This leaves the 
non-recognized, the “socially dead”, in a hopeless situation in which they have (de facto) no 
rights and with no way to claim (de jure) the rights they should have had. In other words, they not 
                                                 
513 Rancière, Jacques. 2011. "The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics." In Reading Rancière, edited by Paul; 
Stamp Bowman, Richard, 1-18. London ; New York: Continuum. 
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only lose their human rights, but also their right to political action at the very moment they need 
it the most: “If statelessness corresponds not only to a situation of rightlessness but also to a life 
deprived of public appearance, how could those excluded from politics possibly claim the right to 
have rights?”514 If you are excluded from the space of appearance, how do you claim the right to 
appear? 
Following Rancière’s argument,515 it is a mistake of Arendt (as she is presented in the 
conventional reading) to deduce a conception of a fully human life from an understanding of the 
human as a speaking animal. ‘To be political’ is in Rancière’s terms not a form of life, but a way 
of staging disagreement. For instance, evoking the claim to be “human” is to assert a 
fundamental equality not currently recognized. On these terms, he can claim that Arendt 
depoliticizes human rights (including cosmopolitan law) and stands left only with constituting 
civil rights (domestic law):  
Arendt understands (ordinary) rights as a precondition for politics since they 
institutionalize an artificial equality that is constitutive of the public sphere. This is why 
the right to have rights amounts to the right to politics. For Rancière, in contrast, politics 
is fundamentally about contesting political exclusion by enacting equality.516  
The basic disagreement here is based on the assumption that Arendt completely dismisses the 
idea of human rights and keeps only citizen rights. The conventional reading confirms this 
impression of Arendt to the extent that her account of “human rights” is reduced to a right to 
citizen rights. In consequence, in order to have a right to politics, i.e. to have a say, one must be a 
citizen. Although this is close to the accurate description of the circumstances which lead Arendt 
to a bitter agreement with Burke, it does not reflect well Arendt’s basic ambition to revise the 
conception of human rights.  
Rancière represents in this context a defense of the French notion of human rights,517 which 
implies a notion of equality that is less dependent on institutions. This notion of human rights 
suits the case of ‘sans papiers’ very well.518 How else could we account for the political character 
                                                 
514 P.22, in Schaap, Andrew. 2011. "Enacting the Right to Have Rights: Jacques Rancière's Critique of Hannah 
Arendt." European Journal of Political Theory 10, no. 1: 22-45. 
515 And, supported by Andrew Schaap’s reading of Rancière. 
516 Schaap 2011, p. 23 
517 Rancière’s notion is qualified by his own strategic account, and in contrast to Arendt’s existential account and to 
“natural law”-accounts), 
518
 See Archibugi, Danielle; Held, David. 2015. "Cosmopolitan Democracy: Paths and Agents." In Politics and 
Cosmopolitanism in a Global Age, edited by Sonika Gupta and Sudarsan Padmanabhan, Ethics, Human Rights & Global 
Political Thought. From a liberal cosmopolitan position Archibugi and Held discuss how foreigners might, and to some 
degree already are allowed to, participate in their own cases. They notice how immigrants are often supported by civil 
society in their struggle for rights in the hosting community (such as the ‘Sans Papiers’- movement, p. 27-8). Peculiar 
to the ‘sans papier’-movement is however the fact that they’ve chosen strategically to deemphasize their status as 
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of the protests of territorial residents without papers, unless these rightless individuals still have a 
sense of political agency and a capacity to contest the current political order by enacting equality? 
Rancière’s argument is relevant because it actualizes a clear danger in Arendt’s thinking to fall 
victim to the essentialist fallacy of assuming that the excluded, the denationalized, the refugees, 
etc., are “world-poor” (to speak Heideggerian) without the capacity for politics. There is thus an 
ontological trap here in Arendt’s reliance on Aristotle: the risk that one “identifies politics with 
the form of life of those who are already destined for it.”519 The basic idea is that the division 
between those that can speak and those that have no political voice, is already organizing the 
social order.520 Since the way of life of those that are non-liberated – be it women, slaves, 
workers, or the encamped or irregular – are associated with unpolitical activities, the uncritical 
appropriation of this notion of the social order might lead one to assume the excluded to be 
without the capacity to act and speak. The political struggle of the “unpolitical” is then running 
the risk of being undermined and reduced to an apolitical or anti-political struggle, unfit for a 
proper political life. Arendt’s reliance on these ideas, might lead her conception to reproduce the 
relations and the crimes of humanity that she sought to combat: 
While everyone has the capacity for action and speech, not everybody makes something 
of this capacity. Moreover, when they do act politically, those preoccupied with sustaining 
life are likely to act in the wrong way, approaching politics with the mentality of labour 
and work.521  
I readily admit that this is a problem and that Arendt sometimes makes such mistakes based on 
conceptual prejudices.522 Since Arendt relies on Aristotle’s notion of action, associated with the 
political life (bios politicos), several commentators have questioned the status of naked life (zoë), in 
her works.523 This is of central importance to political theory because it points to a basic 
distinction between the political and the apolitical. What is it that makes some sounds turn from 
‘mere noise’ into ‘voices making sense’? To ‘make sense’ is defined by quite demanding 
                                                                                                                                                        
immigrants, travelers, refugees, foreign origin, and so on, and appeal instead to their lack of a formalized status in the 
hosting state. The strategy is in other words to simulate and reiterate historical emancipation-movements for citizen 
rights of workers, women, and so on.  Hence, in the case of this movement it is strikingly clear how a cosmopolitan 
issue is converted (as a political performance of activism) to a domestic one. This might be one reason why this case 
also fits Rancière’s model of human rights, as they are historically associated with domestic struggles for 
emancipation.    
519 Schaap 2011, p. 30 
520 As Schaap points out: “The split that Rancière discerns in the apparently ‘common capacity’ of speech thus opens 
up between speech and the account that is made of speech: ‘the account by which a sonorous emission is understood 
as speech, capable of enunciating what is just, whereas some other emission is merely perceived as a noise signaling 
pleasure or pain, consent or revolt’.” (Schaap 2011, p. 30; quoted from Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and 
philosophy, p. 23, 1999)    
521 Schaap 2011, p.32 
522 See for instance Benhabib 2000, p. 141-155 for similar critique.  
523 Such as Rancière, Agamben, Birmingham, etc. 
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requirements in Arendt’s framework. Unlike the individualist idea of human dignity of an 
inherent character, Arendt relates dignity to the capacity to act. Does this imply that those 
occupied with other a- or non-political activities remain voiceless? 
As Benhabib pointed out as well, there is an inherent risk in Arendt’s taxonomy of activities that 
sometimes mistake the psychological profile of the activities themselves for the essentialist 
psychology of an entire group or class. Laborers takes on the anti-political mode of labor; 
workers the apolitical mode of work, etc. How could those who speak and act according to the 
mentality of labor and work be included in political discussions without making political 
nonsense in public? Similar to basing human dignity on rationality (like Kant), one also 
encounters problems of marginalization of those who are considered abnormal according to the 
standards of political action. Although these problems should be taken seriously, I do not think it 
accurately address Arendt’s main ambitions. First of all, the essentialist psychological assumptions 
about how entire groups tends to think, mistake the labels of activities for the political critique of 
certain mentalities that dominate the actual public debates. It is simply false (for reasons I will 
explain in more detail in the next chapter) to assume that people occupied with a certain activity 
will adapt the corresponding mentality. Second, that Arendt sometimes seems to make the same 
mistake should not count as an argument against her main concern, which is the way some 
fractions were able to pervert the public presence of the social movements and depoliticize them. 
This critique is relevant to foreigners who are excluded from political membership in other states. 
To the stateless, a proto-political account of Arendt seems to respond in a similar way as 
Benhabib’s account, by appealing to the right to political membership. To the rightless, it still 
remains to defend the claim that a proto-political reading will imply a notion of the “right to have 
rights” that addresses those deprived of a home, and hence deprived of the framework of action 
and opinion, or deprived of the opportunity to make a public presence. And, that addresses the 
invisible “homeless” in such a way that their human dignity is still guaranteed – at least negatively 
by articulating the clear violation of their right to have rights. To do so, I will have to make 
plausible a pre-institutional notion of human equality beyond the descriptive notion of a general 
human capacity to act.   
6.3 Defending the proto-political reading of Arendt 
Schaap summarizes a problematic state-centric assumption of the conventional “political” 
reading when he claims (as quoted above) that “Arendt understands (ordinary) rights as a 
precondition for politics since they institutionalize an artificial equality that is constitutive of the 
public sphere.” A basic point of promoting a proto-political reading is to nuance this picture and 
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claim that the public sphere is actually able to constitute itself without institutional protection.524 I 
hold this to be true independent of Arendt’s opinion on the matter, but I’ve also indicated that 
we find passages in Arendt that suggest that she would agree. The point is not to reject the 
political character of institutionalized communities, but to extend “politics” beyond it and specify 
the value of institutions and the protection and regulation of a space capable of emerging on its 
own. This emergence is clearly in need of institutional protection to endure. This institutional 
protection is, however, legitimate only if it is guided by principles that allow this space to prosper. 
If we stage the disagreement within the conventional reading as a disagreement between 
Benhabib and Rancière on how to read Arendt, we could say that it is a disagreement about 
where to place the emphasis regarding two different aspects of Arendt’s notion of the political. 
Benhabib contributes to a richer conventional reading by her emphasis on the narrative-linguistic 
character of the phenomenology of the everyday “space of appearances”, while Rancière – in 
attacking the “conventional Arendt” – emphasizes (and is unintendedly in agreement with) the 
agonal aspect of her thought. An implication of a proto-political reading would be acknowledging 
Rancière’s emphasis, at least to a certain degree.  
Benhabib recognizes the agonal aspect of political action, but marginalizes it by considering it 
exceptional and episodic:525  
Narrative action is ubiquitous, for it is the stuff out of which all human social life, all life 
together in the “mode of speech and action,” is constituted. Agonal action is episodic and 
rare; only some human actions attain that quality of “shining forth” and “manifesting a 
principle” that Arendt associated with agonal action. The “space of appearances” 
corresponds to the human condition of plurality, that is, that we are many and not one; it 
is only under certain very specific historical and institutional conditions that the human 
space of appearances assume the form of a public space.526  
This passage summarizes in many ways Benhabib’s reading of Arendt and draws the background 
for Benhabib’s critical, institutionally oriented, reading of the right to have rights. Benhabib 
appreciates Arendt’s phenomenological-existentialist account to the extent that she recognizes 
Arendt’s contribution to our understanding of human action as linguistically structured (which is 
                                                 
524 This claim is in line with the secular or mundane concept of sociality accounted for in “3.3 The state-centric, 
democratic social imaginaries”.  
525 This distinction of aspects relies on Benhabib’s critique of Habermas reading of Arendt. In her reading, Benhabib 
points out that Arendt’s conception of action is richer and more complex than Habermas distinction is able to reflect 
in his notion of communicative action: “This “web of relationships and enacted stories” combines the constative as 
well as the expressive dimensions of speech acts; its rational core cannot be as clearly extricated as Habermas would 
like and as he attempts to do with his concept of validity claims.” Benhabib 2000, p. 125 
526 Benhabib 2000, p. 127 
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to say something more than that speech is a form of human action).527 The following insight is 
central to Benhabib’s reading of Arendt: “The philosophical thesis [in Arendt’s work] is that 
actions can only be identified through a narrative that is disclosed to others and to ourselves.”528  
Although I agree with Benhabib on the emphasis on the narrative structure of the pre-
institutional “space of appearance” (which in Benhabib’s context would be synonymous with the 
ontological or proto-political), I think her separation of this (private) space from both the agonal 
and institutional public space is too strong.529 I will end this chapter by following two lines to 
defend the need for a proto-political reading of Arendt, and qualify it further:  
First of all, both the publicity of the “space of appearance” and the agonal action in a public 
space – the outstanding performance accessible to all – are fragile. While it is perhaps true that we 
“must appear” is some way to each other, we most certainly must not appear as human, i.e. as a 
plurality of unique human beings with a common world. This condition relies on certain obvious 
spatial and material conditions, but also – and less trivially – it relies on action, understood as a 
specific performative mode of disclosure. As such, the condition of plurality can emerge in 
“private”, but not prosper, without public institutional protection of the space of performance. 
The institutional protection is however never perfect, since human situations cannot be fully 
subsumed under general laws. Hence, we (and usually some more than others) sometimes have to 
struggle, insist, or actively “stand out”, in order to appear. We have to “make” our appearance as 
human. 
Second, since the disclosing actions are guided by certain principles, actions take on a certain 
attitude or mentality that is related to these various principles of action. These principles are 
manifested in different ways and given expression in both the agonal and institutional aspects of 
action. Crucially, answering to the condition of plurality the principle of equality is, together with 
distinctness, the central moments of meaningfulness as the guiding principles of the mentality of 
action. Since some kind of artificial equality is required in order for action to be possible, and the 
framework of political membership is the only one that can provide this artificial equalizing, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that only citizens can act. In my proto-political account, this 
conclusion is contested by giving primacy to the pre-institutional sphere of appearance, which 
relies on the agonal performance of claimed equality. The institutional framework provides the 
                                                 
527 Ibid., p. 199 
528 Ibid., p. 112 
529 Is this strong distinction motivated by the emphasis Benhabib (in Benhabib, Seyla. 1992. Situating the Self : Gender, 
Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge.) puts on the difference between the 
abstract and concrete other? Does she not in this sense seem to follow Habermas in a phenomenologically 
problematic distinction between “political”/legal and moral/face-to-face relations? (see discussion in chapter 8) 
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more permanent expression of this experienced equality. Hence, I see the agonal aspect of 
someone’s appearance as human as an integrated part of every performance.  
To be sure, we do not always act in such a way that the agonal aspect of our actions take on an 
outstanding character that contests the dominating political order and the current political (and 
excluding) expression of equality. But, if agonal actions were only episodic and rare530, Benhabib’s 
reading would imply that our appearance as human in plurality would be an exceptional event. I 
think this is an unintended, but still unacceptable consequence of her distinction.  
By removing the agonal aspect from everyday social life, Benhabib does in the conventional sense 
“depoliticize” the space of appearances, i.e. the proto-political public space. In this manner she 
isolates the ontological (or proto-political) space of appearances from the agonal performances 
that Rancière associates with political struggle. A proto-political reading aims to reintroduce the 
political character of everyday life as – at least potentially – parts of the soft public. Wherever you 
go, be it in the underground or in spontaneous public assemblies, there might be a “polis” that 
should not be hindered and that could eventually require public recognition and institutional 
protection. The fact that this relation is quite well established in the practices of strong 
democracies, as a relation between the domestic “extra-political” public sphere and the 
institutionalized procedures of government, seems to make it even harder to conceive of other 
public spheres, such as the global, that are in need of similar protection.  
6.3.1 The manner of appearance 
The first argument I present to defend the proto-political reading is related to Rancière’s concern, 
because politics for him is exactly to contest the way we “must appear” to each other. The central 
feature of a given social order, according to Rancière, is that it defines someone (“who is”; who 
speaks) in excluding and violent terms as something (“that is”; that makes sounds). Every actualized 
political order is an imperfect compromise also in this symbolic sense of exclusion from the 
political “in-group”.  
A proto-political reading interprets the right to have rights as the right to action and to opinion, 
in short: the right to appear. As such, it seeks to address the fragility of human appearance by 
seeking to provide it with protection in a legal discourse. The right to have rights is not a 
cosmopolitan law, but expresses more generally the condition of politics (i.e. plurality, the 
condition for having a voice), that the institutionalized system of domestic and cosmopolitan law 
                                                 
530 “Action is agonal when it embodies or lets “shine forth” a principle or a virtue like justice, generosity, wisdom, 
and kindness, or when it expresses a passion, an emotion in its quintessential form […] Such action is rare; it 
transcends and in many ways transfigures everydayness and our understanding of ourselves.” (Benhabib 2000, p. 
129-30) 
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(or the system of organized communities at large) should protect And, since the space of 
appearance corresponds to the human condition of plurality, this is the space to be protected.  
Benhabib might then be right in holding that the best way to protect this plurality on the 
institutional level is to anchor a concern for diversity in a right to political membership. But, as 
long as we hold, with Benhabib, that we need institutions and civil rights in order to do politics, 
Rancière is right to criticize ‘the right to have rights’ for prolonging this underlying state-centric 
assumption. The strong distinction Benhabib relies on between the space of appearance and the 
public sphere, is also detectible in her reluctance to locate “the public realm” and political activity 
outside the protected hard or softer public sphere. The “soft public” can be understood, as 
mentioned in chapter 5, as a mediating political space between the impersonal formal relations of 
legal subjects and the personal ethical relations of everyday life. Apparently, only under extreme 
conditions does the public realm migrate into the unprotected private spheres:   
Under totalitarianism, the public square is filled with the hollow signs of the regime’s 
power, but a common world is re-created elsewhere [in churches, drawing rooms, and 
cafés]. These regimes start toppling when the common world created elsewhere starts 
spilling over into the streets, the market-place, and into the city squares, thus constituting 
an alternative public sphere.531  
This is a very good illustration of how we might think of the institutionally unprotected public 
space under all conditions. But, compared with Taylor’s description of the Enlightenment notion 
of public sphere, isn’t the idea of the public realm, migrating into topical spaces like the cafés, 
very similar to the idea of a continuous debate in the public sphere? Where exactly does it stop 
being political? And, given that our social imaginaries constantly revises our theoretical ideas of 
justice, including in our private lives with partners, kids, consumption and waste, etc.; how does it 
make sense to say that our actions in the private domain only become inspired by political 
principles under totalitarianism? The kind of “common world created elsewhere” which starts 
“spilling over into the streets” would fit quite well as an image of countless political counter-
movements – even the kind of quiet, high-income cosmopolitan individualists that drink single-
origin coffee with enthusiasm, eat their vegetables with profound enjoyment and ride a bike with 
provoking ease. 
This said, it is a misunderstanding of Rancière to assume that Arendt’s new political principle, 
which is reflected in ‘the right to have rights’, is “deduced” from the Aristotelian anthropology of 
man as a speaking animal. First of all, as Peg Birmingham has pointed out in her excellent 
discussion on Arendt’s influence from Augustine, Arendt does not share the kind of attributive 
                                                 
531 Benhabib 2000, p. 129 
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ontology that Aristotle holds.532 Further, Arendt’s support of the institutionalist critique of 
natural human rights (inspired by Hobbes, Rousseau and Burke) is qualified and restricted by a 
peculiar anthropological universalism based on the highly unnatural, narrative-linguistic human 
condition of plurality.533 Hence, there is a crucial difference between the notion of “human” that 
Arendt criticizes for being too abstract (grounded in our biological nature), and the notion of 
human dignity that Arendt appeals to in approving terms (grounded in plurality). The former 
hides the privilege of citizens behind the label of “human rights”; the latter answers to the 
concrete conditions of the political affairs that make us human. 
As mentioned in 6.1, a proto-political reading depends on the possibility of grounding the right 
to have rights in the experiences of this condition of plurality (as a normative anthropology). This 
must be understood both according to the narratively structured experience of agency, and to the 
agonal manifestations of a principle. In the next chapter I will clarify this normative ground by 
giving a phenomenological reading of Arendt’s notion of action. According to this reading, 
Rancière’s strategic concept of the politics of human rights, and the performative notion of 
“enactment of equality”, seems compatible with the implications of Arendt’s own 
phenomenological perspective. We might say that agonal actions are rare when seen as contesting 
a political order, such as Rosa Park’s refusal to move from her seat. But, at least in a republic or a 
liberal democracy, the agonal manifestation of equality is also part of everyday life.  
6.3.2 Mentalities and the manifestation of principles  
Another consequence of Benhabib’s depoliticization of the everyday space of appearance is that 
“the web of relationships and the enacted stories”534 is not clearly a home, i.e. social world where 
individuals are personally distinguished from others. I think Benhabib is right to hold the 
narrative structure to be the stuff the social world is made of, or the material out of which the 
social horizon is spun.535 It is, however, unclear to me how Benhabib understands the relation 
between actions and mentalities.  
                                                 
532  Birmingham 2006 
533 Benhabib emphasizes the philosophical significance of human plurality as the basic human condition, and 
understands it to have universalist pretensions in terms of identifying general anthropological features and a ground 
for normative standards. (See 1996, p. 195) It claims in other words a decentralized/general validity. 
534 See Arendt 1958, p. 182-3. Benhabib reads “web” as horizon (see 1996 p. 112). 
535 To be sure, this world is nothing like a coherent philosophical account of reality. Correspondingly, nor should 
one, according to Arendt, think politically in such a rigorous manner: “Arendt herself no longer thought it either 
desirable of even possible to fit the world into a coherent “philosophical Weltanschauung.” For her, political 
philosophy became a method of narration to “cull meaning from the past,” an exercise in establishing distinctions 
that would enable us to think the meaning of our times and our actions, to “think what we are doing”.” (Benhabib 
2000, p. 118, reference to “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future” in Arendt, Hannah. 1961. Between Past and 
Future, Six Exercises in Political Thought. New York,: Viking Press. 
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On the one hand, Benhabib seems to recognize that the attitudinal reading of Arendt’s activity 
types is the only one that is “sophisticated and rich enough to do justice to the sociological 
complexity and variety of modern institutions”536 The attitudinal reading emphasizes that the 
various activities is reflected in various mentalities,537 and objects to the idea of distinct activity 
types that correspond to properly designated realms because it is sociologically untenable and 
phenomenologically essentialistic. In other words, to assume that laborers in the household are 
determined by the mentality of labor, and that the workers and bourgeoisie at the market place 
are determined by the mentality of work, is simply misguided.  
On the other hand, since mentalities relies on and are guided by principles, it is unclear how the 
agonal aspect of action can be seen as exceptional. It does not make sense to claim that we act 
according to a certain mentality or appear as useful, or even as human, only in some exceptional 
and outstanding performances. Certainly, we may live most of our everyday life in ways that make 
ourselves and our surroundings remain gray and undistinguished. But, there is no essential 
necessity to this lack of color and richness of everyday life. It also makes sense to say that the 
agonal contestation of a political order is quite rare and episodic. Still, it would be strange and 
alarming to describe our human appearance in this everyday life as rare and exceptional (although 
it certainly is a possibility under extreme, “everyday life”-conditions such as those in the 
totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin). If anything is clear from Arendt’s use of “humanity”, it 
is that an everyday life without activity guided by the proper mentality has a disastrous and 
depriving character associated with uncanny images such as the “living dead’.   
My impression is that Arendt borrows the old cases of principled action of virtue, honor and 
glory to illustrate a possible alternative to the modern mentalities of consumerism and 
instrumental rationality. Similar to the way Arendt appeals to isonomia, her reference to republican 
virtue (or the “love of equality”), is not meant – as I see it – as expressions of nostalgia, but as 
expressions of a common human experience that gets lost in the mentalities grounded in the 
condition of life or worldliness.538 For instance, in an essay from around 1953-54, “On the 
Nature of Totalitarianism”, Arendt seems to relate the notion of equal value to the common 
experience of plurality:  
The common ground of republican law and action is […] the insight that human power is 
not primarily limited by some superior power, God or Nature, but by the powers of one’s 
                                                 
536 Benhabib 2000, p. 141 
537 For first development of this reading of Arendt, see Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1998. The Attack of the Blob : Hannah 
Arendt's Concept of the Social. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
538 See chapter 7 for detailed discussion. 
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equals. And the joy that springs from the experience that only because this is so, only 
because there is equality of power, is man not alone.539 
This equality of power is, as discussed earlier, not depending on institutional law as such. The 
republican law is rather one of several expressions of a common experience of men (in plural) 
living together and acting in concert as equals. In this sense the mentality of human agency, and 
the personal mode of appearance, would exactly “stand out” from the background of the 
anonymous life of labor and work. This alternative mentality should be worked out, in my view, 
on all levels, including both the exceptional level of “outstanding individuals” and in the more 
quiet routines and social imaginaries of everyday life. On both levels the “outstandingness” is 
crucial for the subsistence of plurality. In concrete relations Arendt seems to draw on Augustine, 
as the principle of humanity takes on the agonal manifestation of “love”: I want you to be. On the 
political level, the manifestations are perhaps less hazardous, but also more complex.  
As Birmingham makes clear, Arendt is greatly in debt to Montesquieu in her understanding of 
political agency and its essential dependency on principles of action.540 Political agency and living 
institutions, Arendt holds, depend on principles that move and guide them. The original idea of 
Montesquieu was, according to Arendt, his attention not only to the particular structure of 
various governments but to their guiding principles of action:  
[…] he adds that in a republic the principle of action is virtue, which, psychologically, he 
equates with love of equality; in a monarchy, the principle of action is honor, whose 
psychological expression is a passion for distinction; and in a tyranny, the principle of 
action is fear.541  
Montesquieu’s notion of an innate principle, a spirit or an ethos, in each form of government, 
gives us the clue to how a new political principle could be implemented. First of all, his notion of 
‘principle of action’ is not static (where all deviations would be seen as degeneration), but is seen 
as a principle of motion (which opens the changes in the structures of governments as a historical 
process open to improvements). Second, by introducing the principle divisions of power, 
Montesquieu himself demonstrated how a new political principle could be established.  
A crucial point for Birmingham is that this understanding of principles of action bridges the clear 
divide between the public and the private in political theory. While Arendt seems to agree with 
Montesquieu on the rejection of the essentialist psychological assumption that “all people behave 
at all times according to the principles of the government”, she also criticizes him for being 
                                                 
539 P. 336, in Arendt, Hannah. 1994. "On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding." In Essays in 
Understanding, 1930-1954, edited by Jerome Kohn, xxxi, 458 p. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 
540 Birmingham 2006, p. 13 ff. 
541 Arendt 1994, p. 330 
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caught in the problem of the conflict between man as citizen and man as individual. Arendt 
compares this problem to the double standard of the modern realist conception of international 
relations, which rejects arbitrary sovereignty in the domestic domain, but fully accepts the 
principle of domination (“might is right”) in the international domain.542 In a similar way, modern 
political thought seems to be caught in a double standard of the public and private: “The 
distinction between the citizen and the individual becomes a problem as soon as we become 
aware of the discrepancies between public life, in which I am a citizen like all other citizens, and 
personal life, in which I am an individual unlike anybody else.”543  
In contrast to public laws (or legal recipes), which might protect and define the boundaries of the 
private but not regulate it directly, principles are the general guidance of human agency – even in 
the personal sphere, where the cases cannot be subsumed under nor guided by general laws.544 
Hence, in this essay, Arendt is much clearer on this than she is in the Human Condition: there is a 
common ground, a human “arche”, 545 which provides our principles, even fear, with a 
recognizable and reliable character, both in personal and public life.546 This “common ground” 
clearly has many facets, as it can ground so different governmental types as republics and 
tyrannies. In the end, the question is:  
How do the types of human activity that Arendt identify, serve as a ground for her new 
political principle?  
As found in the quoted passage above on the common ground of republican law, Arendt 
mentions characteristics of the experience of power of equality which are essential to the human 
activity of action, such as “living together” and “acting in concert as equals”. But, since the 
“political-public” sphere which is regulated by law is insufficient in its responsiveness to the 
uniqueness of each in their personal sphere of life, it cannot alone provide the sufficient 
conditions for political change:  
                                                 
542 It should be noted that Montesquieu’s principle of divisions of power led him to an idea of a world federation of 
international relations, which inspired Kant’s view discussed in chapter 2.  
543 Arendt 1994, p. 333 
544 Ibid., p. 335 
545 Arche refers to «beginning» or «origin» in Greek. Similar to Aristotle Montesquieu and Arendt seems to use it as an 
quasi-transcendental term, of a principle (for instance of government) which is in itself indemonstrable and 
intangible, but still provides it with its conditions of possibility.  
546 Birmingham 2006, p. 14, Birmingham identifies this common ground with the “event of natality”, where plurality 
is one aspect of this event. Although I am greatly in debt to Birmingham’s understanding of Arendt’s work, I do not 
follow her analysis all the way. I think it relies too much on Heidegger’s notion of ontology, which in 
phenomenological terms gives her analysis a genetic rather than generative character. This is noticeable in the way 
“natality” takes on the character of an existential, rather than a generative and non-egological event with 
transcendental significance. Unfortunately, an elaborate discussion to do Birmingham’s position justice is not 
possible within the scope of this thesis.  
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[…] it is [an entirely different, non-public, sphere of life] from which the sources of 
action and motion, as distinguished from the stabilizing, structural forces of law and 
power, spring. Hedged in by law and power, and occasionally overwhelming them, lie the 
origins of motion and action.547 
I read “non-public” here to imply the kind of public sphere that is protected by, but not regulated 
by law. I interpret this emphasis on the “non-public” as an early attempt to revise the republican 
principle of virtue, and the legal protection of the private sphere, by nuancing the conception of 
the common ground, from the experience of equality of power to its implied fact of plurality. 
The latter is later developed in The Human Condition as a conception of political action and 
publicity that requires both equality and uniqueness for someone to come “into his own” and 
appear as fully human.  
Arendt’s conception seems to improve considerably in clarity between her early critiques of the 
Human Rights Declaration (1949-51), where the view of Aristotle is briefly mentioned, to her 
fully worked out conception of human dignity in The Human Condition (1958) and the last chapter 
of Origins (added in 1958). In the former texts Arendt is mainly critical to the conventional 
grounding of human rights and seems preoccupied with presenting the suggested extension of 
cosmopolitan law as the one human right. As Menke points out, Arendt understands the one 
human right to belong to a distinct sphere of positive law, “above the nations”. It is distinct from 
interstatal law (in the Kantian sense of “intercourse of sovereign nations”), but still initiated and 
guaranteed by “a comity of nations” and the “emergence of mankind as political entity”.548 In 
other words, Arendt seems to locate the “right to have rights” in the domain of cosmopolitan law 
enforced by an international federation.  
In this cosmopolitan argument, Arendt clearly distinguishes herself from the position of Burke, 
but still moves within the bounds of the same structural level of a state-centric institutionalist 
account. Arendt’s early conception of the new principle is very close to the old republican 
‘equality before the law’. With this institutional grounding, Menke argues, Arendt seems to run 
into the same risks as any reliance on factual historical conventions; the norms loses their 
function as an external normative guidance and turns into positive historical law with the same 
inherent risk of exclusion of imperfect compromises as state institutions. It simply relocates the 
problem to a higher level of political entity, that of “mankind”.549 Even if this political entity is 
understood as a legitimate international federal order, the institutionalist dependency on 
historically introduced rights cannot serve as a conceptual guarantee against the aporia of human 
                                                 
547 Arendt 1994, p. 335 
548 Menke 2007, p. 750 
549 Ibid., p. 751ff 
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rights. Since such a comity of nations would rely on positive law, it might implement legal 
guarantees for both citizen rights and cosmopolitan rights, but it cannot serve as its autonomous 
conceptual grounding.  
According to the Kantian conceptual framework that I developed in chapter 2, cosmopolitan law 
does not ground citizen rights (on the international or state level); they complement them and 
might address individual or systemic outcomes of an international regime of citizen rights. 
Crucially, if the right to have rights is to be understood as a right articulating a new political 
principle – which serves as a guide and inspiration for both these categories of rights – it cannot 
be read as a cosmopolitan right. If we interpret this new principle as a cosmopolitan right, the 
very ‘verticality’ of the principle is lost into the horizontal levelling of public right. On the other 
hand, if we read it as a right to the basic activity of human appearance (i.e. action and speech), it 
seems to comply quite well with a principle of meaningfulness, which answers to the human 
condition of plurality, and hence to the new regulative idea of humanity. The cosmopolitan law 
of second admission would still be recognized as in compliance with this new political principle, 
but no longer as identical with it.  
To clarify this new conception, Birmingham’s exegesis of ‘the right to have rights’ could serve as 
a helpful starting point: “Significantly, for Arendt, the right to have rights is more than merely a 
juridical right. For her, the right to have rights is a fundamental political right; it is the right to 
belong significantly to a political space.” 550 To Arendt, the traditional citizen rights of freedom 
and thought are seen as a specification (within domestic law) of the right to action and speech; 
and the right to sovereignty (as an autonomous individual and sovereign collective), is replaced 
with the relational right to belong to an organized political space (plurality against the unified 
will).551 While Birmingham seems to retain the assumption of a foundational human right, she 
detaches this right from the conventional understanding of these “further rights” as citizen rights: 
“[…] the law of humanity (understood as the appearance of the actor among a plurality of actors 
in a public space of freedom), demands that the actor have the right to appear, or, as Arendt so 
succinctly puts it, the right to have rights.” 552 
                                                 
550 Birmingham 2006, p. 59 
551 Paraphrased Ibid., p. 36 
552 Ibid., p. 57. For reasons that I cannot discuss properly here, I’ve left out Birmingham’s notion of “event of 
Natality” as the “carrier of the principle of publicness”. The main reason is that Birmingham, despite doing an 
excellent exegesis and contextual reading of Arendt, remains within the Heideggerian framework of “existentials” in 
her interpretation of Arendt’s notion of Natality. The radical break with Heidegger in Arendt, which is reflected in 
the generative-transcendental significance of the influx of newcomers, is not properly addressed by Birmingham. I 
thank Anne Granberg for discussions on this point.    
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I read this “right to appear” as an attempt to explicate an aspect of human dignity that is not 
captured in the conventional interpretation and that could be given content by articulating both 
citizen rights and cosmopolitan rights. As discussed in chapter 4, I understand this conception of 
human rights to answer to the new circumstances experienced in a completely organized world. 
The world has become “one world” and exclusion from this community implies a kind of 
deprivation of the basic human conditions which the conventional conception of human rights 
stands unprepared to answer. The right to appear and the right to belong is, in my view, Arendt’s 
general conceptual answer to these circumstances. In the next chapter I will consider the relation 
between activities and principally guided mentalities in more detail.  
6.3.3 Grounding citizen and cosmopolitan rights 
To appreciate what is at stake we have to interpret the rights to appear and to belong in the 
context of Arendt’s project to rethink the conceptual justification of political (including 
cosmopolitan) rights. This conception should inspire us to treat each other with humanity, but it 
cannot rest on a foundation of an individualist metaphysics. In other words – and Arendt is 
persistent in this view – there is nothing in our individual nature that will ensure our default 
membership in humanity. We do not appear as human by revealing our true, inherent material or 
mental nature. Only by being included in the proto-political “in-between” space of appearances 
do we appear in this mode. A formally organized community does not provide this framework, 
but protects it. In this space, shared with others, we are someone by manifesting our responsible 
agency through action. Hence, the proto-political indicates the political “arche”; the stable and 
universal human experience of action and speech. Action and speech furthermore relies on 
plurality, the human condition which any political principle of justice can and should take as its 
point of departure.  
The point here is not to claim that we have to require a proto-political performance of foreigners 
in order for them to be included in humanity. This would require us to exclude both newborns 
and victims of non-recognition; rather it implies a moral-legal obligation to listen to every 
newcomer (in the sense used by Arendt in On Revolution553: i.e. as someone who makes their 
public appearance, which could potentially be anyone). Hence, the point is to let the most 
appropriate aspects of the human experience ground the principles that inspire the way we treat 
each other in private and organize our communities in public.554 Arendt finds these aspects in the 
experiences where we appear most fully as human beings to each other. This must not be 
                                                 
553 P. 36, Arendt, Hannah. 1965. On Revolution, Compass Books,. New York,: Viking Press. 
554 This is why a sense of pain or embodied vulnerability might serve as a good common ground for animal rights, 
but not, in Arendt’s view, as a common ground for human togetherness and human dignity.  
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understood as an essentialist attributive determination of human nature, but as an experientially 
based, comparative preference of experienced aspects of life. She finds inspiration in the Greek 
notion of praxis, as a concept that captures some of this experience in the most political mode of 
human activity. In her appropriation, “action” and “speech” is the key terms that refer to the type 
of activities where such optimal experiences emerge.  
Michelman suggest that we have to account for this “proto-political” aspect to make the best 
exegetic reading of Arendt. While more interesting than the conventional reading, it does not 
solve the problem of political exclusion that it sets out to do, according to Michelman. This 
reading is interesting, Michelman argues, because it contests the attributive model where rights 
are grounded in some aspect of human nature (such as sense of pain or human reason).555 It does 
not, however, solve the problem of exclusion associated with the “rights of Man” as positive 
citizen rights. By emphasizing the performance of agency and enactment of rights, it rather seems 
to describe the social contingency of political inclusion and leaves us pointing to an “irreparable 
groundlessness of rights”.556 I basically think this is a mistaken assumption on Michelman’s part. 
The reliance on agency and enactment does not make rights “irreparably groundless”; it simply 
reflects their guidance by comparatively preferred principles and not some static doctrine. It 
describes a central feature of the lived and highly artificial life, guided by political principles that 
can be given content (but never determined) as duties and rights of states and individuals.  
As mentioned above, Benhabib shares Michelman’s qualified pessimism of philosophical 
groundlessness and is quite dismissive about the possibility of developing a theoretically sound 
proto-political account.557 Benhabib criticizes Arendt for being conceptually vague on her notion 
of the public, and not to distinguish clearly enough between the exceptional agonal aspects and 
the everyday narrative form of plurality – and correspondingly between the institutional and the 
ontological levels of public space. Andrew Schaap also seems to take the position of Michelman, 
admitting that Arendt’s ambition was most plausibly a proto-political558 reading and then 
criticizing her for not succeeding with it, based on her inadequate solution to the problem of 
non-recognition (following Rancière).  
                                                 
555 It breaks with the Kantian view: “each human being’s attributed capacity for rational agency is a “feature of us,” 
[…] that serves as a ground or “source” for the moral judgement that others ought to accord us certain kinds of 
respectful treatment or, in other words, that we have certain moral rights.” (Michelman 1996, p. 204) 
556 Michelman 1996, p. 207 
557 Benhabib refers approvingly to Michelman’s article in The Right of Others, without however clarifying the difference 
between the most interesting and the most conventional reading of Arendt. 
558 To my knowledge he is the first to coin this term of “proto-political” in relation to Arendt, referring to 
Michelman’s article. The proto-political is not mentioned in Michelman’s text.   
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Schaap is clearly aware of the “proto-political” level in Arendt, and explicates it quite succinctly: 
“For Arendt politics properly concerns the constitution and preservation of a space of 
appearances in which individuals can act and speak.”559 And further: “While the political depends 
on institutions for its preservation, the space of appearances is primordially dependent on 
political action: it is there where men and women come together to act and speak in public but it 
begins to disappear with each individual’s withdrawal from the public realm.”560 Then he 
concludes by pointing exactly at the ground that Benhabib calls for (while rejecting praxis as a 
sound possibility):  
If the right to have rights can be said to have a ground at all, it is in praxis and the space of 
appearances that emerges contingently when men in the plural get together to act in concert. 
This space of appearances is, fundamentally, prior to the establishment of institutions.561  
Although Schaap is exceptionally clear on the proto-political reading of Arendt, he dismisses, like 
Benhabib and many others562, the possibility of reconciling the agonal and institutional aspects of 
the political. Schaap seems to suggest that it is almost like “praxis” supplied Arendt with the 
necessary distance from the institutionalized principle of equality (Burke’s ‘right of an 
Englishman’). Associating praxis with the “anarchic principle of isonomia” (which means “not to 
be subject to the necessity of life or the command of another, and not to be in command 
oneself”)563 Arendt is also able to distance herself from Aristotle and the conventional view on 
politics as partaking in ruling and being ruled. Hence, the distance taken from both the 
institutionalist and substantialist notion of rights, seems to leave her however with no reliable 
alternative.  
To counter this pessimism, I’d like to argue that the interpretation of “the right to appear” and 
“the right to belong” as expressions of the principle of meaningfulness is promising. According 
to this reading, these rights moderate the dichotomy between the institutionalist and the praxis-
based approaches. Rather than focusing on the incommensurability of the topical and 
metatopical levels of sociality, it understands the framework of action and its organized 
protection as two expressions of the same principle (and indirectly of the same kind of basic 
experience and human condition).  
I’ve already suggested that this principle should be understood as the principle of 
meaningfulness, which correlates to the common ground of experience defined by the condition 
                                                 
559 Schaap 2011, p. 27 
560 Ibid., p. 27 
561 Ibid., p. 28 
562 See for instance Etienne Balibar, who points the irreconcilable tension in Arendt’s combination of a strong 
institutionalism (from Burke) with the anarchic notion of isonomia and praxis: Etienne Balibar (2007) 
“(De)Constructing the Human as Human Institution: A Reflection on the Coherence of Hannah Arendt’s Practical 
Philosophy”, in Social Research 74(3): 727–38. 
563 Schaap 2011, p. 28 
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of plurality. A central clue to how this principle connects to ‘the right to have rights’ is Arendt’s 
notion of “home”, as the framework for action and speech. She describes this framework as “the 
entire social texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a 
distinct place in the world”564 It is a notion that is clearly wider than the legal situation guaranteed 
by a political membership. Accordingly, to be displaced and encamped is not primarily to lack a 
place to stay or to lack citizenship, nor the basic needs like shelter and food, but rather to lack a 
place in which to make oneself “at home”. Arendt’s ambition of articulating a new conception of 
human dignity, or to restore its meaningfulness, is reflected in this notion of “home” in the sense 
that it seeks to explicate what is violated in rightlessness, but which one cannot be deprived of as 
a fundamental moral claim without ceasing to be human.  
We find traces of this idea in Arendt’s work already in the text from 1949, as a conception of 
“human being” that is neither referring to a natural state, nor to a historically developed entity 
(such as “a comity of nations”). This rules out the strong anthropological sense of “praxis”, as if 
its constituents had the character of an unchangeable universal nature. Similarly, it qualifies the 
institutionalist notion of “rights” as not reducible neither to “the rights of an Englishman” (or 
any other nation with legal institutions) nor to the positive international law of cosmopolitan 
rights. In its most general expression, it is perhaps best expressed in the regulative idea of 
humanity.  
Arendt’s point in referring to “praxis” is not to determine anything like an attributive feature of 
the essential nature of Man. The point is not to grounding human dignity in the “unnatural” 
character of the political and speaking human being, as if “political” and “speaking” were 
contingent attributes of man. Arendt does not speak of the rights of Man, but of the rights of 
men. The idea with “praxis” is rather, as I see it, to point out the kind of activity, or rather mode of 
activity, which actualizes the human condition of being together, i.e. of plurality. This leads us, as 
I see it, to a profound phenomenological insight. Menke points out that the foundational 
significance of praxis is to be found in the experience of the value of political existence, from an 
insiders’ perspective, in comparative relation to other experiences we have of human existence.565 
I take this to be very precise, but to appreciate the point fully, I will establish the central 
phenomenological distinction in the next chapter.  
The grounding function of comparing experiences also specifies the significance of Arendt’s 
interest for “isonomia”, which, analogous to the concept of “praxis”, has significance as an 
inspiring concept for rethinking the principle and mentality that answers to the condition of 
plurality. Since the right to have rights cannot be a “bestowed” or empirical right, like the rights 
                                                 
564 Arendt 1968, p. 293 
565 Menke 2007, p .754 
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of citizens or even of world-citizens in the positive, historical sense of subjective rights, Arendt 
must present some way to qualify the status of this right. And, since Arendt dismisses the 
possibility of natural rights (like the unbestowed subjective right), Menke’s solution is to define 
“the one human right” as an articulation of what is right for human beings, rather than as 
individual right claims.  
Although Menke’s account clarifies Arendt’s conception negatively by dissociating it from other 
traditional conceptions of right, I am critical to the implication he draws from it: that it is right 
for human beings to be members of a political community, grounded in “the experience that 
political membership is the true human condition”.566 If we accept Menke’s conclusion at face 
value, we find ourselves very quickly in a paternalistic version of the conventional reading. It 
relies on the contingent claim to have discovered what is good or right for all human beings in 
the modern state (or some historical equivalent). And, even if we do accept that there are certain 
general conditions to a good life that can be qualified and agreed upon (such as environment, 
food, moderate rates of homicide, etc.), what is meant by a “political community” in this context 
and how is it nuanced from a “home” is unclear.  
In contrast, I think that Arendt’s concept of the political is primarily attitudinal,567 implying that 
(proto-)political actions can happen anywhere there is a “home”, and a home is not necessarily an 
organized polis or nation, it could also be a class room, a spontaneous revolutionary assembly, a 
secret community or a diaspora. As I’ve suggested by the notion of the proto-political, Arendt’s 
concept of the political is not located on the institutional level. By “attitudinal” I understand the 
“the political” as a mentality, guided by a principle grounded in the arché of action; i.e. in the 
condition of plurality. This principle can be given content on several levels. On the level of the 
insiders’ experience (or the lived experience) it is given expression in the way we appear to each 
other, primarily as individual types. On the level of imaginaries, this mentality is given expression 
in the way we imagine the social and institutional context of concrete interactions. On the 
conceptual level it is articulated as regulative ideas and general norms.  I’ll explicate these levels in 
broader detail in chapter 8.  
Conclusion 
The problem of statelessness presents us, according to Arendt, with an apparent aporia of human 
rights. When we are most in need of guarantees that rests on our membership in humanity, the 
human rights fail to provide this protection. From the perspective of the “eighteenth century 
categories” (of individual, civil rights) the problem that statelessness leads to rightlessness seems 
                                                 
566  Menke 2007, p. 755 
567 Benhabib 2000, p. 139: Attitudinal reading of “action”. 
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insolvable. Arendt does however not accept this aporetic diagnosis as the final word. She seeks to 
base a new conception of human dignity in the human condition of plurality, which requires a 
framework of action and speech, i.e. a “home”.  
In this chapter I’ve discussed the conventional reading of Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’. This 
reading is characterized by taking Arendt’s solution – the articulation of the right to have rights – 
as a cosmopolitan right to citizenship, which implies an emphasis on the institutionalist aspects of 
Arendt’s work. It recognizes the necessity of institutional protection of the public space, and 
defends this institutionalist emphasis by criticizing Arendt’s appeal to the agonal aspects of praxis 
and topical public spaces as essentialist and exceptional. Sympathetic readers of Arendt, such as 
Habermas and Benhabib, tend to leave these aspects to the side and embrace the aspects that 
better suit their own agenda.  
Further, the problem of non-recognition presents Arendt, according to some of her critics, with a 
fundamental critique that might lead to a wholesale rejection of her position. According to this 
critique, the aporia of human rights (i.e. that they are inapplicable when needed the most) is not 
solved by de-emphasizing the agonistic and performative aspects of Arendt’s appeal to praxis. 
According to this less sympathetic reading, such as Rancière’s, the favoring of the communicative 
and narrative aspects – which are well-suited to an established institutional context – risks 
contributing to the excluding order that led to this apparently unsolvable problem in the first 
place. To the contrary, the performative aspects are exactly the core of political actions, which 
according to Rancière, is missing in Arendt’s account. But, as I argue in my discussion of 
Benhabib’s reading of Arendt, these are exactly the aspects that are filtered out in the 
conventional reading of her position. If anything, the problem of non-recognition reveals a 
weakness of the conventional reading; it operates with a notion of political action that excludes 
the capacity to contest the political order and establish new publics from outside “the political”. 
My proto-political reading of Arendt seeks to loosen this close connection between citizenship 
and political action. One way to do this is to insist that the distinction between domestic rights 
and cosmopolitan rights articulates complementary constraints of the state. This point makes the 
conception of the public sphere more malleable and less “bounded” or “closed” because it 
recognizes the need for protecting spontaneously emerging public outside the conventional 
domestic sphere. Cosmopolitan rights imply an obligation to protect political actions that are not 
already protected or enabled by citizen rights. More fundamentally, if we read the right to have 
rights, reflected in the wider notion of “home”, as a general right to appear, it becomes clear that 
the cosmopolitan right to political membership is but a partial articulation of the protection 
required by this wider framework. 
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To qualify the phenomenological point of grounding principles in experience, we have to 
consider this phenomenological approach more carefully. This is what I will do in the next 
chapter (chapter 7). I aim to show that this approach can be defended, if we read Arendt’s 
understanding of praxis as a normative term. In the following chapter I will argue that this 
normative aspect comes to expression in Arendt’s work on two distinct levels: First, the 
communicative activity of action and speech is compared to other human activities associated 
with survival and production. On this level, action and speech (i.e. praxis) is rendered the most 
human activity in terms of the degree to which it relies on being with others. Second, on the level 
of mentalities, the principles that spring from the experience of action are judged in comparison 
with other general human experiences and condition in terms of their adequacy as political 
principles. The principle of meaningfulness is not simply found preferable ‘in itself’. It stands out 
in comparative relation to how the other principles manifest themselves in actions, institutions 
and governmental forms. In other words, the political mentality (guided by the principle pf 
meaningfulness) is found preferable due to its ability to provide a thoughtful concern for the 
sustenance of plurality, the condition of action and speech, and hence to protect and preserve the 
proto-political public space. The right to have rights is Arendt’s central articulation of this 
principle.   
If we accept the interpretation of Arendt’s right to have rights as a basic human right, or rather as 
a right to humanity, the basic injustice toward the refugees is not that we deprive them of 
something that we have, namely state membership. What we actually fail to provide is a social 
context where we are, to each other, not merely “Norwegians” and “foreigners”, but co-
humans.568 Hence, what we violate in the case of the stateless or the long-term encamped is not 
primarily some specific individual rights, whether they are the rights of citizens or foreigners. 
What is violated is the humanity that we are all presumably members of. Both those subjected to 
inhumane exclusion and the inhumane excluders, lose their membership in the violation. Only 
when this basic right to humanity is recognized should we consider how to protect this primary 
belonging by “further rights”.  
To give content to this “further rights” I still find Kant’s threefold distinction of public right 
relevant, and hence the protection could be provided in the form of both domestic rights and 
cosmopolitan rights. Further, I argue that the account of cosmopolitan rights should be extended 
beyond the content of both the cosmopolitan law of admission (including the law of second 
admission) to include the cosmopolitan law of deliberation.569 
                                                 
568 Menke 2016 (Zurück Zu Hanna Arendt – Die Flüchtlinge und Die Krise Der Menschenrechte)  
569 See  
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Chapter 7: Hannah Arendt‘s non-instrumental notion of the political – a 
phenomenological reading  
“Every black child born in Mississippi 
You know the poor child is born dead” 
J.B. Lenoir 
In this chapter I will defend the view that Arendt presents us with a normative account of politics 
that is adequately grounded, although its primary purpose or source of legitimacy cannot be 
located outside the political activity itself. This must be understood, in my opinion both in light 
of the extraordinary wide notion of politics that Arendt uses, and the in light of the way she 
grounds its normativity. The purpose of politics is for Arendt not instrumental, hence it is not 
grounded on goals of the common wealth, the nation nor ultimately on the individual as an end 
in itself. It is rather, I argue, articulated in the new political principle of meaningfulness, which 
finds its expression primarily as the individual right to a framework that makes political 
interaction possible. “Politics for the sake of politics” implies therefore, in my reading of Arendt, 
that the state’s primary obligation is to promote and protect the constitution and preservation of 
the political action and the space that makes this “motion” possible. The framework of action 
and speech is also indicated by the notion of home, as that which displaced persons must leave 
behind, and which they in an unjust and ‘completely organized world’ hardly find anywhere else. 
This framework is usually understood as “political” in so far as it is organized within the 
conventional perimeters of a modern state. As argued in chapter 6, the proto-political 
interpretation provides in my view a more open conception of the character of this framework 
because “politics” for Arendt includes the pre- or extra-institutional publics as well. 
To establish the ground of the principle of meaningfulness, I aim in this chapter to elaborate on 
Arendt’s notion of political activities according to my proto-political reading and defend the 
normative value of plurality, beyond its value as a description of pre-institutional public spaces or 
spaces of topical interaction. I will argue that the normative judgement that leads Arendt to the 
political principle of meaningfulness is phenomenologically informed. Simply put, this means that 
the typology of activities – labor, work and action – that Arendt presents in the The Human 
Condition should not be interpreted as categories that define “what” these activities are (their 
essential features, location, psychology, etc.). This would reduce this typology to a set of 
descriptive terms and leave any normative ranking among them as an expression of arbitrary 
preference. Rather, the typology refers to various ways of “how” an experiencing agent discloses 
aspects of its intentional object.  
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Correspondingly, the most relevant intentional object of Arendt’s phenomenological analysis is 
not the activities per se, but the object correlating with these activities, which can in principle be 
anything – since these modes of disclosure are quite open. However, I think that if there is a clear 
line in Arendt’s work, it is her concern with the human being and the way we appear to each 
other. In other words, the most relevant intentional object of these various modes of activities is 
“us” (in plural). This point is related to the normative grounding of the political in Arendt’s 
thought for the following reason: The “political” is synonymous with the kind of activity that 
make us appear to each other as of human agents in plurality, and make us experience each other 
as “fully”570 human. 
In her analysis of these activities, Arendt’s thinking is primarily oriented toward various human 
practical, and not so much the contemplative, activities. This is widely held as a characteristic trait 
of Arendt’s work. In this chapter I also nuance this picture by considering how Arendt’s analysis 
of practical activities as the various modes of disclosure, finds parallels in her conception of 
‘thinking’. Most importantly, there seems to be a close and consistent correlation in Arendt’s 
work between her analysis of various mentalities (of animal laborans, homo faber, the political agent) 
and the various modes of contemplative activities she identifies (logic, cognition, thinking).  
As noted, crucial to my argument is the idea that Arendt’s analysis can, on the modes of practical 
human activities, be described as a phenomenologically informed analysis. These analyses are on 
one level almost purely conceptual. With affinity to ‘eidetic reductions’, Arendt explores the 
conceptual core of the main modes of human activities – labor, work and action – and 
determines the necessary moments that constitute their conceptual character as a specific type of 
activity and more importantly what sustains their quality as “human” activities. The central 
distinguishing criterion of the three types of activities, I explain, is their varying degree of 
constitutive dependency on the meaningful presence of others.571  
On the level of everyday life, this other-dependency seems trivially true. We are born and brought 
up by others, beginning in utter dependency. We learn a language and appropriate a social 
imaginary. In the tradition of western thought, however, this dependency on others is seen as an 
obstacle of objective knowledge and autonomous reasoning which must be escaped somehow by 
finding another secure ground. Arendt’s thinking draws on the response of a phenomenologically 
                                                 
570 Which I read as closely related to the phenomenological terms of modal experience with normative significance, 
such as evidence, optimality, normality, familiarity, etc. 
571 It should be noted that the presence of others (as plurality) can be understood as a human condition both in the 
sense of the human way of life or state of affairs (such as acting together or communicating), and in the sense of a 
necessary condition, which makes it possible for us to appear as human. I will mainly use “condition” to refer to the 
latter.  
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informed transcendental philosophy (or in Heidegger’s case: fundamental ontology) which 
understands intersubjectivity to be an unavoidable constitutive requirement for the self and a 
common, objective world. As Sophie Loidolt argues, what makes Arendt’s thinking original is her 
understanding of this presence of others (as someone unique) to be closely linked to the human 
activity of action (and speech), and her interest in the way these activities actualize  the “we” as 
composed of a plurality of co-present and unique accesses to the world.572 I take this insight of 
Arendt’s to have great implications for her evaluation of the adequate mentalities of both the 
contemplative and the practical life. I also agree with Loidolt that it expands her notion of the 
political far beyond the usual distinction between the private and the institutional public. It equals 
in many ways politics with genuine co-existence573, which – as I will discuss in more detail in 
chapter 8 – finds its distinct expression on the various levels of social life.  
Experientially, the comparative optimality of the human activity of action and speech as most 
“human” relies on more than the physical presence of others. It also depends, as noted, on 
“how” further aspects the other are disclosed. Further, within the mode of action, Arendt makes 
another decisive distinction: Due to the narrative and agonal structure of action, and in particular 
its reliance on principles, the optimal mode of human appearance also depends on the mentality 
that guides our actions. Hence, to appear as “fully human” in Arendt’s terms requires both the 
actual bodily presence of others, the mode of action and the proper mentality. In other words, to 
appear as ‘unique beings in plurality’ implies, in my reading of Arendt, a manifestation of certain 
principles. So, when Arendt speaks of basic human experiences of being among equals, she is not 
referring to the “naked” (i.e. purely sensual) presence of others, rather she refers to experiences 
of a life already embedded in concrete practices, mentalities and history. 
On the level of mentalities, I argue, the paradigm of action and speech is relevant beyond the 
topical space of face-to-face interaction. Mentalities and their associated principles of action are 
also relevant to metatopical interaction as they might be given expression through different forms 
of government and social imaginaries. In this way the normative significance of the mode of 
action, and the fully human appearance, takes on relevance on both the theoretical and 
institutional level. To give examples of less preferable theoretical mentalities, I will refer to 
Arendt’s critique of the solipsistic tendency of Heidegger’s existentialism and the instrumentalist 
mentality of modern political thinking, initiated by Hobbes. In both cases, Arendt identifies 
                                                 
572 See Loidolt, Sophie. 2016. "Hannah Arendt's Conception of Actualized Plurality." In Phenomenology of Sociality : 
Discovering the We, edited by Thomas Szanto, Routledge Research in Phenomenology, 42-55. New York: Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group. For her more developed account, recently published: ---. 2018. Phenomenology of Plurality : Hannah 
Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity, Routledge Research in Phenomenology. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group. 
573 Similar to Aristotle distinction between genuine friendships, as distinct from friendship of pleasure and utility.  
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mentalities modelled by the mode of work (poiesis), rather than action (praxis). These mentalities 
are associated with the self-understanding of man as homo faber, a figure spanning from the secure 
foundation and mastery of the (social) engineer to the authentic way of being in poetic 
expression. In contrast to these mentalities, of which Arendt was highly critical, she sought out 
concepts and principles that better responds to the specific sociality of action, i.e. plurality. Her 
ambition was, as I understand it, not to reject the modern public sphere as such, but to re-
conceptualize it according the proper mentality. 
In short, I understand Arendt to develop a notion of “we” – more specifically as “a plurality of 
unique beings” – which reflects a basic human experience of interaction with equals and that 
represents (in its actualized form) the most precious of human conditions. From this experience 
Arendt develops – as I see it – a principle of action, the principle of meaningfulness, which 
informs a proper political way of acting and thinking. The mentality guided by this principle is 
then contrasted to solipsism and instrumental reason, such as political thinking based merely on 
the ideals of social engineering and measurements of utility. In this way Arendt both enables us 
to appreciate the basic character of the political community – both as a fact and as a human 
condition574 – that requires legal protection, and develops an original understanding of the 
principle that gives expression to a new, non-individualist conception of human dignity by giving 
us guidance on “how” to do politics.  
7.1 Sociality as the central concept in Arendt’s thinking 
As argued in the introduction of this chapter, I understand sociality (i.e. in the form of the 
condition of plurality and factual co-presence of others) to be a central, organizing concern in 
Arendt’s thinking. I hold it to be organizing in the sense that Arendt relates different types of 
activities and ways of thinking to sociality of plurality as the condition which make the activities 
human. That she provides sociality, or intersubjectivity, with central philosophical significance 
gives her thinking perhaps a closer affinity to Edmund Husserl than to Martin Heidegger.575 
Ultimately, I think a full appreciation of Arendt’s notion of intersubjectivity will have implications 
both for the moral soundness of our practical judgments (moral epistemology) and the character 
of human dignity (moral anthropology). In this section I will initiate such a study by considering 
                                                 
574 According to Arendt, the condition of action (i.e. plurality) is both that which is constituted and sustained by 
action as a political human condition (in the sense of a factual lifeform of distinguished beings), and the condition (in the 
transcendental sense) of action as such.  
575 A full comparative analysis of Arendt with Husserl and Heidegger is beyond the scope of this thesis. Loidolt’s 
work seems to indicate a support to this point. At least, reading Arendt in the company of the phenomenological 
tradition leaves her less alone than when reading her work in the company with existentialist like Heidegger and 
Sartre, which both have a rather pessimistic view on the significance of the other for one’s genuine self-experience. 
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the central role plurality plays in Arendt’s conceptual analysis of the various practical experiential 
modes.  
The central examples of the conceptual organizing function of ‘sociality’ is found in The Human 
Condition, where Arendt systematically organizes the threefold typology of human activities 
according to the social modes of the mass/loneliness, isolation/solitude and 
togetherness/plurality. These social modes in their experiential aspects are all carefully studied in 
Arendt’s work. For instance, these modes correlate consistently with different layers of a 
common world, and a sense of self (or in the case of loneliness; the absence of both).  I will 
spend most of the following section illuminating these aspects, but I will also briefly point out 
that a similar, parallel organization is found in Arendt’s understanding of a threefold distinction 
of modes of thinking.576  
7.1.1 Modes of action and mentalities 
In The Human Condition Arendt distinguishes three modes of human activity of everyday life – 
labor, work and action.577 Each respective mode relies on its specific human condition – life, 
worldliness and plurality. In everyday life we might shift unnoticeably and dynamically from one 
mode to the next and will probably find ourselves engaged in hybrids of these ideal types at any 
given moment. Since Arendt’s threefold distinction has been extensively criticized, it’s important 
to stress that these modes are not, in my phenomenological interpretation, understood as straight 
forward empirical categories of say economic, sociological or psychological studies of behavior. 
Arendt’s distinctions are organized, or so I argue, not from the “what” of these activities, 
including their attributes, location or the social pattern they generate as seen from an observer. 
Rather, they are organized by “how” each activity discloses oneself, others and the material 
environment from a first-person perspective.578 Hence, it is first when these activities are analyzed 
                                                 
576 Based on p. 170-171 (1958), where Arendt distinguishes thought from cognition, and the both from logical 
reasoning. Connected to “thoughtlessness”, which for Arendt was associated with clichés and the complacent 
repetition of “truths”; a characteristic not only famously attributed to Eichmann, but also taken to be the 
“outstanding characteristic of our time” (Arendt 1958, p. 5). So, thoughtlessness is, as I see it, related to Arendt’s 
general Socratic concern for a public where understanding and judgment is replaced with indoctrination, and words 
are used for fighting and has lost their quality of speech (p. 308, in Arendt 1994). Arendt also relates a threefold 
notion of thinking politics. Her general concern is that the distinction between understanding and knowledge is lost, 
but she also indicates a further possible degeneration of the public into a realm of totalitarian lawlessness, that only 
follow the logic of the laws of history or nature. (Arendt 1994, p. 339) 
577 Benhabib (1996) discusses the different ways to interpret Arendt’s distinction of human activities. She concludes 
that only an attitudinal reading can be defended to avoid essentialist consequences. These are not sociological terms; 
and they do not pretend to give normative prescriptions on how to behave in certain settings or areas.  
578 This interpretation is inspired by Anne Granberg’s reading, who distinguishes more clearly between modes of 
activities (as modes of disclosure; existentials) and human conditions (such as plurality), than other 
phenomenological readings of Arendt (such as Birmingham and Parekh). See Granberg, Anne. 2013. "Kategorier 
Eller Avdekkingsformer? Et Forsøk På En Nylesning (Og Forhåpentligvis Avklaring) Av Noen Av Arendts 
Grunnbegreper Og Distinksjoner." Instituttets skriftserie (Bergensnettverket for kvinner i filosofi) nr. 32: 63-94. 
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as modes579 – i.e. as distinct ways of orienting oneself in the world or setting the problem in a situation – 
that we might speak of them as distinct forms.  
As experiential modes these activities represent three basic and fairly historically stable features of 
human existence, similar to the way equality, distinction and fear are basic experiences that finds 
expression in the remarkably stable variety of governmental forms. Yet, Arendt’s appreciation of 
Montesquieu’s notion of principle of action seems to be grounded in the way they are open for 
revision and renewal of these forms: in the worst thinkable case, as the possibility of totalitarian 
government; in the best case, as a form of government that gives expression to the experience of 
action and the human condition of plurality. Like forms of governments, the mentalities of the 
different activities give expressions to these modes in a relatively stable, but still historically 
alterable way. To Arendt the shift in emphasis from the mode of action (praxis) to the mode of 
work (poiesis) marks the broad lines of the western tradition of thought. The shifts or reversals of 
modes of activity also take a central place in Arendt’s historical diagnosis of modern political 
thinking. Since the Greeks, Arendt claims, philosophers have promoted the mentality of work 
(homo faber) at the expense of the mentality of action (political being). In the modern age of the 
mass society, it is even threatened by the mentality of labor (animal laborans) – or, rather the 
substitute for a mentality in ideology.  
Contrary to the common critique of Arendt, which emphasizes her seemingly conservative 
distinctions between private and public, social and political, activities for the household and the 
public sphere, etc., the phenomenological reading that I am promoting takes interest primarily in 
locating the organizing principle of Arendt’s modal distinction. In the following I will suggest 
that it makes good sense to locate this principle in the optimal experience of the other as “fully 
human”. Although all three types of activity depends on the existence of contemporaries (the 
potential presence of others) to remain human, they vary to a high degree on how their 
performance depend on the direct presence of others.580 To emphasize this point, I will specify 
the character of this presence – beyond the merely bodily presence of the other – by drawing on 
the phenomenological terminology, so to specify: others might also be co-presence as subjects of 
their singular access to a common world.581  
                                                 
579 Similar to the kind of modes or «cognitive styles» as Schutz puts it, which includes orientations such as wide-
awakeness, dreaming and contemplation (which correlated to different virtualities or modes of the world). See p. 12, 
in Schutz, Alfred, and Thomas Luckmann. 1973. The Structures of the Life-World. 2 vols., Northwestern University 
Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy. Evanston Ill.: Northwestern University Press. Each style has its 
own way of explicating and altering the surrounding environment, and with its own specific form of sociality, self-
experience and temporality. (Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 27) 
580 Arendt 1958, p. 22-3 
581 Steinbock 1995, cf. Loidolt 2018. 
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To sketch out the levels briefly: Labor might be performed in the concrete bodily presence of 
others, but does not rely or reveal the co-presence of others as distinct subjects. The mode of 
labor correlates to the social mode of “the mass”, which leave each individual subject in the 
experiential state of “loneliness” unless assisted by the other modes. This social state of labor 
(considered alone) is therefore associated with the loss of self and the deterioration of a common 
world. The mode of work, according to Arendt, is best performed in “isolation” from the 
presence of others and in the experiential state of “solitude”. In general, the social state of work 
is associated with a functional sense of the self, as more or less useful, and the common world of 
artifacts. Hence, the mode of work does obviously not rely on the concrete presence of others, 
and is not able to disclose the distinctness of others beyond their functional merits. Only the 
mode of action relies on and at the same time reveals the co-presence of others. The social state 
of action is “togetherness”. As correlating to a performative event, “togetherness” can be seen as 
both a human condition, i.e. “plurality”, and as that which is revealed by action as its correlating 
object, i.e. as fully human or unique beings.   
A central example of how Arendt can be read as a phenomenologist, is the way she discusses 
metaphysical distinctions (or the regional ontologies of experience) by emphasizing that which 
makes objects distinct, rather than identical or equal:  
Otherness, it is true, is an important aspect of plurality, the reason why all our definitions 
are distinctions, why we are unable to say what anything is without distinguishing  it from 
something else. Otherness in its most abstract form is found only in the sheer 
multiplication of inorganic objects, whereas all organic life already shown variations and 
distinctions, even between specimens of the same species. But only man can express this 
distinction and distinguish himself, and only he can communicate himself and not merely 
something – thirst or hunger, affection or hostility or fear. In man, otherness, which he 
shares with everything that is, and distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, 
becomes uniqueness, and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings.582  
I see in this quote the perspective of a thinker that is concerned with more or less making the 
same distinctions as Husserl was in Ideas II.583 Hence, the three level of distinctness (or lack 
thereof) associated with the modes of labor, work and action is located in a larger formal map of 
“otherness”584. It is an ontological map that follows the typical experience from the material 
region of all spatio-temporal objects, through the animalistic region of organic specimens [animal 
                                                 
582 Arendt 1958, p. 176 
583 See Husserl, Edmund. 1989. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy - Second Book: 
Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Translated by R. and Schuwer Rojcewitz, A. . Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publisher., and perhaps especially supplements IV and XIII.  
584 I understand Arendt’s use of «otherness» here to be close to the use of ‘Great kinds’ in Plato’s Sophist, where “the 
Stranger” proposes “difference” as one of five great kinds to organize other kinds or forms. They represent in a 
sense a grammar of metaphysics (i.e as formal analysis).  
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laborans], to the kind of objects that distinguishes themselves, either indirectly through objects 
made [homo faber] or directly through meaningful action [biographical subjects; political beings]. 
The “political” is closely related to this capacity to actively distinguish oneself through action, and 
not the least the concern for this “how”. Legally, this finds expression in the protection of the 
opportunity to distinguish oneself. Yet, this capacity is clearly also central to Arendt’s 
understanding of what it means ultimately to be human and to be treated as one. The political 
implications of this point is perhaps not so clear in the original edition of The Origins (from 1951), 
but it is quite explicit in the central significance plurality, and its anti-thesis in loneliness, finds in 
the last chapter (which was added in 1958, in the second edition, the same year the HC was first 
published). Here in this last chapter, we find the significance of plurality expressed in its negation: 
the sociality of “loneliness” was identified as the basic experience that found its political 
expression in totalitarianism as a new form of government.  
The dehumanizing effect of loneliness is linked to the deprivation of human relations and its 
corresponding consequences for our self-experience:  “What makes loneliness so unbearable is 
the loss of one’s own self which can be realized in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by 
the trusting and trustworthy company of my equals.”585 This loss of self, and the corresponding 
loss of a sense of reality, is the extreme consequence of being deprived of the human condition 
of plurality. Loneliness corresponds to the permanent loss of a home and the implied “social 
death” associated with the incapacity to establish proper relations with others: “A life without 
speech and without action […] is literary dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life 
because it is no longer lived among men.”586  
Arendt’s point here is not primarily based on sociological or psychological studies, but relies on 
experiential analysis of the human activities and is given expression in a formal, threefold 
conceptual distinction587: “All human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live together, 
but it is only action that cannot even be imagined outside the society of men.”588 To use of 
“imagine” is an interpretative cue to a phenomenological reading here. Plurality is an essential 
feature of action as a mode of activity, in the sense that we couldn’t conceptually imagine action 
                                                 
585 Arendt 1968, p. 477 
586 Arendt 1958, p. 176 
587 Arendt’s conceptual analysis of the human activities is very similar to an “eidetic reduction”, where the integrity of 
a concept is tested by an imaginary variation of possible cases to determine its essential features. A sign of the loss of 
conceptual integrity is the “unimaginable” case. This conceptual analysis should not lead us to think of Arendt’s 
approach as merely formal in character. The phenomenal or material features of Arendt’s thinking is perhaps most 
clear in her critique of ideology and the emphasis on the significance of basic experiences and the historic events of 
birth and death. These features point toward topics more relevant to generative analysis, which had been developed 
but systematically by both Heidegger and Husserl.   
588 Arendt 1958, p. 22, my emphasis 
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without plurality. In other words, if we imagine ‘action’ in a space of free variation, removing the 
condition of plurality would not only narrow the range of variation but simply cause the 
conceptual space to disintegrate. Hence, in this passage Arendt identifies – in my opinion – a 
limit to our conceptual imaginary which is very typical to the eidetic reduction in 
phenomenology.  
In the following I will demonstrate in closer detail how Arendt’s typology of human activities is 
related to her threefold distinction of sociality and self-experience. As we seen, the mode of 
loneliness is associated with the loss of self and is defined by the incapacity to establish relations 
with others. In the mode of labor I might be social, according to Arendt, in the sense that I am in 
the physical presence of other individual bodies, and still be lonely in the sense of living in the 
absence of co-present others. Arendt sometimes refers to this state as “complete solitude”. In 
general however, the mode of solitude simply refers to a temporary absence of or isolation from 
others. This second mode is not univocally destructive. It enables for instance certain productive 
activities of excellence and contemplative, monastery modes of thoughtful withdrawal. In 
distinction from loneliness, I can at any time break the isolation of work and join the company of 
others. Togetherness, or plurality, refers to the direct presence of others in the specific mode of 
simultaneous distinctness (personal uniqueness) and equality. There is therefore a complex 
dynamic tension to the mode of togetherness that Arendt articulates as the paradoxical character 
of human community: a “plurality of unique beings”. It’s paradoxical I take it because being in 
the company of “equals” usually imply equivalence, whereas uniqueness implies the very lack of 
an equivalent. We might there for ask what is meant by equality in this context? (see chapter 8)  
7.1.2 Labor 
To dwell briefly on the types of activities that Arendt develops, I will begin with the mode of 
labor, which corresponds to the sociality of loneliness. Labor does not require more than the 
kind of distinctness that we share with “everything alive”. In satisfying our needs and reacting to 
basic desires, we are basically distinct variations within the same species. This mode is associated 
with the sociality of loneliness in two ways:  
First, the character of labor does not require us to be able to establish proper relations with 
others: “The activity of labor does not need the presence of others, though a being laboring in 
complete solitude would not be human but an animal laborans in the word’s most literal 
significance.”589 A life in “complete solitude” might still be a life according to its conditions as 
mere life, but it is no longer a human life. Notice how Arendt makes a nuance here between the 
                                                 
589 Arendt 1958, p. 22 
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
252 
 
laboring animal as a deprived human condition (a lifeform), which taken in its literal sense is 
distinguished from “animal laborans” as the mentality of labor, which I’ll return to in the next 
section. It seems Arendt’s use of loneliness is closer related to the mentality of labor, then to the 
kind of momentary self-loss associated with the mode of labor.   
Second, the laboring activity is associated with the mode of appearing as “the same”, or as a mere 
specimen of the same species, i.e. Homo Sapiens. For instance, Arendt reminds us that in the 
Greek context the household was designated as the proper private sphere of this type of activity. 
“[…] Man existed in this sphere not as truly human but only as a specimen”590 “Sameness” is a 
kind of equality that we have as specimens, independently of a legal or proto-political framework. 
The human condition of life is in this sense clearly part of what makes us “equal” in an 
anthropological sense, but – and crucial to Arendt’s ambition to establish a new guarantee for 
human dignity – this equality would not serve as a guarantee against loneliness (or 
totalitarianism).  
This indicates why Arendt is worried about the abstract character of human rights and their 
grounding in human nature. The experience of “sameness” is reflected in a mentality of labor that 
reduces men to specimens, entitled to a specific category of animal rights. We might agree with 
the animal rights movement that all living organisms (or at least the sentient ones) should have 
certain rights and recognize their inherent value on the ground of this basic experience. Arendt’s 
point is that this would not be enough for human beings, if the ultimate goal is to secure their 
opportunity to distinguish themselves.  
As a mode of activity, the biological sameness of labor inflicts loneliness, unlike temporary 
solitude, with an experiential loss of self. Under the right conditions, this loss of self can be 
provoked as a collective state of mind, as ‘being one’ or ‘a mass’:  
The sameness prevailing in a society resting on labor and consumption and expressed in 
its conformity is intimately connected with the somatic experience of laboring together, 
where the biological rhythm of labor unites the group of laborers to the point that each 
feel that he is no longer an individual but actually one with all others.591  
In this phenomenological description of labor, Arendt compares the homogenizing effect of 
labor with marching and the sense of becoming one with the group.592 She also tends to think of 
                                                 
590 Arendt 1958, p. 46 
591 Ibid., p. 214 
592 This is a well-known psychological effect, which is reported in states induced both by certain kinds of activities 
and the intake of psychedelic drugs See Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. The Righteous Mind : Why Good People Are Divided by 
Politics and Religion. 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books. Haidt describes it as a psychological function which he calls 
the “Hive-switch”, alluding to the sense of sameness and collectivity of a bee-hive.  
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sympathy (or pity)593 as a boundless and consequently indiscriminating sense of the sociality of 
the mass.  
7.1.3 Work 
The second type of activity that Arendt distinguishes is “work”, which refers to the productive 
activities that make artificial things that are durable and represents a break with nature’s cycle. It 
answers to the human condition of “worldliness”, that is, we are not only depending on the 
material in order to sustain our life, but also to make stuff and build a common cultural world 
that may last through generations.  
To be clear, the “world of things” cannot be reduced to simple actuality. It has a certain cognitive 
depth which is lacking in labor. Central to Arendt’s definition of work is that it is performed and 
interpreted under the guidance of a model – a shape or a form. This point is central to the 
parallel Arendt draws between the practical mode of work and the contemplative mode of 
cognition. Cognition (or, as I will add, imagination) are distinct from “logic” and “thinking” in 
that it is oriented toward objects that have (at least potentially) an ostensive index. Similar to the 
Greek notion of idea [eidos] – which was primarily associated with the activity of work [poiesis] –, 
cognition operate with models that can be actualized (or, like in memory, have been actual at 
some point). These models is understood both to precede and survive (i.e. transcend) the object 
that is constructed. Such models rely on a linguistically constructed world, which – at least 
indirectly – indicates a reliance on other people. Hence, cognition also shares with work a similar 
sociality, in the sense that cultural artifacts and ideas imply an indirect dependency on others. 
Compared to the sociality of action, Arendt notes early in HC that we can imagine a world where 
man “working and fabricating and building a world inhabited only by himself would still be a 
fabricator”.594 In other words, the concept of “work” does not disintegrate in the same manner as 
“action” when deprived of plurality. It is not unimaginable without it. However, she is also clear 
on the fact that man in this imagined situation would have lost his human qualities. Here as well, 
Arendt is careful to point out that the condition of worldliness is not enough to live as fully 
human. 
7.1.4 Action 
As the third and last type of activity, “action” refers to communicative activities, including 
speech, which allows us to appear as distinct persons and weave/spin the web of human 
                                                 
593 Arendt does not however develop a psychological (individualistic, genetic) account of empathy, like Husserl and 
other phenomenologist do. Arendt’s emphasis on the political or historical level (social, generative) might call for 
interesting studies that elaborate on their differences and possible mutually informing relation. 
594 Arendt 1958, p.22 
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relationships through stories. The human condition of action is a social mode. It actualizes 
“togetherness” through it performance, and relies at the same time on this concrete state of 
togetherness as its condition, i.e. plurality. This co-dependency might sound unusual, but makes 
sense when we consider the peculiar temporality of action: In a thin sense, even the trade and 
barter of the marketplace have this character. But action, unlike work, has no end-product. Like 
the performance of an act or a piece of music, like the actuality of the drama, the melody, etc., 
the “end” of action is in its performance. In the case of action, the actuality in question is of the 
agent and her intentions and opinions; of her story.595  
Further, the outcome of human action is highly unpredictable. Since I depend on others for 
myself to be actualized, my actuality is hardly my own achievement. In contrast to the 
achievement of the isolated master, the power of action – the potential of public appearance – is 
irreducibly relational: “[…] the strength of the beginner and leader shows itself only in his 
initiative and the risk he takes, not in the actual achievement.”596 That is, an actor can only initiate 
an action alone. It depends entirely on the unpredictable response of co-present others for its 
outcome.  
Although Arendt, in a phenomenological reading, situates her analysis from a first-person 
perspective, it is clear that it is not always the subject itself that has the epistemological privileged 
when it comes to understanding “who” he or she is. Similar, the “meaning” of an act is not 
reducible to its psychological content for the agent. Hence, the achievement of an act is usually 
better grasped and narrated from the view of the storyteller. Arendt distinguishes in this sense the 
meaningfulness of an act (for the agent) from the meaningfulness of the story that follows (its 
common sense so to speak). It is in this sense similar to a consequentialist ethics; it sheds the 
individual intentions little importance. Arendt’s notion of action differs however crucially from 
this ethical notion of action, in the sense that the consequences of actions are highly 
unpredictable and hence not subjectable to ethical mastery. Arendt was highly critical to a 
utilitarian perspective on ethics (see also 7.3.2). 
Arendt’s exploration of the sociality of action and speech, as togetherness or plurality, presents 
the distinctive features of action compared to the other human activities. We can divide this into 
three main moments. First, the public space – the proper framework for action – rests on a non-
Weberian concept of power associated with human appearance, rather than physical or incentive 
                                                 
595 Arendt 1958, p. 206-7: “full actuality” and the end in itself. 
596 Ibid., p. 190 
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
255 
 
force. As mentioned earlier, according to Arendt “power” is what sustains the space of 
appearance.   
Second, action is conceptually unimaginable without the co-presence of others. Isolated from this 
togetherness, we are simply deprived of the capacity to act: “Action and speech need the 
surrounding presence of others no less than fabrication needs the surrounding presence of nature 
for its material, and of a world in which to place the finished products.”597 In this quote, we see 
how Arendt uses “world” in a sense unfamiliar to natural science. The “world” is for Arendt the 
world of things, i.e. artifacts or natural objects (such as fruits), experienced in the depth of its 
practical significance to us. The mode of labor is in this sense “world-poor” to Arendt, because it 
does not depend on providing this cognitive depth, beyond what facilitates the satisfaction of 
certain drives. In a similar comparison, we could – with Arendt – that the performative act must 
be “placed in a world”, which Arendt calls “the web of relationships”. This social context or 
situation shed a specific light on our body or lend a special ear to the sound of our voice. This 
light is not simply daylight, but it might in an analogue fashion to the experience of color be said 
to present the object of experience under optimal conditions. There’s an irreducible concreteness 
to our dependency of other’s co-presence, just like the way making a common cultural world of 
objects depend on the concreteness of matter.  
Third, action is the constitutive activity of the realm of human affairs, the common world of 
political life, described as “the web of relationships” 598. As Arendt articulates it, it is as if the 
world of things (the objective in-between) is “overgrown” or that it hosts an augmented reality. 
This reality of human affairs can be phenomenologically described as a conceptual depth to the 
things constituted by deeds and words. This subjective in-between is the intangible reality which 
Arendt calls the “web of human relationships”. This web is structured by stories and “populated” 
by persons with unique biographies.  
Since action and speech constitutes a conceptual depth to reality, this mode is – unlike the other 
modes of activities – irreducibly marked by a certain mentality. A “mentality” is perhaps best 
understood as certain orientations – guided by certain principles – in the overgrown or 
                                                 
597 Ibid., p. 188 
598 Is the web a horizon or a collective? This question anticipates the distinction made in chapter 8 between 
contemporaries and collectives. Partly I think Schutz is right to think of collectives mainly as a horizontal indication, 
which in some cases are simply irreducible to individual types, but can be given manifestations through the actions of 
individual types. But, partly the web is also the horizon itself in the generative sense of a pre-given world, existing 
before we were born. In this manner I think Birmingham is right to speak of the web of relationships as a kind of 
cultural givenness (p. 93 ff, one we shouldn’t deny) or pregivenness (see Steinbock, Anthony J. 1995. Home and Beyond 
: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. 
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.).   
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augmented world of human activities. Unlike action, the modes of labor and work are not 
accompanied by a mentality. Mentalities are narratively structured and might frame the activities 
of labor and work in different ways according to the orientation. Consequently, one can not only 
perform a certain activity in the mode of labor, but one may also act in the mode of action  guided 
by principle of comfort, that is, according to the mentality of animal laborans. In the same way, one 
can perform a certain activity in the mode of work, but also act as guided by the principle of 
usefulness, according to the mentality of homo faber.  
Because of their narrative structure, actions are guided by “principles of action”. This is why 
actions can also be guided by the conceptual modelling of the activity of work. We may act and 
speak as if these activities had the same character as work led by a projected end. The activity of 
work is understood as driven by the specific and concrete cognitive motives (or ideas). We work 
“in-order-to” achieve some end; to actualize some model. In contrast, Arendt understand the 
actual moving element of action as “for-the-sake-of” some principle. In other words, to conceive 
ideas as motives of action and speech requires a certain conversion (or modelling) of such 
cognitive motives into principles. This is possible, according to Arendt, because principles of 
action may correspond to basic experiences that reflect stable human conditions (including life 
and worldliness, associated with labor and work).599 In the case of totalitarianism, the basic 
experience of loneliness is given expression in the (mis-)guidance of ideology (as a substitute for a 
real principle).  
Playing with the plural meaning of the Greek word arche, Arendt connects ‘principle’ both to 
beginning and to a common ground. Like other ideal objects, principles of action in general 
depend on manifestations; which Arendt understands to be “actions” in her specific sense of the 
term:  
To act, in its most general sense, means to take initiative, to begin (as the Greek word 
archein, “to begin,” “to lead,” and eventually “to rule,” indicates), to set something into 
motion (which is the original meaning of the Latin agere). Because they are initium, 
newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into 
action.600  
Through actions the principles are set into motion and brought to life, but never fully realized or 
actualized. Principles can be repeated inexhaustibly (which, like iterations, give ideal objects a 
character of atemporality and metatopicality), but are still at the same time embedded in history 
and the artificial world of linguistic reasoning and virtual memory (artifacts, books, archives, etc.). 
                                                 
599 See 6.3.2  
600 Arendt 1958, p. 177 
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So far, Arendt’s understanding of principles seems to comply with Kant’s notion of the 
“supersensible”, as the difference between “sensible” concepts of understanding (cognitions; 
images; regulative ideas) and concepts of reason (principles).601 They make everyday life 
meaningful, but are disclosed as such only in rare moments of historical significance.602 
Although there are clear influences of and affinities to Kant’s understanding of principles in 
Arendt’s thinking, there are a few possible conflicts that are worth noting:  
First, Kant’s position seems to hold that there is a divide between metaphysical and empirical 
enquiries, i.e. of form (noumena) and content (phenomena). For instance, as considered in chapter 2, 
the concepts of reason related to moral norms can be analyzed in a purely formal manner. In 
contrast, Arendt draws on a phenomenological and existential tradition that rejects the idea of 
purely transcendental a priori. For Arendt, principles are always historically embedded and cannot 
be completely detached from their content (or basic experiences). Although it can be argued that 
Kant could agree to this – at least to the extent that the changing circumstances and content 
given to these principles may alter our understanding of them –, it seems less likely that Kant 
would be open to radical revisions of the metaphysical framework, say for instance to revision of 
the innate right to humanity or the principle of justice. But, as discussed in chapter 6, such 
revisions are exactly what Arendt’s ambition of a new political principle implies. Hence, Arendt is 
more open to the historical possibility, and sometimes moral necessity, of altering even the 
conceptual framework. This implies also seeking out new ways to conceptualize the basic notions 
of human dignity and political principles of action. 
Second, the rejection of the pure transcendental a priori is motivated by the basic organic 
phenomenological assumption that the form is constituted by the organic relational synthesis of a 
unity in a manifold content. On the level of perception this implies an interpreting activity of the 
perceiver to constitute “laws” of experience in a more open and dynamic manner than the 
Kantian account would allow.603 On the level of constituting and judging principles of action this 
is obviously a much more complex process, but the basic genetic assumption remains relevant: 
principles are constituted by and develop in relation to the manifold of their manifestations. New 
experiences or circumstances might call for the constitution of new principles, and not just the 
                                                 
601 Concepts of understanding are for Kant still reducible to examples with a phenomenal content, whereas concepts 
of reason or principles are supersensible in the stricter sense that they are irreducible to such “sensible” content, but 
can still be giving living illustrations or manifestations.  
602 Arendt 1958, p. 42 
603 Miettinen, Timo 2013. "The Idea of Europe in Husserl's Phenomenology : A Study in Generativity and 
Historicity." University of Helsinki. 
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extended content of law. It might, for instance, be the case that certain horrific experiences 
actualizes the protection of certain human conditions, previously taken for granted.  
Further, this grounding has implications for the way the principles are identified. Whereas Kant 
seems satisfied by relying on a set of basic ontological distinction to formulate the conceptual 
framework of cosmopolitan moral-legal norms, Arendt’s conceptual analysis relies on a 
normative verticality of competing modalities and principles – guided by the optimality of 
appearing as fully human – to be able to make a judgement on the preferred principles of action. 
In this sense principles are, for Arendt, always preferred in relative approximation to the optimal 
in comparison to a manifold of competing principles.604  
Since actions are always entangled in an interactive web of relations, their outcomes are highly 
unpredictable. And, since they might initiate new beginnings, even of an uncanny character like 
the totalitarian projects, we need to be prepared for experiences never before encountered. This 
is a moral-existential challenge, given that new historical experiences are always interpreted in 
relation to the (pregiven) laws and principles constituted by previous experiences. The normality 
of our pregiven principles is not only given as the optimal preference of a set of competing 
principles, but are also “normal” in the sense of a common ground, which is taken for granted 
and integrated into our social imaginaries of everyday life. Positive laws are, to Arendt, a central 
part of this common ground: “they guarantee the pre-existence of a common world, the reality of 
some continuity which transcends the individual life span of each generation, absorbs all new 
origins and is nourished by them.”605 Hence, approximations toward the optimal principles are 
always situated in a pregiven, normal lifeworld, and will unavoidably be colored by this. As such, 
the approximated principles might also be misguided and criticized.  
In the case of the totalitarian projects, this is exactly what Arendt sets out to do. These projects 
might share some of Arendt’s pessimistic view on a decadent and decaying modern society. Their 
corresponding preference of principles of action was, however, – and independent of the 
correctness of the diagnosis – completely misguided in Arendt’s opinion. The crucial point in 
Arendt’s perspective was not that the project invented new political principles, but that these 
principles answered to aspects of the human condition which where anti-political. As such, their 
actual implementation actively undermined the political conditions of action and speech; of 
history and lawfulness. This undermining was “thoughtless” and “banal” to Arendt. Partly, I take 
it because the totalitarian mentality was negligent to the political conditions as such, and partly 
                                                 
604 See Steinbock 1995 for theoretical framework on competing norms.  
605 Arendt 1968, p. 465 
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
259 
 
because horrific and calculated experiments in dehumanization carried out by the totalitarian 
regimes were guided – not by truth – but by the simplest ideologies and their logical force of 
non-contradiction. If you accepted the basic idea of the struggle of classes or the struggle of 
races, Arendt observes warningly, the path was already laid out – with no room for the 
hesitations and interruptions associated with thinking or the capacity to begin something new.  
As can be noticed, there is a self-referential structure inherent to Arendt’s argument, where 
Arendt’s critique of competing principles relies on the requirement that principles of action 
should answer to the conditions of action. If not, these principles take on a self-undermining 
(anti-political) or self-neglecting (a-political) character.  
7.1.5 The sociality of thinking  
Although Arendt is mostly known for her contribution to a philosophy of action that confronts 
the intellectualist and monastic mode of thinking, she should not be read as a political theorist 
that wants us to stop thinking. Rather, Arendt urges us to think in a way responsible to the co-
presence of others.  
To separate the practical and contemplative concerns distinctly, it is helpful to note that Arendt 
sometimes refers to “thinking” as the kind of activity that withdraws from the presence of others 
, and instead relies on the kind of cognition and images that she associates with the social mode 
of work, i.e. isolation or solitude.  
[Thinking] always deals with objects that are absent, removed from direct sense 
perception. An object of thought is always a re-presentation, that is, something or 
somebody that is actually absent and present only to the mind which, by virtue of 
imagination, can make it present in the form of an image.606   
This creates an interesting practical conflict in Arendt’s conception, since proper thinking, like 
excellent work, relies on solitude: “[T]o think about somebody who is present implies removing 
ourselves surreptitiously from his company and acting as though he were no longer there.”607 I 
take this temporary withdrawal to be a conspicuous feature of the ability of taking the position of 
others, associated with the notion of “enlarged thought” (or in general impartiality) and the 
second maxim of Kant’s notion of common sense.608   
                                                 
606 Arendt 1971, p. 423 
607 Ibid., p. 424 
608 In her later work Arendt draws on Kant’s Critique of Judgment to make this point even clearer. In the §40 on “the 
maxims of common sense” [Maximen des gemeinen Menschenverstandes], Arendt emphasizes particularly the political 
significance of the second maxim. The three maxims are:  
1) Think for yourself (Selbstdenken, Maxime der vorurteilfreien).  
2) To think from the position of every other. (An der Stelle jedes andern denken, Maxime der erweiterten.)  
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Thoughtful actions in the presence of others seem to rely on a reflective process, where the 
change of social mode and cognitive attitude is able to shift frequently and effortlessly. I might 
start off with a very clear idea of the situation, whereas interaction with others might lead me to 
pause and try to put myself in the perspectives of my fellows and adjust my own idea accordingly. 
In everyday life the implied social withdrawal of thinking might not even be noticeable, unless we 
are “caught” by it:   
For thinking’s chief characteristics is that it interrupts all doing, all ordinary activities no 
matter what they happen to be. […] the moment we start thinking on no matter what 
issue we stop everything else, and this everything else, again whatever it may happen to be 
[within “being among my fellow-men”],  interrupts the thinking process; it is as though 
we moved into a different world.609  
This interruption might also take on a mode closer to the first of Kant’s maxims, namely to think 
for oneself. As a type of the contemplative activities, thinking for oneself has a peculiar character 
of sociality: Since it presupposes a withdrawal it is left only with the possibility of communicating 
in a twosome dialogue between “me and myself”. Although not all of us find it attractive to seek 
solitude in a cabin at the deepest end of the longest Norwegian fjord, we should (as philosophers) 
be familiar with this mode, for whom the duality and equivocality of thought in solitude is our 
“way of life and a condition of work”.610 This twosome dialogue cannot, however, stand on its 
own. Beyond logical consistency “my” perspective relies on the ‘company of my equals’ to be 
confirmed and unified as one: 
The problem of solitude is that this two-in-one needs the others in order to become one 
again: one unchangeable individual whose identity can never be mistaken for that of any 
other.  For the confirmation of my identity I depend entirely upon other people; and it is 
the great saving grace of companionship for solitary men that it makes them “whole” 
again […].611 
What is at stake is not so much limited to moral concerns of a clear and unified conscience,612 as 
it concerns the integrity of the very moments (i.e. dependent parts) of being human: the self and 
the world. This becomes painstakingly clear in the state of loneliness, the negation of the 
company of equals: “In this situation, man loses trust in himself as the partner of his thought and 
                                                                                                                                                        
3) To always to think in concordance with oneself. (Maxime der konsequenten Denkungsart).  
To take the position of others enlarges the mind and makes us able to take general or decentralized positions. 
609 Arendt 1971, p. 423 
610 Arendt 1968, p. 476 
611 Ibid., p. 476 
612 As Benhabib seems to read «Moral and thinking»  (Benhabib 1992, p. 138), see also discussion in 9.1 and 9.2.1. 
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
261 
 
that elementary confidence in the world which is necessary to make experience at all. Self and 
world, capacity for thought and experience are lost at the same time.”613 
Hence, unlike logical inferences, which rely merely on self-consistency (or concordance) – 
thinking still requires the co-presence of others to gain a proper sense of objectivity and reality. 
We might say that, in the same way as the shoemaker anticipates a costumer, the inner dialogue 
anticipates true communication and have, as conscience, the capacity to respond to the co-
presence of others. To act thoughtfully could therefore be said to relate to a kind of thinking 
which, in its doubt, anticipates the other’s point of view and that manifests a mentality which 
seeks to answer to this anticipated presence of others, not as mere bodies but as simultaneously 
present persons.  
Our “habits of thought” are certainly convenient in our interaction with others in the sense that 
we depend upon prejudices and expectations not to be caught in surprise and thoughtful 
withdrawal at every turning corner of a social situation. But, the lack of social interruptions, 
according to Arendt, also bears witness of an irresponsible mentality:  
Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and 
conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, 
against the claim on our thinking attention which all events and facts arouse by virtue of 
their existence. If we were responsive to this claim all the time, we would be exhausted; 
the difference in Eichmann614 was only that he clearly knew of no such claim at all.615  
This is the extreme case of thoughtlessness for Arendt. Eichmann’s declaration of a clear 
consciousness was morally absurd to Arendt, and a manifestation of the superficiality or 
“banality” of evil. His clear consciousness expressed to Arendt, it seems, the lack of the 
interruption of thought, of doubt and hesitation about the rightfulness of his actions. Arendt’s 
critique of the universal declaration of human rights, after WW2 and Holocaust, follows a similar 
line in the sense that it expressed the desire for restoring the world as if no interruption had taken 
place. Hence, Arendt accuses the declaration for a similar superficiality, since it reflects old habits 
of thought and adherence to conventional codes proven inadequate to the task at hand. To 
remain ‘uninterrupted’ at such a disastrous turn of the shared historical situation (of one global 
world) seems utterly irresponsible.  
                                                 
613 Arendt 1968, p. 477 
614 Adolf Eichmann was of course one of the major organizers of Holocaust and responsible for the efficient 
deportation of Jews to the extermination camps. In 1960, he was captured in Argentina by Mossad and sentenced to 
death for war crimes in a trial Arendt famously gave her controversial report to the New Yorker, later published as 
“Eichmann in Jerusalem”. Arendt, Hannah. 2006. Eichmann in Jerusalem : A Report on the Banality of Evil, Penguin 
Classics. New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books.[1963] 
615 Arendt 1971, p. 418 
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Obviously, the declaration of human rights expresses, unlike Eichmann, a deep moral concern 
for the events. The similarity lies in the shared inability or lack of courage to actually rethink our 
basic principles without the old doctrines as bannisters of our judgment. It is this courage to 
rethink that Arendt seems to require of her own thinking when encountering the experience of 
speechless wonder, which is this time not motivated by the beauty of the world (theumazein) (as 
for the old philosophers), but by its uncanny horror.  
Arendt does not dismiss metaphysics or philosophy as such. She considered the acclaimed “death 
of metaphysics” in her time to imply, not “the death of the capacity to think”, but rather “the 
rejection of certain ways of thinking”.616 At least in this text, Arendt is certainly critical to certain 
ways of thinking, including the individualist conception of human rights, but she is equally critical 
to the extreme positivist dismissal of metaphysics as such.  
On this point she reveals her influence from Kant as she draws on his distinction between 
thinking and knowing, and appropriates it in a way that suggests a parallel to the distinction 
between action and work: “The activity of knowing is no less a world-building activity than the 
building of houses.”617 Hence knowing (cognition; concepts of understanding) corresponds to the 
worldliness of work and the durability and stability of a common, regular world. We need 
knowledge to build a public and a home for human beings. Nevertheless, a further depth is 
required if this world is to be filled with a sense of moral soundness and meaning. To achieve 
this, Arendt appeals to a performative aspect of thinking which has similarities to the temporality 
of action and speech, and that aspires to conceptual entities (concepts of reason) that can be 
given expression and manifestations, but never exemplified and stabilized like knowledge in 
doctrines:   
The inclination or the need to think, on the contrary […] leaves nothing so tangible 
behind, nor can it be stilled by allegedly definite insights of “wise men”. The need to 
think can be satisfied only through thinking, and the thoughts which I had yesterday will 
be satisfying this need today only to the extent that I can think them anew.618  
Hence, the responsibility of thoughtful actions relies not on frozen moral doctrines, but on the 
re-iterations of yesterday’s thinking. This rejection of moral doctrines must be understood as 
consistent with Arendt’s distinction between knowledge and thinking corresponding to the 
distinction between motives (of cognition) and principles (of thought). As much as our everyday 
life relies on ready-made social recipes, we should also be open for the unpredictable 
                                                 
616 Arendt 1971 
617 Ibid., p. 421 
618 Ibid., p. 421-422 
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interruptions at the turning of a social situation. This might even in rare cases reveal new political 
relevance of aspects of our common experience as human or sentient beings. Unlike rules and 
doctrines, the spirit of a principle is malleable and enables us to respond thoughtfully to cases 
which cannot easily be subsumed to ready-made recipes. This includes both responding to the 
rare events that make history, but also the way each of us are unique and begin the world anew.  
To sum up the way I think it is plausible to organize Arendt’s concepts according to her 
phenomenology of plurality: 
 
Human activities: Labor  Work  Action  
Condition Life Worldliness Plurality 
Project Sustenance Fabrication Communication 
Sociality  Mass/Loneliness Isolation/ Solitude  Togetherness/Men in 
plural 
Self-experience Loss of self Master/duality Unique/in-one 
Mentalities of    
Principle of action Comfort Usefulness Meaningfulness 
Contemplative activity Logical deduction Cognition of ideas Thinking/judging 
(Sociality = isolation) 
Contemplative 
capacity 
Intelligence Knowledge Understanding 
Figure 2: Tentative table of the human activities and mentalities 
Since this table of concepts might give the impression of a complete systemic account of Arendt, 
it should be stressed that this table simplifies a multilayered and multi-contextual analysis. The 
main purpose of this systematization is to support the argument that the way Arendt uses these 
three terms is not coincidental. The modes of sociality are quite consistently ranked in Arendt’s 
work, The Human Condition in particular, and seem to organize the other categories of the table in 
terms of vertical hierarchies (which are oriented horizontally in the figure toward the right as the 
most preferable).   
7.2 The principles of action as a necessary condition 
Since actions are linguistic-narratively structured, they are also able to be inspired by – or 
performed “for the sake of” – more abstract reasons than other human activities. Arendt refers 
to these general, unspecified reasons as “principles of action”. And, given the character of 
thinking, action is consequently the only activity that requires us to think (in this specific sense). 
Based on the contrast Arendt makes between usefulness (in-order-to) and meaningfulness (for-
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the-sake-of)619, and the case that usefulness is the principle corresponding to the condition of 
worldliness, I’ve chosen to extend the line and call the principle corresponding to the condition 
of action ‘the principle of meaningfulness’. It has a somewhat unattractive self-referential 
structure if we spell it out: “the principle of acting for the sake of principled action”, we might 
also understand it as the principle of human agency or of human appearance. 
I suggest that we understand the implied layers of reasons620 as a dimensional ladder of increasing 
experiential depth. In order to appear fully as human beings, it is not sufficient to act in the 
physical presence of others (perceptual depth), nor in their mediated representation as an image 
(depth of cognition or imaginary depth, including their functional value). We must also ‘act 
thoughtfully’, i.e. according to the right principles (symbolic or rational depth). The way we orient 
ourselves and define the situation is decisive for the way others appear to us and how we together 
are able to sustain the conditions of action. What Arendt calls ‘apolitical’ mentalities, are those 
that neglect the concern for the conditions of action, while ‘anti-political’ mentalities are those 
that are outright destructive and self-undermining of it. 
7.2.1 Labor as mentality – the anti-political principle of comfort 
The loss of self and the sociality of the mass are reflected in the mentality of labor, which is 
associated with the superficial indistinctness of consumption and the radical dehumanization of 
groups or individuals as “naked life”. In her description of modern society, Arendt draws on the 
notion of “labor” to highlight some characteristic features of mass society. Most importantly, the 
rise of civil economy introduced the admission of “housekeeping activities” to the public realm. 
That is, the economy takes on a defining function for the community as an undifferentiated 
“common wealth”. “This unitedness of many into one is basically anti-political; it is the very 
opposite of the togetherness prevailing in political and commercial communities […].”621  
The problem, I take it, is not linked directly to the free market as a part of modern civil society, 
which Arendt views primarily as the apolitical public of work. The problem is that the human 
condition of labor, namely life, inspires a new model of politics based on “comfort” or “welfare” 
as the defining purpose of political co-existence. This mentality of labor is “anti-political” in 
Arendt’s view, because it tends to see the community as an entity determined by natural laws and 
the sameness of the human species. It reduces politics to the bureaucratic regime of “pure 
                                                 
619 Arendt 1958, p. 154 
620 The notion of mentality makes more sense from the perspective of the historian (or the story-teller), than from 
the perspective of the agent or the psychologist. Principles of action may, however, be understood in both senses. I 
think Taylor’s notion of social imaginaries captures the way principles of action can be part of everyday life in an 
exemplary manner. (see section 3.3) 
621 Arendt 1958, p. 214 
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administration”. No distinct voice could make a difference. The classical management of a 
refugee camp may serve as the paradigmatic example because it provides its residents with basic 
needs without much individual variation and distinctness beyond the biologically or medically 
defined differences of specimens. 
In a mentality of labor, the human being takes on the self-understanding of a laboring animal (i.e. 
animal laborans) and turns life’s comfort into a principle of action. This has potentially disastrous 
consequences, because as a principle based on labor it is not fit to preserve the human conditions 
of action. Arendt loads the notion of “society” with these negative associations of the 
“communist fiction” of “one interest” and “one opinion”, thereby drawing a parallel to the 
notion of a completely organized humanity in the Origins, a possibility that is rather dystopic: 
It is because this one-ness of man-kind is not fantasy and not even merely a scientific 
hypothesis, […] that mass society, where man as a social animal rules supreme and where 
apparently the survival of the species could be guaranteed on a world-wide scale, can at 
the same time threaten humanity with extinction.622  
The notion “social animal” must not here be confused with the human condition of the presence 
of others. It refers to a superficial and banal mentality where persons are reduced to members of 
a unified whole, and all distinctness and plurality is lost. The “extinction” of humanity does not 
refer to physiological undermining of life conditions, but to a social death, i.e. the deprivation of 
the condition of action associated with “humanity”. This finds its political expression in the 
totalitarian ambition to solve the old political dilemmas of the legal divides between domestic and 
foreign, and citizen and individual by simply abandoning them in the projected global and total 
rule.623 As an antithesis of the cosmopolitan order of Kant, it exceeds the imagination of a global 
tyranny.  
The problem is that the mentality of labor ignores the peculiar character of political equality. The 
sameness of labor is more similar to our “equality before death” (as a part of natural life): 
In these instances (of death – based on the sameness of our inherent nature), no equalizer 
is needed because sameness prevails anyhow; by the same token, however, the actual 
experience of this sameness, the experience of life and death, occurs not only in isolation 
but in utter loneliness, where no true communication, let alone association and 
community, is possible.624  
Accordingly, the problem is not that the attitude of labor, which dominates in mass society, is 
irresponsive to the factual conditions of life. For good or worse, this has changed our world by 
                                                 
622 Arendt 1958, p. 46 
623 Arendt 1994 
624 Arendt 1958, p. 215 
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producing an immense surplus. The problem is rather the one-sided attention given to life in this 
attitude as a “job-holder”. The mentality of labor becomes, so to speak, detached from labor 
understood as concrete private activities. Society is in this sense not merely a world filled with 
laborers and housewives, nor with activities of agriculture and housekeeping. The point is rather 
that they manifest a certain aspect of being human, which in modern mass society has been raised 
to a guiding principle in its public organization. This aspect is associated with the common 
experience of cyclical drives and needs, and their correlating repetitious activities. This common 
experience is expressed in the principle of comfort, corresponding to the condition of life. 
7.2.2 Work as mentality – the a-political principle of utility 
What characterizes the project of homo faber is control of the production process. Distinguished 
from the perishable urges and products of repetitious labor, fabrication can multiply an object 
somewhat detached from the urgencies of life. And, it does so from the guidance of a mental 
image that transcends in its permanence and oneness the multitude of objects made in its 
image.625 
Even though Arendt holds that most work in the modern world is “performed in the mode of 
labor”626 (which I read as activities depending on a common world performed in a mode that 
does not depend on or appreciate this world)627, work has at least the potential of being carried 
out by somebody with a clear image of its end-product. This distinction captures a characteristic 
alienating effect of the modern consumerist society, where most of us rely on others to have the 
material and technological competence to produce the objects that we use and depend on. 
Hence, the mode of work relies on an insight in the construction of the world that remains 
unnecessary to the mode of labor. Arendt goes as far as claiming that labor does not require a 
common world at all, no knowledge is – strictly speaking – necessary merely to live. Unless we 
consider the extreme cases, this is of course a quite abstract way of describing modern mass 
society. If the veil of abstraction is lifted somewhat to include the company of equals in a society 
of craftsmen, the sociality of workers (unlike that of laborers) does not appear as anti-political. 
Although the mentality of consumption undoubtedly has a strong presence in our days, we still 
find traces of the mentality of work, which Arendt labels “homo faber”:  
                                                 
625 It was this aspect of making (poiesis) that inspired Plato’s doctrine of eternal ideas. 
626 Arendt 1958, p. 141 
627 I’m thinking here in particular on the motivation for doing the work as a motive of day-to-day subsistence, which 
includes both physically demanding work (industry) and emotional (service) work. One works to get paid, not to 
increase one’s understanding of the images and ideas involved in the process or ultimately to build a common world. 
One might of course also consider the work in assembly lines as materially inducing a mode of labor in its 
monotonous and repetitive manner of work.  
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Unlike the animal laborans, whose life is worldless and herdlike and who therefore is 
incapable of building or inhabitating a public, worldly realm, homo faber is fully capable of 
having a public realm of his own, even though it may not be a political realm, properly 
speaking.628   
In other words, a practice guided by a mentality of work (homo faber) will not cancel all human 
interaction.629 It allows for a limited public realm of the market (agora), where we don’t meet as 
citizens but as producers and buyers of utilities. Here the craftsmen can show and exchange their 
products (and indirectly themselves as makers and/or owners). As an example of a hybrid, 
universities could typically be said to have a self-image which is somewhat caught between the 
paradigm of knowledge (associated with the market) and the paradigm of thought (associated 
with practical wisdom and political responsibility).  
The public realm of work, i.e. the market, provides a sense of reality to the products of the 
workers. It is limited compared to the public realm proper of actions, because the products are 
ideally produced in isolation.630 As a ‘principle of actions’ the principle of usefulness  is still strongly 
prevalent in the current understanding of politics; statistical measures of utility or socio-economic 
cost has a wide range of applications in the public management of a modern mass society. It is 
also a basic premise for the sense of justice that we find in the egalitarian sense of meritocracy 
and equality of opportunity. Accordingly there is also a sense of limited distinctness associated 
with the mentality of work, which is limited to the way the mode of work relies on the mediation 
of distinctness through the product or service. The limit-case for Arendt is the performative 
artists, which like any artist does produce unique objects, but objects that are of an ephemeral 
temporal character that relies, similar to action, on a simultaneous (or at least contemporary) 
audience.  
                                                 
628 Arendt 1958, p. 160 
629 It is important to keep in mind the distinction between the activity or mode of labor and the mentality of labor here. I 
do not argue that the laboring activity cancel all human interaction, it does so only if accompanied with actions 
guided by the mentality of labor.  
630 Somewhat puzzlingly and untimely, but consistent with the notion of sociality, Arendt holds that solitude is the 
sociality of production: “This isolation from others is the necessary life condition for every mastership which 
consists of being alone with the “idea,” the mental image of the thing to be.” (Arendt 1958, p. 161) “Only when he 
stops working and his product is finished can he abandon his isolation.” (Arendt 1958, p. 162) This ideal-typical 
determination of the condition of production seems to be primarily oriented against the kind of “teamwork” that is 
associated with the industrial production and the alienating effect of separating the operations of the process. The 
solitude of the worker is later modified: “In his isolation, not only undisturbed by others but also not seen and heard 
and confirmed by them, homo faber is together not only with the product he makes but also with the world of things 
to which he will add his own products; in this, albeit indirect, way, he is still together with others who made the 
world and who also are fabricators of things.” (Arendt 1958, p. 209) 
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7.2.3 Action as mentality – the political principle of meaningfulness 
According to Arendt, the mentality of action is the only way of thought that guides action in a 
way that fully appreciates the self-referential problem of attending to its own conditions as the 
guidance of political activity. The problem can be articulated as follows: How do we maintain the 
possibility of actualizing ourselves as human beings in a common world? Presumably, only man 
can communicate and distinguish himself through words and deeds. But, why is communication 
– and the framework of action and opinions – so crucial to Arendt? The answer is found in the 
relative comparison of the mode of action to the other modes of human activities and how they 
all respond differently to the magnetic pole of Arendt’s moral compass, namely the conditions 
under which we appear most fully as human. We could rephrase the question accordingly: How 
do we maintain the conditions for the most vivid or rich mode of appearance of ourselves and 
others? 
Due to the peculiar character of human appearance, this is not a solipsistic project. We would not 
expect to find the optimal conditions for the appearance of others in the mode of thoughtful 
withdrawal. Hence, Descartes discovery of “the ego” through his methodological doubt is very 
far (perhaps as far as you get?) from a human person in its full appearance. “Full appearance” is 
more likely to be found as an experiential equilibrium in the presence of and acting together with 
others. As Arendt points out, plurality, i.e. the condition of action, has a twofold character of 
equality and distinction.631 On the one hand we must be able to understand each other and to 
identify as equals on the relevant level. On the other hand each of us must be able to distinguish 
ourselves as unique actors among equals. In this twofold character there is a dynamic tension 
which must be balanced for the human person to appear. Depending on the mentality, or the 
guiding principle of action, the interpretation of the relevant equality and distinctness will vary. 
Hence, the relative calibration of the equilibrium will vary and give outcomes with various 
degrees of depth and clarity. 
The point here is not that we have to be concerned with the active revelation of each other in 
order to be political. Men are together, and retain their “agent-revealing capacity” also when they 
are oriented and concerned exclusively with “the matters of the world of things”632 The activities 
of labor and work might be imagined as performed purely in modes without togetherness, but it 
is more commonly found in hybrid versions where we remain human agents. For instance, while 
eating or making stuff we may have a reflective awareness of the relevance of these activites 
                                                 
631 Arendt 1958, p. 175 
632 Ibid., p. 182 
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within a framework defined by the mode of action guided by a political mentality. We might 
gather for lunch and produce materials before a political demonstration.  
When we speak, we usually speak about the world, our common objective reality. We do not 
have to speak self-reflectively about ourselves and the conditions of appearance to reveal 
ourselves as persons, i.e. as acting and speaking agents. However, a strong political community, 
such as a strong democracy, stands out in the comparison with other governmental forms in the 
sense that they are more self-reflexive and responsive to the conditions of this being together as 
equals. Ideally, according to my reading of Arendt, the political community is organized “for the 
sake of” meaningfulness. 
Every mentality (the mentality of labor and work included) relies on the conditions for the mode 
of action (plurality, natality, etc.). The mentality of labor, however, has a tendency to calibrate the 
appearance of human appearance according to the principle of comfort, which emphasizes 
superficial aspects of being together that we all share as specimens of the same species. Hence, 
this mentality might lead us to fulfill the ambition of a comfortable life, but at the same time to 
unintentionally undermine its own condition by extinguishing the circumstances that enable us to 
appear as unique individual beings. Similarly, a mentality based on the principle of fear, could – 
since fear is a basic human experience – be able to fulfill its ambition as a reign of terror. 
Nonetheless, such a reign is (rather more obviously than the welfare-state) anti-political and has a 
destructive effect on the public, which will ultimately make it politically impotent. 
Correspondingly, the mentality of work has an apolitical or depoliticizing effect. According to the 
principle of utility it tends to calibrate the appearance of human agency in terms of functional 
value, i.e. as the functionary of some purpose or role. The main problem with the apolitical 
mentality seems to be that it defines action in predictable ways by determining human agency as 
motivated by certain predefined purposes (in the form of images; i.e. knowledge). The influential 
model of rational choice can illustrate the instrumental mentality. It gives a certain functional 
depth to the strategic agent beyond the basic comforts of satisfying life necessities, but it 
nevertheless relies on a limited assumption about the aspirations and end-settings of the agents. 
Usually the psychology is defined in terms of motives of quantifiable utility or more vaguely in 
terms of self-interest. In Arendt’s terms the agent acts “in order to” achieve some cognitively 
modelled goal. Hence, this mentality does not respond to the open character of acting “for-the-
sake-of” principles (correlating to “thinking”), which gives action its characteristic unpredictable 
and initiating status.   
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In my reading I stress this distinction that Arendt makes between instrumental reason of work 
and the meaning of action to articulate the principle of meaningfulness.633 It is an interpretation 
based on filling an empty spot in the schematic web of related concepts that Arendt applies. (See 
grey box in Figure 1) In a way, I merely count to four, where Arendt has already counted to 
three, yet I leave it open if to further considerations whether the principle of meaningfulness 
should be complemented by other principles. Probably it should. In any case, only the mentality 
of action is able, according to Arendt, to guide the mode of action is a way that is responsive to 
its own condition of plurality. In contrast to the principle of usefulness, the principle of 
meaningfulness is able to guide actions in a way that sustains the material, worldly and social 
conditions for “how” we appear to each other as co-present. In other words, only the mentality 
of action has a self-reflexive character that might help us to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of action and power.634 It could be said to ground a self-reflexive form of political 
sociality.  
7.3 Arendt’s critique of apolitical and anti-political mentalities 
I think it is true, as Bernstein have pointed out, that Arendt’s project must be understood as 
deeply motivated by her historically situated response to totalitarianism as a new form of 
government.635 How is this related to sociality? A main aspect of Arendt’s critique of 
totalitarianism concerns the isolating and dehumanizing effects this new form of government had 
on its subjects. This form of government leaves the subjects in a state of loneliness associated 
with the social experience of the mass. For Arendt, totalitarianism was the manifestation of a 
complete disregard for, and active suppression of, the human condition of sociality as plurality; i.e. 
the condition for human action and moral thought. We could say with Arendt, that this was new 
because the guiding principle of totalitarianism was not anything like those of the old regimes. 
The totalitarian form of government was guided by historical determinism,636 and hence the 
crimes against humanity performed by these regimes had a particular character, previously 
unknown to mankind.  
But, the most thought-provoking aspects of Arendt’s response to the horror of the totalitarian 
experience was the way she included this ideology and governmental form as an integral part of 
                                                 
633 Ibid., p. 154 
634 Remember: principles of action inform both private and public, individual and citizen actions. 
635 P. 11-12 in Bernstein, Richard J. 2011. "Hannah Arendt's Reflections on Violence and Power." Iris 3, no. 5: 3-30. 
636 The reason or principle behind this, as it took on a shape as new form of government, was not utility or honor, 
and in the end not even fear, but the substitute of a principle, found in the simple logic on an idea, i.e. ideology. 
Either grounded in the idea of “classes” (and the necessity of history) or in the idea of “races” (and the necessity of 
evolution), the totalitarian ideologies was based on the human capacity to follow an idea to its necessary and dreadful 
conclusion. In mundane terms, this is truly a way of “thinking”, but what Arendt aims to show us, is that it is 
possible only in a banal and superficial attitude of thoughtless neglect of its own conditions. 
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modernity and humanity. It is part of being human in modernity in the sense that it reflects (the 
practical possibility of) the most extreme consequences of the solipsistic and instrumentalist 
modes of thinking and the corresponding incapacity of the mentalities of labor and work to 
appreciate meaningfulness as a principle, and plurality as its corresponding human condition. The 
totalitarian project reflects a basic experience in the sense that it gives political expression to the 
extreme possibility of which the tyrannical destruction of the public realm and isolation of men 
are merely its preliminary conditions: “[…] totalitarian domination as a form of government is 
new in that it is not content with this isolation and destroys private life as well. It bases itself on 
loneliness, on the experience of not belonging to the world at all, which is among the most radical 
and desperate experiences of man.”637 It is, as such, an experience to which – given the awareness 
of plurality as a human condition – it would be morally absurd and self-contradictory to give a 
life-confirming “yes”. Rather, it should make us ashamed of being human, according to Arendt.638  
In the following I relate Arendt’s critique of totalitarianism to modernity by referring to Arendt’s 
response to what she regarded as solipsism in Heidegger’s thinking and her critique of the 
embrace of instrumentalist rationality in modern political philosophy (from Hobbes). These two 
thinkers – Heidegger and Hobbes – represent in this way the negation of the proper way, which 
Arendt seeks to articulate in the mentality of action. The problem with these thinkers is not what 
they think about, but “how” they think.  
7.3.1 Solipsism and intersubjectivity  
One of the clearest expressions of Arendt’s emphasis on the significance of sociality is found in 
her critique of Heidegger’s thinking as solipsistic. Heidegger was in many ways an excellent 
thinker, especially when it came to ‘thinking for himself’. He did, however, not seem to fully 
understand and theoretically appreciate the significance of the perspective of others in his 
thinking. This is recognized by Benhabib, but as I will come back to later, it seems as though 
Benhabib (perhaps with Habermas) draws the conclusion that this implies the “shipwreck” of a 
phenomenology of sociality as such – found both in Heidegger and Husserl. This is a relevant 
point, concerning Benhabib’s reluctance to recognize a philosophical project in Arendt’s thinking 
beyond her political concepts (which in Benhabib’s reading, Arendt also gets wrong)639. As I’ve 
explained in the previous sections (and will continue to defend in the next chapter), there seems 
to be good reasons to claim that Arendt grounds her political concepts in the normative 
comparison of common experiences in ways that demonstrate the strength of a 
                                                 
637 Arendt 1968, p. 475, my emphasis 
638 She mentions this shamefulness in a famous interview with Günther Gaus. 
639 See introduction to part 2 above. 
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phenomenologically informed analysis of the social, and that has principle relevance beyond its 
political expression in the form of government. This is most clear in the contrast between the 
experience of loneliness and of togetherness.  
For Arendt, Heidegger was an apolitical thinker. According to Arendt, it was Heidegger’s 
solipsistic existentialism that made him susceptible to the mass movement of Nazism.640 As 
Benhabib points out, whereas Heidegger’s interest rested (along with the main line of western 
thinking) in the world of making (work; poiesis) and the preferred withdrawal from its 
inauthenticity through contemplation;641 Arendt sought her antidote for the mass-mentality 
(associated with totalitarianism) in the world of action (praxis), which emphasizes the interactive 
and other-dependent aspects of the human condition. The point here is not simply that 
methodological individualism leads one to embrace totalitarian ideologies. Historically this seems 
to be an absurd claim given that liberal-minded philosophers clearly rejected the fascist projects. 
Rather, the point is that radical isolation (existentially speaking) – which for Arendt is manifested 
in Heidegger’s inability to articulate the human condition of plurality – makes one susceptible to the 
false totalitarian “promises of solidarity and companionship”.642  
Trivially true, Heidegger did not reject the existence of other people and of the social world 
(Mitwelt) as such. Rather, it was his existential-philosophical project that led his thinking into 
isolation (perhaps as a potential hazard in line with the working conditions of philosophers 
mentioned above). Although Arendt and Heidegger seem to share a basic suspicion to the way 
the modern public society and political life developed – its idle talk, clichés, thoughtlessness, the 
anonymity of the mass, etc. – it nevertheless led them to diametrically opposed practical 
conclusions. Whereas Heidegger sought to escape the inauthentic world of others (of the “they”; 
das Man) through seeking out existential conditions that would remind the concrete Being 
[Dasein] of its finitude (as being-toward-death)643, Arendt sought to confront the anonymous 
sameness by articulating those actions that reminds the individual of its radical dependency on 
others. Whereas Heidegger answers to the involuntary “thrownness” into the world by 
withdrawing into thinking in finitude,644 Arendt redefines her understanding of this existential 
                                                 
640 Likewise there is a historical coincidence between Husserl’s growing concern with the political situation in 
Germany and his break with a, until the late 1920’s, quite apolitical and solipsistic orientation of philosophy.  
641 Plato’s Cave allegory is paradigmatic in this context of depicting the self-understanding of the philosopher as 
withdrawing from the world of men.  
642 Paraphrased, Benhabib 2000 p. 104-5. 
643 “Only the step of pulling oneself back out of the facticity of everydayness to a condition of resolute coming-to-
one’s senses (Besinnung), getting hold of one’s existence, can enable Dasein to reach authenticity.” (Benhabib 2000, 
p. 105) 
644 And the notions of inheritance and collective identity. See “What is existenz-philosphy?” in Essays in Understanding 
(1994). 
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predicament as “birth”, which emphasizes how we are received by others rather than thrown, and 
thus carefully guided into the world that should be answered with the welcoming of genuine 
interaction. 
7.3.1.1 A detour on Arendt’s intersubjective approach 
As Benhabib reminds us, Arendt’s use of the term “space of appearances” – i.e. being as 
disclosure – is also heavily influenced by Heidegger.645 However, Arendt’s emphasis on plurality 
gives this epistemological aspect of “the public” an intersubjective character which is much closer 
to the perspectives of phenomenologist such as Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, Paul Ricoeur, and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty.646 Consider the following passage:  
The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the 
reality of the world and ourselves, and while the intimacy of a fully developed private life 
[…] will always greatly intensify and enrich the whole scale of subjective emotions and 
private feelings [such as our death-awareness], this intensification will always come to pass 
at the expense of the assurance of the reality of the world and men.647  
In addition to being a devastating critique of Heidegger’s style of thinking, it resonates with the 
significance devoted to intersubjectivity in the Husserlian epistemology. The main point is that 
no aspect or perspective is epistemologically valuable on its own. The experienced aspects and 
perspectives must always stand in a contrasting or comparative relation to something or someone 
else. The method of justifying judgments of common and scientific knowledge is according to 
this model relational and not foundational, beyond the way a “web” of relations might serve as a 
ground. No single experience (even in a specifically evident mode) can be trusted alone. We 
depend on others to form a coherent/consistent world view and reliable evidence has to be 
accessible to others. 
The following passages in The Human Condition seem to go in the same direction, and reveal the 
basic phenomenological character of the notion of plurality:  
[…] the reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable 
perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for which no 
common measurement or denominator can ever be devised. For though the common 
                                                 
645 Benhabib 2000, p. 110-11 
646 The work of Husserl: perhaps most well-known from CM, where he established the essentially intersubjective 
character of objectivity, but failed to give it (or intentionally demonstrated the impossibility of giving) a purely 
individualistic, genetic account. 
647 Arendt 1958, p. 50, my insertion 
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world is the common meeting ground of all, those who are present have different 
locations in it […].648  
Only where things can be seen in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, so 
that those who gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can 
worldly reality truly and reliably appear. Under the conditions of a common world, reality 
is not guaranteed by the “common nature” of all men who constitute it, but rather by the 
fact that, differences of position and the resulting variety of perspectives notwithstanding, 
everybody is always concerned with the same object.649  
These passages are written in the context of “the public” understood as “publicity”. Following 
these passages, Arendt discusses how the common world, the second phenomenon signified by “the 
public”, deteriorates when the sociality of plurality is replaced by isolation or mass society. That 
is, wherever the plurality of perspectives are replaced by one single perspective.650 Hence, we see 
in Arendt a concern for the political that is able to connect quite abstract epistemological 
discussions of objectivity to the notion of a proper collective self-understanding.  
In general, we might say that our primary dependency on others is to be found both in acting and 
in thinking. To act and to think are other-dependent capacities that rely on 
togetherness/plurality, which is strengthened and made durable by institutional protection. The 
institutional protection of uniqueness and equality in plurality is grounded in something common. 
However, it is worth noticing here that the “public thing”, that which we have in common, is not 
primarily something already in me (or in every one of us), but something in-between us.  
So what happens when the common “in-between” deteriorates and gets lost? In the worst cases 
(such as in the regimes of Hitler and Stalin) we are truly in a “post-truth” situation where “people 
for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e. the reality of experience) and the 
distinction between true and false (i.e. the standards of thought) no longer exist.”651 Given 
Arendt’s diagnosis, that what is deteriorating in modernity is our sense of a common world, a 
withdrawal into solipsistic finitude seems to be the least adequate response. In the case of 
Heidegger this withdrawal in his thinking, seems to have made him susceptible to Nazism in his 
acting.  
                                                 
648 Arendt 1958, p. 57 
649 Ibid., p. 57-8 
650 A more extensive comparison of Arendt’s appreciation of the significance of intersubjectivity – as the concrete 
co-presence of other subjects – should be made with Husserl’s late work (with chapter 5 of The Cartesian Meditations 
as an important pivotal point of a new orientation of his interest.) A part of my dissertation that treats Husserl’s 
approach to intersubjectivity was removed in the process due to lack of space and time to work it out properly. 
There are clear parallels between Husserl’s notion of crisis and Arendt’s existential perspective on the general level of 
abstraction and shallowness in western thought.   
651 Arendt 1968, 474, quoted by Hinchman 1984, p. 321 
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On a more optimistic note, as the experience from totalitarian regimes has shown us, the public 
realm is never fully suppressed, but only fragmented. Under such conditions it becomes easier to 
distinguish the “institutional” dimension of the public from the “ontological”. Since the public 
space of freedom and action has imploded in these regimes, the alternative publics are forced to 
go “underground” without institutional protection. As Benhabib describes it, a new common 
world might be created elsewhere and start “spilling over into the streets”.652 This capacity to start 
something new is what seems to give Arendt hope. That even in the darkest situations of 
loneliness under totalitarian domination, one can maintain a love of freedom and pockets of 
proto-political spaces of movement, of action and freedom. 
Although the global civil society is certainly less subjected to total domination and rather 
suffering from institutional neglect, the lack of institutionally protected citizenship are similar. 
Both in the underground publics and in the cosmopolitan public, the public space is not 
sustained by the division and distance between private individuals and citizens. As institutionally 
protected, law provides “the framework of stability which human action and motion can take 
place”.653 But, in situations where we cannot simply rely on the pre-existence of a common world 
of legal institutions and public spaces we have to leave our hopes to the “underground” (such as 
the republic of letters), and learn to appreciate the “spilling over” of the global common world 
into the “public”. 
To return from this detour, there are at least two important aspects of Arendt appreciation of 
intersubjectivity that have normative implications. The first one is epistemological, or what we 
might call a political epistemology. As Hinchman argues, Arendt employs the idea of 
intersubjective validity that she finds in Kant, in a wider range.654 Although this last is mainly 
thought of as a contemplative mode, it follows the same sociality or rather – as I see – it attempts 
to retain the condition of plurality in the contemplative activities, as discussed in 7.1.5.655  
[Arendt] considers politics to be peculiarly concerned with human plurality, people joined 
together in an ongoing community and requiring each other to live well. Kant’s third 
Critique strikes her, by this standard, as the most political of his major works precisely 
because it is the only one that deals explicitly with “men” rather than “man”, with mutual 
dependence rather than with obedience to universal laws and rules.656  
                                                 
652 Benhabib 2000, p. 129, quoted above as well 
653 Arendt 1968, p. 464 
654 Hinchman, S. K. 1984. "Common-Sense and Political Barbarism in the Theory of Arendt,Hannah." Polity 17, no. 
2: 317-339. http://dx.doi.org/Doi 10.2307/3234510.  
655 See also Arendt’s “Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy,” p. 27 
656 Hinchman 1984, p. 322 
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As mentioned, the appreciation of presence of “men” (in plural) and not just oneself (in singular), 
and its epistemological relevance is something Arendt seems to share with a broader 
phenomenological revision of Kant, and something which the discourse-ethical tradition has 
developed as a well-established approach to political theory.657 It highlight an aspect of a 
meaningful life that cannot be replaced by autonomous will and impartial thinking. As Hinchman 
summarize; “The only common good that we know is the shifting product of dialogue.”658  
The importance of the political dimension of our lives – our speaking and acting in 
concert – cannot therefor be overestimated. Common sense is neither a spontaneous 
outgrowth of our life together nor the product of detached observations, but the result of 
an activity in which we compare perspectives on the world through speech.659  
The normative implications extend, however, beyond the revision of the second maxim. To 
count only the epistemological implication would certainly be an underestimation of the political 
dimension. I think we find in Arendt’s work also the recognition of the presence of the other as 
something more than other individuals, instantiating possible perspective available to me. Her 
work points, more importantly, to the effect of encountering concrete others (after the 
thoughtful withdrawal). These encounters have to potential to establish our ‘sense of objectivity’ 
in the existential sense of constituting the self and the world.  In other words, the concern for the 
plurality of perspectives does not only make impartiality possible, it is in a sense what makes 
anything possible. Hence, “the public” signifies to Arendt two closely interrelated phenomena: “It 
means, first, that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has 
the widest possible publicity. For us, appearance – something that is being seen and heard by 
others as well as by ourselves – constitutes reality.”660  
7.3.2 Instrumental and non-instrumental notions of politics 
So far I’ve established that the sociality of plurality is a central, organizing concept in Arendt’s 
thought, which is reflected in her critique of solipsism and her emphasis on our other-
dependency. I will now move on to her discussion of instrumental and non-instrumental notions 
of politics. Corresponding to the mentalities of work and action, the main difference between 
instrumental and non-instrumental notions of politics can be said to be whether politics is seen as 
a form of problem-solving (corresponding to the mentality of work) or something more 
(presumably corresponding to the mentality of action).  
                                                 
657 See also 9.1.  
658 Hinchman 1984, p. 327 
659 Ibid., p. 325, my insertion 
660 Arendt 1958, p. 50 
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In the discussion on democracy in chapter 3, I made a distinction between two ways of 
understanding democracy: either as a system or as participation. The system-model of democracy 
has the procedural advantage of facilitating efficient will-formation. The cost is the conceptual 
threat of reducing democracy to an instrument, as merely one among several governmental 
forms, i.e. democracy is conceived simply as one mean to the same political end. In Arendt’s 
perspective such a view corresponds to the mentality of work, which appreciates the utility of 
such a system, but fails to recognize its meaningfulness.  
The participant-model of democracy tries to remedy this short-coming, and offers a more 
adequate account of opinion-formation. Habermas’ methodological use of anarchism (see 
chapter 3) can be seen in light of the influence from Arendt and her reevaluation of “action” (as 
well as her critique of private reason – enlightened self-interest – as a ground for politics). 
Habermas’ argument in favor of communicative action theory, compared to a purposive or 
instrumental rationality, seems to point in the same direction.661 While one might discuss how 
much of Arendt’s insight is actually retained in Habermas’ theory,662 what in any case is certain is 
that he maintains an instrumental notion of politics, and understands the communicative aspect 
mainly as an extra-political, moral corrective to the systemic will-formation of the sovereign.  
To the extent that we hold the political to serve a non-political purpose, such as enlightened self-
interest (contractual accounts), we have an instrumental idea of the political. From this 
perspective, the idea of democratic participation will be judged in the light of how efficiently or 
justly it responds to issues defined by the given substantive criteria (of security, wealth, etc.). In 
contrast, a non-instrumental conception of the political will claim that democratic participation 
has a value of its own, regardless of or in addition to being a means of decision-making in 
response to external goals.  
As explained above there are two main camps of democracy theory which differs in their 
emphasis on the significance of participation. The thinner conceptions of democracy tend to 
emphasize the aggregation of preferences (polls, votes, etc.). John Rawls has shown how these 
                                                 
661 “The concept of communicative action singles out above all two aspects of this situation management: the 
teleological aspect of realizing one’s aims (or carrying out one’s plan) and the communicative aspect of interpreting a 
situation and arriving at some agreement. In communicative action participants pursue their plans cooperatively on 
the basis of a shared definition of the situation. If a shared definition of the situation has first to be negotiated, or if 
efforts to come to some agreement within the framework of shared situation definitions fail, the attainment of 
consensus, which is normally a condition for pursuing goals, can itself become an end. In any case, success achieved 
by teleological action and the consensus brought about by acts of reaching understanding are the criteria for whether 
a situation has been dealt with successfully or not.” (Habermas 1987, p. 126)  
662 Benhabib (1996) discusses this in her book on Arendt. The main point being that be separating the expressive 
from the communicative in the notion of “action”, Habermas isolates and leaves behind the parts of Arendt’s notion 
that does not fit his own model of rationality.  
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
278 
 
thin conceptions (in its extreme systematic form: as a purely utilitarian calculus) have problems 
with accounting for even the basic criterion of democratic participation of informed consent (i.e. 
the principle of publicity). From a utilitarian perspective it is strictly speaking a contingent matter 
whether or not the secrecy of an aristocratic republic (read: the rule of experts) is preferable to an 
open democratic one. According to Rawls, there are no inherent criteria that prevent a utilitarian 
from preferring an aristocratic government if it creates more utility (of some specified sort).  
I would assume the pure utilitarian view to be contra-intuitive to most members of our “public 
culture” in the sense that most of us would not accept the governmental form of democracy to 
be simply replaceable with an aristocratic/epistocratic, not to mention autocratic or totalitarian, 
rule. To claim that it is more efficient is not a sufficient reason. What we do see, however, in 
democracy theory are different conceptual attempts to find a middle-ground between the 
principles inherent to democratic rule and the pragmatic advantages of efficient bureaucracy and 
will-formation.  
When it comes to ‘thicker’ accounts of democracy, which are guided by a rights-based conception 
of justice, participation is to some degree protected by the condition of publicity that we find both in 
Kant and Rawls as a constraint of public right or the basic principles of justice.663 Only if it is 
based on this constraint, Rawls argues, is his political conception of justice preferable to a pure 
utilitarian account. As we have seen, Habermas develops this conception even further by giving a 
decisive role to participation as part of a free opinion-formation.  
Arendt holds what John Elster calls a fully developed version of the non-instrumental theory of 
politics. Although I think Arendt would take this as a compliment, it is not intended as such by 
Elster. To identify the limit against too thick conceptions of democracy, Elster develops an 
argument to the effect that we should dismiss purely non-instrumental conceptions of the 
political that favor the inherent value of participation. Elster claims that a non-instrumental 
notion of politics takes on a narcissist attitude and neglects the “serious matters” that politics 
should be occupied with.664 This being true, it would leave us basically with one valid conception 
of the political: some form of deliberative democracy theory.  
                                                 
663 Elster 1997, p. 20 
664 Ibid.. Elster argues that most non-instrumental arguments emphasize side-effects to democratic participation that 
lies beyond the motives of the participants themselves. When it comes to the observer-based perspective of the 
economic and educative effects on civil society (such as reported by Tocqueville and Mill) I think this is accurate. 
When it comes to Arendt, I struggle to recognize her position in Elster’s critique of it. To claim that she relies on an 
observers-perspective or that self-reflexivity in political participation is psychologically incoherent, simply does not 
hold. If Elster is right, the notion of sustainable politics is “debunked”.   
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If we take the anarchic conception of democracy (and the principle of isonomia) to represent 
Arendt’s view, I am inclined to agree with Elster and Habermas that it is too thick. I would also 
agree with Elster’s critique if Arendt was a mere proponent of a pre-modern, nostalgic 
conception of the topical politics of the forum, and the associated “joy of politics”. Yet, the 
relevant question here is whether this picture adequately reflects what Arendt is setting out to do?  
In my opinion, this is implausible. Arendt readily admits the favorable traits of instrumental 
reason: From the perspective of practical politics, “durability” and “instrumental competence” 
are clearly attractive traits. However, as a mentality of work, based on the project of making a 
durable world of things, it is also limited to appreciate the depth of things and agents as suitable 
or as useful. It is caught in the apolitical project of making, which “[…] is itself entirely 
determined by the categories of means and end.”665 In other words, homo faber sees only the world 
of things, which is primarily a utilitarian world. Arendt also criticizes the regress of purposes 
implied by instrumental reason. Since all ends of fabrication can be transformed into means for 
some new end, utilitarianism has a build-in perplexity that “can be diagnosed theoretically as an 
incapacity to understand the distinction between utility and meaningfulness.”666 Hence, the 
mentality of work fails to grasp the condition of its own possibility as meaningful action.  
[…] the ideal of usefulness permeating a society of craftsmen – like the ideal of comfort 
in a society of laborers or the ideal of acquisition ruling commercial societies – is actually 
no longer a matter of utility but of meaning. It is “for the sake of” usefulness in general 
that homo faber judges and does everything in terms of “in order to”.667  
With the ambition to facilitate deliberation on the “serious matters” of politics in mind, an 
instrumental conception of politics hardly seems up to the task. The conception and discourse of 
instrumental reason is simply not able grasp the “objects of thought” implied by the notion of 
meaning:  
Homo faber, in so far as he is nothing but a fabricator and thinks in no terms but those of 
means and ends which arise directly out of his work activities, is just as incapable of 
understanding meaning as the animal laborans is incapable of understanding 
instrumentality. And just as the implements and tools of homo faber uses to erect the world 
become for the animal laborans the world itself, thus the meaningfulness of this world, 
which is actually beyond the reach of homo faber, becomes for him the paradoxical “end in 
itself”.668  
                                                 
665 Arendt 1958, p. 143 
666 Ibid., p. 154 
667 Ibid., p. 154 
668 Ibid., p. 155 
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We can see how each level of mentality is organized as the addition of a new dimension, which is 
inaccessible to the lower levels. To make the distinction between the two higher levels (the 
mentalities of work and action) clearer, I suggest that we emphasize the distinction Arendt makes 
between a worker, who make something “in order to” [some idea; cognition; image], and an 
agent, who act “for the sake of” [some principle or regulative idea]. I my opinion, Arendt marks 
with this distinction a phenomenological shift of levels. In the phenomenological terms of 
Husserl, it’s a shift from what is called “real objects” (objects derivable from sensual experience 
or imagination), to “ideal objects” (objects which can only be manifested, but not reduced to 
sensation or cognitions as such).  
To use a spatial metaphor, I think we could say that for Arendt, when the “work”-minded 
utilitarian attempts to act guided by a principle of utility, he dissolves its object in approximately 
the same way the depth of a black hole “disappears” (i.e. has no spatial dimensions) in a 3D-
model of space. As a political project, the man as a maker or craftsman takes on a task he is not fit to 
solve. The mentality guiding the project simply lacks the conceptual depth to distinguish clearly 
between meaning and purpose. This is why, in my mind, Arendt can claim that “utility established 
as meaning generates meaningless.”669 Unable to grasp the depth of meaning, homo faber mistakes 
meaning for mere purpose. Hence, it does have the a-political consequences associated with the 
implementation of the principle of usefulness into politics, which tends to depoliticize our shared 
world. “The basic error of all materialism in politics […] is to overlook the inevitability with 
which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even when they 
wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, material object.”670 Although this is 
certainly a radical critique of instrumental reason, I understand it as caution against leaving 
politics to this semi-superficial mentality of work, and not as an attempt to exclude the conditions 
of life and worldliness as serious matters of politics.  
Often, a non-instrumental notion of politics is described in terms of “inherent value” or being an 
“end-in-itself”, or politics “for the sake of politics”. These expressions are all symptomatic, in my 
view, of the discourse of an instrumental mentality’s attempt to grasp the meaningful depths of 
the world in concepts that are too shallow for the task. According to Arendt, this paradoxical 
language of “end in itself” is – quite tellingly – the only valid or meaningful solution within this 
paradigm of utilitarian philosophy. The Kantian formula of ‘man himself’ as the ultimate end (as 
an “end in itself”) is in this sense an expression of the mentality of homo faber drawn to its very 
                                                 
669 Ibid., p. 154 
670 Ibid., p. 183 
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limits of adequacy. The inherent value of man (individual dignity) is then an unsatisfying and 
paradoxical way to articulate the world of action from the perspective of the maker.671  
As much as Arendt admits that we need an artificial world of things to “house” the life process 
of men (because of their unstable and mortal nature), and appreciates the way it ensures duration 
and even permanence to human life (including texts, archives, etc.), she is highly critical to allow 
the project of homo faber to function as a paradigm or regulative idea for political philosophy. 
Arendt’s main opponent in this regard is Hobbes and the modern political philosophy that 
emerged after him.672 Inspired by the Socratic philosophers, modern philosophers replace doing 
for making; action for work – even in politics:  
The Socratic school [of Plato and Aristotle] turned to [legislation, foundation and 
execution of decisions by vote], which to the Greeks were prepolitical, because they 
wished to turn against politics and against action. To them [these procedural activities], 
are the most legitimate political activities because in them men “act like craftsmen”: the 
result of their action is a tangible product, and its process has a clearly recognizable end.673  
In a sense, this decisive turn from the mentality of action to the mentality of work, made the 
institutional protection of the political synonymous with “politics”.674 In Arendt’s historical 
account this is also the background for the basic assumption that the ontology of politics is 
defined by the relation between the individual and the state. If we follow Taylor’s advice675, it 
seems impossible to resist the individualism of the modern social imaginary. It is basically too 
well protected and integrated into our social recipes and way of life. Even our language of politics 
can hardly escape it, and the discourse of rights is a good example. Arendt’s project is in a sense 
to defy this impossibility and attempt to infuse the public with new theoretical ideas.676  
                                                 
671 Since there’s no God to balance this story, the price of this anthropocentric remedy to the short-comings of 
instrumental reason, is that the rest of the world is devalued as a mere set of means for man. The unintended 
consequence is that both nature and the world are consequently “robbed” of their independent dignity. Which, in 
addition to being a devastating existential deprivation of the political life, also implies the kind of disastrous relation 
that the (post-)modern men have to their environment on the scale of a geological event on the earth’s surface, mass 
extinction of biological species and potential extinction of all life.  
 Within this framework, we can perhaps better understand how disastrous it must be for a being, human or 
otherwise, to be rendered without rights, hence animal and human rights work on the same ontological level within 
this paradigm.   
672 See also Arendt 1958, p. 299, and Arendt 1971, p. 160ff, for comparison on Hobbes and Montesquieu, especially: 
p. 163. 
673 Arendt 1958, p. 195 
674 Foreign lawmakers and judges are not unknown in history. It has been conceived of as a source of perspectives 
with expertise and lack of local interests; i.e. impartiality. ‘The right of the foreigner’ points to another claim, 
suggesting the reversed: i.e. that we are no longer detached but “unavoidably side by side”. 
675 Given its link to «societies of unprecedented power in human history”, see Taylor 2007, p.169. 
676 A good example of this point, which there is little room to discuss here, is Arendt’s critique of the modern, liberal 
conception of freedom as an individual choice. Arendt dismisses the identification of freedom (as free will) with 
sovereignty, because it makes the principle of isonomia paradoxical. (Arendt 1971, p. 164ff) Conceptually, Arendt 
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In terms of the implications of these new ideas for the state obligations toward foreigners, I think 
it speaks for the recognition of the cosmopolitan laws of deliberation as the primary obligation of 
the state. I consider this to be in line with the regulative idea of a cosmopolitan society in Kant’s 
work and developed further by Arendt with her emphasis on politics as primarily something we 
are engaged in for the sake of meaningfulness (and the constitution of our reality). Similar to the 
way law secures a distinction between citizen and individual, public and private, the border-
keeping concerns of the cosmopolitan law of admission can still be understood as the useful 
complementary protection of the domestic sphere in compliance with a notion of just 
membership.  
Concluding remarks   
In order to articulate a positive project or “setting of the problem” from the mentality of action, I 
take the notion of a “full” or “full depth” appearance of the human agent to be the key to a 
systematic reading of Arendt’s work. In my reading this functions both as an analytic leading clue 
to her conceptual organization of activities and mentalities, and as the location of a moral 
compass in her normative ranking of the different modes and mentalities.  
Negatively speaking, this guiding notion of full appearance manifests itself in her critique of the 
instrumentality and assumed self-sufficiency of the basic entities – be it the individual or the state 
– in modern political philosophy. For instance, the political social imaginaries of the common 
wealth represent to Arendt a political expression of the mentality of labor, which reduces our 
human co-existence to society of indistinguishable individuals unified and guided by the principle 
of comfort. As such the state community takes on the character of the self-sufficient entity of the 
mass. Similarly, the imaginary of a sovereign will gives expression to the mentality of work. 
Defined by the perspective of the maker, politics is reduced to a matter of the strategic rationality 
of realizing or actualizing certain ideas or ends. Either in the figure of an individual monarch or a 
representing government, the will appears self-sufficient. Politics takes on the measures of the 
principle of usefulness, as something to be proven efficient and best carried out in solitude. At 
worst case, it turns politics into bureaucracy and the citizens into a populous, measured by its 
potential to breed, produce and fight.  
                                                                                                                                                        
seems to hold, “unified will” is just the other side of the coin to individual free will. Both notions reduce the 
question of freedom to the scope of the mentality of production. To find a conceptual escape from this binary 
binding of liberal and totalitarian models of freedom, Arendt points to Augustin’s notion of natality as a nerve of 
antiquity undistorted by the modern notion of free will. (Arendt 1971, p. 167) Combined with Montesquieu’s idea of 
principles of action, it has a guiding significance in Arendt’s project: man is free, not because he has several, non-
constrained options on the menu, but because he is a beginner.  
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Both of these imaginaries are deeply problematic, not because they are necessarily driven by any 
kind of ‘evil intention’ to extinguish humanity and the condition of plurality, but because they are 
characterized by a thoughtless forgetfulness of plurality as the human condition of political life. 
The infamous phrase “banality of evil” refers precisely to this; an unintended shallowness with a 
potentially disastrous neglect of meaningfulness and one’s political responsibility.677  
Thus, Arendt’s emphasis on positive, non-instrumental ends cannot be interpreted within an 
individualistic paradigm without ending in paradoxes or incoherencies. A certain “mental 
revolution” is required, a change of mentality or perspective, where the co-existence of others is 
given primacy in relation to the individual genesis of meaning.678 This does not mean that there 
are no “serious issues” in politics regarding life and production, rather it basically entails that 
similar to the way in which environmental and distributive problems threaten to undermine the 
conditions of labor and work, action has its own problems of sustainability.  
To underline this insight, Arendt continuously insists on the peculiar sociality and other-
dependency inherent to our capacity to act and appear as a person: “Action, the only activity that 
goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the 
human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the 
world.”679  
This claim is not just part of a descriptive universal anthropology, but implies a clear normative 
priority of the human activities: We might live well personally without performing the activities of 
labor and work (even if we then rely on the slavery and terrible working conditions of others), 
but we cannot live a fully human life without action and speech in the presence of others. On the 
level of activities, the implications of this priority might be confined to a rather well-known 
Aristotelian ethical conclusion of a good life: We should speak and act, instead of labor and work. 
On the level of mentalities however, I’ve made the case that the implications of this ranking have 
                                                 
677 “Banal” is, in my mind, here used in a rather specific meaning, associated with the neglect characteristic of the 
mentality of work and labor. It does not imply that an action lacks premeditation or ideological motivation. Hence, an 
evil action is not “thoughtless” in these ordinary senses of the word. In the case of Eichmann, the fact that he was a 
fully convinced Nazi just proves the point (which has become clearer in interviews published more recently). The 
point of his banality was not that he was a blind pawn in a bigger game, but that the very totalitarian ideology infused 
its subjects with a racist shallowness, unable to see the plurality of people (including groups) as a condition for 
humanity. Race is, after all according to Arendt, not the beginning of humanity, but its end. (Arendt 1968, 157) 
Arendt seems to think of the concentration camps as the mentality of work taken to its possible extreme. (See 
Arendt 1994)   
678 In terms of the epoché this means that the isolation of meaning and reason as something constituted in the mind 
of private experience, is replaced by a wider frame of sociological or anthropological reciprocity, similar to Schutz. 
Arendt remains however (unlike Schutz) philosophically interested, which implies that as much as she appreciates the 
value of reciprocity or common sense, she is continuously concerned with its human condition (natality and plurality) 
679 Arendt 1958, p. 7 
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a less trivial significance for the preference of political principles, which seems consistent and 
central throughout Arendt’s work.  
The key political problem can be formulated like this: since states are modelled after “the maker” 
and the idea of sovereign individuals with free will, the political character of state communities as 
a plurality of unique beings, risks getting lost:  
The famous sovereignty of political bodies has always been an illusion, which, moreover, 
can be maintained only by the instruments of violence, that is, with essentially 
nonpolitical means. Under human conditions, which are determined by the fact that not 
man but men live on earth, freedom and sovereignty are so little identical that they cannot 
even exist simultaneously.680  
They idea of a polity as sovereign is then mistaken about the ontological character of the political 
community. We must correct this conceptual error in order to be free, according to Arendt: 
“Sovereignty” must be renounced! This seems indeed very revolutionary. As I read it (in a 
moderate reform-oriented Scandinavian way) Arendt urges us to rethink the character of the 
territorial entities that are meant to protect us. If the imaginary of sovereignty does not allow us 
to think plurality, how do we think these entities otherwise? 
To answer this question, I think we need to take up the challenge which Arendt poses in the 
beginning of Origins: How to articulate a political principle that reflects the human condition and 
hence is able to guarantee a new conception of human dignity? In so far as sovereignty implies a 
mentality that does not reflect this condition, i.e. the framework of action – plurality – it is either 
a-political or anti-political. The point would be to emphasize the primary role of these polities, 
which is to establish the promoting and protecting infrastructure of an already established and 
continuously re-establishing public sphere.  
According to Arendt’s relational ontology, we are not primarily individuals and secondary 
someone who initiate relations with others, but we are primarily in relations to others, and it is 
these relations that enable us to stand out as distinct individuals. The traditional political ontology 
(of individuals and states) is not false, as much as it is a shallow abstraction which needs to be 
qualified and restricted when it comes to its assumed legitimizing function. And, although Arendt 
recognizes Kant’s attempt to ground humanity in the inherent dignity of every individual as a step 
in the right direction, she insists that this ontological framework must be complemented by a 
greater depth in order to ground individual rights properly. 
                                                 
680 Arendt 1971, p. 164 
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This ground is unusual in its character (and to some extent reminiscent and inspired by pre-
modern models), since it takes social relations – or more specifically the condition of plurality – 
as its point of departure. This has led some (like Benhabib) to criticize Arendt for basing too 
much of her political notion on topical, face-to-face relations. That is, Arendt’s framework does 
not fully appreciate the distinct character and advantages of the impersonal levels of modern 
society (i.e. the way public discussion is oriented toward issues and bureaucracy is uncorrupted by 
personal relations).  
In the next chapter I will flesh out Arendt’s notion of “full appearance” from a Husserlian 
phenomenological perspective as it is found in Alfred Schütz’s work. Relying on this perspective, 
I have to admit, implies a weakness in terms of the significance given to face-to-face relations. A 
phenomenological approach like Schutz’ gives firsthand-experience a privileged status. I will 
however nuance the critique of a topical bias in Arendt by arguing that her project was not 
primarily to restore the “face-to-face”-character of politics, but to develop new principles of 
action, which are equally relevant to the street-level/topical interaction as to the imaginary of 
modern mass society. A political world and its public spaces (where we may appear as human and 
free agents) should be guided by general principles, not by a distinct and commanding will. A 
polity might assign institutional representatives, but in order to remain political they have to act 
according to the proper principles. In other words, genuinely political institutions must manifest 
those principles that sustain the condition of plurality.   
The political character of institutions takes on a cosmopolitan relevance simply by acknowledging 
that the presence of others also implies, within the current international order, foreigners and 
relations with a cosmopolitan character. These relations should lead us to rethink the sovereign 
state in terms of the plurality of the global civil society. Cosmopolitan relations, for sure, face 
different problems and are not in need of the same type of protection as provided by state 
membership, but the same political principle apply and lead us to articulate complimentary 
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Chapter 8: The personal, the mere contemporaries and the collective – 
various levels of the public    
How do we appear most fully as human? When we act together as equals, Arendt claims, we 
appear to each other in a richer and more distinct sense as “fully human”. In the last chapter I 
argued that this claim indicates a phenomenological-philosophical grounding of the right to have 
rights in Arendt’s account of the human condition of plurality as the condition of human 
appearance (i.e. as an expression of “meaningfulness” understood as a principle of action). 
Further, in line with the general account of principles of action in chapter 6, I hold that this 
human appearance of ‘acting together’ is not merely a concern of private face-to-face 
communication, but a public one. The divide between the private and public is crossed, not by 
considering the specific types of activities directly, but by considering distinct modes of activities 
and how various mentalities are inspired by these modes through their guiding principles of 
action. These principles might be given both private and public expression. Arendt is critical to 
mentalities that, as she sees it, undermine the conditions of human appearance, but she’s less 
clear on the exact character of the condition of plurality itself. Beyond indicating that principles 
somehow are necessary in order to appear with the appropriate depth of presence as a 
meaningful agent, exact phenomenological descriptions are not presented. To flesh out the details 
of what constitutes a proper “humane” depth, I will in the following consider an ambiguity of the 
condition of plurality more carefully, that is, its two aspects of equality and distinctness. 
According to my interpretation of ‘the right to have rights’ as the proto-political right (as “a right 
to appear”), it seems to me clear that this right is an expression of the principle of 
meaningfulness. This principle answers to the condition of human appearance, namely plurality. 
In the last chapter I emphasized the modal aspect of “how” we appear. In this chapter I will 
concentrate on the intentional correlate of the mode of activity, namely the “who”. It seems 
intuitive enough to claim that we should be responsive to the uniqueness of others in face-to-face 
situations and in close relations. The challenge in the following is to defend that what I’ve called 
“the principle of meaningfulness” has relevance for the way we think about and seek to manifest 
plurality in social spheres that has an endurable and metatopical character (and not merely topical, 
face-to-face encounters of say, spontaneous assemblies). The challenge is the following question: 
How can we think of plurality in a mass society consisting of the unimaginably many? Or, in 
other words, how do we provide content to the principle of meaningfulness – for instance in 
terms of regulative ideas, duties and rights – that answer to these (modern) circumstances?  
To answer this question I will first consider the ambiguity of the terms “equality” and 
“distinctness” of the human plurality in light of what seems to be some their richest or “deepest” 
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accounts in Arendt’s work: the notions of isonomia and freedom. These terms also explicate the 
challenge above of a transition from the topical to the metatopical, since they are both associated 
with the influence from the ancient Greek concepts of politics on Arendt. How can such 
experiences from spontaneous assemblies and relatively small city states – and characterized by 
the temporality and performative character of face-to-face relations – be held to ground political 
principles of action? How do we make this proto-political, praxis-inspired account relevant for 
politics in a modern mass society?  
In order to defend Arendt’s reliance on “full appearance” as something more than mere 
nostalgia, I will discuss her notion of plurality – with its elements of equality and uniqueness – in 
relation to Alfred Schutz phenomenological description of the “double character” of the way 
people appear. Compared to Arendt, Schutz’ descriptive account of social relations is much more 
detailed and enables us to narrow down the intentional object approximated by Arendt. Through 
a comparison between Arendt’s and Schutz’ accounts the appearance of others, I aim to specify 
the most relevant notions of equality and distinctness associated the “fully human” appearance.   
Second, I will use an original distinction developed by Schutz’ between “contemporaries” and 
“collectives” to make a point that is often missed in the comparison of personal and formal 
public relations. When we speak about formal equality, we usually – or so I claim – tend to 
describe it in terms that places it on the scale of contemporaries. We imagine our fellow citizens 
as completely anonymous and empty indications of “someone”, and correspondingly think of 
demos as a group of such formally defined subjects of rights and obligations. Schutz’ distinction 
does not deny this possibility, but it nuances our understanding of the essential character of 
groups and membership by suggesting that “a demos” or “humanity” is something more than a 
sum of anonymous contemporaries. The point is not to deny that the ethical and moral-legal 
commitment might vary according to the kind of relations we have to others, but to point out 
that the artificial equality of plurality – that both personal and anonymous relations depend on 
for its parts to appear as “qua human” – is defined independently of these relational variations. 
According to this distinction, the scope of equality is not merely based on the reciprocity of some 
attribute (such as property, profession or blood) or capacity (autonomous reason or to act/to 
initiate), but it relies on the circumstantial extension of the world.   
8.1 Freedom and equality – diving for pearls  
Sharing Benjamin’s view that the idea of history as a continuous line has (and must be) disrupted, 
Arendt’s approach to the past has been described by herself as “diving for pearls” in the 
fragments we might access from our time. As argued in the previous chapter, Arendt gives 
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preference to the human activity of action and speech because of its normative quality as the 
mode of appearance where we appear “qua human”.681 However, Arendt offers us little but 
negative definitions of this mode of appearance. For instance, she notes – inspired by Kant – that 
we have to understand the character of action in such a way that it manifest a free agent that 
“never appears in the phenomenal world”.682 For Arendt this “phenomenal world” includes not 
only the immediate perceptions of someone’s physical presence. It also includes the phenomenal 
content of our cognitions and imaginations of someone (including ourselves).  
Unlike the realization of the target of an instrumental agent, the appearance of a free agent cannot 
be – strictly speaking – actualized. To “actualize” some potential is for Arendt related to the 
mode of work. The free agent cannot be reduced to such a model of our imagination. Not even 
in our dreams, because there is a metaphysical (or ideal) component to human appearance, which 
in the previous chapter was connected to meaningfulness and the principles guiding action. 
There’s an affinity in Arendt’s thinking – and here I agree with Loidolt – to the general 
phenomenological notion of the other experienced as “intangible presence” or a co-present 
“inaccessible accessibility” to the world. And still, original to Arendt is the emphasis on the 
aspect that the other is not only a peculiar kind of intentional object to “me”, but someone who 
actively distinguishes herself to me (and herself) as a “we”. Hence, it is not just that some 
perceptual object of mine has a perceptual access to the world that escapes me. She also 
manifests through her actions a common sense beyond the perceptual depth of the experience.     
In the following I will consider in some detail two concepts Arendt borrows from the ancient 
Greek tradition of thought to highlight central aspects of her own thinking. I understand these to 
indicate approximately the intended experiential and conceptual depth of Arendt’s notion of 
plurality. In order to provide Arendt’s notion of freedom with a positive content, I suggest we 
consider the comparison she makes between free agency and performing arts. This comparison 
also makes clear that there is a close connection between freedom and uniqueness in Arendt’s 
thinking through the ability to distinguish oneself. Freedom is to act, and to act is to distinguish 
oneself. 
The second conceptual “pearl” that Arendt picks up from the ancient Greeks is the radically 
egalitarian notion of isonomia. Similar to the way she rethinks of freedom according to the 
condition of plurality, Arendt seeks a concept of equality that can be separated from the 
conception of individual dignity and its deep (and usually tacit) reliance on the guarantee 
                                                 
681 Arendt 1958, p. 176 
682 Arendt 1971, p. 145 
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provided by the sovereign state. In a proto-political perspective, this radical notion of equality 
makes sense, since it emphasizes the possibility of political equality as a spontaneously emerging 
condition in civil assemblies. If we search for positive accounts of political equality in Arendt’s 
work however, the institutionalist account of how we become equal through an organized 
community seems unavoidable. How do we reconcile these accounts? 
When Arendt defines “plurality” as having a twofold character of equality and distinctness, there 
seems to be an inherent ambiguity to the way these terms are used:  
If men were not equal, they could neither understand each other and those who came before 
them nor plan the future and foresee the needs of those who will come after them. If men 
were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever 
be, they would need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood. Signs and 
sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs and wants would be enough.683  
First of all, in this passage Arendt speaks of equality and distinctness in terms of already given 
constitutive conditions of plurality. They are not something we are in the becoming of, but 
something we have already become.  
On the one hand, we are (already) equal in terms of needs and embodiment. For instance, we 
might speak of a kind of pre-linguistic sociality (or social horizon), constituted by basic needs for 
care and sexual attraction (and their associated compass of emotions). In other words, there is a 
character of sameness to us as a species and as mammals that enable us to understand each other 
and appreciate the kind of living environment and common world across generations, and even 
across species, as a shared environment. If we follow Arendt’s levels of sameness and otherness 
(sketched out in 7.1.1), the introduction of a long-term temporal horizon of a “future” and a 
“past”, seems to indicate a character of sameness and distinctness associated with functionary 
roles of strategic agents. We make plans, develop and maintain a cultural world not only for our 
own generation, and we sense (to some extent at least) the purpose of artifacts, expressions and 
norms given to us be previous generations. Also, already as “workers” – as functionaries or 
makers – we would need a language beyond signals to indicate “identical needs”. Further, we 
could push the interpretation of “equal” and “distinct” the top of the ladder by emphasizing 
Arendt’s use of “who”. This is also indicated by the way she uses “distinct” as synonym to 
“distinguished”, which is associated with the modes of action and speech.   
There is a temporality to this quote that complicates the matters. In Origins Arendt is known to 
have claimed that we are not born equal, we become equal. Here she takes this becoming for 
                                                 
683 Arendt 1958, p. 175-76, my emphasis 
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granted and claims “if men where not equal” (or distinct) it would have absurd consequences. To 
clarify, I suggest we consider the first claim as an answer to the genetic question of how we 
became equal by arguing that we become equal through organization, and that this organizing can 
emerge both in spontaneous configurations of assemblies and in institutional configurations 
usually formed long before we were born. The second claim answers to a constitutional question 
of the given: Given that we able to situate ourselves in a historical situation of generations, and 
given that we are able to make ourselves understood through action and speech, what are the 
conditions for this? Arendt’s answer corresponds to the two moments of the condition of 
plurality: equality and distinctness.  
Given the adequacy of this interpretation, Arendt has in this quote reversed the direction of 
analysis in a typical phenomenological manner, start off from the most “evident”, the richest and 
most distinct experience of the given. From the experience “qua human” it follows: If we had not 
already distinguished ourselves as individuals (answering to a “who”), then the already established 
equality would amount to a form of distinctness limited to a “what” (of specimens or strategic 
agents). This level of equality could, according to Arendt, easily be communicated by ready-made 
code (or clichés as she sometimes puts it). Hence, Arendt’s notion of equality seems to call for 
the necessity of depths of equality beyond strategic reciprocity of a historical common world to 
actualize the condition of plurality. Further, what exactly this ‘already given’ distinctness amounts 
to, is not easy to articulate. As mentioned, Arendt tends to appeal to negative descriptions. The 
appearance of human agency is the appearance of the unpredictably new; the undeterminable 
unique; the non-reified and non-durable, and so on.  
In the following, I will consider Arendt’s notions of distinctness in terms of freedom and equality 
in terms of isonomia.  
8.1.1 Freedom as the performance of free agency  
To appreciate Arendt’s notion of freedom, we must emphasize its character of other-dependency 
and dissociate it from the strong individualism associated with the Kantian notion of 
“autonomy”. However, if we accept O’Neill’s reading of Kant, the difference might not be as 
decisive as one would usually assume; in that public reason obviously relies on the presence of 
others,684 and taking the position of others seems to have a central epistemological significance in 
the “enlargement” of political thought for Kant. What distinguishes Arendt’s thinking from 
Kant’s is the emphasis she gives to the conditions of this presence of others and the recognition of 
                                                 
684 See chapter 2.  
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the central significance of these conditions in her call for a reconceptualization of the political 
principles in a globalized world.   
An indication of this shift in emphasis is detectible in the way Arendt primarily associates 
freedom with human agency, and hence the way we appear to others, and not primarily to the 
autonomous will. Although Arendt recognizes Kant’s notion of practical reason, she raises at the 
same time a question against Kant’s apolitical notion of freedom as free will. According to 
Arendt, the Christian idea of free will (from Paulus, via Augustin, to modern philosophy) 
obscures the original meaning of freedom as the principle (or “ultimate end”) of politics.685  
Without freedom, political life would be meaningless, Arendt claims. This freedom is not 
primarily the freedom of the autonomous will or the freedom of thought, but the kind of 
freedom associated with action and speech. Hence, the political principle it implies does not 
merely define certain liberal boundaries (i.e. freedom as non-constraints), but reflects an 
understanding of politics as something closer to the building and maintenance of a scene where 
agents may display their performances, i.e. the establishment and maintenance of a public space.  
Arendt’s takes noticeable distance from the individualist notion of freedom in passages like this: 
“[…] wherever the man-made world does not become the scene for action and speech […], 
freedom has no worldly reality. Without a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the 
worldly space to make its appearance.”686 In this sense, freedom cannot simply be the political 
guarantee not to interfere in the private concerns of production and trade or of moral conscience 
and religious beliefs. It also implies a right “to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s 
actions and opinions” (as discussed in chapter 6). In terms of my proto-political reading of the 
right to have rights, this passage indicates a critical notion of freedom which renders unfree any 
institutional protection of freedom that does not allow the world to become a framework for 
political relations. This reading comes with the cost, however, of the somewhat awkward notion 
of an informal political “guarantee” in cases where public realms emerge spontaneously or have 
to go underground.  
Freedom, according to Arendt’s conception, is located in the activity in-between individuals, and 
not inside them: “Men are free – as distinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom – as 
long as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same.”687 Considering 
the dependency of freedom, in this sense, on the actualization of the space of appearance, it 
                                                 
685 It should also be distinguished from the ancient notion of liberty from necessities, which associated freedom with 
the necessity of exploiting the unfree and apolitical others as slaves, servants and housewives.  
686 Arendt 1971, p. 149 
687 Ibid., p. 153 
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becomes a challenge to explain how freedom can take the form of a durable agent.688 The parallel 
to the artistic performance underlines the specific temporal character of the appearance of 
someone as a human agent:  
Performing artists – dancers, play-actors, musicians, and the like – need an audience to 
show their virtuosity689, just as acting men need the presence of others before whom they 
can appear; both need a publicly organized space for their “work”, and both depend upon 
others for the performance itself.690  
At first glance, the performing arts and action seems to share the same kind of sociality through 
the necessity of “the presence of others”. In the case of performing art this presence is, however, 
not necessarily an audience of equals acting together; i.e. a plurality of unique beings. What to the 
contrary seems to be a possible similarity from the comparison with artistic performances is that 
the level of organization, required by the framework of free agency, might not have to be 
identical to the state level. It can also be actualized proto-politically on a less protected scene 
(both physically and economically), but then in a more ephemeral manner.  
Given the possibility of such a scene, we are left with a genetic question: How can this free 
agency “appear” if – as mentioned initially – a free agent never appears as a worldly 
phenomenon? In my opinion, we should understand this claim of the impossibility of appearance 
as a matter of qualifying the level of phenomenological depth required for us to appear as agents. 
The levels of equality and distinctness required for us to appear as human seem to not to be 
plainly presentable in the ordinary sense of pointing out an object in an ostensive manner. What 
Arendt points out, in my mind, is that it is not enough to superficially perceive the bodily 
presence (or absence) of someone in order to recognize them as agents. For a personal presence 
to take place, the behavior must be seen as the manifestation of someone who acts “for the sake 
of” some reason (the agonal aspect), and according to some story (the narrative aspect). But, for 
this to be possible we cannot simply be free and distinct, we also rely on a sense of reason that is 
“common” and open, in other words; possible to share with others. We have to be equal; i.e. we 
must share with (at least some) others a certain conceptual background and contextual 
understanding (a social imaginary) for their presence to make sense. Still further, is this all it takes 
to be acting and speaking “as equals”? As I will discuss in the next section, there seems to be a 
                                                 
688 It should be noted that in line with the “for the sake of” an enduringly free agent is nothing like an agent with a 
standing/potential capacity to act and speak. This might be true of an officer or a dictator, but given the condition of 
action in plurality, free agency is radically other-dependent and relies on the meaningful manifestations of principles 
in a way very different from agents with certain talents or functional capacities (such as masters).  
689 Linked to Machiavelli’s notion of political «virtu». 
690 Arendt 1971, p. 154 
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higher order equality correlating to the appearance of the biographical uniqueness of the free 
agent.  
8.1.2 Equality – isonomia and the organization of equality 
As Arendt states, “if men were not equal they could not understand each other”. If we 
understand this equality as not merely biological sameness, but also that we share some 
“common sense”, it is at least clear that the pregiven equality that political organization must 
respond to is not “natural” in any unchanging sense of original or pre-given, but rather 
conventional (and thus in a certain sense “artificial”). It also indicates a level of social 
organization that can emerge and change spontaneously on a pre-institutional level.  
When Arendt appeals to the notion of isonomia, this proto-political character of plurality seems 
close to mind. In its definition as “a state where men are ruled by no one and rulers of none”, it 
is also negatively defined as an anarchic principle, closely associated with the radical notion of 
democratic participation that Habermas evokes methodologically. It evokes a sense closer to the 
community of rational debate and conviction, the free space of communication associated with 
the republic of letters, rather than the kind of state that rules by aggregation of votes and 
monopoly of violence.  
The implied connection of this proto-political concept of equality to the spontaneous assembly 
seems to stand in conflict with Arendt’s institutionalist account of political equality:   
We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our 
decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights. Our political life rests on the 
assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can act in 
and change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with his 
equals.691 
In contrast to the already given equality mentioned in the passage where Arendt spoke of 
plurality (discussed in 8.1.1.), equality is here described in its becoming. In this sense, isonomia is 
perhaps best understood as the term for the government of equals (which was labeled 
“democracy” by its opponents). In this sense, isonomia seems to represent a regulative ideal of an 
institutional protection of equality.  
Arendt’s claim that we “become equals as members of a group” is often associated with an 
institutionalist aspect of Arendt’s analysis. Arendt was clearly influenced by the republican 
tradition found in Rousseau and Burke. But, the context also suggests that Arendt was clearly 
critical to a shallow institutionalist account. Arendt’s claim is part of a section where she confirms 
                                                 
691 Arendt 1968, p. 301 
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(in bitter agreement with Burke) that history seems to have proved the nationalist interpretation 
of rights to be correct. Burke’s parochialist conception of “the rights of an Englishmen” as the 
only meaningful conception of right proved itself to be descriptively true in the moment where 
the guarantee of the existence of human rights was most needed. 
In a harsh critique of the way this parochial idea of rights lead to the fatally misguided 
assumption of the later idea of national self-determination (that only members of a national state 
could have their human rights protected), Arendt made clear how the world of equals (that was 
produced through organization of nation states) could not live up to its regulative ideas and the 
guiding principles of political equality. The gap between this ideal and the positive law of 
organized equality was clear to Arendt, both in the ancient Greek variant and in our modern 
“globally, universally interrelated civilization”. To explicate this point, she presents organized 
equality with its ultimate test: to account for the fact that we are born (not as free or slave, 
Englishman or subaltern) but as “single, unique and unchangeable”692. 
As a consequence, Arendt’s confidence in the value of organized equality should be qualified with 
her critical concern for the guiding principle of meaningfulness that is given expression in the 
specific rights we agree upon, for instance as fellow citizens. This concern is given expression in 
the required responsiveness of the civilized notions of equality toward the already given 
distinctness of the newborn or “naked” life.693 In terms of being responsive to “newcomers” in a 
public that previously did not allow them the freedom of the public scene, this seems like a 
reasonable critique of the exclusion of groups, such as slaves, workers or women.694  
I take the general point to be that an adequate concept of equality should reflect a mentality that 
answers to the conditions of action, namely plurality. If so, a unique being is also something we 
become, on the terms of the twofold requirement of plurality: equality and distinctness. 
Accordingly, the following figure suggests the corresponding forms of equality and distinctness 
on each level: 




Sameness of species Equality of force/ 
Functional reciprocity 
Equality of power 
Distinction of 
things 
Distinction of biologically 
variating specimens 
Distinction of merits Whoness of agency 
Figure 3: Table of correlating levels of sameness and otherness (equality and 
distinctness)  
                                                 
692 Arendt 1968, p. 301 
693 Arendt even describes this as an increased sense of unease with this distinctness, positively correlating to the 
increased degree of organization.  
694 See On Revolution, Arendt 1965.  
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Given the performative character of the unique agent, the pregiven uniqueness of the newborn is 
however somewhat puzzling. Should we really provide a scene for the infant to appear as a 
meaningful, free agent? Or, should we somehow give respect to the potential capacity to act and 
speak by bringing up the newborn to become an equal? 
To highlight the experiential aspect of these requirements, action and speech should be guided by 
principles that make us appear as simultaneously equal and unique: “Through [deeds and words], 
men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct; they are modes in which human beings 
appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men.”695 There’s an important nuance in 
Arendt’s notions of the distinct and the unique, which corresponds to the distinction between the 
superficial (animalistic and instrumental), and the fully human (political) appearance worth 
noticing: The uniqueness of a free agent is distinct from the uniqueness of the finger print (or in 
general: our being as a unique specimen within the biological variation of the human species): 
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal 
identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while their physical 
identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique shape of the body and 
sound of the voice.696  
In order to specify the level of equality and uniqueness implied in the “human world”, Schutz’s 
concept of the double character of personal appearance can be helpful. Schutz’s analysis of the 
double character situates different levels of equality (or what he terms “reciprocity”) within the 
social experience of the personalized other, where the equality is calibrated with the proper level 
of uniqueness.  
8.2 The double character of personal appearance – Thou- and they-orientations 
I will situate my reading of Arendt’s notion of the twofold character of plurality – equality and 
distinctness – in a dialogue with Alfred Schutz’s last work, The Structures of the Lifeworld (1973).697 
Schutz’s core intention was to apply a Husserlian phenomenological method to “the social world, 
the product of human symbolic action and material work”,698 or as a “systematic description of 
the common-sense world as social reality”.699 Accordingly, Schutz’s analyses the communicative aspects 
of everyday life and provides a systematic account of how equality (“reciprocity”) enables us to 
understand each other. By developing a phenomenological account of distinct levels of 
reciprocity within social experience, Schutz provides us with an analytic perspective that may 
clarify Arendt’s notion of plurality.700   
                                                 
695 Arendt 1958, p. 176, my emphasis and insertion 
696 Ibid., p. 179 
697 Co-written with, and edited and published posthumously by Thomas Luckmann. 
698 Schutz and Luckmann 1973, Preface vol. 1, p. xix 
699 Ibid., p. xx) 
700 See 8.1.2 
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According to Schutz, if we analytically dissect the play of aspects in the way we experience a 
concrete person (“a fellow-man”), we are able to isolate two formal orientations701 of “thou”702 
and “they”. First, Schutz speaks of “thou-orientation” as how we experience someone “in 
person”703. Unlike an inference by analogy, which is the common model of empathy [or 
Einfühlung], Schutz underlines that the orientation toward “you” is a one-step grasp [monothetic].704 
It is a concrete apprehension which is immediate in the sense that “I” encounter “you” “here and 
now”.705 This is what distinguishes face-to-face situations from other kinds of social situations. 
And it is only “here and now” that I can grasp directly the singularity (or “thisness”) of “you”.706 
The grasp can be expressed as the experience of “there is somebody there”.  Further, according 
to Schutz, when “my” orientation toward “you” is reciprocated, “we” have a social relation (as a 
formal, reciprocal thou-orientation; a “we”-relation). This is the “encounter”; the least mediated 
relation to “you”; the firsthand social experience, from which any other kind of relation is in 
principle derived.707 
Second, to distinguish the depth of the experience of a person from the superficial orientation 
toward “you”, Schutz also identifies the formal “they-orientation”. They-orientations rely on 
                                                 
701 Synonym: Einstellung, attitude 
702 I’ll use «you» hereafter only because it seems more intuitive according to current English, which have normally no 
distinction between informal (thou) and formal (you) pronoun for the other. The use of “thou” in Schutz’ text refers 
to the German distinction between “Du” and “Sie” which are still being used. I also tend to read “they” with the 
ambiguity of “Sie” as the more formal and impersonal aspect of orienting toward someone.  
703 Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 62 
704 See Overgaard 2007 for comparison with similar views in Husserl, Wittgenstein and Levinas.  
705 Notice how the relative terms are sought to indicate their status as social coordinates, which rely irreducibly on 
the concrete situation they indicate. I’ve chosen to use “you” instead of “thou”, which trades the precision of 
referring to the informal German “Du” for the everyday life sound of “you”. Notice also that Schutz is not using 
immediacy to argue for unlimited/unmediated access to the others mind: “Although we speak of the “immediate” 
experience of a fellow-man, this experience is internally, also in the precise meaning of the word, “mediated.” I grasp 
my fellow-man’s flow of lived experiences only “mediately,” in that I explicate his movements, his expression, his 
communications as indications of the subjectively meaningful experiences of an alter ego.” (Schutz and Luckmann 
1973, pp. 63-64) 
706 Lately, Zahavi (2014) and Overgaard (2007) have argued that there are kinds of empathy that works on quite 
minimal grounds of prior experience, as a spontaneous capacity to notice that “someone is there”. Although I agree 
to these analyses that isolate a basic temporally structured empathy (as animated body), this is situated on a minute 
and technical level that is less relevant for my discussion. It mainly serves the theoretical purpose of refuting the 
behaviorist and dualist assumption that we are somehow primarily and experientially separated from others; that we 
see first their material nature, and then have to infer their spiritual dimension. I take this to be an important part of a 
recovery from the shipwrecking. If my explanation gives another impression, it is unintended. See Zahavi, Dan. 
2014. Self and Other Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. First edition. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
707 This notion of primacy must not be conflated with normativity in the linguistic or ethical sense (as if the original 
meaning or value was already there in the first experience). It is merely based on a genetic assumption in 
phenomenology that abstract and imagined objects are derived from concrete experiences. In this sense it has a deep 
affinity with the empiricist tradition in philosophy. But, instead of explaining this derivation in the form of induction, 
it is explained (as above) as a process of typifications that involves mediation through signs (the indicative and 
expressive function of the body and language). The habituating, sedimenting process explains in this manner the 
genesis (or monadic constitution) of a world beyond actual reach. In complex phenomena like human interaction this 
world of potential reach (or even beyond any reach and merely imaginary) is quite obviously an important part of our 
situations, defining its invisible surroundings. Within this social space we might talk about distance in terms of spatial 
distance (near-far), temporal distance (predecessor-fellow-men/contemporary-successor) and level of anonymity. 
When the latter overrides the spatial and temporal proximity, such as in the case of the bridge players (or much 
worse, in the de-politization of people), the relational and modal notion of interactive social distance is most clearly 
profiled.  
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cognitions, which Schutz calls typifications; “they” refer primarily to the undetermined content of 
a type, such as “people like…”708 Unlike the encounter with “you”, the orientations toward 
“he/she” or “they” as contemporaries are characteristically “out of sight”. They are in this sense 
metatopical. Unless you are in love, the difference is hardly noticeable in everyday life,709 but it is 
essential to an adequate understanding of social reality according to a phenomenological 
perspective:  
In the we-relation the fellow-man was bodily present; I could grasp her conscious life in 
the greatest abundance of symptoms. We were tuned in to one another in temporal and 
spatial community. I was mirrored in her, she in me; her experiences and my experiences 
formed a common course: we aged together.710  
As soon as “you” leave “me”, I stand left behind, relying on my memories and imagination of 
you. You have become an individual personal type for me, upheld and represented only by my 
cognition. A concrete apprehension of you is now out of reach, at least temporarily. “You” are 
no longer a particular, unique person upheld by my perceptual experience.711 Schutz’ we-relation 
is, similar to Arendt’s notion of action, dependent on the presence of others. And in this relation, 
the way we appear might vary from the quite superficial and functional to the intimate and 
personal.  
The “thou”- and “they”-orientations make it possible to suggest the possible locations of the 
equality and uniqueness that Arendt refers to in her definition of plurality:  
- Thou = singular/unique 
- They = typical/equal712 
These are formal distinctions, and in most concrete cases there will be a combination of these 
orientations. When we encounter someone, the way they are given to us is always informed by 
certain typifications. The person appearing in front of me has in this sense a “double character”. 
                                                 
708 Or “he-orientation” in singular. (Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 75) 
709 From this alteration between encounter and detachment, Schutz talks about a social relation as repeatable, rather 
than as continuous. With social media, this character of clear breaks is less obvious. We are always “online”, 
continuously engaged with our friends. Or, perhaps more precise still: the idealized unity of the other person has a 
stronger integrity because she is continuously accessible. “Idealization” means here the endless continuation of a 
sequence (2,4,6, and so forth or …), the “…” (“and so forth”) is usually called stereotypes or prejudices in their 
social form. The noetic correlate (the corresponding subjective act) of such idealization is the available repetition of  
“I can always do it again”. This is of course not fully true of social relations, but it is only the loss of someone that 
makes us realize the “never again” of the life after death.  
710 Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 70. Notice the pretense, and yes I revised the gender of the “fellow-man”.   
711 In a communicative interaction this indicates for Schutz a double context to the social situation. On the shared, 
common sense level of social reality “your” words are signs in a context we share with everyone else. Schutz calls 
this context “Objective”. On the specific, face-to-face level of the encounter, “your” words might also be given to 
me as indications or symptoms of a unique meaning, which Schutz refers to as “Subjective”. (Schutz and Luckmann 
1973, p. 63, for more nuances of proximity and depth, see “The social encounter”, p. 64 ff) 
712 The equality of “they”-relation is here meant to refer to sameness and lower levels of equality, and not primarily 
equality of dignity. I do however think of equal worth as located as a higher-order, ideal content of “they”-
orientation, not reducible to typifications.  
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
299 
 
This framework of the double character can be compared with and might help us to flesh out the 
twofold character of plurality. At least it captures the tension discussed above between pregiven 
uniqueness of the perceived other and the equalizing aspects of the linguistic typifications that 
provide this perception with further conceptual depth.  
In Schutz’s analysis, there is however a tendency to assume that the relation between these two 
characters aligns with the genetic direction of constitution: from the manifold of topical 
experiences of “thou” to the constituted norms, or idealizations of types on the metatopical level 
of “they”. In this way, the revision of my typifications of another’s conscious life (her unique, 
subjective meaning-context) is primarily informed by face-to-face encounters (involving topical 
thou-orientations). This assumption relies on an analytical abstraction from the existential 
situation where linguistic types are already informing the immediate perceptions.713 Hence, the 
conceptual constellations of thou-unique and they-equal are not always reliable in an everyday life 
setting.  
Notice in the following passage how the double character of personal appearance is also taken on 
by orientations toward (metatopical) “mere contemporaries”, where the sense of agency is 
brought to life even in their perceptual absence:   
I grasp fellow-men as “people like…”. But at the same time, I experience them in the we-
relation as unique fellow-men whose conscious life manifests itself before my eyes. They 
thus have a double character: They are “people like…” and they are “thou’s”. On the basis 
of this double character of fellow-men there then occurs a third transposition: the mere 
contemporary, experienced by me as a type, is endowed with a conscious life like a fellow-
man. But it must be established that I do not immediately experience the conscious life of 
the contemporary, but as it were “breathe” consciousness into the reference point of the 
they-orientation, into the type through an act of explication of mine.714  
In this quote Schutz uses several technical terms that needs to be explained. As mentioned above, 
“thou” and “they” refer to formal orientations that usually combine, even, as Schutz notes here, 
in cases when the person is not “over there”, but merely present through imaginative explication. 
In addition, “fellow-man” and “contemporary” have precise meanings in Schutz’s framework. 
They are relative positional terms in social space.  
“Fellow-man” refers to the person in the topical encounter. The key to understand the double 
character, as I see it, is to understand Schutz’s notion of a “fellow-man” as referring to a concrete 
person that is simultaneously constituted by two formally distinguished orientations: the “thou”-
                                                 
713 This situation is genuinely historical in the sense that it relies on the generative events of birth and death, and the 
appropriation of a language, a social imaginary, and so on.  
714 Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 79, my emphasis 
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orientation (which grasps the individual and unique) and the “they”-orientation (which grasps the 
typical and equal). The typifications give the presence of the other a depth beyond the immediate 
grasp of the presence of another conscious being. For instance, individual types refer to 
experiences of the same person over several encounters. 
Initially, Schutz treats the relation to individual types as fully based on personal encounters, but 
as the quote above reflects, these concrete encounters might lead to derivatives that are less 
dependent of such direct experiences. We may understand this as different degrees of presence 
and absence. The more absent – i.e. the further removed from a direct encounter – the more the 
individual types takes on an anonymous and general character. But also in the case of persons we 
know well, their presence is very different from their absence. This is perhaps most clear when 
their presence is negated: waiting for her in a café alone or not seeing her “there”, waiting for me. 
Detached from the contingency of her presence, I can think of her as a particular person (real 
object, individual type) that I happen at the moment to be waiting for (“it’s so typical of her to be 
late”), or as a group-member or gender “as such” (as an Academic or as a woman; both idealized 
types of real objects).715 “Contemporary” refers to this imagined relation to the other, depending 
on cognitions of someone not “here”. The contemporary other is, as Arendt would say, simply 
an object of thought.  
To isolate the typifications that constitute one orientation of the double character, it helps to 
imagine someone you’ve never met. This is how we relate socially to “mere” contemporaries: “I 
grasp the factual existence and being-thus-and-so of a contemporary only by means of derived 
typifications.”716 These are people I’ve never experienced directly, but at best only second hand – 
i.e. their presence is not directly informed by any a previous “living we-relations”.717 I can only 
imagine their factual existence.718  
The reference point of the they-orientation is a type for the conscious processes of typical 
contemporaries. […] The reference point of the they-orientation is inferred from my 
                                                 
715 See Berger and Luckmann for useful distinction in this regard between types of primary socialization and ideal-
types of secondary socialization. 
716 Ibid., p. 74, my emphasis. For elaboration on typifications, see Ibid., chapter 3, C.  
717 Ibid., p. 72 
718 On the most general level of an individual contemporary type, I do not imagine any particular person. In other 
words, I am not concerned with the subjective experience of someone I know that just happen to be out of sight. I 
relate ultimately to the general individual type as a ‘human being in general’. They involve the most abstract levels of 
the thesis of reciprocity of perspectives – i.e. “assumptions of typical anonymous repeatability” (Ibid., p. 76). In its 
most general form it is merely an empty representation of “someone” free of attributes. Out of this Schutz 
formulates a law of social reality: “The anonymity of a typification is inversely proportional to its fullness of 
content.” Ibid., p. 80)  
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knowledge and from the social world in general, and is necessarily in an Objective 
meaning-context.719  
From this it is clear that when I’m alone, I have to rely on they-orientations, as I am without 
“thou-orientations” and have no fellow-men within my actual reach. Unless the social horizon of 
contemporaries has been broken completely, I still anticipate and relate to potential encounters in 
the future. But, if these potential relations rely only on very general, non-individualized 
typifications, they indicate a more permanent kind of superficiality of anonymity. In a mass 
society, in the city or in the nation, it is certainly convenient to be able to rely on objective 
meaning-contexts shared even with complete strangers. Still, a life with mere they-relations seems 
(at least conceptually) to be on the edge of dehumanization. 
If we compare Schutz’ notion of pure they-relations with Arendt’s notion of solitude and 
loneliness, they-relations describe the social horizon of solitude. It captures the social mode of a 
master working alone, uninterrupted. Even taken to its limit of a life in company with mere 
contemporaries, it is not yet a life in loneliness in Arendt’s terms because the objective meaning-
context of types implies the existence of a shared world. Loneliness would, in Schutz’ terms, 
amount to a social horizon that is weakened to the point where the situation reveals no indication 
of possible reciprocal social relations, not even beyond the actual reach. The situation is then no 
longer defined by the depth of a common world or a common sense.  
As Arendt’s distinction between mentalities indicates, the superficial character of anonymity 
might take on various forms of experiences of oneself, others and society. According to Arendt, a 
mass society, strictly speaking as a “mass”, is characterized by the superficiality of others as 
undistinguished laboring animals, i.e. in undistinguishable sameness. At this level there is no 
distinct sense of self and other. But since we would usually speak of a mass society also as a 
functional system (as in the notion of “civil society” as a market), the superficial and anonymous 
relations to contemporaries in a modern society might take on the additional character of 
relations between working producers and artists (homo faber). In this sense “mass society” would 
no longer imply an undistinguishable mass, but a system of more or less distinct functionaries, or 
functional types as Schutz would call them. In this variation, members would share a common 
material world of production and even the limited public of a marketplace. The limit case on this 
level is for Arendt the performing artists, which are able - as indicated by the quoted passage 
above – to “breathing life” into personal types, even when these characters are based on the 
                                                 
719 Ibid., p. 75 
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types of mere contemporaries. I take this last possibility as an important clue as to how the 
sociality of plurality can be understood under metatopical conditions.   
Since to appear as fully human seems to be possible only under the condition of a certain balance 
or calibration between the unique and the equal, this clue must be further developed in order to 
understand how a space of appearance can be detached from the topical encounter with others. 
In the following I will consider mainly two specific aspects: First of all, to what extent can we 
apply Schutz’s notion of reciprocity to approximate the character of a metatopical political 
equality? And second, how does the unique character of a human agent take on a durable 
character beyond the co-presence of a singular “you”?   
8.2.1 Equality – reciprocity and political equality 
When we interact and speak to each other, there is usually an implicit confidence in the fact that 
we understand words and actions to mean the same. They tend to follow the same recipes of 
social interaction, as Taylor would put it. Schutz labels this confidence of everyday life “the thesis 
of reciprocity”.  
Simply put, in everyday interactions we tend to take for granted that we share the same 
interpretative schema for actions and utterances. But since this is a moving and living field, it is 
constantly subjected to redefinitions and negotiations. The way each participant defines the 
situation overlaps with others, but should not be understood as identical. In a sense, every new 
utterance is a test of whether the definition implied by the speaker is “confirmed, modified, partly 
suspended, or generally placed in question.”720 This background or horizon of utterances “within 
which communicative actions “always already” are moving” is called the lifeworld. 721 This 
“common sense” – an already established sense of sameness or reciprocity – is what Schutz seeks 
to describe.722 “Common sense” is basically defined as certain everyday assumptions, which is 
structured by the “fundamental axioms of the social, natural attitude”723.  
                                                 
720 P. 121, in Habermas, Jürgen. 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action : Vol.2. Cambridge: Polity. 
721 Further, Habermas specifies the relation between a situation and the lifeworld in its widest sense:  
“Situations do not get “defined” in the sense of being sharply delimited. They always have a horizon that shifts with 
the theme. A situation is a segment of lifeworld contexts of relevance that is thrown into relief by themes and articulated 
through goals and plans of action; these contexts of relevance are concentrically ordered and become increasingly 
anonymous and diffused as the spatiotemporal and social distance grows.” (Habermas 1987, p. 123) 
722 Schutz follows a similar path: “For the time being it is enough to establish that in the natural attitude I assume 
that objects of the outer world are in the main the same for my fellow-men as they are for me […] since it is brought 
into a common frame of interpretation.” (Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 4) And: “Since we cannot here enter into 
the phenomenological problems of the constitution of intersubjectivity, we must be content with the statement that 
in the natural attitude of everyday life the following is taken for granted without question: […]” (Ibid.p. 5) Curiously 
this leads Schutz to be clearer than most phenomenologists on the point that the natural attitude implies a distinct 
social epoché. Such bracketing usually implies a narrow sense of a theoretical dissection of a mundane whole, an 
abstraction, and reflectively taking something out of its original context. But, Schutz understands it more generally as 
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The first of these axioms is the assumption of the existence of intelligent fellow-men, i.e. we 
usually take for granted that we are together as embodied and conscious beings. This level of 
reciprocity corresponds more or less to the level of physical and mental sameness that Arendt 
operates with. 
The second axiom refers to the assumption that we have a similar experience of the things 
around us. This second assumption does not exclude that we see different aspects of the same 
object, and even have – according to the specific biographical situation of each of us – somewhat 
divergent and overlapping “systems of relevance” or “hierarchy of plans”. In Arendt’s thinking 
this would fit with the “common world” as the framework of working activities, which is also 
reflected in the mentality of work as a specific social imaginary of the civil society as a functional 
system and the state as the agency of social engineering.  
Schutz’s main point is, however, that the problems that might occur on these levels in terms of 
subjective variations are usually set aside when we seek contact and interact with people in our 
daily life. Hence, the third assumption is that we take for granted that this interaction is possible 
and that we can make ourselves understood. This requires at least a shared repertoire of linguistic 
typifications on the level of cognition (as concepts of understanding or idealized types).  
This natural, social attitude of everyday life, Schutz terms “the general thesis of reciprocity of 
perspectives”724. This thesis rests on two pragmatically motivated idealizations:  
1) The idealization of interchangeability of the standpoints: We can take each other’s perspectives. 
They have an analogue character. 
2) The idealization of the congruency of the systems of relevance: The differences of the individual 
interpretative schema are practically irrelevant for our current interactions and for those 
to come. 
That we usually hold this thesis of reciprocity to be true without critical reflection expresses itself 
in a certain “objectivity” or natural character of our lifeworld. The objectivity of this world is 
strictly speaking not mind-independent, but must be understood as an “objective meaning-
context” that – similar to grammar or the significance of a word – is not dependent on my 
                                                                                                                                                        
motivated by the setting of a problem, which in the natural attitude of everyday life is strongly associated to the 
pragmatic project of getting along with others in an effortless manner. Sometimes the natural attitude is therefore 
understood as a primary whole of possible and actual naïve experiences. But, Schutz stresses more accurately that the 
corresponding realm of the everyday lifeworld is merely primary in a relative sense to other orientations. It is in this 
sense generally “pre-dissected”, but it also has, strictly speaking, its own epoché: related to “the thesis of reciprocity 
of perspectives” and the neglect of pragmatically irrelevant subjective variations. Schutz so to speak “borrows” this 
social epoché in his own methodological abstention from the “problems of intersubjectivity”. 
723 Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 59. Compared to Arendt’s notion of common sense, as discussed by Hinchman 
(see chapter 7), she seems to emphasize the common world based on taking the position of others. It’s an intimate 
part of “acting in concert”.  
724 Ibid., p. 60 
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individual assumptions. Nor do they simply accidentally overlap with those of others, it is a context 
that we are brought up in or always-already thrown into.  
Depending on the integrity of this “web of relationships” (Arendt’s term), we keep each other in 
position and depend on reestablishing a consensus when the objective meaning-context dissolves. 
To account for my meaning-context being at least partly objective and shared, Schutz points out 
– as a fourth assumption (or axiom of social relations) – that we in the natural attitude also take 
for granted that our social and cultural world is historically pregiven (always already) to “us” (in 
general: to everyone) as a common framework and only to some extent able to be 
formed/reformed by “me”. Within this framework we could also find concepts that are less 
dependent on the shared perceptual surroundings and that enable meaningful iterations across 
generations, such as mathematical concepts and principles of action.  
Approximately we get a conceptual diagram like this: 
Axioms of social relations Assumptions Comparative equivalents in 
Arendt’s terms 
First axiom The existence of other 
embodied, intelligent beings 
Sameness of biology 
Second axiom The existence of a common, 
objective world. 
A common world of 
materials and producers 
Third axiom The existence of shared 
meaning and the possibility 
being understood 
The equality of plurality (at 
least insofar as reciprocity is a 
necessary aspect of this 
condition) 
Fourth axiom The existence of a pregiven 
and durable cultural world. 
Stability of human condition 
across generations; common 
experience and plurality of 
peoples. 
Figure 4: Table of Schutz levels of reciprocity  
The notion of “equality” can be related to these axioms in several ways. The first and perhaps 
most obvious is that it makes perfect sense to speak about a political principle of equality as part 
of the interpretative linguistic schema that we presumably share with others. In this way the 
concept of “political equality” is located as an element of a common background in a historical 
lifeworld. We could think of this both as the public culture of a state community or in a wider 
sense as the social imaginaries of a linguistic-cultural sphere, such as the “western”. I’ve already 
discussed this aspect of equality as part of a public culture in the context of Rawls and Carens 
(see chapter 3 and 5) and considered the problematic heteronomy it seems to imply, if we say that 
we ought to be guided by the principle of equality simply because it is part of our tradition. 
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
305 
 
A second meaning of equality – as reciprocity – is related to the necessary similarity of members 
of a political organization (even in a spontaneous assembly). Equality is in this sense not a 
principle of action, but a condition for understanding, and hence an element of the condition of 
plurality. Since Schutz’s axioms of social relations describe the structure of our relations to our 
fellow-men and contemporaries, our social world can be modelled as a topography of actual and 
potential relations of more or less reciprocity (including the sense of equal capacity to act and 
speak). Correspondingly, we could imagine how our expectations function as a relational 
distribution of reciprocity. On the general level we share a common world with wide circles of 
others (including other species), according to the reciprocity of the two first axioms. On a more 
specified level, the expected reciprocity of the third and fourth axioms draw more narrow circles. 
The distribution of the latter is politically relevant because the expected possibility of establishing 
a communicative relation is crucial to a political community. To claim to be “human” on the level 
of sameness (i.e. as a human specimen) is in this sense very different from claiming to be an equal 
(or fully human) on the level of a historically pregiven (and constantly renegotiated) framework 
(i.e. of ethnicity, culture, civilization, etc.). The latter is associated with being politically 
competent. There is usually no doubt about the status of slaves, women or foreigners as human 
specimens; historically there have, however, been various opinions on the status of each category 
as capable of reciprocal political relations.  
A decisive difference between Schutz’s notion of reciprocity and Arendt’s notion of equality is 
their different applications: Schutz’s project is mainly descriptive, and although his concept of 
reciprocity might have a state-centric bias (as most of sociology tend to)725, this is not an explicit 
concern. In contrast, Arendt’s thinking has an explicit moral (or moral-legal) ambition. For 
Schutz, reciprocity is intended to be neutral with respect to the kind of social relations or 
situations it defines. For instance, the capacity to take an order requires reciprocity (at least of the 
kind implied by the second axiom, as in a master-slave, or employer-employee relation). The 
situation is in this sense defined by the reciprocity of a common world, not the kind of equality 
associated with communicative freedom (Benhabib) or free human agency (Arendt).  
Evidently, the occasion for renegotiations of the content of a command is not the same as it 
would be if one was asked politely by an equal. One might still disobey and passively resist, but 
the interaction is clearly not situated in a proper framework for action and speech. For Schutz, 
this distinction between communicative and functional relations is merely a question of variations 
                                                 
725 In sociology this bias is known as methodological nationalism. See Alexandra Ålund for specific critique of 
Schutz’s notion of communities and “strangers”, in Ålund, Aleksandra. 1995. "Alterity in Modernity." Acta sociologica 
38, no. 4: 12..  
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
306 
 
of possible social relations, whereas for Arendt the same distinction has a crucial normative 
significance. My guess is that they would both agree that reciprocity on some level is needed for 
people in order to understand each other. Where Arendt seems to depart from Schutz’s account 
most clearly is in her insistence that to appear as human, and to co-exist as a plurality of unique 
beings, some further notion of equality as dignity or equal value is needed. This insistence 
corresponds to Arendt’s critique of organizing equality that put too much weight on certain 
forms of reciprocity, such as that of a “nation”. Similar to the blindness the mentality of work has 
to meaning, these modes of organizing equality seems irresponsive to the human capacity to start 
something new. 
Although it seems reasonable to claim that the modern egalitarian state has been central to 
successfully equalizing its members (for instance in terms of equality before the law), it also 
seems plausible to claim that this mode of political organization has room for improvements. In 
light of the globalizing development of civil society (including both the market and the public 
sphere), a distribution of reciprocity within homogenous domestic spheres seems increasingly 
inadequate.  
As a response to these changing circumstances, the ambiguity of equality associated with Arendt’s 
right to have rights, as the right to appear, seems to imply both that the expectation of equality 
(as reciprocity) should be extended to foreigners, and that they should somehow be considered as 
equals. In other words, we should expect foreigners to be able to make themselves understood 
and their plans and needs should be considered. Furthermore, foreigners should be granted 
equality as members on some level, although all could obviously not become regular citizens of 
the same state community. The normative guarantee for equality is most urgently called for by 
the most vulnerable foreigners that are victims of systemic exclusion, such as those suffering 
from long-term encampment. These foreigners are at risk of being deprived of the condition of 
plurality. These foreigners might become “naked” – not merely in the sense that they are 
institutionally unprotected in an international order that tend to politically equalize insiders only 
(i.e. territorial members) – but also in the sense that they risk losing their human appearance. If 
so, they are left so to speak with their “native” character as “singular” and “unique” (as in pure 
you-orientations), i.e. as the uncanny figure of “naked life”. 
8.2.2 Distinctness – the given and the performed  
Since the problems that occupy Schutz and Arendt are quite different, the significance of 
distinctness or uniqueness diverges in their accounts. Whereas Schutz give analytical significance 
to the uniqueness of the other as it is grasped by the “thou”-orientations in order to analyze the 
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dynamic of an emerging social horizon, the uniqueness of the other has a crucial moral 
significance for Arendt as an element of plurality that can be lost and that must be restored in 
order to appear as human. For Schutz, the implied variation of subjective meaning-contexts only 
becomes relevant when it occurs as a pragmatic distortion of the thesis of reciprocity. Schutz 
even sets aside the variations associated with the forth axiom as irrelevant to his analysis of 
common sense. For Arendt however, these variations are of central moral-legal significance. On 
the level of individual distinctness, it implies the decisive possibility to be able to express or 
distinguish oneself (including one’s subjective meaning-context) in a framework of equals. The 
moral-legal significance of this possibility is also expressed in its possible negation through the 
way organized equality excludes some individuals from the public. On the level of the cultural 
world, the variation of cultural reciprocity has moral-legal significance as the value of different 
traditions of expression (including different objective meaning-contexts) and the possibility of its 
negation in the form of genocide as a crime against humanity.  
It seems to be a continuous concern for Arendt that people might be excluded and “thrown 
back” on their natural, naked (uncanny, and undistinguished) givenness: “This whole sphere of 
the merely given, relegated to private life in civilized society, is a permanent threat to the public 
sphere […]”726And further: “They lack that tremendous equalizing of differences which comes 
from being citizens of some commonwealth and yet, since they are no longer allowed to partake 
in the human artifice, they begin to belong to the human race in much the same way as animals 
belong to a specific animal species.”727  
There is, however, an ambiguity in the way Arendt refers to the distinctness of human agents. On 
the one hand the formulation “if men were not distinct”728 seems to suggest that uniqueness is 
pre-given, as in: “If men where not already distinct, there would be no reason for them to perform 
it in public”.729 This interpretation finds some resonance in the passage referred to above730 (, 
where Arendt claims that we are born “singular and unique” and that we are able to express in 
actions our (presumably already given) “personal identity”. In Arendt’s critique of the highly 
developed political communities of organized equality (such as the Greek polis and the modern 
state system), the equalizing achievement seems to come with the risk of an excluding intolerance 
of “mere existence” and “the alien”. These notions of what is excluded seem to imply the 
assumption on her part of an inherent uniqueness of the newborn or the newcomer.  
                                                 
726 Arendt 1968, p. 301 
727 Ibid., p. 302 
728 Arendt 1958, p. 175 
729 My interpretation. 
730 see 8.1.2, p. 284 
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As a symbol of the fact of difference, understood as “individuality as such”731 to use Arendt’s 
phrase, the newcomer confronts the artificial human world with its limitations. Arendt brings this 
up in her discussion of how a civilization, which produces a world and equality through 
organization, becomes increasingly uneasy with the underlying individuality of our “unchangeable 
and unique nature”. This unease is caused, according to Arendt, by the hubris of the civilized 
world to “master” the fact of difference through equality. Often the criterion of ethnic 
homogeneity has been deployed as the regulating idea of equality, such as in the notion of “rights 
of an Englishman”.732 This might have calmed the cause of “dumb hatred, mistrust and 
discrimination” within a group, but with the increasing risk of backfiring as the civilized world 
takes the form of an organized global world. Arendt opposed this ethnic grounding as an 
irrelevant form of equality on the terms that it – while enabling this political life – also has unjust 
excluding consequences for “the alien”.733 With nowhere else to go, this is not just insensitive to 
the political integrity of those excluded, it also presents a danger to the civilized world as the 
emergence of superfluous and rootless people in its midst. 
This is the reason why Arendt suggests a civic form of government which remains neutral to the 
assumed ethnic reciprocity based on the fourth axiom of social relations. “The decline of the 
nation state”734 implies for Arendt exactly the replacement of political equality with ethnic 
reciprocity. In the worst cases, the excluding functions of this inadequate notion of political 
equality (as reciprocity) lead to the systemic loss of rights of those that stand out for the wrong 
reasons. It reproduces a state of exclusion as “mere existence” as in the institutional forms of 
slavery and encampment. To be born a slave or to be born a refugee is, in this sense, extreme 
cases of intolerance and non-recognition. It welcomes the newborn as a “born dead”. 
On the other hand, Arendt seems reluctant to solve the problem of non-recognition by providing 
the inherent uniqueness with any content. Presumably, the reason is that any given content would 
be located on the lower levels of the social axioms of reciprocity, of “what” makes us different. 
Hence, it would give the newborn or the excluded newcomer attributes such as those based on 
biological sameness, a concern which is clearly manifested in Arendt’s worry that human rights 
                                                 
731 Arendt 1968, p. 301 
732 In terms of Schutz’s axioms, we might say that the problem stems from converting the fourth axiom of ethnic 
reciprocity into a regulative idea for the distribution of political equality. Similar to the way the assumed reciprocity 
takes on the form of methodological nationalism in sociology, “nationality” becomes the guiding principle of the 
state. 
733 Arendt’s analysis here is more accurate and relevant when she discusses the Jewish question than when she 
discusses the violent effects of the term “Negro”. On the latter issue she seems to comment only from a distance, 
and unable to present the relevant perspectives of both sides.   
734 See Chapter 9, Arendt 1968 
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take on the same character as animal rights.735 In phenomenological terms, there is a similar 
problem associated with mistaking the singularity of the “you” (which is given genetic primacy) 
for a proper political concept of optimal human appearance (as a plurality of unique beings).   
To avoid these pitfalls, we have to consider that Arendt understands this immediate presence of 
the other – experienced merely as co-existent or genuinely simultaneous – as a highly superficial 
presence. Only when accompanied by action and speech, i.e. with the implied depth of language, 
does the agent appear as fully human. In other words, speech is a central part of the way 
someone appears as a double character:  
Speechless action would no longer be action because there would no longer be an actor, 
and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of 
words. The action he begins is humanly disclosed by the word, and though his deed can 
be perceived in its brute physical appearance [i.e. as “you”] without verbal 
accompaniment, it becomes relevant only through the spoken word in which he identifies 
himself as the actor, announcing what he does, has done, and intends to do.736  
The political activities of speech and action are the modes of appearance through with we are 
given to each other as most human. This is not a point made to argue against Schutz’s 
qualification of the genetic primacy of “thou”-orientations, but a point made to qualify the 
optimal mode of the double character of personal appearance in normative terms.  
If we ask for the general features of future deliberations on cosmopolitan reform, we might still 
find inspiration in Schutz’s account of the way first-hand experience molds (or schematizes) the 
pre-given types. Here we get a sense of the general character of this dynamic as a molding or 
schematization of the types, central to the human appearance:  
Since I already bring a stock of knowledge [i.e. typifications] to every immediate 
encounter with a fellow-man, typifications also will necessarily play a role in the thou-
orientation and we-relation. I also grasp the unique fellow-man who stands across me 
face-to-face, with the help of typifications. Basically, there still remains an essential 
difference [to second-hand images of one of my contemporaries]. My typifications of my 
fellow-man are brought into his uniqueness, which is immediately grasped in the living 
we-relation, and they are modified by this uniqueness. The typifications are “enlivened” in 
application to my fellow-man, are arranged and subordinated to the living reality.737  
                                                 
735 Arendt 1968, p. 292 
736 Arendt 1958, p. 179, my insertion 
737
 Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 77, my emphasis. Later this modification is related to a degree of generality (of 
detail and determinateness), which defines the fullness of content. In relation to contemporaries, this is relevant 
because it defines a certain social distance in terms of anonymity. “The anonymity of a typification is inversely 
proportional to its fullness of content.” (Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 80) Further, it has a curious temporal 
component that reflects a deeper point that can be made on accessibility/imagination [which can be related to short-
comings in Arendt’s own work – assumptions made about the situation of others; see Benhabib]: “The sooner I can 
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These analyses are still topical, but they allow us to appreciate the possibility of types that are 
responsive to the unique appearance of a fellow-man in first-hand experience. To convert this 
possibility to the metatopical level, there still remains a peculiar problem: How do we retain or 
convey the uniqueness of someone through words? Say, we have the adequate conception of 
equality (that calibrates sensitive synthesis of the types and the unique) in a way that includes the 
most vulnerable alien amongst us. How do we retain this experience on a metatopical level and 
make it objective? That is, how do we express or share the way someone makes an impact on our 
stock of knowledge to others? Arendt is clearly sensitive to this issue:  
The manifestation of who the speaker and doer unexchangeably is, though it is plainly 
visible, retains a curious intangibility that confounds all efforts toward unequivocal verbal 
expression. The moment we want to say who somebody is, our very vocabulary leads us 
astray into saying what he is; we get entangled in a description of qualities he necessarily 
shares with others like him; we begin to describe a type or a “character” in the old 
meaning of the word, with the result that his specific uniqueness escapes us.738  
It seems both Arendt and Schutz would agree that the unique is an irretrievable character of the 
encounter, and something that is only insufficiently manifested through language. This problem 
is related to the problem of thoughtlessness considered in chapter 7. In other words, how do we 
express uniqueness – or more precisely, the ephemeral experience of free agency – in a way that 
does not reduce the other to an object of knowledge and cognitions? How do we express, in the 
insufficiency of our language, the manifestations of a (in Kant’s empirical terms) “non-worldly” 
phenomenon? 
The main way Arendt addresses this issue seems to be by claiming that stories and drama 
provides us with the best representations and manifestations of the unique agency of a person. 
Consider for instance the following passage:  
The disclosure of the “who” through speech, and the setting of a new beginning through 
action, always fall into an already existing web where their immediate consequences can 
be felt. Together they start a new process which eventually emerges as the unique life 
story of the newcomer, affecting uniquely the life stories of all those with whom he 
comes into contact. […] They tell us more about their subjects, the “hero” in the center 
of each story, than any product of human hands ever tells us about the master who 
produced it and yet they are not products, properly speaking.739  
In this way, by telling someone’s life story or biography, we might convey the specific molding of 
types into a metatopical manifestation of the person, and not merely as an individual type. To be  
                                                                                                                                                        
immediately experience the typical characteristics of “someone” as properties of a fellow-man, as components of his 
conscious life, the less anonymous is the typification in question.” (Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 81) 
738 Arendt 1958, p. 181 
739 Ibid., p. 184 
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free, or to be recognized as an equal, amounts, in Arendt’s terms, to be a “hero” in the original 
meaning of being someone whose story can be told. Drama is superior in the sense that it reflects 
better the temporality of the action: “[…] the specific revelatory quality of action and speech, the 
implicit manifestation of the agent and speaker, is so indissolubly tied to the living flux of acting 
and speaking that it can be represented and “reified” only through a kind of repetition, the 
imitation or mimesis, […]. Only actors and speakers who re-enact the story’s plot can convey the 
full meaning, not so much of the story itself, but of the “heroes” who reveal themselves in it.”740 
This seems paradoxical, given that artistic performances has the same ephemeral temporal 
character as human agency, but the key point lies in the possibility of reenactment.  
Hence, full appearance as human does not rely only on the mode of action and speech, but also 
on the way it manifests a human agent in a story that can be re-enacted elsewhere.741 As an 
expression of the new political principle of meaningfulness, ‘the right to appear’ implies the 
protection of the narratively structured framework of appearance. However, the stories told in 
this framework, especially those that manifest plurality in an exemplary manner, might also self-
reflexively inspire and re-iterate the way we understand this principle and how to implement it. 
The final synthesis is not predetermined.  
8.2.3 The problematic dependency on the spoken word 
To be a “hero”, or to stand out as someone whose story is worthy of being told, seems to repeat 
the problem of “speechlessness”, brought to our notice by Rancière (see 6.2). It seems Arendt’s 
concept of speech and reenactment, and the assumed reciprocity of the third axiom might lead to 
intolerable exclusions similar to those addressed in the case of political equality based on ethnic 
homogeneity. If we accept Rancière’s solution, we should insist that the excluded still have the 
capacity to act (and speak). In general, I think Arendt would support this solution and judge it as 
preferable to solutions that appeal to universal vulnerability or to pleasure and pain. It also seems 
close, at least in my reading, to her critique of the modern notions of the inherent dignity of an 
autonomous will.  
Still, in the most extreme cases of non-recognition, that of the “living dead”, we might 
nonetheless have to consider the possibility of an absolute state of speechlessness. How do we 
account for the dignity of those that are truly incapacitated from speaking?742 In these cases we 
might have to accept solutions based on the reciprocity associated with the two first axioms of 
                                                 
740 Ibid., p. 187 
741 Jackson, Michael. 2002. The Politics of Storytelling : Violence, Transgression, and Intersubjectivity. Copenhagen Denmark, 
Portland, Ore.: Museum Tusculanum Press, Distributor USA & Canada, International Specialized Book Services. 
742 See Lysaker 2013 for illuminating and systematic discussion on these cases.  
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social relations, even if it implies a compromise with the principle of meaningfulness. They are 
compromises in the sense that they imply transgressive assumptions of reciprocity of the type: 
We are similar to the point where there is no need to listen. These solutions must be considered 
emergency-solutions, as they do not address the institutionalized problem of exclusionary neglect. 
For instance, we might accept the provision of refugee-camps on the basis of recognizing 
universal humanitarian need. But, it would be unacceptable to allow such camps – based on 
paternalistic transgressions of meaningfulness – to become an institutionalized solution to avoid 
resettlement of the “superfluous”.  
I’ve generally addressed such “transgressions” according to the issues of alienation and 
dehumanization implied by inadequate mentalities in Arendt’s work. Arendt explains other a-
political or anti-political mentalities as possible conceptions that are grounded in other parts of 
human experience than the political life.743  In terms Schutz’s analytic terms, I’ve shed light on 
how these non-political modes of experience can be understood as other possible calibrations of 
the double character of experiencing others. Hence, we might distinguish different mentalities 
according to the depth and clarity the various modes they are based on, or conceptual designs of 
equality they are able to offer. The ability to promote and protect a plurality of unique beings will 
vary accordingly.  
Further, I’ve also suggested that a person can appear on the metatopical level, given the right 
framework. The double character of personal appearance makes the difference between topical 
and metatopical appearance less radical. They both rely on typifications of they-orientations. And 
whereas topical encounters can combine this with the singularity and temporality of the concrete 
performance, metatopical encounters rely on simulations or reenactments in order to “breath 
life” into personal individual types.  
8.3 Mere contemporaries and collectives 
In the last section I considered how the synthesis of the double character in the encounter could 
be conceived and shared in such a way that the appearance of someone “qua human” could be 
maintained in the metatopical character of a contemporary through stories and re-enactment. The 
next question is how we can understand this durable aspect of face-to-face interaction to have 
any normative relevance on the level of the state?  
                                                 
743 i.e. in the narrow sense of the bios politikos, that Arendt describes in the classic appreciation of freedom. Other 
experiences are for instance related to honor and glory (monarchy), to fear (tyranny/despotism), to comfort (welfare 
state; mass society) and to utility (commerce; night watcher state). 
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This last detail is concerned with the required level of equality associated with the fully human 
appearance. Either topical or metatopical, the equality implied cannot – it seems – be reduced to 
reciprocity of typifications. The equality of an organized group might be given content through 
typifications, but the membership itself and the regulative ideal of a group of equals must be of a 
different character.  
As discussed above, Arendt understands “equality” mainly to be something we become as 
members of a group, i.e. as something produced through organization. Taken in this sense, there 
is a decisive difference between equality and the individual type of “people like …” that Schutz 
refers to. The former refers to the conception of a political principle of equality that should be 
sensitive to the manifestations of “non-worldly” free agency, and the latter to responsiveness to 
the concrete, immediate givenness of the other. When Arendt refers to the kind of equality that 
makes us understand each other – the reciprocity that Schutz refers to – these typifications might 
be relevant in order to indicate the extent to which we share the same objective meaning-context, 
for instance language. Most of our social life relies on such social stereotypes (of people like this 
and that) in order to adapt our behavior to the situation. We might also apply the imaginary of 
types to give content to absent or anonymous free agents.  
The kind of equality achieved through organized membership, is, however, essentially different. It 
cannot be given a concrete example in the same way. If we recognize that someone is acting “for 
the sake of” some principle, we experience it – in contrast to the typical – as a unique 
performance and manifestation of a shared principle. The difference between imaginary 
individual types and the agency that manifests principles seems to me to be a crucial conceptual 
distinction. The implied difference in depth is exactly what Arendt critically addresses as lacking 
in the mentality of work. The “who” of a person escapes a mentality based on the principle of 
usefulness. Further, the concept of individual equality of the third axiom of reciprocity cannot 
remedy the shortcomings of, say, national sameness. Individual equality (as reciprocity) tends to 
reduce equality to the property of a generic and anonymous individual type, as knowledge of 
“what” someone is. Neither notion of equality (as cultural or individual reciprocity) is able to 
capture the normative status of the other as someone worth listening to.  
To capture the fragile and intangible character of equality in plurality, Arendt appeals to the 
anarchic notion of isonomia in the spontaneous assembly. This appeal is not an expression of 
nostalgia, but refers to a manifestation of a principle of equality that can be re-iterated on various 
levels. To live according to such a principle of equality would presumably take on a different 
figure in the case of spontaneous assemblies compared to mass democracy. The general point is 
Johannes Servan – Final draft – PHD-thesis 
314 
 
that the principle in question does not demand institutional protection of certain (cognitively 
grasped) attributes of the other – not even in the paradoxical sense of being an “end in itself”. It 
rather seeks the protection of the in-between, the web, which makes thoughtful actions possible. 
Both in informal and formal situations, the decisive feature of equality is not based on some 
reciprocal functional capacity of communicating, but the equality of power in terms of equal 
availability to the scene of action and speech.  
Even if we accept that the principles inspired by the human appearance of face-to-face encounter 
and the isonomia of the spontaneous assembly are topical manifestations of metatopical principles, 
we encounter a problem similar to Walzer’s reliance on topical metaphors.744 It is uncertain 
whether we should accept the analogies as valuable on the metatopical level. In essence: How 
should we think properly of a framework of equal and free agents in a metatopical community – 
such as a modern state or, even more challenging, humanity as such?   
To answer this question I find it necessary to turn to how actions might manifest our 
membership is such communities. In the case of national membership, there seems to be certain 
actions and rituals, especially associated with border control (both internal and external) that 
manifests and reiterates the status of belonging to a metatopical community. This regulation 
might be marked by a state-centric distribution of political reciprocity, but the organized equality 
of citizens might take on more cosmopolitan-civic character. If so, we have to detach the 
possibility of human appearance from the distribution of equality associated with citizenship. To 
understand how plurality can manifest itself on this metatopical level then, we have to understand 
what it entails to appear as “human”, not merely as a unique individual type, but also as a 
member of humanity.  
To address this challenge, Schutz’s structural distinction within the social horizon between “mere 
contemporaries” and “collectives” is useful. Compared to Arendt, this distinction corresponds to 
the distinction between the social space defined by cognitions and the social space defined by 
thinking.745 “Mere contemporaries” refers to the community of equals defined by imagined 
individual types (cognition), whereas “collectives” refers to the community within the idealized 
conception of the un-imaginably many (thinking). To specify the implication: There is a crucial 
difference between thinking of a metatopical community – such as a state or humanity – as a 
group of “mere contemporaries” (i.e. as an imagined manifold), and as a “collective” (i.e. a unity 
                                                 
744 See also 5.2.1. 
745 As mentioned earlier, in Kant’s terms this is parallel to the distinction between concepts of understanding and 
concepts of reason (knowledge and faith/thinking). The central phenomenological parallel would be the distinction 
between real and ideal objects.   
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of the unimaginably many). In the following, I will argue that both topical and metatopical 
relations, and the appearance of persons within such relations, rely on a notion of equality 
associated with membership in collectives.  
8.3.1 Imagined and unimaginable communities  
In order to clarify a possible confusion, we have to distinguish between imaginable or presentable 
objects746 on one side, and unimaginable and non-presentable objects on the other. Individual 
types – either personal or anonymous – belong to the former. They are presentable in the sense 
that they are experienced or can be expected to be experienced, in some near or hypothetical 
future. Presentable objects are, as phenomenologists would say, related to objective time and a 
common world (associated with the second axiom of the natural attitude, in Schutz’s terms). 
They bear resemblance to Arendt’s notion of models or ideas in the sense that they refer to 
objects that can be located, and they have the peculiar temporality which implies that I 
sometimes have to wait for them to arrive within the proximity of my body. And individual type, 
even a “mere contemporary” that I’ve never met, might travel or migrate.  
Some unimaginable objects have a similar, worldly character. A bureaucracy (guided by machine-
like archival techniques) might be able to manage a mass society (as a population) while it 
maintains a conceptual, numeric precision of the unimaginable multitude of individual types.747  
To be a member of humanity, seems, however, to refer to something other than simply being an 
individual personal type of a multitude. The difference can be explained, I suggest, by considering 
that some objects are not only unimaginable, but also non-reducible to presentable objects. They 
have no peculiar spatiotemporal location and are in a sense everywhere, always available and at the 
same time “irreal” and hence nowhere, in the sense that they cannot be located in space and 
time.748 That is, they cannot be given empirical examples as an ostensive “there” (as spatial 
objects) and “now” (as temporal objects). Nor does it make sense to refer to these objects in 
terms of processes or recipes that can be demonstrated (like unimaginable, but reducible objects).  
Hence, when we speak of collectives, such as states, as “imagined communities” – what we seem 
to do, according to this conceptual analysis, is to refer to their metatopical status as unimaginable 
and irreducible.  
                                                 
746 To avoid confusion this would include the empiricist’s notion of “ideas”. 
747 The analogue to counting an object with thousand sides is quite suiting. We cannot precisely imagine an object 
with thousand sides, but we can adopt techniques to reduce the complexity of the object to manageable operations 
such as counting.  
748 P. 29, in Held, Klaus. 1998. "Einleitung." In Phänomenologie Der Lebenswelt - Ausgewählte Texte, edited by Klaus Held, 
304 s. Stuttgart: Reclam. 
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To nuance this point, we might consider two possible ways of understanding metatopical 
communities: On the one hand, we have the conceptual option of understanding these 
communities in terms of their practical impossibility from the street-level perspective of the 
citizen. In Benedict Anderson’s account this is given expression in the recognition of the 
contemporary strangers that we’ll never meet: “[…] all communities larger than primordial 
villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined, because it will be 
impossible to meet most of their fellow-members.”749 More precisely, according to Schutz: In a 
modern society, we cannot even imagine all the strangers that we will not meet.  
On the other hand, we have the conceptual option of understanding these communities in terms 
of their non-reducible character. The curious hesitation of Anderson’s “perhaps even these” 
suggest that he might be aware of the difference. We will find the “irreal” aspect of communities 
also in traditional societies. This option refers to society – not as a metatopical constellation of 
“mere contemporaries”, i.e. as a society of individual strangers – but as a “collective”.  
Distinct from populations of strangers, a state is a collective. It can be said to be territorial, but it 
does not make sense to say that it is a territory. Similarly, we might say a modern state is 
constituted by its citizens (or that its citizens are constituted by it), but it does not make sense to 
say that it consists of citizens as its empirical content. Further, there might be processes and 
procedures closely associated with a state, such as democratic procedures of will-formation, but I 
struggle to see how we could say that the state can be demonstrated by an election or a 
parliamentary assembly, as if these where examples of a generic category or organs in a larger 
organism.750  
Anonymity is a mode of social vagueness associated with imagined individual types; an “empty” 
type in our imaginary orientation toward absent individual others with a generic, unspecified 
content. The status of the presentable object can be clarified and specified by approximation, i.e. 
it can be made presented or exemplified. In contrast, un-presentable or ideal objects are not 
anonymous, they simply do not convert to presentable individual types at all. Their anonymity is 
– so to speak – absolute. From this we might tentatively say that corporations and states (agents of 
legal fiction) are ideal objects, while a human individual is a highly anonymous imaginable object. 
                                                 
749 Anderson 2006, p. 6 
750 See interesting footnote, Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 83. Schutz makes a comment in a footnote here which I 
think is really to the point: how do you study a state? It certainly does not take the form convertible to a subjective 
meaning-context as such, which would amount to a totalitarian project, but it might be to some degree converted to 
the functionaries of the state. The way I understand it, it is a question of presentation of a “we” that is not 
presentable as such. 
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How can such ideal objects guarantee political equality? And, is “humanity” conceivable as a 
collective of this sort? 
Based on these considerations we might specify a point concerning human appearance: Similar to 
the double character that Schutz models in his analysis of experience of the other, human 
appearance relies on the perceived distinctness of persons as singular beings and on the 
imaginable character of individual personal types. But since the human appearance, the 
appearance as unique, cannot be sufficiently grasped by such cognitive typifications, “equality” 
seems also to suggest something similar to a membership of an ideal objective character. In this 
sense human equality operates on the ideal level of objects, similar to principle that guides 
thinking and action, and reflects a conceptual status of political membership that is perhaps best 
captured by its symbolic status. It is actualized only through performances that manifest this 
conceptual equality. It should begin, as I read Arendt, by giving every member of the “one 
world” a symbolic status as members of humanity and the implied right to have rights.  
In the following I will explore the two possible conceptual options of a political society in brief 
detail.  
8.3.2 Mere contemporaries 
How can we think plurality as a human condition among mere contemporaries? 
Compared to familiar personal types, the problem with “mere contemporaries” is that it deals 
with high modes of anonymity of mass society that seems incompatible with plurality. As Schutz 
points out, this anonymity has a pragmatic function in our daily life that we hardly notice. Many 
of our daily relations are to “mere contemporaries”.  For instance, we take for granted the 
interaction we have with mere “functionary” types that support our daily routine. We barely 
notice these services unless they fail to function according to their purpose.  
The way we coordinate our behavior in this manner is useful in a mass society. When I put a 
letter in a mailbox, I expect some anonymous functionary in the postal service to carry out my 
intention.751 The assumed functionary does not have to rely on my subjective intentions, nor do I 
have to care for his personal motives for doing his job as a postal employee. We need only to 
trust the objective meaning-context taken for granted in the postal system.752 On the level of civil 
society understood as a functional system, this superficiality indeed seems necessary. However, if 
                                                 
751 Schutz uses this example. 
752 Schutz clearly relies on Max Weber notion of ideal types in this analysis and refers to some of Weber’s own 
examples that reflect similar relations to functionary types, such as our assumption that commercial agents share the 
acceptance of money as a medium of exchange. (Schutz and Luckmann 1973, p. 76) 
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we consider it as an option for imagining a political society it seems clearly inferior to an 
imaginary of the public sphere, which enables us to “breathe life” into our mere contemporaries 
as personal types.753  
In a modern society it also makes sense to say (in phenomenological terms) that we live in an 
imagined community to the extent that we rely on typification to organize our expectations 
regarding the strangers that are co-members of the same community. I might still meet these 
strangers someday under circumstances with a certain degree of shared familiarity (depending on 
the social trust and integration I have acquired). There seems to be no moral reason why we 
should seek to personify the individual type of all these anonymous strangers and functionaries 
that we implicitly rely on in our everyday life. Rather, it seems we have good ethical reasons, i.e. 
to the extent that it would affect those who do in fact rely on us, not to get lost in idle curiosity 
and indiscriminating concern for all.  
We do, however, have a responsibility regarding the way we imagine the reciprocity and 
differences of those within and outside this community. This responsibility concerns the level of 
honesty and adequate precision of the interpretative schemas through which we appropriate 
knowledge about others. We do by necessity rely on stereotypes of each other, but there’s an 
empirical contingency to the question of whether or not these prejudices are fairly accurate and 
reliable in practical circumstances. An increased level of our stock of knowledge seems to be 
compatible with the condition of plurality in the sense that we become more receptive to the 
manifold of individual and cultural expressions in society, both domestic and global. It makes us 
better prepared to consider the perspectives of others, and to “think” in the sense of “enlarged 
thought”.  
But although it is compatible with the condition of plurality, even a rich stock of knowledge of 
anonymous types cannot meet requirements of equality and distinctness associated with plurality. 
It seems we have to conclude that we cannot think plurality on the ground of cognitions of 
“mere contemporaries” alone.    
8.3.3 Collectives 
To consider the second option: How to think plurality in collectives? 
                                                 
753 We could for instance consider stories of personal interest cases where individual types are breathed into life in 
the metatopical sphere. This has certainly been part of the way the media has covered the recent immigration to 
Norway, especially in cases involving children, where the rhetoric effect of evoking sympathy was applied 
deliberately by both journalists and civil organizations.  
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The notion of collectives has a different character in the social experience than mere 
contemporaries. It operates more like regulative ideas, organizing experience without themselves 
being explicated in perceptions or images. This distinction between types of contemporaries and 
ideal collectives makes Schutz social ontology both original and provoking, in that he rejects the 
simple analogy between individuals and states as social agents. Some collectives, such as “the 
state” or “the economy” cannot be converted into imaginable individual types. They are not 
derived from experience, in the sense individual types – even mere unknown, contemporary 
strangers – are. They are, in a strict sense, non-presentable. Hence a state is of a completely different 
phenomenological order than individuals. What Schutz shows us, is that if we consider these 
questions from the premises of an individualistic methodology, membership categories such as 
“citizenship” or “humanity” are not empirically based nor experientially derived at all. They are 
symbolically ascribed to individuals according to the ideal concepts of membership in “the state” 
or in “humanity”.754  
So, according to this distinction, what does it really entail to be a member of such a collective as 
“the state” or “humanity”? For sure, it is not enough to be a specimen of the biological category 
Homo Sapiens. The equality of citizens or human beings is not identical to or grounded in 
biological sameness, nor should it be understood as “equalizing” in the sense of functional 
equivalences. More precisely, the content of these memberships seems to be structured by 
narratives and exemplary performances that adhere to the principle of equality, without providing 
any definite determinable content of it. According to Arendt’s notion of political principles, the 
content and character of these membership categories are malleable to the way we re-iterate and 
re-enact them. For instance, while we do have stereotypical notions of “a Norwegian”, it would 
be an essentialist fallacy to say that the generic Norwegian “type” is grounded in what people are 
actually like in Norway. More accurately, since “Norwegian” here primarily refers to being a 
member of a collective of equality, it represents an imaginary of the practices and narratives that 
we think of as proper manifestations of the Norwegian collective. To be a good example in this 
manner refers to the manifestations of an ideal case, not an empirical category. Hence they differ 
from accurate stereotypes.  
Given that thinking of society as collectives allows us to distinguish more clearly between the 
reciprocity of our “mere contemporaries” and the equality of our co-members, it seems plausible 
to say that we have specified the kind of equality required by the human condition of plurality. 
                                                 
754 Schutz and Luckmann 1973, see p.73 and 83 for schemes of degrees of anonymity (lack of individual type) 
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We still have to consider how these membership categories allow for the corresponding 
uniqueness that plurality implies.   
On the level of state communities, the political responsibility of thinking plurality in collectives is 
confronted with the unfortunate implications of superficial assumptions on the various levels of 
reciprocity. For instance, the main problem associated with the mentality of work is that it is 
unable to conceptually grasp equality and uniqueness as aspects of the human condition of 
plurality. It is restricted to the specification of “the citizen” within the domain of functionary 
types, which tends to define a good citizen in terms of being a hard-working employer; an eager 
consumer, and so on. The subjective variation it leaves open is defined by the same level of 
reciprocity. It may self-critically leave these specifications open, as in the liberal notion of 
negative freedom, but the basic instrumental character of this mentality cannot be stretched, it 
seems, beyond the paradoxical notion of the individual as “an end in itself”.  
Compared to other definitions of a richer character, the superficiality of the instrumental 
mentality of work has the advantage of being less susceptible to traditional imaginaries of 
reciprocity as defined by the narrative of a nation. The generic cultural type of a “good citizen” 
exemplifies this possible parochial bias of giving our “mere contemporary” co-citizens an 
increased depth based on assumed in-group reciprocity of “the nation”. Taking these inherent 
risks into considerations, I still think the question of a “good citizen” could be understood as a 
genuinely political issue in Arendt’s sense. I agree with Arendt that the question of a good citizen 
should not be resolved by reducing it to a question of being a good functionary. Rather, we 
should critically address the content of our current notion of a good citizen and consider to what 
degree it complies with the right to appear (i.e. the rights to action and speech). Simultaneously, 
we should consider what it implies to be a “good member of humanity”.  
In either case, the content associated with these memberships should in my view be contested 
and open to as any many perspectives as possible, given conditions and limitations similar to 
those approximated by Arendt.  
Conclusion  
If we were to agree with Benhabib that the political space defined by the in-between the relations 
between mere equals and private ethical relations, then the question of the good member of a 
state and of humanity are located outside the formal and procedural political sphere.755 At best, in 
this framework Arendt’s notion of “politics” seems to refer to something that takes place in the 
                                                 
755 See 5.4.2 
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outskirts, in the public space where personal interaction allows for personal distinctness. As a 
concluding remark to the discussion in this chapter, I think this model of the public space as “in-
between” the anonymous meta-topical space of formal equality and the personal topical space of 
informal uniqueness is misguided.  
“Formal equality” is not found on the same conceptual level as anonymous and personal types. 
Further, the private sphere – in so far as it hosts more than individual types of “mere difference” 
or “mere sameness” – is a space of appearance in the sense that it allows for the expression and 
distinction of personal uniqueness. And the political sphere, to the extent that it consists of 
subjects of positive law, is only political if it allows itself to “absorb all new origins” and be 
“nourished by them”.756 Hence, the public sphere (as a space of appearance) is not a specific 
social space among others (like the private and public; social and political), but a mode that any 
social sphere might take on if it finds the right balance between what we might call “equality of 
power” and “biographical uniqueness”. To appear as fully human presupposes a proper balance 
between both of these elements of plurality. Whereas the equality in question depends on the 
organization and its level of protection, the uniqueness is not something a political community 
can master, but rather something it must allow for the performance of.  
Although Schutz’ is one of those within the phenomenological tradition (broadly speaking) that 
has, like  Arendt, an interest in the field of the social, I do not pretend that their perspectives are 
in full agreement. What I have attempted here is to promote a constructive dialogue based on 
their similarities, and (perhaps a bit uncritically) allowed this dialogue to take place within the 
constraints of Schutz’s methodological individualism.757 I do, however, think that central aspects 
of Arendt’s thinking, such as free agency and the principle of equality associated with the concern 
for plurality, remains quite intact.  
The continuous concern of this chapter has been the possibility of thinking human appearance in 
relation to metatopical and a-topical (or ideal) levels of sociality. If we cannot simply appear as 
agents; if actions are manifestations of non-presentable principles and memberships, what does it 
tells us about the relation between being member of a state and the possibility of appearing? How 
can we make sense of ‘the right to have rights’ as the right to act, or the right to appear (as 
human)? Is it the right to manifest oneself as part of an imagined community? What does that 
                                                 
756 Arendt 1968, p. 465 
757 Arendt’s thinking pushes beyond the scope of a methodological individualism, this is especially evident in her 
notion of Natality  
For instance, Arendt’s emphasis on the significance of the newborn and the new beginning, is not just a 
critique of historical determinism, but also reflects a new metaphysical conception of humanity. One which 
decentralize and deemphasize the transcendental significance of the individual constitution of meaning 
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even mean? Could we say that to appear as human (which certainly is not independent of the 
cognitions or typifications involved in personal appearance), also has a symbolic or virtual depth 
to it that enable us to assess the way we appear to each other in the light of principles of thought?  
If so, to appear as human implies that we act and speak in such a way that we manifest ourselves 
as members of humanity. Depending on our conception of these principles, or which principles 
we understand to be higher-ranking, we may favor or marginalize various ways of acting and 
appearing. Arendt’s basic point seems to be that the very possibility of being judged in this 
manner – i.e. by principles of action – relies on conditions of action. In order not to be a self-
undermining (and not merely logically self-contradicting) performance, our chosen guiding 
principles – and their corresponding mentality – should reflect these human conditions and 
plurality in particular. 
I still think a Kantian reading of Arendt, like Benhabib’s, can be supported, but only if the ‘right 
to humanity’ is qualified by a proto-political reading. In this sense, “humanity” is, like the ancient 
notion of “glory”, not referring to a bunch of specimens that could potentially be collected in a 
single concentration camp by some extra-terrestrial invading force. Rather, much like the 
individualist idea of seeing some phenomena as ends-in-themselves, it is concerned with how we 
appear and treat each other. As such, a forced encampment of the entire species of Homo sapiens 
would very likely leave us with anything but humanity. To be a human individual type is in this 
sense very different from being a member of humanity as a collective. To be a member of 
humanity is equal to have the right to be treated with humanity. 
The point is here, I take it, not that the excluding or isolating system is simply able to turn people 
into animals (although this might be the objective in the most extreme cases of concentration 
camps). When someone is denied participation, the main implication is their denied status of 
belonging to humanity. In this case, the “alien” – the symbol or manifestation of the fact of 
difference – is received not as a part of humanity (according to the mentality of action), but 
merely as part of the human race (according to the mentality of labor). According to the 
mentality of labor we are recognized as “the same”, but only in a biological way which renders 
unique difference politically indifferent. In the entertainment business, the human sameness of 
the activities of sex and violence (which assumingly triggers the psychological mechanisms of 
desire and fear) seems like an efficient recipe for addressing a wide audience.758 In political terms 
                                                 
758 Enjoyed and consumed today mainly in intimacy through the parallel distribution via individual devices offering a 
standing supply supported by “the cloud”. If there is a moral-political problem here, it must be that the value of 
privacy as a space to form one’s own thoughts is lost or at least challenged by the time-consuming consumption of 
entertainment.  
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this mode of addressing people is far from harmless. The difference was demonstrated in the 
horrific practices of the imperial and totalitarian regimes in a hereto unprecedented scale, forcing 
millions into conditions of mere sustenance.759  
Furthermore, Arendt’s notion of “crimes against humanity” only makes sense as crimes against 
humanity as an ideal objective collective. This is not an attempt to abstract away from the 
violations against individuals, but rather to explicate how an individual conception of human 
dignity is not able to grasp the wider consequences of such violations, and how they transgress 
the limit-claims of human integrity and ultimately destroys the framework that enable us to 
appear as humans to each other. In this sense, we are not only sympathetically affected by the 
violations of others, we are all violated by such crimes. To violate human dignity is not primarily 
a crime against an individual or a people, but it is a “crime against humanity”; it is a crime against 















                                                 
759 By “mere sustenance” I’m thinking of the kind of living conditions associated with slavery, colonial oppression 
and encampment. Today we might find similar conditions associated with extreme poverty and human trafficking. 
760 See Arendt 2006, p. 268-269  
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Chapter 9:  Conclusion of thesis - The proto-political and the new political 
principle  
In part 1 I discussed the question of state obligations toward foreigners within the scope of 
cosmopolitan law of admission. I argued against humanitarian and narrow moral understanding 
of the character of cosmopolitan obligations, and promoted a view that supported a moral-legal 
conception of cosmopolitan law. I also suggested that according to the regulative idea of a global 
civil society, these moral-legal norms articulate obligations of a political character in the sense 
that they articulate the conditions which makes deliberations on the future content of 
cosmopolitan laws possible. This concern for further deliberations on cosmopolitan law was 
given support by a reading of Kant’s cosmopolitan law of hospitality as provisional in character. 
The right to present oneself could be read as an early articulation of a provisional cosmopolitan 
law of deliberation, which seeks to protect transnational communication. In other words, I 
promoted in the end – based on the concern for a global civil society – a quite wide cosmopolitan 
account of the character of the state’s obligation toward foreigners.  
Further, I connected the depoliticization of cosmopolitan law to a state-centric tendency in 
modern political thinking. I raised concern for the conventional understanding of state 
obligations as defined in universal domestic terms (such as civil rights) and its ability to respond 
to circumstances dominated by cosmopolitan problems. In chapter 5 this concern was discussed 
in the context of the immigration debate. In this context the pace of immigration and the 
presence of foreign territorial residents exemplify how cosmopolitan problems challenge the 
state’s obligations to its members and the regulation of membership. I considered three different 
positions on the question of how cosmopolitan obligations should be balanced with domestic 
obligations, and concluded that, within the premises set for this debate, Benhabib’s position 
seems most attractive.  
In part 2, I began by issuing some objections against Benhabib’s position. First, I raised the 
pragmatic concerns regarding the applicability of highly sophisticated concepts. This can be 
understood as a practical dilemma between developing concepts reflecting the actual 
circumstances in an adequate manner and providing concepts that are shareable and accessible to 
public scrutiny. Second, I questioned the adequacy of the right to membership as the suggested 
extension of cosmopolitan law of admission. In this regard I pointed out the systemic problems 
of forced displacement and long-term encampment, which are not addressed by the law of 
admission. Third, these practical objections raised conceptual concerns regarding Benhabib’s 
restriction of cosmopolitan law to the law of admission. Essentially, it tends to depoliticize the 
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significance of the voice of foreigners, and to give epistemological privilege to territorial 
newcomers.  
In chapter 6 I argue that Benhabib’s commitment to the ethics of admission seems to have 
colored her reading of Arendt’s conceptual ambition. This is considered more specifically by how 
it constrains Benhabib’s interpretation of “the right to have rights”. Mediated by Rancière’s 
critique of Arendt, which seems to share Benhabib’s basic institutionalist premises in the reading 
of Arendt, Arendt’s position is confronted with the aporia of rightlessness and the futility in 
solving this unsolvable problem by a concept of equality grounded in the capacity to speak. It is 
futile because the assumed capacity to speak is strongly tied to the recognition as a political 
subject in the first place. In short, Arendt’s account seems to confirm the standing institutional 
order, where the political beings are already protected by citizenship and those excluded are so 
because they are non-political beings, unable to speak up because they are unable to speak 
properly.  
I suggested an alternative, proto-political reading of Arendt as a promising way to answer 
Rancière’s critique and consequently to improve on Benhabib’s interpretation. This alternative 
reading relocates the political character of human relations to the pre-institutional public space. 
The conditions of political agency are as such not restricted to the institutionalized community of 
a state. According to this view, rightlessness is not an unsolvable problem, but a case of severe 
violation of the state obligations to protect human beings from the deprivation of the fragile 
intersubjective conditions that make us able to act and speak. Hence, Arendt’s ambition to 
articulate a new political principle can be seen as an attempt to guide the development of a 
mentality or social imaginary of territorial collectives that enable us to recognize the intolerable 
harm of statelessness and depoliticization (before it turns into rightlessness and dehumanization). 
Benhabib certainly also addresses the excluding institutional order of the globalized world, but 
she does so directly by reading the right to have rights as part of the content of cosmopolitan law. 
This answer operates, in my opinion, on a different level than Arendt’s thinking. Regarding the 
interpretation of “the right to have rights”, this implies a decisive difference. Whereas Benhabib 
emphasizes the complementary, institutional articulation of “the right to belong to some kind of 
organized community” (i.e. the right to belong), Arendt expresses, in my reading, in “the right to, 
have rights” a more general human right, which I’ve also called “the right to appear”.  
A proto-political reading of Arendt has, however, been criticized for its reliance on the agonal 
and performative aspects of political action, implying a lack of a proper philosophical grounding 
of the political principle in question. In chapter 7 I argued against the assumed groundlessness 
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implied in the proto-political reading of Arendt. This basic right is understood as an expression 
of a new political mentality that Arendt seeks to develop, guided by the principle of 
meaningfulness. Consequently, I’ve argued, along with Birmingham’s interpretation, that ‘the 
right to have rights’ is not the ground in Arendt’s political thinking. It is connected to Arendt’s 
influence from Montesquieu and the central notion of the principle of action. Arendt’s main 
concern, as I see it, is to introduce a new political principle, and to ground this principle in the 
basic human experience the condition of politics. This basic experience Arendt finds in the rich 
communicative interaction, which enables us to appear to each other as most human compared 
to other experiences. This comparison has a clearly normative element to it. Hence, Arendt’s 
analysis does not depend, contrary to the assumption of the conventional reading, on a 
descriptive anthropology of human beings as speaking and political beings. Further, Arendt 
analyzes this experience through its mode of disclosure (the mode of action) and according to its 
human condition (the condition of plurality). Hence, comparable to the innate human right of 
autonomy that Kant articulated, this basic right expresses human dignity from the perspective of 
plurality. This general level of justice can subsequently be given content both in terms of domestic 
and cosmopolitan law, including Benhabib’s suggested right to political membership.  
My proto-political reading emphasizes Arendt’s conceptual recognition of the public space as the 
necessary framework for taking political agents seriously as responsible and with something to 
say. Further it explicates that this framework is not essentially depending on a state community, 
but primarily depends on more informally organized communities that – due to the 
circumstances – also take on the (imaginary) character of a global civil society. However, it also 
acknowledges that the absence of or exclusion from state protection leaves the political subjects 
very fragile. Since the global civil society should not (preferably) be protected by a global state, 
the right to belong should also be given content in a wider range of cosmopolitan law than the 
traditional law of admission. The need for protection also obliges states to secure the political 
integrity of all, including non-residential foreigners.  
The new political principle Arendt proposes, the principle of meaningfulness, finds its 
inspirations in the activities situated in the space of appearance. Thus, it is reasonable to question 
its relevance for organization of groups beyond the topical face-to-face relations. How do we 
retain our appearance as distinct persons in a modern state or a global civil society? To address 
this remaining issue, and to indicate the implications of this new political principle on these 
higher levels of sociality, I compared in chapter 8 Arendt’s concept of plurality, and its elements 
of uniqueness and equality, with Schutz’s phenomenological description of the double character 
of persons in everyday life experience. I argued that human appearance is related to a conceptual 
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depth of experience that cannot merely be derived from cognitive typifications of the topical 
experiences of the perceptual presence of others. To be a member of a human group, either it is 
topical, metatopical or essentially a-topical, implies also an ideal element that cannot – it seems – 
be traced back (or reduced) to experience. In this sense, to be member of a tribe, but more clearly 
of demos or of humanity, implies taking part in an “unimaginable”, but only thinkable unity. If it is 
correct, as I argue, that this membership approximately represents the kind of equality Arendt 
holds to be an essential element of the condition of plurality, then it seems this condition 
depends on an a-topical, ideal-objective element at its core.   
Further, since Arendt’s ambition of political renewal is not based on the activity of action per se, 
but on the principle of action, the basic experience of the mode of action might inspire our 
interactions within all kinds of social relations that Schutz’s framework distinguishes. This 
includes the topical interaction with fellow men that Benhabib describes as face-to-face 
interaction with concrete others in the everyday lifeworld. But, it also includes the metatopical 
interaction with anonymous and personalized contemporaries (of which the relations of public 
persons in the civil society seems most politically relevant) and the atopical interaction with other 
citizens and members of humanity as such in collectives of formally equals.  
The political character of these collectives relies on their regulative ideas, and their ability to 
sustain a level of politically relevant equality. This equality represents in my view the most 
politically relevant aspect of appearing as fully human that is calibrated with the biographical 
uniqueness of the free agent. To appear as “naked”, implies to appear without the conceptual 
depth of a political being. “Naked” appearance is in Arendt’s sense nothing similar to pure or 
honest, but implies rather a kind of “shallow” and uncanny appearance of pure sameness. We 
might say that is corresponds to the mere perception of others, i.e. empathy, a psychological 
disposition Arendt associates with our digestive or respiratory system. To be “naked” in this 
sense implies to be excluded by the regulative idea of the collectives in question, and manifest as 
such the clearest negation of the political principle of meaningfulness.  
In other words, we might conclude that even though the phenomenological-existential analysis is 
situated in a subjective experience that has, unavoidably, a topical situatedness, the particular 
conceptual depth that makes someone appear as human is depends on elements of typifications – 
that it shares with metatopical relations – and formal equality – that it shares with all collectives. 
Together they reflect the peculiar and artificial conditions of the human activities of action and 
speech. 
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To summarize: Arendt organizes her key concepts according to the basic elements of the human 
condition of plurality, namely uniqueness and equality. Primarily, the principle of meaningfulness 
– which guides the mentality of action – answers to plurality as the proper condition of political 
agency. To act according to the principle of meaningfulness implies to act for the sake of 
thoughtful and free actions, or implicitly for the sake of acting together. Further, the 
corresponding mentality of action is given its most general expression in the awareness of the 
right to appear761 and the right to belong762, motivated reflexively by its ultimate negation in the 
case of millions of the naked and rightless. Beyond the spontaneous organization of the pre-
institutional public space of the assembly, the implementation of these rights implies some kind 
of institutional organization. In relations regulated by cosmopolitan law, the level of organization 
is still provisional, implying that the opportunity to appear is fragile and unprotected, and the 
belonging to humanity guaranteed by an unsanctioned code of human dignity.  
I will end this dissertation with some open remarks on how the mentality of action can be given 
expression as legitimate forms of government and proper institutional protection of the public 
space and the human condition of plurality. I begin by critically considering the deliberative turn 
as a reception of Arendt’s thinking. Further, I will structure Arendt’s own account according to a 
proto-political reading by considering the implied scope of state obligations associated with the 
right to appear and the right to belong. In the final section I will consider some possible practical 
implications of these thoughts. 
9.1 Arendt and the deliberative turn 
In the context of democratic opinion- and will-formation I made a distinction between its 
systemic and performative aspects. Usually, when we speak of “the political”, we refer to the 
political system. That is, primarily we mean the institutions that ensure representative procedures 
of binding decision-making and legislation in modern democratic states. Whereas the systemic 
aspect is associated with aggregation by making decisions through direct or indirect vote, the 
performative aspect is associated with the deliberative forming of an opinion. This latter aspect 
has usually, as Habermas has pointed out, been considered to have a spontaneous and anarchic 
character to it. Within the framework of the modern understanding of the function of the 
political system, it thus seems reasonable to include these aspects only as a methodological 
consideration on the value of deliberation.  
                                                 
761 I.e. the right to have rights 
762 I.e. the right to belong to some kind of organized community 
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The “proto-political” conception of politics could, nonetheless, be said to find its expression in a 
central aspect of the imaginary of a secular democratic society. In the imaginary of the self-
constituting and opinion-forming civil society, we find a metatopical space that seems able to 
host the conditions of the mode of action. It is considered, as Taylor phrases it, to be “extra-
political”, i.e. located outside and independent of those in representative positions of political 
power. Yet, the civil society might display its political power of action through a “siege” of the 
system, as Habermas would say. Since the conception of proto-political relations I’m promoting 
emphasizes the mode of performative, opinion-forming actions, it will not so easily be located to a 
specific localization. Still, I think it is fair to say that this political mode of activity is usually found 
in the extra-institutional space of appearance. Hence it contests the assumption that “the 
political” is synonymous with what we call “politics”. Unlike Arendt’s concept of political action, 
politics is an activity located in the institutional or systemic aspects of democracy and often 
portrayed as performed in a mode of strategic agents fighting with words. To Arendt, the system 
is not redundant, but takes on a secondary role of regulating and protecting the political actions 
in the public space.  
When Habermas analytically isolates the performative aspects by considering the anarchic notion 
of democracy, he emphasizes the kind of assemblies that spring out of topical face-to-face 
interaction and solve problems through mutual understanding. Since Habermas seems to rely on 
a sociological location of these performative, proto-political aspects on the topical level of 
“fellow-men”, it leads Habermas to limit their relevance for the metatopical locations or spheres 
in the modern mass society. Hence, a decisive feature of Habermas’ deliberative account is that 
he – inspired by the proto-political – formalizes the performative aspect and redefines it as 
communicative rationality.763 This ensures perhaps the explication of the modes of justification in 
political deliberation, by extracting the aspects most suitable to the metatopical public sphere. To 
be sure, the identification and reevaluation of this sphere, is in itself a considerable contribution 
by Habermas, and one clearly inspired by Arendt’s work on the public space. It is, however, 
criticized for being too rigid in its definition of the kind of reason that is shareable in this sphere.  
The affinity between the deliberative turn in democracy theory and Arendt’s thinking is also 
clearly manifested in Benhabib’s account. Benhabib is also able to remedy some of the rigidity 
associated with Habermas’ adaptation of Arendt, when she adds the narrative structure of agency 
as the decisive contribution of Arendt’s thinking. Benhabib criticizes Habermas for emphasizing 
too much the decentralized position of the generalized other, because it has an excluding effect 
                                                 
763 Habermas 1987 and 1989 
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on issues (such as gender issues) that do not so easily order itself under the label of “generalized 
interests”. In its place, Benhabib values the way narrative agency enable us to put ourselves in the 
position of concrete others, and emphasizes how this enables a moral standpoint that should be 
appreciated in the model of the public sphere.764 From this vantage point Benhabib develops her 
account of just membership and porous borders in a way that retains a richer conception of the 
performative aspect of politics. Hence, both Habermas and Benhabib lifts forward central 
features of Arendt’s thinking and discuss how these features can guide the articulation of 
adequate rights and the establishment of legitimate political institutions. 
I claim, however, that both Habermas and Benhabib overlook the basic originality of Arendt’s 
project. There seems to be, so to speak, something “lost in translation” in the appropriation of 
Arendt’s thinking to a more applicable account. Both Habermas and Benhabib locate Arendt’s 
weakness in her reliance on a face-to-face model of the public, similar to the ancient topical 
public of the polis. By taking distance from the anarchic and agonal manifestations of the public, 
they both try to avoid the implied weakness of Arendt’s political theory. As I’ve argued in the 
previous chapters, I think this conceived weakness is somewhat misguided, since Arendt’s 
primary ambition seems to have been to re-conceptualize the basic political principle of action. 
This ambition seems to be silenced in the adaption of Arendt’s thinking to a conventional 
framework as merely a valuable supplement to an instrumental and formal notion of politics.765  
“Humanity” is for Arendt not an entity taken for granted, but an ambiguous term. On the one 
hand “humanity” refers to the circumstantial fact that we have become one human society or one 
world, interconnected by the effects of our actions and co-destined by the shared problems. On 
the other hand, “humanity” refers to a regulative idea of a collective. As such an idea it breathes 
some life into the principle of meaningfulness, and the scope of which such a principle should 
inspire us to reenact and rethink it. Reflecting her ambition, I think this point is perhaps best 
captured Arendt articulates in the reformulation of the right to belong as “the right of every 
individual to belong to humanity”.766 It is also clear that Arendt has ambitions beyond the statist 
scope of domestic state obligations: “the idea of humanity constitutes the sole regulating idea of 
international law.”767 
                                                 
764 Benhabib 1992 
765 Habermas seems to accept the value of communicative action, but from within the mentality of work, as its 
enrichment. Politics is primarily still of an instrumental and systemic character, whereas the communicative and 
lifeworldly aspects of life are designated to the moral sphere. 
766 Arendt 1968, p. 298 
767 Ibid., p. 157 
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Complementing this manifestation of the principle of meaningfulness in humanity, I find the 
right to appear to articulate the other-dependency of the individual will by the emphasizing the 
importance of “acting together” in public space. This public space is not primarily related to the 
institutionalized public, nor the semi-formal public of communicative action, but has the peculiar 
cosmopolitan character of being potentially found “wherever you go”: “It is the space of 
appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where I appear to others as others 
appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their 
appearance explicitly.”768 Accordingly, the right to have rights is not merely the unwritten code of 
cosmopolitan law, but the general protective human right to public spaces, wherever they might 
be.  
The principle protection of this space is usually associated with the negative freedom of liberal 
civil rights. Arendt does not reject the values of these rights, but explicates their limitation due to 
their reliance on the right to belong, hence the protection of this space is connected to the way 
we imagine and think about social organization. To ensure this protection, we have to revise our 
state-centric notion of belonging on the metatopical and ideal level of society.  
Although I recognize that Benhabib’s model of the public as an improvement of Habermas’, and 
also as a model closer to Arendt’s own understanding, I’ve argued that there is a state-centric 
tendency in Benhabib’s thinking that leads her to neglect certain possibilities of relevance to 
cosmopolitan law that Arendt’s work opens up for. The most importantly, is the one I’ve already 
discussed in chapter 6, concerning Benhabib’s impatient skip from the right to belong to 
humanity, to the right to political membership. There are however also some further points to be 
made that seems to indicate possible improvements from the perspective of a cosmopolitan, 
proto-political reading of Arendt.  
First, it seems that Benhabib, along with Habermas, still locates the public as the “res publica” 
which gives scrutiny and legitimacy to the state. For instance, while referring to Arendt’s 
contribution, Benhabib describes the public as “a regulative ideal of the democratic form of self-
government”.769 Benhabib admits that the boundaries of this public is contestable, but 
understands it as intimately tied to the body politic. As a descriptive term, I take this to be 
uncontroversial, but as a habit of thought is also have problematic normative implications 
concerning that modern polities are complex, multicultural, and increasingly globalized. In my 
mind, this should also lead us to strive for the articulation of a public sphere that is less attached 
                                                 
768 Arendt 1958, p. 198-199 
769 Benhabib 2000, p. 209-10 
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to the idea of self-governance and distinct polities. To be sure, even the imaginary of a globalized 
civil society would rely on institutional protection on the state and international level. This 
protection should not, however, lead to a nationalization of the public. 
Second, and in more theoretical terms, Benhabib’s “break” with Arendt seems to be motivated 
by a somewhat misconceived understanding of Arendt’s notion of plurality and the 
corresponding self-relation. In Benhabib’s interpretation of Arendt’s essay “Thinking and Moral 
Considerations”, she understands Arendt to make a clear distinction between moral conscience 
on the one hand and political judgment on the other. Further, it is the case, according to 
Benhabib, that whereas harmony seems to be the relevant moral experience, plurality is the 
political principle par excellence. To me this seems like an implausible reading, given that 
Arendt’s main condition for finding “harmony” of conscience and “to be at home with 
ourselves” is plurality. Accordingly, the model of simulated dialogue (between me and myself) or 
representative thinking (taking the position of others), are for Arendt what defines thinking as 
morally responsible – in its irreducible ambiguity and conflict. (see 7.1.5) The confusion might be 
grounded in different ways of distinguishing the public from the private. Whereas Benhabib 
seems to rely on a distinction of public actions (of the public sphere; of the morally right) and 
moral actions (of everyday life; of the morally good), Arendt tends to emphasize the distinction 
between the generality of law and the uniqueness of human situations. In relation to her early 
discussion on Montesquieu, she even attacks the idea of the implied double standard in 
distinguishing between public-political and privat-moral norms.770 In agreement with this view, 
the principle of meaningfulness should be considered relevant for both public and private 
actions.   
In the section 9.2 I will consider some promising ways to implement the insights of a proto-
political conception of justice in regard to cosmopolitan issues. First, I will summarize the proto-
political account in contrast to the deliberative reception of Arendt.  
9.1.1 Rethinking dignity and the new law on earth – the right to have rights and the right 
to belong to some kind of organized community 
As I have discussed already, Arendt’s notion of human dignity is quite unusual and hard to place 
in a traditional map of positions. As a concept of dignity, “humanity” does not merely refer to 
some aspect of our (biological) nature as human beings or some inner nature as free and rational, 
nor does it refer to a product of a specific culture, although the artificiality of the human 
condition presupposes both evolutionary and socio-historical processes. Hence, it does not 
                                                 
770 Arendt 1994 
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correspond to a thin individualistic notion, nor does it properly fit a ‘thick’ communitarian one. 
By giving Arendt a proto-political reading I’ve emphasized the basic insight she advances on what it 
means simply to appear as human and to belong to humanity. To be human refers for Arendt 
basically to the experience of being seen or being given the opportunity to appear as a person of 
equal power. This “appearing” is not like the shallow presenting of a specimen as an example of 
an empirical concept, such as the category of the human species. Nor is it reducible to the 
presentation of a set of functional capacities associated with the concept of a purpose (“in-order-
to”) in a production process. Still, the proto-political integrity of the human person is not, or at 
least not only the historically embedded, legally protected and formal “citizen”. 
Decisive to understand Arendt’s project in my mind is that “humanity” is for Arendt the 
regulative idea of the collective corresponding to the “new political principle, in a new law on 
earth”. This new law is basically given expression in the right to have rights and the right to 
belong to some kind of organized community. By guiding the articulation of basic political 
norms, the principle of meaningfulness is comparable to other principles of action and the way 
they serve as guiding principles of various governmental forms: monarchy to honor, republic to 
virtue, tyranny to fear. The principle of meaningfulness is distinguished from these traditional 
forms of government and their well-established principles by the historical contingency that its 
ground, i.e. the condition of plurality, has until recently been taken for granted and remained 
“hidden”, i.e. politically irrelevant. Only the horror caused by the newly emerging governmental 
form of totalitarian regimes, guided by the quasi-principle of ideology and situated in the 
reinforcing circumstances of the completely organized world, has so far provoked its relevance. 
The implied violent negation of the condition of plurality was, according to Arendt, so grave that 
it made the condition of plurality stand out clearly in its absence.  
I will also suggest that the proto-political reading opens up for an understanding of rights that 
has a dynamic and creative character, which might easier pick up and address the unintended 
systemic consequences without marginalizing them as “questions for later” or as simply 
unsolvable (aporetic). This seem at least to be a central ambition of Arendt’s historical reflection 
and the way she confronts the conventional approach to human rights after the experience of 
totalitarian regimes and their concentration camps, which turned out to be industrial labs of 
dehumanization. By emphasizing the significance Arendt put on principles of action, new 
experiences which put our most highly cherished moral doctrines in utter embarrassment and 
redundancy can still be accompanied by meaningful thoughts. According to Arendt, concepts 
enable us to think what we are doing, and when we can’t rely on standard concepts (as 
bannisters), thinking is fragile.  
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If we read The Human Condition with an emphasis on Arendt’s concern for a new conception of 
human dignity, her critique of the mentalities of labor and work is that they leave our action 
“meaningless”. Because of this lack of meaning, our actions risk ending up as misguided uses of 
force, unable to articulate an adequate protection of the home which answers to the human 
condition of plurality. The problem of non-recognition, or exclusion from humanity, is in this 
sense central to Arendt’s concern. Arendt addresses this problem both in its extreme form as the 
loss of a home, and in the moderate forms of alienation and reification of oneself and the others 
(i.e. as mis-recognition). The problem of inadequate mentalities is not that they represent the way 
of thinking of group or pre-defined apolitical lifeforms, but that they do not provide our own 
thinking with any guarantee against the processes of depoliticization and dehumanization.  
The philosophical step that clarifies the political relevance of the grounding of the basic human 
right in the activity of action and the intersubjective space of appearance is related to Arendt’s 
notion of principles of action. Arendt describes the peculiar character of free and meaningful 
actions as guided by principles. These principles find their source in various stable conditions of 
human life, and hence have a tendency to model the implied political mentality correspondingly. 
Although the activity of labor and production contribute to the condition of political agency 
through the conditions of life and worldliness, principles of action grounded in these conditions 
tend to inspire apolitical and even anti-political mentalities that neglect or undermine their own 
condition of agency. Within this framework I situated Arendt’s critique of solipsism and 
instrumental reason, which are basically guided by anti-political and apolitical principles of action.  
In contrast to these principles, Arendt articulates the political principle of meaningfulness in 
order to express a principle that corresponds to the stable intersubjective condition of action, 
namely plurality. The principle of meaningfulness is in this way not only the principle of 
narratively structured agency, but more precisely the principle of principled actions. This principle, that 
is given expression through the right to have rights and actualized through speech and 
meaningful action, is unavoidably self-referential. Since the human condition of plurality is 
artificial, there is no default or natural mode of human appearance which can serve as a secure, 
external grounding of moral-legal norms. And, since principled action relies on the presence of 
others, it cannot be reduced to an inner anthropological disposition of the individual (such as 
psychological unity, or sameness). The account of plurality as a stable human condition can only 
be guided by the relative comparison of a manifold of experiences of human agency. I hold this 
phenomenologically informed grounding of a political principle to be central to understand 
Arendt’s conceptual ambition. Within the activity of action, there is a ranking of mentalities or 
attitudinal modes of action according to the conceptual depth of human appearance, from 
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dehumanizing shallowness, via depoliticizing instrumentality to the principled meaningfulness of 
agency.  
Conceptually, Arendt acknowledges the possibility of being fully deprived of the capacity to act 
politically, but this would be the case only under the most extreme circumstances, such as the 
totalitarian environments. The situation of ‘sans papiers’ is clearly different and involves in many 
cases “irregulars” who are informally attached to the community from which they seek formal 
recognition as domestic citizens. Those unable to resettle and caught in the situation of long-term 
encampment are clearly more severe victims to a dehumanizing form of exclusion. Similar to 
other political movements, the problem of ‘sans papiers’ is not primarily their lack of capacity for 
political action, but the risk of using their power as a civil movement to promote mentalities that 
are ultimately self-undermining. One might, for instance, question to what degree the claim of 
emancipation by simulating domestic citizen relations will not defeat the improvement of 
cosmopolitan relations in the long run? To what extent is this movement able to change the 
imperfect compromise in a way that addresses the systemic aspects of the international order and 
the reproduction of difference from one generation to the next? 
9.1.2 The compromise of law: the legal protection of the public space 
As argued, the principle of meaningfulness is closely connected to the public space in the widest 
sense, and the human activities of action and speech. The principle has a guiding role in the sense 
that any actual protection of this space must be considered adequate and promoting the 
conditions of this space. Negative examples of the proper protection is indicated by Arendt’s 
critique of the protective walls and internal homogenization of the nation-state and the way this 
kind of protection led to “savage conditions” (i.e. to exclusion of human beings) in the midst of 
civilization. This savagery is not only linked to the consequential loss of human rights 
experienced by the de facto stateless. More precisely, “the savage conditions” refers to an 
exclusion from humanity and the associated loss of agency as such. 
To be clear, Arendt’s new conception of the political should not be understood as some anarchic 
utopian vision that simply suspends the trilemma of public right.771 It does however, in my view, 
accomplish to explicate the asymmetry in the distribution of political integrity, from citizens to 
members of humanity, in such a way that cosmopolitan law could be given a fairer share of the 
moral-legal whole. The demanded redistribution of political integrity (and corresponding 
distribution of duties and rights) is not simply determined by an ideal model of distribution, but 
by the need to respond to concrete circumstances and the historical experiences of actual 
                                                 
771 Explain trilemma shortly: How to balance domestic, international and cosmopolitan concerns of public right? 
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exclusion within the current system. Arendt’s conception enables us to articulate the severe harm 
experienced by the structural injustice of the current political order, and hence to define the 
circumstances in new ways. The adequate content of state obligations should be revised 
accordingly. 
Historically, the imaginary of the state collective has undergone a considerable development. If 
the state collective understands itself primarily as situated in a state of nature among other 
nations – all states against all – (an absolutist sovereignty regime), then the foreigner is per 
definition an enemy, and in direct confrontation with the regulative idea of humanity. If the state 
is understood as a protection of the extra-political civil space, we get a more moderate tension 
between the protected public space of a state and the unprotected space of humanity (liberal 
international regime). Conventionally, the use of “political” is restricted to domestic law in the 
liberal redaction of the modern imaginary, rendering political relations to foreigners unprotected 
according to the depoliticized status of “merely moral” or humanitarian subjects. What Arendt 
specifies, and what has since been partly recognized and protected by soft-law on the 
international level, is the political integrity of the foreigner (a cosmopolitan international regime).772 
There is, however, still a decisive difference between giving foreigners a quasi-domestic status as 
subjects of universal domestic laws, and articulating norms that directly protect the foreigners’ 
status as members of humanity according to cosmopolitan law.   
This is at the core a question of what it means to be human and of what is lost in a state of 
rightlessness. What are the consequences of violating the right “to live in a framework where one 
is judged by one’s actions and opinions”? In positive terms of cosmopolitan law, any protective 
policy should be articulated in such a way that foreigners are recognized as normal political 
subjects in cosmopolitan matters. In negative terms, and given that any actual institutional 
protection is an imperfect compromise, cosmopolitan law should reflect the intolerable 
consequences of the violation of the right to appear implied in rightlessness. Statelessness should 
be recognized as a situation of outmost urgency and vulnerability, and long-term encampment 
should be recognized as an intolerable and grave violation of the principles guiding cosmopolitan 
law.  
9.1.3 Giving content to the right to appear and the right to belong 
What does it mean to appear as a human person? How do we understand the ontological status 
of humanity? As discussed above, to appear as human is not merely “naked” appearance. It 
presupposes a certain artificial attitude (a mentality or normality) that is able to appreciate the 
                                                 
772 I’m thinking in particular of the convention of asylum right and convention on statelessness.  
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appearing person at the same time as a biographically unique and as an equal in power. This 
implies that the experiences, which provide the grounding manifold of manifestations of the 
“new political principle”, are already conditioned by principles of action. In other words, we 
should not understand Arendt’s proposed right to appear and right to belong as an ex-nihilo 
creation. It should rather be understood as giving expression to old political principles of action – 
such as the republican principle of equality – reconfigured as the principle of meaningfulness. 
This new principle seeks to account for the new awareness of plurality as the human condition of 
political action and to provide public right with an adequately revised content according to the 
new historical circumstances. As a principle of action, it does however also have relevance for the 
moral judgment of interactions where “everything is permitted” according to law. 
According to Arendt, we are able through meaningful actions to manifest principles of action, 
both as private persons and as citizens in public. Through the narrative structure of human 
agency, principles of action can go beyond the topical sphere of fellow-men and become relevant 
also for interactions in the metatopical sphere of contemporaries, to use Schutz’s term. The 
topical face-to-face interaction is certainly central to the way we appear as fully human. At least, 
the most effective manifestations of humanity rely on features that bear close affinity to these 
interactions, such as the temporality of narratives and artistic performances. But, since the 
presence of others – understood as plurality – relies on the equality of humanity, it is a highly 
artificial situation of face-to-face interaction. The “equalizing” component is guided by principles 
and hence does not depend on the face-to-face situation in order to manifest itself. For instance, 
it can also manifest itself in the presence of others in the “public sphere” of contemporaries.773  
A more challenging question is how we could turn this regulative principle of humanity into a 
principle of politics and government. This question brings us right to the heart of the dilemma of 
preserving liberal democratic ideas and addressing the cosmopolitan responsibility of states at the 
same time. On the one side, the articulation of human rights associated with “strong democracy”  
as a preferred type of government, protecting our right to participate as well as our right to 
privacy – is probably the best answer we have at the moment to how the principle of 
meaningfulness can be politically implemented. On the other side, this public-political expression 
of the regulative idea of humanity relies heavily on their background as solutions to domestic 
problems. In other words, a strong democracy is well suited (though not always respected or 
enforced) to protect citizens against violations of their individual political integrity. It is – unless 
                                                 
773 For instance, whereas “identity politics” can be seen as a legitimate struggle against an ascribed depoliticized 
status, politics based on the politicization of certain group interests negates this regulative idea of equality of the 
collective. Still, a public sphere were the parties of interest are allowed to speak, seems better than silencing them as 
a- or anti-political movements (unless they actually cause damage). They should, however, be contested.  
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revised – less successful in addressing the problems of a cosmopolitan character that affects us as 
members of humanity or as co-world-citizens.  
A reform that seeks to implement the regulative idea of humanity on a global level will therefore 
need to be quite precise regarding the state obligations that are cosmopolitan in character. If 
anything, this would clarify the lacuna of legal protection in this domain. Arendt’s formulation of 
a basic human right is conceptually useful because it detaches the political status of being human 
from the status of being a citizen. What Arendt has not made so clear, and which I have stressed 
in my proto-political reading, is that it equally detaches the right to belong to humanity from the 
specific cosmopolitan status of being a foreigner. To be able to make this distinction we cannot 
simply understand the ‘right to have rights’ as a human right to political membership, as Seyla 
Benhabib proposes.774 We have to understand this basic right primarily, or so I argue, as the right 
to appear. The cosmopolitan right to political membership should certainly be recognized as an 
improvement of the content of cosmopolitan law, compared to the right to asylum. But it does 
not address precisely enough the specific non-formal character of belonging associated with 
appearing as a human person. Rather, it has for understandable reasons of applicability, already 
converted this basic right into a question of admission (i.e. of political membership as a “second” 
admission).  
In order to more adequately remedy the asymmetry between domestic and cosmopolitan 
protection of the public, the protection of civil deliberations should also be addressed by a 
cosmopolitan law of deliberation. The exact content of such a cosmopolitan law, including the 
law of deliberation, I understand as a democratic issue that should be articulated through 
opinion-formation and political negotiations in the global public. In this regard the cosmopolitan 
right to political membership is highly relevant. Nonetheless, the global public also requires a 
kind of institutional protection that does not simulate the domestic integrity of participants in the 
national public. In order to avoid that we protect the global public in a way that does not make 
the cosmopolitan relations implode into mere domestic relations, we also need to articulate a 
cosmopolitan right to influence or participation. This cosmopolitan right is intended to protect the 
political integrity of foreigners as foreign (including non-residential) members of humanity, in 
decision-making processes on policies that will affect them.  
9.2 Practical implications of a proto-political account of justice 
To draw a sketch of the practical implications of the regulative idea of humanity and the new 
principle of justice as laid out in the preceding discussion of the proto-political reading of Arendt, 
                                                 
774 See Benhabib 2004. 
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I will in this last section consider some promising approaches that seem to comply with the 
ambition of Arendt’s thinking. The consideration is structured on three levels: first, on the level 
of individual contemplation; second, on the level of deliberations in civil society; and third, on 
the level of moral-legal state obligations.  
The first level is concerned with the question of how to think impartiality in the context of the 
condition of plurality. Such contemplative practices has the practical advantage of being less 
dependent on a wide public, and can be meaningfully expressed and confirmed even in publics of 
quite few members (such as among political philosophers). The second level is concerned with 
deliberation and allowing the contest of competing conceptions of justice (including imaginaries) 
in a global public sphere. In practical terms, the implications of the right to appear and the right 
to belong depend on the more demanding development of a wider public, but not on strong 
institutional protection from states or global institutions. The third level is concerned with moral-
legal norms of cosmopolitan law that states should respect, but that might be rendered unfeasible 
in the near future due to their institutional dependency. Implementations of state obligations are 
highly demanding because they require binding agreements on global systemic issues.   
On all levels, the implementation of the regulative idea of humanity will emphasize the value of 
the political integrity of foreigners, in opposition to the depoliticizing tendency of state-centric 
approaches. In these terms, Benhabib’s deliberative answer to the given circumstances is still 
within the conventional framework because of her emphasis on political membership. In effect, 
she interprets the right to appear and the right to belong in such a way that it converts 
cosmopolitan relations into domestic relations – i.e. the foreigner is allowed political integrity 
insofar as she becomes a citizen.   
To be fair, Benhabib recognizes the moral responsibility that we have as citizens to listen to, and 
consider the perspective of foreigners when a demos forms an opinion on state policies. The 
notion of “porous borders” is grounded on this concern. Still, I understand the cosmopolitan law 
of deliberation as an important specification in the sense that we do not only have a moral duty to 
listen to the foreigner in the public debate and consider their perspectives in a fictive dialogue (a 
moral discourse), but also a moral-legal cosmopolitan duty to involve foreigners – somehow – in the 
actual process. In other words, the basic democratic ideal is proto-political to the extent that it 
recognized that we have a right to participate in the opinion-formation on issues that affect us – 
prior to, or rather; continuously independent of, the institutional framework that divides us into 
fellow-citizens and foreigners.  
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Epistemologically, this requirement of influence could be said to increase inversely proportional 
to the extent to which we can rely on a common human understanding of a situation. The less we 
share a “common stock of knowledge”, in Schutz’s terms, the more we depend on the actual co-
presence of others to carry out a morally responsible judgment. In practice, the need to include 
foreign perspectives in the formulation on a legitimate opinion on cosmopolitan law is inversely 
proportional to the actual level of reciprocity between the positions. In other words: the harder it 
is to make sense of each other’s perspectives, the stronger the duty to listen to each other.  
How should this be done? As Benhabib makes painstakingly clear to us, Arendt’s new political 
principle lacks the practical density of ideas “schematized” into our liberal-democratic social 
imaginary:  
Arendt’s theory of action [not only] leaves the relationship between action and moral 
limitations unanswered, but also her view of political institutions at large […] leaves 
questions of justice, equality, and mutual recognition unexplored. Not only are Arendt’s 
reflections on morality cursory and unconvincing, but the absence of a justification of the 
normative dimensions of the political, that is, of the question of social and political justice 
in her work, is deeply disturbing.775  
Although I’ve attempted to moderate and counter the most serious of these allegations through 
the proto-political reading of Arendt, Benhabib is undoubtedly right in pointing out the need for 
further deliberations on how to implement the Arendt’s quite general and unspecified 
articulations of the new political principle. However, I think Arendt comes quite far in defining 
the problem of cosmopolitan law in a precise manner. She also articulates some general rights for 
the protection for the domain in question. But, when it comes to how this protection specifically 
should be implemented or how democratic deliberations on it should proceed, she is silent.  
In the words of Taylor, we might say that Habermas and Benhabib are right to claim that 
Arendt’s ideas are far from schematized into a full institutional program. As Benhabib has 
critically addressed, Arendt does not sufficiently explicate the difference between a public, as a 
topical space where everyone participates in reciprocal communicative relations, and the mass, as a 
metatopical sphere where only the perspectives of a few are channeled one way, as it where, and 
where it is difficult to reciprocate from the periphery of the sphere. Arendt offers us, in the end, 
a provisional and highly conceptual notion of cosmopolitan justice.  
What Habermas and Benhabib seem to neglect in their attempt to do so within the modern social 
imaginary, is that Arendt’s new political principle does not necessarily fit neatly into this (post-
                                                 
775 Benhabib 2000, p. 194 
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conventional) imaginary. After all, the principle of meaningfulness implies a deep critique of the 
political thinking out of which these imaginaries are partly developed. The new principle is 
intended to guide us to rethink our acting; both in private and public, and both as private 
individuals and as citizens. 
In line with Arendt’s political principle and her notion of the public, Benhabib notes: 
“Deliberative rationality requires procedures as well as institutions that guarantee equality, 
freedom, and participation rights to all those who are affected by the outcome of certain 
decisions.”776 But, although Benhabib to a far extent contributes to the schematization of this 
principle within the scope of democratic closure, she does not go far enough in considering a 
democratization of the deliberation on cosmopolitan law. 
9.2.1 In terms of epistemological improvement (political thought experiments)777 
According to Kant men are “unsocial” in the sense that they want to direct everything in 
accordance with their own ideas. This is an egocentric aspect of the hypothetical natural state in 
the sense that everyone follows their own judgment. Devoid of a common legal standard, there is 
no way to solve disputes between competing conceptions of justice. The concept of rights is only 
provisional without a sanction of public law, putting them into effect.778 In the contemporary 
global context, especially considering cosmopolitan law, the situation seems to be defined by 
unsocial states acting in a self-centric way independently of the opinion of others. This diagnosis 
can of course be nuanced by counter-examples, but the general state of affairs is defined by a lack 
of binding agreements and recognition of cosmopolitan obligations.  
In order to increase our ability to assess the parochial character of our own assumptions, we 
might, while waiting for better times, turn to the few who are willing to acknowledge the 
regulative idea of humanity. Part of such an “underground” activity involves contemplative 
exercises of thought, such as political thought experiments. How do we perform such 
contemplative exercises in a manner that responds to the condition of plurality? 
If we look to the history of political philosophy, we find that the theoretical ideas have been 
linked to contemplative exercises for quite some time. A central idea of Derek Parfit’s discussion 
                                                 
776 Ibid., p. 209 
777 Parts of this section has been published as a conference paper: Servan, Johannes. 2013. Sympathy and Impartiality – 
Intersubjectivity as a Procedural Aspect of Political Thought Experiments. . Contratualismo moral e político na contemporaneidade: 
Anais do I Congresso Internacional. Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro: UFRRJ. 
778 See § 44, MM, p. 6:312. 
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on impartiality in On What Matters779 is that principles such as ‘the golden rule’ and Kant’s 
‘formula of the universal law’ are similar to the more obvious thought experiments, such as ‘the 
impartial spectator’780 and Rawls’ ‘consent principle.’781 They all tell us to carry out certain thought 
experiments in order to make our moral or political thinking more impartial. How they do this, 
however, differ.  
If we loosely define impartiality as the ability to avoid personal (or in-group) bias by taking a 
more disinterested and detached (and usually imagined) position, we will find this criterion in 
most moral and political conceptions (at least after Hume and Kant782). As Amartya Sen explains, 
“[I]n seeing the original position as ‘a device of representation’, Rawls attempts to address various 
types of arbitrariness that may influence our actual thinking, which have to be subjected to ethical 
discipline to arrive at an impartial point of view.”783 The problem for Sen, as we have seen, is that 
Rawls’ account is not able to address every kind of arbitrariness, especially when facing 
cosmopolitan problems. Rawls’ procedural design is not able to provide a guarantee against 
procedural parochialism.  
Parfit designates cognitive empathy (or perhaps rather ‘social cognition’) with a central 
instrumental significance: moral impartiality depends on our empathetic ability to imagine that we 
are in the position of someone else. Based on this assumption he reconstructs the procedural 
design of the four moral principles as antecedents of thought experiments that instruct us on 
how to imagine ourselves in certain positions in order to become more impartial.  
The common procedural problem of moral thought experiments is this: How are we to imagine 
that we shall be in the position of two or more people? As Parfit points out, we don’t think of 
these positions as mere expectations or predictions of the future. They are rather imaginative 
answers to the hypothetical and normative question of what we would be rationally willing to if we 
were in a position relatively like theirs. Further, an attempt to answer this question is decisive for 
the procedural design of these kinds of moral thought experiments. Parfit gives us a brief 
overview of our options: We could go for the amoeba-design, imagining we become two persons 
simultaneously (Nagel), or we could imagine living several lives in a serial order (Hare). These 
may both tackle small scale social situations.  
                                                 
779 See Parfit, Derek, and Samuel Scheffler. 2011. On What Matters. Vol. 2, The Berkeley Tanner Lectures. Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press. Especially pp. 321-343 (Chapt. 14) on “Impartiality” 
780 Held to be a utilitarian perspective when added with desire. 
781 Taken to be a part the contractualist revision of Kant in the more complex account of the original position. 
782 Arendt’s political reading of Kant’s sensus communis in The Life of the Mind is relevant in this context. I do not see 
however exactly what it contributes to her perspective other than noticing that Kant recognized the relevance of 
others’ perspective, although in a more restricted manner than herself.  
783 Sen 2009, p. 132 
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However, in order to solve problems relevant to modern political communities, we would need 
the ability to account for impartiality in situations involving millions of people. Our capacity to 
imagine distinct positions would fall short long before that. The equivalent of a chiliagon would 
suffice to make the point of unimaginably many perspectives. We quickly reach the point of the 
cognitively impossible or the unimaginable in Nagel’s case. In Hare’s case, a similar point will be 
made in terms of duration.  
Parfit indicates a very important point here about how moral principles must design procedures 
in such a way that they tackle this limitation of the imagination. If one only seeks to give advice in 
face-to-face relations, this seems not to be an urgent problem. But, given the topic of political 
justice, it is hardly avoidable. One common way to deal with it is the veil of ignorance. Kant’s 
universal law formula, as a modification of the Golden Rule, is another well-known and quite 
simple test of consistency, imagining that everyone either did or didn’t follow the proposed rule 
(maxim).784 Similarly, the Equal Chance formula (John Harsanyi, associated with a utilitarian 
position) deal with the self-interest bias through a generalized self-positioning; we could imagine 
having an equal chance of ending up in either (or any) of the actual positions.785 We could say 
that we are not asked to be in everyone’s position,786 but in anyone’s anonymous position (within the 
contractual group; in the position of“(any-)one of us”).787 As the implementation of the chosen 
conception of justice is revealed, the perspective taken becomes more concrete. In Rawls’ case 
the “worst-off” position is given priority. 
In contrast, the position of the impartial spectator is based on detachment or disinterest rather 
than contractual commitment. A version of this position exploits the value of being an outsider; 
                                                 
784 This is by all means not the best account Kant has of empathy. For an account of this, look for instance at The 
Critique of Jugdment, § 40. I thank Lars Svendsen for this comment. Nor does Parfit seem to be in dialogue with the 
development of the political application of this paragraph on common sense, see for instance Benhabib 1992 on the 
notion “enlarged thought”.  
785 Rawls’ veil of ignorance is arguably a more advanced version of the same because the former leads us to accept 
the Utilitarian Average Principle flat out, which is an unacceptable consequence, at least intuitively. In Rawls’ 
alternative we are not given the probabilities of which position we will end up in (which involves a higher risk of 
ending in a worst-off position). Still, it is not random reincarnation. We do already know that we won’t end up in the 
actual worst-off positions, such as the strongly disabled, the stateless foreigners, not to mention the industrialized 
animals. As long as we presuppose the consent principle, there are certain restrictions to the positions that are 
reckoned as capable of consent. 
786 Rawls sees this option as a requirement to consider an endless amount of particular facts that would make the 
bargaining problem hopelessly complicated.  
787 I understand this in general to imply that we don’t know anything about our personal situation or relations, except 
the basics of primary goods and the impersonal, functional structure of stereotypical positions (i.e. a minimalistic 
empathic account of exchangeable social positions), and that we are taxpaying citizens in a reasonably pluralist 
society. We know that we could end up as anyone (of us), within a spectrum defined by a certain historically 
conditioned, social normality. 
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imagining everyone else involved as strangers.788 In this manner, one seeks, so to speak, to 
“flatten out” the biased effect of the near and dear by comparison with distant perspectives. This 
kind of procedure is realistic and rich, but also highly demanding because it relies on the stock of 
available knowledge about foreigners. Beyond the function of securing consistency, the value of 
imagining the impartial spectator will – similar to Benhabib’s moral discourse – rely on the 
amount of  knowledge available. If ignorant, the value of such thought experiments seems close 
to none.  
If we consider Arendt’s response to these contemplative exercises, it seems somewhat 
ambiguous. On the one hand, Arendt considers the absence of others as a condition for 
contemplation. Thinking requires solitude and hence we cannot contemplate on someone while 
acting in concert with them.789  In other words, the activity contemplation does not seem to go 
well with the condition of plurality. 
On the other hand, Arendt recognizes the value of being able to put oneself in “the other fellow’s 
position” as part of what it means to think. As mentioned above, this seems to lead Benhabib to 
the idea that “enlarged thought” is possible only in interaction with others: “A major mistake of 
Kantian moral theory is to assume that the principle of enlarged thought can be realized via the 
isolated thought experiments of a thinker. These solitary thought experiments often substitute 
the standpoint of one privileged part for that of the whole.”790   
Given that contemplation requires solitude, it seems Arendt remains a Kantian. But, this 
conclusion would not account for Arendt’s idea of the interrupting character of thinking. Indeed, 
Arendt’s view on contemplation is responsible – i.e. it only maintains its mode as a human 
activity – if it is performed in the expectation of an actual dialogue with others (much like labor 
and production). When I’m thinking alone, Arendt assumes, it’s like me having a dialogue with 
myself. This duality is relieved as soon as I can talk to others and rely on their confirmation of my 
thoughts (which allows me also to be one; undivided; in harmony).  
                                                 
788 If we want to keep the kind of worldview-neutrality that Rawls’ thought experiment offers us, we should be 
careful to avoid any dependency on divinity as a cross-boundary perspective. In Simmel’s classical article on the 
stranger we find a more secular figure than God/the priest to fill the role of the impartial, meta-topical stranger: the 
travelling merchant who stays for some time, but not for too long and never really gets set in the ways of the natives. 
Simmel, Georg. 1971 [1908]. "The Stranger." In On Individuality and Social Forms : Selected Writings, edited by Donald N. 
Levine, 143-150. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press. The danger here might be that we tend to go 
looking,  like Joshua Greene (see Greene, Joshua David. 2013. Moral Tribes : Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us 
and Them: Penguin Press.), with the eyes of a merchant for a “common currency.” Panikkar’s comparative notion of 
“morphological equivalents” (in Human Rights as a Western Concept (2007)) is more promising.  
789 Arendt 1994 
790 Benhabib 1992, p. 140 
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As such it is not given (for Arendt) that the imagined dialogue with other is the most responsible 
way to account for two or more perspectives. Still, the procedures that are able to accomplish an 
equalizing effect of impartiality without giving up the distinguished character of one’s individual 
position or perspective, such as ‘the impartial spectator’ and ‘the moral discourse’, seems to be in 
closest affinity with Arendt’s account (of representative thinking). It also goes better with her 
view on how we should respond to cases that are unpredictable and not easily subsumed to 
principles based on self-consistency alone. In this sense, I see her position as in line with 
Benhabib’s view on isolated thought experiments, but with the qualification that when a dialogue 
enable us, and even obliges us, to take the perspective of others, it tends to interrupt this dialogue 
and motivate the withdrawing mode of thinking. Our moral judgment depends on common 
sense, and the validity of our moral thinking thus relies on the confirmations from others on the 
distinctness of our own standpoint. At the same time, as a contemplative mode, thinking cannot 
be reduced to a practical mode of action.  
In the current global context I agree with Waldron’s description of an analogous challenge to the 
one assumed by Kant as implied when we constitute a civil condition on state level: In the global 
public sphere we are confronted with quite different and competing conceptions of justice, some 
of which we “can barely understand”.791 These circumstances suggest a limited relevance of 
isolated thought experiments in the proper formulation of cosmopolitan law. 
I also agree with Waldron that the starting point of political interaction should not be a shared 
conception of justice, but individuals with competing conceptions which require moral-legal 
norms to regulate interactions among themselves. On the global level, it is tempting to think in 
terms of “peoples” (or in-groups of some character) with a shared conception of justice that 
stand in conflict with conceptions held by other, equivalent entities; as if cultures could be 
regarded as semi-persons (like moral agents; Rawlsian “peoples”). To avoid this temptation it 
might be useful to distinguish between actual and assumed reciprocity in Schutz’s sense. The notion 
of a “people” tends to lead us to distribute our expectations in a certain static manner. We assume 
an actual reciprocity on the domestic level (especially according to the fourth axiom of social and 
cultural reciprocity or simply “common sense”), while the same is not assumed to be the case 
across people’s. In a globalized world I take it to be increasingly difficult to maintain this static 
assumption about the actual distribution of reciprocity. Such a distinction between the actual and 
assumed would prepare us for the expected revision of the map of reciprocity on a transnational 
level according to a more dynamic notion of reciprocity.  
                                                 
791 Waldron 2000 
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So the cultural borders have become less clear with globalization. But, without relying on these 
territorially based generalizations of reciprocity, it still seems reasonable to assume that a 
globalized public will actualize – to a stronger degree than the domestic public – the relevance of 
our relative historical situatedness and our ignorance of other conceptions of justice. Some 
conceptions of justice will be more difficult to comprehend than others, and hence more difficult 
to account for in the absence of competent representatives of these conceptions. How do we 
think in a way that “expects the company of others” in this cosmopolitan situation? 
We can at least try to avoid some obvious mistakes: The first is the fallacy of what we may call 
“naïve parochialism”, which has been treated quite extensively in this thesis as expressions of a 
tacit state-centric attitude. This attitude differs from the statist attitude of parochial 
communitarian positions (i.e. a kind of cultural relativism). It does not take explicit distance (like 
parochial communitarianism) from the universal character of conceptions of justice by claiming 
the inherent value of “our way”. Still, the state-centric attitude is naïve in that it tends to 
marginalize cosmopolitan relations and problems associated with them. Waldron assumes that 
this naïve character of moral assumptions is something like a default position:   
[Humans and human groups] make deep claims, powerful claims about what is important 
and what sort of things are at stake in the areas of life that they govern. Those claims are 
usually held to be true (by those who make them), which means that they claim to offer to 
give a better account of what really matters than the reasoning associated with the 
different norms and practices of the society next door or across the sea.792  
Hence, the problem of naïve parochialism is not that such “deep claims” are assumed to be true, 
but that they are held without actual competition from other conceptions. If the mono-cultural 
veil of naïve parochialism is lifted and its claims subjected to the scrutiny of a global public, we 
get something closer to an adequate, comparative intercultural attitude. We are normal, others are 
abnormal, but might also be anomal, i.e. a positive deviation that forces us to improve our own 
conception or adapt the anomal conception. 
The second fallacy is explicit parochialism, such as nationalism, where deep claims are held as 
valid, not because they are seen as evidently true, but because they are “ours”. To the extent that 
identity politics are based on such assumptions, it is multicultural in the bad sense of the term as 
the promotion a segregated nation-state order. Each “people” is assumed to share a political 
conception of justice and should live segregated from peoples of other conceptions.  
                                                 
792 Ibid., p. 235 
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In comparison to naïve and explicit parochialism, the cosmopolitan attitude is a mean,793 
somewhere between the intercultural comparison794 of and the transcultural transgression of 
differences into a universal unity. There is however a limit to how far (beyond parochialism) 
contemplative exercises can get us. One can, perhaps, become self-critically aware of one’s own 
ignorance through contemplation. But, given the character of politics, it seems like a 
performative self-contradiction to find oneself to be satisfied by contemplating on the political 
integrity of foreigners.  
In order to develop a global “common sense” and a truly common world, we cannot simply 
expect the presence of others, we have to encounter them and live with them. To imagine how 
this can be done for the sake of meaningfulness and plurality, we might find inspiration in the 
way the domestic public sphere is understood in the deliberative approach:  
The public sphere has always acted as the mirror in which a polity has seen its identity 
reflected, magnified, distorted, or clouded. […] To recognize its own diversity, and to 
come to grips with the implications this diversity may have for its own self-understanding, 
a democratic people needs to reenact its identity in the public sphere.795  
This identity of the polity that gets mirrored in the public sphere, I understand as the regulative 
idea of the state collective. In an analogous fashion, a global public sphere could mirror the 
diversified identity of humanity as a collective. As such, our (contemplative) imagination might 
manifest this diversity in a more or less adequate manner, within the limitation of the imaginable. 
The richness of humanity would, however, rely on its continuous performative reenactment in 
order for the assumed reciprocity and uniqueness to sustain the manifestation of this collective. 
To achieve this, communicative relations is obviously essential.  
9.2.2 In terms of cosmopolitan democratization (political procedures) 
Before considering the implications of Arendt’s proto-political account of obligations and rights 
associated with democratic participation of regular and irregular immigrants in the last subsection 
(9.2.3), I will consider the possibility of a broader notion of cosmopolitan democracy. As 
discussed earlier, the debate on immigration tends to situate the question of the democratic rights 
of foreigners within the framework of domestic politics (for example by limiting cosmopolitan 
law to a law of admission).  
                                                 
793 In dynamic terms I think of the perfect balance as one oscillating between the intercultural (appropriation; 
plurality) and transcultural (transgression; anomaly as new normality), avoiding going back to the multi (normatively 
flat) from inter, or tip toward mono (normatively homogeneous) from trans. For detailed account, see Paulsen, Michael, 
and Johannes Servan. 2013. Terra Nullius : Utopier I Et Hav Af Kultursammenstød. 1. udgave. ed., Serie: Læring Og 
Filosofi,. Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag. 
794 Such as conceptions of justice, or its equivalents. 
795 Benhabib 2000, p. 210 
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If we take a global perspective on democracy and the political integrity of foreigners, we should 
not only take arriving or residential foreigners into account, but any foreigner affected. The case 
of border regulations of a state serves as case of peculiar relevance because of its twofold 
character. It is not only one of the most central political issues where state law and policies affect 
foreigners directly, or indirectly. It also serves today as the main practice of the demarcation of 
who counts as subjects with political integrity. Hence, the case of border regulation has peculiar 
significance for the basic character of deliberation on cosmopolitan issues and is applied here as 
an example in order to sketch out the general framework that should be protected by a 
cosmopolitan law of deliberation.  
Angell and Huseby796 have developed a useful taxonomy of different voting rights principles that 
might be relevant in the case of deliberation as well (corresponding to regulative ideas of the ideal 
demos/state collective):  
1) All-affected principle (AAP): everyone who is (possibly) affected by a political decision 
should be allowed to vote over it.797   
2) Subjected to coercion principle (SCP): any act of coercion should be justified and any 
subject to a law should also be its author (or partake in its decision)798 
In the case of border regulation, AAP implies that all foreigners are potential stakeholders. In 
particular, it can affect those aspiring to migrate. These aspirations will for instance be affected by 
changes in border regulating policies in the preferred country of destination. In this manner such 
domestic decisions will affect foreigners and call for a quite broad inclusion of foreigners in the 
democratic process involved. This might not be feasible in terms of providing any aspiring 
foreign migrant with voting right in such matters, but as I will argue in the following, a political 
right to participate in the deliberative opinion-formation seems more realistic.799  
SCP emphasizes the point that anyone subject to a law should also be able to partake in the 
decision-making of it. If we compare migration to other global issues such as climate change, this 
reveals a peculiar character of immigration policies. Whereas state policies on climate change will 
certainly affect foreigners, it does not subject foreigners to legal regulations.800 In contrast, state 
                                                 
796 Angell, K., and R. Huseby. 2017. "Should Irregular Immigrants Be (Rapidly) Enfranchised?" Political Research 
Quarterly 70, no. 2 (Jun): 363-373. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912917695188. 
797  Foreigners are only affected if they have a “life interest” in traveling to this country.  
798 They also develop two further models which I find less relevant in this context.  
799 There’s a range of possibilities from the weak, moral claim of hypothetical consent of foreigners, which Benhabib 
promotes, to the strong legal and institutional claim of direct vote. The more moderate road would allow for a 
greater indirect representation of foreigners’ interests through parliament representatives, ombudsmen, civil 
organizations, inclusion in hearings and media, etc. 
800 Unless the policies on climate changes involve travel regulations. 
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policies on border regulation will not necessarily affect most foreigners, but it will directly subject 
them to the legal regulation in question. Hence, if we are willing to follow the implications of this 
principle, in the case of immigration laws (or “laws on foreigners”) all foreigners are included as 
rightful participants in the democratic process.   
To distinguish clearer between voting rights and rights of deliberation, we might distinguish, 
broadly speaking, between two models of cosmopolitan democracy: 801  The ‘liberal cosmopolitan’ 
model tends to emphasize the institutional and legal aspects, such as David Held’s multi-levelled 
system of cosmopolitan democracy. It conceives the democratization primarily in terms of 
aggregation of votes, and can be characterized as a top-down model of political organization.802 
The “deliberative democratic” model, on the other hand, sees the role of the public sphere as 
primary to the political organization of the transnational domain and as a means of democratic 
control of international institutions.  
In the following I will briefly consider John Dryzek’s account of the latter position.803 Like the 
deliberative positions in general, Dryzek argues critically against the traditional liberal model of 
democracy. Decisive in the context of cosmopolitan issues, he defends the deliberative model as 
clearly preferable. 
Deliberative democracy should be more at home in the international system than liberal 
aggregative models of democracy, though only so long as it can escape its ties to liberal 
constitutionalism, because there are no constitutions worth speaking of in the 
international system. A precondition of aggregation of preferences or interests is 
specification of the boundaries of the demos, the self-governing community. Such 
boundaries are very hard to specify in international politics. But while aggregation across 
boundaries is hard to conceptualize, deliberation across boundaries is straightforward.804  
Expecting the objection raised by the institutionalist side as to how such deliberations can be 
translated into collective decisions (or perhaps rather decisions of the collective), Dryzek 
promotes a “discursive” model of democracy situated in an understanding of international 
politics that deemphasizes the significance of governmental organizations to the role of 
governance:  
                                                 
801 For overview, see: Bray, Daniel. 2009. "Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism: A Deweyan Approach to Democracy 
Beyond the Nation-State." Millennium-Journal of International Studies 37, no. 3: 683-719. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0305829809103239. 
802 See:  Held, David. 1995. Democracy and the Global Order : From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge, 
UK: Polity Press. 
803 See: Dryzek, John S. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond : Liberals, Critics, Contestations, Oxford Political Theory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
804 Ibid., p. 116 
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 […] government in international politics may be defined as explicit and binding collective 
decision at the system level. Treatise, international courts, organizations such as the 
World Trade Organization with the capacity to impose penalties on states for 
noncompliance, and the Security Council of the United Nations are all examples of 
government. Governance, in contrast, may be defined as the creation and maintenance of 
order and the resolution of joint problems in the absence of such binding decision 
structures.805 
Where liberal approaches tend to emphasize institutional frameworks (or lack thereof), the 
deliberative approach is more open to the proto-political activities of civil society in the fluid 
boundaries of the public sphere. Given the lack of an institutional framework of democratic 
decision-making on the international level, deliberations are more robust as they performn the 
controlling function. For instance, deliberations may contest the discourses of international 
governmental organizations (IGO’s): “[…] discourses play a much greater role in co-ordinating 
action in international politics than they do in domestic society.”806 In this manner, Dryzek 
understand the global or “transnational” public sphere as the politicized aspect of transnational 
civil society (mainly in contrast to the global market).  
Dryzek’s account bears many similarities to Arendt’s thinking. The contested “discourses”807 in 
question are similar to her mentalities (or Schutz’s “interpretative schemas” and Taylor’s “social 
imaginaries”) as “a shared set of assumptions and capabilities embedded in language that enables 
its adherents to assemble bits of sensory information that come their way into coherent wholes” 
that “act as sources of order by co-ordinating behavior of the individuals who subscribe to 
them.”808 Although we should be cautious to take for granted that the individual subscription to 
certain discourses or mentalities are always a matter of (an active) choice, it is plausible to assume 
that political deliberations increases the explicit and, ideally, open character of this choice..  
Further, although economic incentives (such as fear of capital flight) and asymmetric military 
strength constrains this public sphere, Dryzek claims that the discursive realm has political 
power, and its “effectiveness” is measured in its ability to answer constitutive, rather than 
instrumental questions.809 This resonates well with Arendt’s distinction between instrumental and 
principled reasons for acting. Reflecting on the pre-institutional role of social organization in the 
web of relationships, Dryzek also emphasizes the role of network organizations in the 
                                                 
805 Ibid., p. 120 
806 Ibid., p. 124 
807
 Dryzek presents discourses that model the international system in various ways (according to their regulative 
idea): anarchy, market liberalism, sustainable development (internally contestet: economic vs green development). He 
also describes several cases where competing discourses influence, for better or worse, international politics: the law 
of the sea, the ozone layer, bio-prospecting (or bio-piracy), whaling, etc.  
808 Ibid., p. 121 
809 Ibid., p. 131 
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transnational public sphere and its essential plural character: […] “deliberations across variety is a 
necessary, not a contingent feature of networks, especially transnational networks.”810  
Although the reliance on discourses seems to require some kind of reciprocity – as required by 
any communication and deliberation – Dryzek explicitly rejects the idea that a shared national 
identity is required in order to deliberate properly. I agree that transnational deliberations are 
possible. We could appeal to other kinds of identity to make the same point, and to the 
significance of English as a global language.  
According to Dryzek’s model of discursive democracy, it is clear that the transnational public 
sphere could represent an important aspect of a global civil society in need of protection. 
Although it is still unclear exactly which institutional arrangements that would actually fulfill the 
political obligations to protect this political sphere, it is quite clear that it would have to take on a 
different form than the law of admission alone. To the extent that such a transnational public 
sphere depends on travelling across borders, the right to visit and to become a political member 
will be relevant but not exhaustive. To ensure cosmopolitan deliberations of further 
cosmopolitan laws to deal with the increasing globalization of political issues, I suggest we add 
the cosmopolitan law of deliberation. The content of such a law might be specified according to 
the democratic principle of all-affected, such as in the case of climate changes, and of those 
subjected to legal coercion, such as in the case of immigration law.  
Another manifestation of such a cosmopolitan law of deliberation can be found in an interesting 
case from the ECHR811, where the article 16812 (on the restriction of the political influence of 
foreigners) were brought up on the issue of a German citizen supporting the Polynesian 
opposition against the French Nuclear bombing. The court gave its support to the right of the 
foreigner (at least EU citizens) to participate in civil protests.  
The right to membership is not sufficient as an additional cosmopolitan right, for at least two 
reasons: It does not adequately address the problem of statelessness and long-term encampment 
properly, but tends to reduce it to a question of an ethics of admission. What is required here is 
not merely conscious self-reflexive charity on the part of strong democracies813, but a coordinated 
                                                 
810 Ibid., p. 135 
811 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57925  
812 «ARTICLE 16 Restrictions on political activity of aliens. Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High 
Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.” 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf  
813 In terms of a self-reflective self-understanding of a collective, this would amount to avoid both an (unreflected) 
monocultural universalism and an explicated multicultural parochialism. The optimal balance seems to be somewhere 
between a comparative inter-cultural and a performative and temporary trans-cultural state. (Paulsen and Servan 
2013)  
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effort of an international order. Nor does the right to membership adequately address the issue 
of democratizing the future deliberations on cosmopolitan law, which seems to be morally and 
epistemologically called for as global issues become increasingly more intrusive. 
9.2.3 In terms of immigration politics and state obligations concerning transnational 
migration 
Although the international system is not strong enough to implement binding agreements on the 
issue of transnational migration and forced displacement, one can still argue, within the Kantian 
framework, for a moral-legal obligation of states due to the level of interdependency associated 
with the global civil society (including the global market). Hence, we could argue that states have 
obligations to refugees beyond those cases where they have directly contributed to the cause of 
flight (and which follows the traditional model of responsibility).  
As discussed in chapter 1, there are two main forms of obligations associated with providing 
arriving refugees with legal residency: asylum and residency on humanitarian grounds. We could 
say that they reflect two possible ways to ground the state obligations in question.  
The right to asylum reflects, despite its narrow content, the kind of ground associated with being 
part of a certain institutional arrangement, such as the international system. In Kantian terms, 
states have a moral-legal obligation to individuals affected by failures in this system. As Parekh 
argues, this is an advantage of the relational conceptions of Arendt and Benhabib, as it reflects 
the circumstances of millions of displaced and excluded: “Many of the harms of the refugee 
regime result not from the actions of a single harmful policy, but are often the collective result of 
many different states and international organizations all serving their own purposes.”814 Hence, 
the legitimacy of regulations of borders cannot be considered only in terms of the consequences 
of unilateral acts of sovereignty, but must also be considered in terms of relational and systemic 
consequences and possibilities of structural injustice.  
Although this way of grounding obligations has the conceptual potential to recognize obligations 
concerning structural injustice (such as the resettlement of those suffering long-term 
encampment), the level of commitment required by these obligations will obviously make it 
difficult to gain acknowledgement for them in the international community. For instance, 
Benhabib seems to settle for a middle ground where people arriving or irregular residents are 
given extended rights by acknowledging that states have at least the obligation to ensure that no 
individual on their own territory is completely excluded. Her solution to this is “disaggregated 
citizenship”, or a gradual and transparent path toward full citizenship. Along similar lines, Angell 
                                                 
814 Parekh 2017, p. 69 
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and Huseby has argued that there seem to be no convincing reasons, according to the most 
common voting rights principles, against rapid enfranchising of irregular immigrants.815   
Residency on humanitarian grounds, on the other hand, reflects a principle of mutual aid. It does 
not ground obligations in causation or systemic interdependency, but in the ability to help those 
in need. Basically, if we are able to help others at a low cost for ourselves, we have a moral duty 
to do so. These “Samaritan duties” have the advantage of balancing partial interests with the 
impartial concern for all human beings. As such, it is easier to gain acknowledgement for these 
obligations, since the level of commitment required is lower. For instance, Carens has promoted 
a view along these lines, as a possible argument for the moral-legal obligations of states to resettle 
displaced persons to avoid long-term encampment.816    
If we look beyond the law of admission (including the second admission to certain semi-citizen 
rights of voting and political participation), Parekh has promoted an obligation regarding 
encampment and “our treatment of refugees while they are awaiting a solution”817. I find this 
obligation relevant in light of the proto-political account of justice for two reasons: First, it 
addresses a kind of state obligations toward non-residential foreigners that are excluded from the 
international system and left extremely vulnerable at the very outskirts of global civil society. The 
obligation to ensure a dignified life, even to the displaced, could be considered a minimum 
content of the cosmopolitan law of deliberation and the right to appear. Second, it grounds this 
systemic (or “remedial”) obligation in an original conception of harm, inspired by a reading of 
Arendt that is compatible with my proto-political reading. Hence, it contributes to the diagnosis 
of the gravest form of exclusion from global civil society.     
Parekh points out that there is a clear distinction between Arendt’s first, institutionalist critique of 
statelessness and a more fundamental “ontological” critique. The first critique is associated with 
the kind of harm that the loss of legal identity and membership in a political community entails in 
terms of the positive protection of human rights. Although there have been made some 
improvements in international law since Arendt’s critique was formulated, refugees (which are 
usually de facto stateless) still find themselves in a highly precarious situation. This first harm is 
clearly a violation of the right to belong, and reflects the conventional reading of Arendt with its 
emphasis on the right to political membership. It also provides a reason for the obligation to 
resettle or find other ways to restore the formal status of the excluded. 
                                                 
815 Angell and Huseby 2017 
816 Carens 2013 
817 Parekh 2017, p. 82 
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The second critique Parekh identifies in Arendt’s work is associated with a more substantial kind 
of harm that she labels “ontological deprivation” and which is related to the core issue of the 
condition protected by the right to appear. Ontological deprivation is defined according to 
Parekh by three dimensions: “the loss of identity and reduction to bare life; the expulsion from 
common humanity; and finally, the loss of agency, understood not as a subjective disposition, but 
an ability to have your words and actions be recognized as meaningful and politically relevant.”818  
These three dimensions seem to be organized according to the same axis as the three mentalities 
that Arendt describes in The Human Condition. The loss of identity is associated with the 
experience of loneliness, and with being defined as a human being merely as a specimen of the 
animal species or as a medical subject. The expulsion from a common humanity is related to the 
mentality of production in the sense that one is deprived of one’s dignity as a co-producer or co-
builder of the common world. The loss of agency is, however, the clearest expression of the 
violation of the principle of meaningfulness.    
On the practical level, remedying ontological deprivation might prove easier than establishing an 
effective international regime of resettlement. Partly, this seems to be the case because remedial 
obligations can be justified as a systemic responsibility of all individual agents (individuals and 
states) that participate in the completely organized world. Even if we do not bear the causal 
responsibility for those excluded from this system, we bear a responsibility for regulating the 
system in such a way that no one gets excluded. Accordingly, Parekh suggests that one may use 
temporary local integration an interim measure and international support to hosting states, rather 
than producing camps (UNHCR) as closed enclaves, including economic integration of refugees.  
Beyond these remedial measures of the most vulnerable, the states also have obligations to 
protect the global civil society as such. This would have to be developed in greater detail in the 
future. As part of a global community (as members of humanity), we could for instance ask 
ourselves (as members of a state): To what extent should we let foreigners be represented in our 
decision-making procedure? Should they have their own minister in government? A few seats in 
parliament? What about a right to veto in cases (such as immigration laws) where the policies 
affect foreigners more directly than the citizens represented? Does it suffice to let them speak in 
public or should foreigners be considered in procedural hearings? How do we – generally 
speaking – balance the protection of the public sphere and topical spaces without causing 
dehumanizing harm on the one hand, and at the same time not giving up the public autonomy to 
inhospitable guests (such as unregulated international corporations) on the other?  
                                                 
818 Ibid., p. 85 




As a contribution to the public debate, I’ve attempted to give a conceptual analysis of the domain 
of which immigration is a part. First I identified the field in question as that of cosmopolitan law, 
and then I suggested that – in order to improve on its future deliberations –this law could be 
democratized by including all affected parties, which in cases of immigration (and, I might add, 
economic and environmental policies) includes foreigners. I further described the state-centric 
tendencies to confine politics within the borders of a state, before making a defense for moral 
cosmopolitan obligations due to the global situation. I qualified this obligation by considering 
several positions in the academic debate on immigration, favoring the moderate cosmopolitan 
position of Benhabib. 
However, this position can still be challenged on conceptual terms, which I did through a 
discussion on how to interpret Arendt’s “right to have rights”. In defending what I called a 
“proto-political” reading, I relied on a phenomenological analysis of the peculiar character of 
human appearance in a pre-institutional and hence unprotected framework. The endurance of 
this “home” – as “a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective”819 
– relies in my opinion on the protection of all three domains of ‘public right’. In order to defend 
that the right to appear is not confined to personal relations and topical spaces, I elaborated on 
the conceptual character of principles and collectives. And I further argued that principles and 
collectives which reflect the fundamental other-dependency of human agency are preferable to 
those guiding competing mentalities.  
In the end, the proto-political reading of Arendt explicates how a relational conception of human 
dignity can be an original expression a political principle of plurality, which corresponds to a 
reformed understanding of the human collective and reflects what Arendt terms “the new law on 
earth”, the human right to have rights. This human right articulates the value of the proto-
political framework, which is in need of protection both from the state and the international 
society.  
The political principle of plurality implies a conceptual detachment of the political public sphere 
from citizenship, and makes this conception of politics more open to cosmopolitan reform than 
conceptions which operates with an underlying state-centric notion of the political. As a first step 
in the articulation of the complementary protection of this sphere as the location of 
cosmopolitan deliberations, I’ve promoted the cosmopolitan right to influence in decision-
making processes that affect us as foreigners.  
                                                 
819 Arendt 1968, p. 296 
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If it is true that we are living in one world – and I think this fact is forcing itself through with 
increasing urgency – then we should also recognize the increasing political relevance of humanity 
as a political community. This is urgent, not only because climate changes indicate that we are 
about to undermine our common living conditions, but also because negligence of this political 
relevance leaves some of us in intolerable conditions.  
Fortunately, globalization has led to a decrease of extreme poverty, but domestic economic 
inequality is on the rise, also in countries with historically low economic differences. This implies 
that the material conditions for a strong civil society – such as institutional trust, spare time, 
topical public spaces and humanistic education – are under pressure. More pressing, it might 
leave the larger part of the human population with not enough resources to see a future at home 
(as a stable middle-class), but with enough resources to travel elsewhere. Combined with the risk 


















                                                 
820 The common number is around 200 million forced displacement due to climate related issues, however these 
numbers are obviously uncertain and contested: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-23899195  
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